



**HAL**  
open science

**New algorithms for the Deuring correspondence  
Towards practical and secure SQISign signatures**  
Luca de Feo, Antonin Leroux, Patrick Longa, Benjamin Wesolowski

► **To cite this version:**

Luca de Feo, Antonin Leroux, Patrick Longa, Benjamin Wesolowski. New algorithms for the Deuring correspondence Towards practical and secure SQISign signatures. Eurocrypt 2023, Apr 2023, Lyon, France. hal-04052502

**HAL Id: hal-04052502**

**<https://inria.hal.science/hal-04052502>**

Submitted on 30 Mar 2023

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

# New algorithms for the Deuring correspondence

## Towards practical and secure SQISign signatures

Luca De Feo<sup>1</sup>, Antonin Leroux<sup>2,3</sup>, Patrick Longa<sup>4</sup>, and Benjamin  
Wesolowski<sup>5,6,7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> IBM Research Europe, Zürich, Switzerland [eurocrypt23@defeo.lu](mailto:eurocrypt23@defeo.lu)

<sup>2</sup> DGA, France

<sup>3</sup> IRMAR, Université de Rennes, France [antonin.leroux@polytechnique.org](mailto:antonin.leroux@polytechnique.org)

<sup>4</sup> Microsoft Research, Redmond, USA [plonga@microsoft.com](mailto:plonga@microsoft.com)

<sup>5</sup> Univ. Bordeaux, CNRS, Bordeaux INP, IMB, UMR 5251, F-33400, Talence, France  
[benjamin.wesolowski@math.u-bordeaux.fr](mailto:benjamin.wesolowski@math.u-bordeaux.fr)

<sup>6</sup> INRIA, IMB, UMR 5251, F-33400, Talence, France

<sup>7</sup> ENS de Lyon, CNRS, UMPA, UMR 5669, Lyon, France

**Abstract.** The Deuring correspondence defines a bijection between isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves and ideals of maximal orders in a quaternion algebra. We present a new algorithm to translate ideals of prime-power norm to their corresponding isogenies — a central task of the effective Deuring correspondence. The new method improves upon the algorithm introduced in 2021 by De Feo, Kohel, Leroux, Petit and Wesolowski as a building-block of the SQISign signature scheme. SQISign is the most compact post-quantum signature scheme currently known, but is several orders of magnitude slower than competitors, the main bottleneck of the computation being the ideal-to-isogeny translation. We implement the new algorithm and apply it to SQISign, achieving a more than two-fold speedup in key generation and signing with a new choice of parameter. Moreover, after adapting the state-of-the-art  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  multiplication algorithms by Longa to implement SQISign’s underlying extension field arithmetic and adding various improvements, we push the total speedups to over three times for signing and four times for verification.

In a second part of the article, we advance cryptanalysis by showing a very simple distinguisher against one of the assumptions used in SQISign. We present a way to impede the distinguisher through a few changes to the generic KLPT algorithm. We formulate a new assumption capturing these changes, and provide an analysis together with experimental evidence for its validity.

**Keywords:** Post-quantum cryptography · Isogenies · Group actions.

---

\* Authors are listed in alphabetical order. This research was funded in part by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under grant ANR-20-CE40-0013 MELODIA, and the France 2030 program under grant ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS.

## 1 Introduction

Isogeny-based cryptography is one of the active areas of post-quantum cryptography. Protocols constructed from isogenies between supersingular curves are generally very compact (in particular with respect to key sizes) but less efficient than other families of schemes. A good illustration of this situation is the recent signature scheme SQISign of De Feo, Kohel, Leroux, Petit and Wesolowski [8,9]. It is, by a decent margin, the most compact post-quantum signature scheme, but signing takes a couple of seconds, which is several orders of magnitude slower than other solutions. In a way reminiscent of Galbraith, Petit and Silva [14], SQISign makes a constructive use of the Deuring correspondence, a mathematical equivalence between supersingular elliptic curves (and isogenies connecting them) and maximal orders in a quaternion algebra (and ideals connecting them). This correspondence was first introduced to isogeny-based cryptography for cryptanalytic ends [16,12,10,26], but it has since revealed its potential as a constructive tool: for signatures [14,8], for encryption schemes [7], and for key exchange [17]. These applications exploit the following idea: certain problems involving elliptic curves and isogenies are hard to solve, but their quaternion counterparts are easy. A trapdoor can be used to translate between both worlds, letting the secret holder solve problems that would otherwise be hard. Note that SQISign’s security is not affected by the recent attacks against SIDH [3,20,21].

Better algorithms for the Deuring correspondence therefore have both constructive and destructive applications. The main technical contribution of [8] is a pair of algorithms to solve two of the major tasks of the computational Deuring correspondence: *translating ideals to isogenies*, and finding *quaternion  $\ell$ -isogeny paths*. The efficiency of SQISign is mostly governed by the ideal-to-isogeny translation, while its security strongly depends on properties of the quaternion-path-finding algorithm. In this work, we improve both.

*Translating ideals to isogenies.* Polynomial time algorithms to translate ideals to isogenies have been known since at least 2016 [14,12], however these were hardly practical, and certainly too slow for cryptographic purposes. One of the main contributions in SQISign [8] is the design and implementation of a new practical algorithm for this task. Despite this considerable improvement, the ideal-to-isogeny translation remains the main bottleneck in SQISign.

Our first contribution is a new algorithm to translate ideals to isogenies when the norm of the ideal is a power of a small prime  $\ell$  (`IdealToIsogenyEichler $\ell$ *`, Algorithm 5). The new algorithm proves to be more efficient than the one in [8], as we demonstrate by applying it to SQISign.

One important building block here is an algorithm to solve norm equations inside any maximal order (`SpecialEichlerNorm`, Algorithm 3), which may be of independent interest.

*Security of SQISign.* In [8], SQISign was proven existentially unforgeable under several computational assumptions, among which there is an *ad hoc* assumption on the distribution of the outputs of the quaternion-path-finding algorithm. We

show that this assumption does not hold, by presenting a simple and efficient distinguisher. Although we are unable to derive a complete attack, this shows that the security of SQISign relies on an easy problem.

We explain how to modify the path-finding algorithm so that our distinguisher does not work anymore. We formulate a computational assumption for the modified algorithm, and analyze it via the study of ideals and isogenies derived from solutions of norm equations over maximal orders.

*Plan.* This article is organized as follows. After a brief technical overview, we introduce in Section 2 the fundamental mathematical notions and notations. In Section 3 we focus on solving norm equations inside Eichler orders and introduce our new algorithm `SpecialEichlerNorm`. In Section 4, we present in full detail our new ideal-to-isogeny algorithm. The application of our method to SQISign and the associated C implementation are discussed in Section 5. This section also reports our results after adapting the efficient multiplication algorithms over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  proposed by Longa [18] to our proposed parameters for SQISign. Finally, in Section 6, we study the security of SQISign.

## 1.1 Technical overview

We now give a succinct outline of our technical contributions.

**Translating ideals to isogenies.** The main bottleneck in SQISign is the following task: given a maximal order  $\mathcal{O}$  corresponding to the endomorphism ring of some curve  $E$  defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ , given an ideal  $I$  of norm a prime power  $\ell^e$  corresponding to an isogeny  $\varphi_I : E \rightarrow E'$  of the same degree  $\ell^e$ , compute an  $\ell$ -isogeny walk for  $\varphi_I$  (i.e., a sequence of isogenies of degree  $\ell$  whose composition is  $\varphi_I$ ).

Following [14,12], this is achieved by decomposing the isogeny  $\varphi_I = \varphi_m \circ \dots \circ \varphi_1$  into isogenies  $\varphi_i : E_i \rightarrow E_{i+1}$  of smaller degree  $\ell^f$ , where  $f$  is a system parameter depending on  $p$ . Such decomposition requires computing the endomorphism rings  $\mathcal{O}_i$  of each intermediate curve  $E_i$ , a task for which SQISign (see [9, Algorithm 9]) employs a variant of the KLPT algorithm [16]. Our main technical contribution consists in replacing the full endomorphism ring  $\mathcal{O}_i$  by a single well-chosen endomorphism  $\omega_i$ , computed by `SpecialEichlerNorm` (Algorithm 3), a new algorithm to solve norm equations inside any maximal order.

`SpecialEichlerNorm` is not, *per se*, faster than KLPT: the true performance gain happens further down the line. Indeed, KLPT produces a representation of  $\mathcal{O}_i$  by using an isogeny of degree  $T$  coprime to  $\ell$ , where  $T \approx p^{3/2}$  is another fixed system parameter. In contrast, the degree of the endomorphism  $\omega_i$  output by `SpecialEichlerNorm` is only  $T \approx p^{5/4}$ . These endomorphisms then need to be evaluated on the torsion subgroup  $E_i[\ell^f]$ , something that can only be done efficiently when  $T$  is a smooth integer and  $E_i[T]$  is defined over a small degree extension of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ .

All these facts combined create a strong constraint  $\ell^f T | (p^{2d} - 1)$  for some small integer  $d$ , and in fact SQISign even forces  $d = 1$ , for maximum efficiency.

Primes  $p$  such that  $p^2 - 1$  has such a large smooth factor are extremely difficult to find, and thus the overall efficiency of SQISign comes from a balancing act between  $f$ , the smoothness of  $T$ , and the computational resources available to search for  $p$ . In this light, it is clear that moving from  $T \approx p^{3/2}$  to  $T \approx p^{5/4}$  constitutes a big improvement as one may hope to find better “SQISign-friendly” primes, as we do here. In fact, even using the same prime  $p$  as in [8], our new algorithm leads to a (smaller) improvement because we can ignore some factors of  $T$  and use a smaller endomorphism degree  $T'|T$ .

**Security of SQISign.** The SQISign signature scheme is obtained by applying the Fiat–Shamir transform [13] to an interactive identification scheme. While it is straightforward to prove that the identification scheme is a 2-special sound proof of knowledge of an endomorphism (a statement closely related to the knowledge of the endomorphism ring [25,1]), proving zero-knowledge turns out to be much more difficult.

Indeed, De Feo *et al.* could not construct a statistically indistinguishable simulator, and had to resort instead to a computational assumption [9, Problem 2] stating that the ideals in output of the quaternion-path-finding algorithm `SigningKLPT` [9, Algorithm 5] are indistinguishable from uniformly random ideals of the same norm. They provided evidence for the assumption by showing that the output of `SigningKLPT` is uniformly distributed in an exponentially large set whose size does not depend on the secret.

We show that their assumption does not hold by proving that the first step of the 2-isogeny walk constituting the response isogeny is not distributed uniformly among the possible first steps. Indeed, we show that the ideal  $I$  output by `SigningKLPT` is contained in an ideal of norm 2 that is not uniformly distributed. This condition can be easily checked, immediately implying that SQISign signatures can be distinguished with non-negligible advantage from random 2-isogeny walks of fixed length.

This bias is due to the fact that `RepresentInteger`, a sub-algorithm of `SigningKLPT`, solves norm equations inside a suborder of a *special maximal order*  $\mathcal{O}_0$  (see definition in Section 2.1). We present in Section 3.1 a variant of `RepresentInteger` fixing the bias, then we provide both heuristic and empirical evidence that the newly defined distribution cannot be distinguished by considering the first  $k$ -steps of the response for some small  $k$ .

## 2 Preliminaries

Throughout this work,  $p$  is a prime number and  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  is a finite field of size  $p^2$ .

A negligible function  $f : \mathbb{Z}_{>0} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{>0}$  is a function whose growth is bounded by  $O(x^{-n})$  for all  $n > 0$ . In the analysis of a probabilistic algorithm, we say that an event happens with *overwhelming probability* if its probability of failure is a negligible function of the length of the input.

We say that a distinguishing problem is hard when any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher has a negligible advantage with respect to the length

of the instance. Two distributions are computationally indistinguishable if their associated distinguishing problem is hard.

## 2.1 Mathematical background on the Deuring Correspondence

We now briefly present mathematical notions used in this article.

**Elliptic curves, isogenies and endomorphisms** Elliptic curves are abelian varieties of dimension 1, and isogenies are non-constant morphisms between them. The degree of an isogeny is its degree as a rational map. An isogeny is *separable* if its degree is equal to the size of its kernel. Let  $E$  be an elliptic curve. To any finite subgroup  $G$  of  $E$ , one can associate a separable isogeny  $\varphi : E \rightarrow E/G$  with kernel  $\ker \varphi = G$ , and this isogeny is unique up to an isomorphism of the target. Isogenies can be computed from their kernels with Vélú's formula [23]. An isogeny from a curve  $E$  to itself is an endomorphism of  $E$ ; together with the constant zero-map they form a ring, denoted by  $\text{End}(E)$ . In positive characteristic,  $\text{End}(E)$  is isomorphic either to an order in a quadratic imaginary field or a maximal order in a quaternion algebra. In the first case, the curve is said to be *ordinary* and otherwise it is *supersingular*. We focus on the supersingular case in this article. Silverman's book [22] is a good reference for more details on elliptic curves and isogenies.

Supersingular elliptic curves over  $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$  always have a model defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ . Furthermore, this model can always be chosen so that all its endomorphisms are also defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ . This property is preserved by the  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ -isogeny class, and in this article, we work in one such class.

**Quaternion algebras, orders and ideals.** The endomorphism rings of supersingular elliptic curves over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  are isomorphic to maximal orders of  $B_{p,\infty}$ , the quaternion algebra ramified at  $p$  and  $\infty$ . We fix a basis  $1, i, j, k$  of  $B_{p,\infty}$ , satisfying  $i^2 = -q$ ,  $j^2 = -p$  and  $k = ij = -ji$  for some positive integer  $q$ . The canonical involution of conjugation sends an element  $\alpha = a + ib + jc + kd$  to  $\bar{\alpha} = a - (ib + jc + kd)$ . A *fractional ideal*  $I$  is a  $\mathbb{Z}$ -lattice of rank four inside  $B_{p,\infty}$ . We denote by  $n(I)$  the *norm* of  $I$  as the largest rational number such that  $n(\alpha) \in n(I)\mathbb{Z}$  for any  $\alpha \in I$ . Given fractional ideals  $I$  and  $J$ , if  $J \subseteq I$  then the index  $[I : J]$  is defined to be the order of the finite quotient group  $I/J$ . We define the ideal conjugate  $\bar{I} = \{\bar{\alpha}, \alpha \in I\}$ . An order  $\mathcal{O}$  is a subring of  $B_{p,\infty}$  that is also a fractional ideal. An order is called *maximal* when it is not contained in any other larger order. The left order of a fractional ideal is defined as  $\mathcal{O}_L(I) = \{\alpha \in B_{p,\infty} \mid \alpha I \subseteq I\}$  and similarly for the right order  $\mathcal{O}_R(I)$ . Then  $I$  is said to be an  $(\mathcal{O}_L(I), \mathcal{O}_R(I))$ -ideal or a left  $\mathcal{O}_L(I)$ -ideal. A fractional ideal is *integral* if it is contained in its left order, or equivalently in its right order; we refer to integral ideals hereafter as ideals. An ideal can be written as  $I = \mathcal{O}_L(I)\alpha + \mathcal{O}_L(I)n(I) = \mathcal{O}_L(I)\langle \alpha, n(I) \rangle$  for some  $\alpha \in \mathcal{O}_L(I)$ . Two left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideals  $I$  and  $J$  are equivalent if there exists  $\beta \in B_{p,\infty}^\times$ , such that  $I = J\beta$ . For a given  $\mathcal{O}$ , this defines equivalence classes of left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideals, and we denote the

set of such classes by  $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$ . We will reuse the following notation from [8]: for any ideal  $K$  and any  $\alpha \in B_{p,\infty}^\times$ , we write  $\chi_K(\alpha) = K\bar{\alpha}/n(K)$ . Ideals equivalent to  $K$  are precisely the ideals  $\chi_K(\alpha)$  with  $\alpha \in K \setminus \{0\}$ . An Eichler order is the intersection of two maximal orders.

**The Deuring Correspondence.** In [11], Deuring made the link between elliptic curves and quaternion algebras over  $\mathbb{Q}$  by showing that the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve  $E$  defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  is isomorphic to a maximal order in  $B_{p,\infty}$ . Fix a supersingular elliptic curve  $E_0$ , and an order  $\mathcal{O}_0 \simeq \text{End}(E_0)$ . The curve/order correspondence allows one to associate each outgoing isogeny  $\varphi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$  to an integral left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal, and every such ideal arises in this way (see [15] for instance). Through this correspondence, the ring  $\text{End}(E_1)$  is isomorphic to the right order of this ideal. This isogeny/ideal correspondence is defined in [24], and in the separable case, it is explicitly given as follows.

**Definition 1.** *Given  $I$  an integral left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal coprime to  $p$ , we define the  $I$ -torsion  $E_0[I] = \{P \in E_0(\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}}) : \alpha(P) = 0 \text{ for all } \alpha \in I\}$ . To  $I$ , we associate the separable isogeny  $\varphi_I$  of kernel  $E_0[I]$ . Conversely given an isogeny  $\varphi$ , the corresponding ideal is defined as  $I_\varphi = \{\alpha \in \mathcal{O}_0 : \alpha(P) = 0 \text{ for all } P \in \ker(\varphi)\}$ .*

We summarize properties of the Deuring correspondence in Table 1, borrowed from [8].

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Supersingular $j$ -invariants over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$   | Maximal orders in $B_{p,\infty}$  |
| $j(E)$ (up to Galois conjugacy)                         | $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ (up to isomorphism)                           |
| $(E_1, \varphi)$ with $\varphi : E \rightarrow E_1$     | $I_\varphi$ integral left $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal and right $\mathcal{O}_1$ -ideal |
| $\theta \in \text{End}(E_0)$                            | Principal ideal $\mathcal{O}\theta$   |
| $\deg(\varphi)$   | $n(I_\varphi)$  |
| $\hat{\varphi}$   | $I_\varphi$   |
| $\varphi : E \rightarrow E_1, \psi : E \rightarrow E_1$ | Equivalent ideals $I_\varphi \sim I_\psi$                                       |
| Supersingular $j$ -invariants over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$   | $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$  |
| $\tau \circ \rho : E \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$   | $I_{\tau \circ \rho} = I_\rho \cdot I_\tau$                                     |
| $N$ -isogenies (up to isomorphism)                      | $\text{Cl}(\mathfrak{D})$ , with Eichler order $\mathfrak{O}$ of level $N$      |

Table 1: The Deuring correspondence, a summary [8].

**Special extremal order.** A *special extremal order* is an order  $\mathcal{O}_0$  in  $B_{p,\infty}$  which contains a suborder of the form  $R + jR$ , where  $R = \mathbb{Z}[\omega] \subset \mathbb{Q}(i)$  is a quadratic order and  $\omega$  has minimal discriminant. When  $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ , we have the special extremal order  $\mathcal{O}_0 = \langle 1, i, \frac{i+j}{2}, \frac{1+k}{2} \rangle$ , with  $i^2 = -1$ ,  $j^2 = -p$  and  $k = ij$ . It is isomorphic to the endomorphism ring  $\text{End}(E_0)$  of the elliptic curve of  $j$ -invariant 1728. For the rest of the paper, we fix this special extremal order  $\mathcal{O}_0$ , with subring  $\mathbb{Z}[\omega]$ , and the corresponding elliptic curve  $E_0$ .

### 2.2 The SQISign protocol

We now present SQISign [8], the main target for applying the present work. The signature scheme is based on an interactive identification protocol, made non-interactive through the classic Fiat–Shamir transform. The initial setup and key generation are as follows.

- setup** :  $\lambda \mapsto \text{param}$  Pick a prime number  $p$  and a supersingular elliptic curve  $E_0$  defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ , with known special extremal endomorphism ring  $\mathcal{O}_0$ . Select an odd smooth number  $D_c$  of  $\lambda$  bits and  $D = 2^e$  where  $e$  is larger than the diameter of the supersingular 2-isogeny graph.
- keygen** :  $\text{param} \mapsto (\text{pk} = E_A, \text{sk} = \tau)$  Pick a random isogeny walk  $\tau : E_0 \rightarrow E_A$ , leading to a random elliptic curve  $E_A$ . The public key is  $E_A$ , and the secret key is the isogeny  $\tau$ .

The goal of the prover is to prove knowledge of the secret  $\tau$  (or equivalently  $\text{End}(E_A)$ ). Intuitively, the prover will reach that goal by finding a path between two vertices of the isogeny graph, a task notoriously hard without the knowledge of the endomorphism ring. Concretely, the prover engages in the following  $\Sigma$ -protocol with the verifier.

- Commitment** The prover generates a random (secret) isogeny walk  $\psi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ , and sends  $E_1$  to the verifier.
- Challenge** The verifier sends the description of a cyclic isogeny  $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $D_c$  to the prover.
- Response** From the isogeny  $\varphi \circ \psi \circ \hat{\tau} : E_A \rightarrow E_2$ , the prover constructs a new isogeny  $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $D$  such that  $\hat{\varphi} \circ \sigma$  is cyclic, and sends  $\sigma$  to the verifier.
- Verification** The verifier accepts if  $\sigma$  is an isogeny of degree  $D$  from  $E_A$  to  $E_2$  and  $\hat{\varphi} \circ \sigma$  is cyclic. They reject otherwise.




Fig. 1: A picture of the identification protocol

The main algorithmic challenge in this  $\Sigma$ -protocol is the response computation and this is the task that we try to improve throughout this work. It is made of two parts: a computation over the quaternions called **SigningKLPT** that gives an ideal, and a translation of this ideal into the corresponding response isogeny  $\sigma$ . In [8], this translation is achieved with **IdealTolsogeny $\ell$**  [9, Algorithm 9] and we present our new variant **IdealTolsogenyEichler $\ell$**  as Algorithm 5.



### 2.3 Algorithms from previous works

We will rely upon or mention several algorithms existing in the literature. In the interest of conciseness, we will use the algorithms below without describing them. The interested reader will find pseudo-code for most of them in [8,9], the others are standard:

- `Cornacchia(M)`: either find  $x, y$  such that  $x^2 + y^2 = M$  or output  $\perp$ .
- `RepresentInteger $_{\mathcal{O}_0}$ (M)`, given  $M \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $M > p$ , finds  $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$  of norm dividing  $M$ .
- `EquivalentPrimeIdeal(I)`, given a left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal  $I$ , finds the smallest equivalent left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal of prime norm.
- `EquivalentRandomEichlerIdeal(I, N)`, given a left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal  $I$  and an integer  $N$ , finds a random equivalent left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal of norm coprime to  $N$ .
- `IdealModConstraint(I,  $\gamma$ )`, given a left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal  $I$  of norm  $N$ , and  $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$  of norm  $Nn$ , finds  $(C_0 : D_0) \in \mathbb{P}^1(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$  such that  $\gamma j(C_0 + \omega D_0) \in I$ .
- `EichlerModConstraint(I,  $\gamma, \delta$ )`, given a left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal  $I$  of norm  $N$ , and  $\gamma, \delta \in \mathcal{O}_0$  of norms coprime with  $N$ , finds  $(C_0 : D_0) \in \mathbb{P}^1(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$  such that  $\gamma j(C_0 + \omega D_0)\delta \in \mathbb{Z} + I$ .
- `StrongApproximation $_{\mathcal{N}}$ (N,  $C_0, D_0$ )`, given a prime  $N$  and  $C_0, D_0 \in \mathbb{Z}$ , and a subset  $\mathcal{N} \subset \mathbb{N}$ , finds  $\mu = \lambda\mu_0 + N\mu_1 \in \mathcal{O}_0$  of norm in  $\mathcal{N}$  (striving for the smallest possible), with  $\mu_0 = j(C_0 + \omega D_0)$  and  $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{O}_0$ . When  $\mathcal{N} = \{d \in \mathbb{N}, d|D\}$  for some  $D \in \mathbb{N}$ , we simply write `StrongApproximation $_D$` . We will also use the notation  $\ell^\bullet = \{\ell^e, e \in \mathbb{N}\}$ .

*Remark 2.* Variants of `RepresentInteger` and `StrongApproximation` (denoted as `FullXxx`) will be presented as Algorithms 1 and 2 in Section 3. Their formulations differ only slightly from the ones introduced in [8], but we will argue these modifications are necessary.

*Remark 3.* The algorithm `EquivalentPrimeIdeal` above finds the smallest possible solution. We sometimes use its randomized version (written `RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal`) where we choose a random output among a set of solutions of small norm.

## 3 Solving norm equations inside maximal orders

In this section, we consider the following problem: given a maximal order  $\mathcal{O}$  of  $B_{p,\infty}$ , and a set of integers  $\mathcal{N}$ , find an element  $\beta \in \mathcal{O}$  with  $n(\beta) \in \mathcal{N}$ . The relevant case for our application is the following: we fix an integer  $T$ , and  $\mathcal{N}$  is the set of divisors of  $T^2$ . Algorithms to solve this task are presented in [9, Section 5.1], but they find solutions that are not well distributed in  $\mathcal{O}$ : they always fall in a particular sublattice, inducing a bias that affects both the efficiency and security of its applications. We explain how to eliminate this bias.

For ease of exposition, we fix  $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ , and the special extremal order  $\mathcal{O}_0 = \langle 1, i, \frac{i+j}{2}, \frac{1+k}{2} \rangle$  (see page 6), where we set  $\omega = i$ . Most of what follows

remains true for other primes and special extremal orders under small adjustments.

The method underlying Algorithm 3 follows the blueprint introduced in [9, Section 5.1]: find an Eichler order of small prime level embedded inside both  $\mathcal{O}$  and the special extremal order  $\mathcal{O}_0$  (considered as an implicit parameter of the algorithm below) and solve the norm equation inside this Eichler order. As a first step, we study in Section 3.1 the problem of solving norm equations in the full maximal order  $\mathcal{O}_0$  (rather than the convenient suborder  $\mathbb{Z}[i, j]$  as in [16,8]). This study, and the resulting new algorithms, will prove useful for Algorithm 3 (as pointed out in Remark 7) and also prevents a simple distinguisher against a problem relating to the zero-knowledge property of SQISign; the latter point is further investigated in Section 6.

### 3.1 Special extremal order case: exploiting the full order

We first deal with norm equations in the special extremal order  $\mathcal{O}_0$ . In this case, algorithms from [16,8] only find solutions in the suborder  $\mathbb{Z}[i, j]$ , exploiting the orthogonal basis  $\langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$ . This suborder has index 4 inside  $\mathcal{O}_0$ , so many potential solutions are excluded, a source of complications for some applications. In this section, we describe how to heuristically obtain well-distributed solutions in  $\mathcal{O}_0$ .

The norm form of  $\langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$  is  $f : (x, y, z, t) \mapsto x^2 + y^2 + p(z^2 + t^2)$  and the usual way to find a representation of a given integer  $M$  (a method common to both `RepresentInteger` and `StrongApproximation`) is to choose  $z, t$  (possibly with some additional conditions) until  $M - p(z^2 + t^2)$  is a prime represented by  $x^2 + y^2$ , then use Cornacchia's algorithm [4] to solve  $x^2 + y^2 = M - p(z^2 + t^2)$ . Solutions in the full order  $\mathcal{O}_0$  can be found from solutions in  $\mathbb{Z}[i, j]$  thanks to Lemma 4. Let  $g : (x, y, z, t) \mapsto (x + t/2)^2 + (y + z/2)^2 + p((z/2)^2 + (t/2)^2)$  be the norm form of  $\mathcal{O}_0 = \langle 1, i, \frac{i+j}{2}, \frac{1+k}{2} \rangle$ .

**Lemma 4.** *An integer  $M$  is represented by  $g$  if and only if  $4M$  is represented by  $f$  with  $x = t \pmod{2}$  and  $y = z \pmod{2}$ .*

*Proof.* If we have  $M = (x + t/2)^2 + (y + z/2)^2 + p((z/2)^2 + (t/2)^2)$ , we have that  $4M = (2x + t)^2 + (2y + z)^2 + p(z^2 + t^2)$ . Thus, an integer  $M$  is represented by  $g$  (with solution  $(x, y, z, t)$ ) if and only if  $4M$  is represented by  $f$  with a solution  $(x', y', z', t') = (2x + t, 2y + z, z, t)$  satisfying  $x' = t' \pmod{2}$  and  $y' = z' \pmod{2}$ .

From Lemma 4 and the algorithm `RepresentInteger` from [16], we derive `FullRepresentInteger` in Algorithm 1. It has exactly the same specifications as `RepresentInteger` (and the same goes for `StrongApproximation` and `FullStrongApproximation`). Just as `RepresentInteger` is heuristically believed to return well-distributed solutions in  $\mathbb{Z}[i, j]$ , the variant `FullRepresentInteger` is believed to return well-distributed solutions in  $\mathcal{O}_0$ . This distribution depends on the factorization pattern of the inputs to the Cornacchia subroutine. This question is further investigated in Section 6, with heuristic and experimental evidence.

---

**Algorithm 1** FullRepresentInteger $_{\mathcal{O}_0}(M)$ 

---

**Input:**  $M \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $M > p$ **Output:**  $\gamma = x + yi + z\frac{i+j}{2} + t\frac{1+k}{2}$  with  $n(\gamma) = M$ .

- 1: Set  $m' = \lfloor \sqrt{\frac{4M}{p}} \rfloor$  and sample a random integer  $z' \in [-m', m']$ .
  - 2: Set  $m'' = \lfloor \sqrt{\frac{4M}{p} - z'^2} \rfloor$  and take a random  $t'$  inside  $[-m'', m'']$ . Set  $M' = 4M - p((z')^2 + (t')^2)$ .
  - 3: If  $\text{Cornacchia}(M') = \perp$  go back to Step 1. Otherwise set  $x', y' = \text{Cornacchia}(M')$ .
  - 4: If  $x' \neq t' \pmod{2}$  or  $z' \neq y' \pmod{2}$  then go back to Step 1.
  - 5: Set  $\gamma = (x' + iy' + jz' + kt')/2$ .
  - 6: **return**  $\gamma$ .
- 

The running time of FullRepresentInteger is the same as the running time of RepresentInteger, divided by the success probability of the condition in Step 4. Heuristically, this constant is 2/3: the solutions  $(x', y', z', t') \pmod{2}$  of the equation  $x'^2 + y'^2 + p(z'^2 + t'^2) = 0 \pmod{4}$  are  $(0, 0, 0, 0)$ ,  $(1, 1, 1, 1)$ ,  $(1, 0, 0, 1)$ ,  $(0, 1, 1, 0)$ ,  $(1, 0, 1, 0)$ , and  $(0, 1, 0, 1)$ . Among these 6, there are 2 that do not lead to  $\gamma/2 \in \mathcal{O}_0$ : the solutions  $(1, 0, 1, 0)$  and  $(0, 1, 0, 1)$ .

*Remark 5.* One might wonder why we do not propose to swap  $x'$  and  $y'$  when the constraint modulo 2 is not satisfied. Undeniably, this would be a good way to ensure that each set of values  $x', y', z', t'$  leads to a solution. However, this introduces a distinguishable bias, precisely of the kind investigated in Section 6.

The StrongApproximation algorithm can also be modified to find solutions in the full order  $\mathcal{O}_0$  with Lemma 4. In Algorithm 2, we present FullStrongApproximation as a generic reduction to StrongApproximation. Thanks to Lemma 4, properties of the distribution of the output of FullStrongApproximation directly follow from properties of the distribution of StrongApproximation. As in the case of FullRepresentInteger, we expect the running time of FullStrongApproximation to be equal to the running time of StrongApproximation multiplied by 3/2.

---

**Algorithm 2** FullStrongApproximation $_{\mathcal{N}}$ 

---

**Input:** A prime number  $N$ , two values  $C, D \in \mathbb{Z}$ .**Output:**  $\mu \in \mathcal{O}_0$  such that  $2\mu = \lambda\mu_0 + N\mu_1$  with  $\mu_0 = j(C + \omega D)$ ,  $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{O}_0$ , and  $n(\mu) \in \mathcal{N}$ .

- 1: Let  $4\mathcal{N} = \{4n \mid n \in \mathcal{N}\}$ .
  - 2: Set  $\mu' = \text{StrongApproximation}_{4\mathcal{N}}(N, C, D)$ .
  - 3: If  $\mu' \notin 2\mathcal{O}_0$ , go back to Step 2.
  - 4: **return**  $\mu = \mu'/2$ .
-

### 3.2 Norm equations in generic maximal orders: the algorithm

We are now ready to describe an algorithm to solve equations inside generic maximal orders. For simplicity, we restrict the description to the case that will be useful for our new variant of *ideal to isogeny translation* (see Section 4). Thus, we require that the algorithm outputs elements of norm dividing  $T^2$  for some parameter  $T$  and that the solution  $\beta$  satisfies the following constraint: given the additional input  $K$ , a left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal of norm  $\ell$  coprime to  $T$ , we need that  $\beta \notin \mathbb{Z} + K$  (see Step 5 in Algorithm 3). A justification for this constraint is provided in Section 4.1.

---

#### Algorithm 3 SpecialEichlerNorm $_T(\mathcal{O}, K)$

---

**Input:**  $\mathcal{O}$  a maximal order and  $K$  a left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal of norm  $\ell$ .

**Output:**  $\beta \in \mathcal{O} \setminus (\mathbb{Z} + K)$  of norm dividing  $T^2$ .

- 1: Compute  $I = I(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$ , the ideal connecting  $\mathcal{O}_0$  to  $\mathcal{O}$ .
  - 2: Set  $L = \text{RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal}(I)$ ,  $N = n(L)$  and compute  $\alpha$  s.t  $L = I\alpha$ .
  - 3: Compute  $K' = \alpha^{-1}K\alpha$
  - 4: Compute  $(C : D) = \text{EichlerModConstraint}(L, 1, 1)$ .
  - 5: Enumerate all possible solutions of  $\mu = \text{FullStrongApproximation}_{T^2}(N, C, D)$  until  $\mu \notin \mathbb{Z} + K'$ . If it fails go back to Step 2.
  - 6: **return**  $\beta = \alpha\mu\alpha^{-1}$ .
- 

**Proposition 6.** *Under plausible heuristics, the algorithm SpecialEichlerNorm $_T$  is correct and terminates with constant probability when  $T > p^{5/4}$ .*

*Proof.* Under the heuristics from [16], we know that the value  $N = n(L)$  has size approximately  $p^{1/2}$  when  $L$  is the output of RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal. Then, it was proven in [8] that EichlerModConstraint is correct and terminates. We argued correctness and termination with constant probability for FullStrongApproximation in Section 3.1. Now, we introduce the following heuristic assumption: the output  $\mu$  of FullStrongApproximation satisfies  $\mu \notin \mathbb{Z} + K'$  with probability approximately  $[\mathcal{O}_0 : \mathbb{Z} + K']^{-1}$  (which is the probability one would get if  $\mu \in \mathcal{O}_0$  were drawn uniformly in a large enough ball). Even though the precise distribution of  $\mu$  appears difficult to analyse, this heuristic is plausible since the algorithm FullStrongApproximation seems to constrain possible values of  $\mu$  only locally at  $N$  and  $T$ , both coprime with  $\ell$ . The proof is concluded by the fact that FullStrongApproximation $_{T^2}(N, \cdot)$  finds at least one solution with constant probability when  $T^2 > pN^3 \approx p^{5/2}$  (see [9, Section 5.3]). Thus, we have proven heuristic termination. For correctness, it is easy to see that  $n(\mu) = n(\beta)$  and so the correctness of FullStrongApproximation proves that  $n(\beta) | T^2$ . Since  $\mu \in \mathbb{Z} + L = \mathcal{O}_0 \cap \mathcal{O}_R(L)$  where  $L = I\alpha$ , and since  $\mathcal{O} = \alpha\mathcal{O}_R(L)\alpha^{-1}$ , we have that  $\beta \in \mathcal{O}$ . Since  $\mu \notin \mathbb{Z} + K'$ , then  $\alpha\mu\alpha^{-1} \notin \mathbb{Z} + \alpha K' \alpha^{-1} = \mathbb{Z} + K$ .

*Remark 7.* Note that the new heuristic introduced in the proof of Proposition 6 would not have held if we had used the StrongApproximation from [16]. Indeed,

the solutions of `StrongApproximation` lie in  $\mathbb{Z}\langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$  which is contained in the Eichler order  $(\mathbb{Z} + \mathcal{O}_0\langle 1+i, 2 \rangle)$ . Thus, when  $K \cap L = \mathcal{O}_0\langle 1+i, 2 \rangle \cap L$ , the condition  $\mu \notin \mathbb{Z} + K$  can never be satisfied. This is why it is important to use our new variant `FullStrongApproximation`.

**Failures.** Algorithm 3 may fail when the heuristics used in the proof of Proposition 6 are not accurate. In particular, the problematic case is when the size of the output of `RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal(I)` is bigger than expected. This situation occurs when there exists a representative in the ideal class of  $I$  with norm considerably smaller than  $p^{1/2}$  (see the bounds on the norm of elements in a Minkowski-reduced basis of a lattice from [16, §3.1]). There are only a negligible number of problematic maximal orders but we still need to handle those few bad cases. The simplest solution to avoid that problem altogether is to increase the size of  $T$ . We have the absolute bound  $N < p$  and so we can ensure termination by taking  $T > p^2$ . However, we want the bound of  $T$  to be as tight as possible and so this is not a suitable solution for us. There is a way to handle the bad cases without increasing  $T$  but it does not always work. Let us assume for the rest of this paragraph that there exists  $J \sim I$  with  $n(J) \ll p^{1/2}$ . `FullStrongApproximation(M, ·)` does not strictly require its input  $M$  to be prime (see [9, §6.3]) and so `FullStrongApproximation` can be modified to work with  $n(J)$  in input instead of  $N$ . We can also run `EichlerModConstraint` with  $J$  instead of  $L$  if we accept possible failures due to non-invertible elements  $\pmod{n(J)}$ . Since  $n(J) \ll p^{1/2}$  it should be possible to complete the computation when  $T \approx p^{5/4}$ . However, we may be in trouble with the additional condition  $\mu \notin \mathbb{Z} + K$ . Indeed, if  $J \subset K$ , this constraint will never be satisfied because  $\mu \in \mathbb{Z} + J$ . If  $n(J)$  is coprime with  $\ell$ , this will not happen but it can occur when  $\ell | n(J)$ .

In summary, `SpecialEichlerNormT` cannot terminate on input  $\mathcal{O}, K$  with  $T \approx p^{5/4}$  when  $\mathcal{O}$  is connected to  $\mathcal{O}_0$  with an ideal of small norm included in  $K$ . We will explain in Section 4.3 how to overcome this obstacle.

## 4 A new algorithm for ideal to isogeny translation

The goal of this section is to introduce our new algorithm to perform the *ideal-to-isogeny translation* required in computations of the effective Deuring correspondence. We start with an informal overview of how our new method manages to be more efficient than previous ones. A more detailed cost analysis tailored to `SQISign` will be provided in Section 5.1.

The goal is, given as input an  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal  $I$  of norm  $D$  and a curve  $E$  with  $\text{End}(E) \cong \mathcal{O}$ , to compute the kernel of the  $D$ -isogeny  $\varphi_I : E \rightarrow E/E[I]$ . We assume for simplicity that this isogeny is cyclic (this is the important case for us). For this task, `SQISign` introduces [9, Algorithm 9] a generalization of [14, Algorithm 2]. Its principle is the following: evaluate the endomorphisms corresponding to elements of  $I$  on a basis of the  $D$ -torsion, then solve a discrete logarithm to find a generator of  $\ker \varphi_I$ .

For this algorithm to be efficient, it is necessary that the evaluation points are defined over an extension of  $\mathbb{F}_p$  of small degree. In [9], this is solved by decomposing the ideal  $I$  as a chain of ideals  $I_i$  of smaller norm  $D_i$ : small enough that the  $D_i$ -torsion is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ . The idea is then to apply the technique introduced in [14], enhanced with several tricks, to translate each  $I_i$ .

It is not obvious, however, how to evaluate endomorphisms of all the  $I_i$  at arbitrary points. This task is easy in special cases: for example, the explicit correspondence between the maximal order  $\mathcal{O}_0 = \langle 1, i, (i+j)/2, (1+ij)/2 \rangle$  and the endomorphism ring of  $E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x$  was leveraged in [14]. Instead, for ideals  $I_i$  of a generic order  $\mathcal{O}$ , the ideal-to-isogeny translation of [9] first computes an isogeny walk  $\phi_K$  of degree  $T$ , coprime to  $D_i$ , from a special curve  $E_0$  to  $E$  (see [9, Algorithm 7]), then evaluates it at the points of order  $D_i$ . The repeated evaluation of such isogenies of large degree is the bottleneck of the computation, consequently the size and smoothness of  $T$  greatly affect performance. In SQISign,  $\phi_K$  is computed using a variant of the KLPT algorithm [16], and thus it is required to have  $T > p^{3/2}$ .

Here, in Section 4.1 we introduce `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_D$` , a new variant of `IdealTolsogeny $_D$`  that only requires one well-chosen endomorphism of  $\text{End}(E)$  to perform the translation above. The endomorphism is computed by `SpecialEichlerNorm $_T$`  and translated to an isogeny from  $E$  to itself. We will show in Lemma 8 that the kernel of  $\varphi_I$  can be found via a single evaluation at a point of order  $D$ . Like in [9], we will use  $T$ -isogenies, with  $T$  coprime to  $D$ , and, thanks to Proposition 6, we need  $T \approx p^{5/4}$ . This reduction in size affords us a lot more flexibility in the choice of  $p$ . Several tradeoffs can be made on the size and smoothness of  $T$  and  $D_i$ ; in any case, our new method speeds up SQISign key generation and signing, as we will demonstrate in Section 5.3.

#### 4.1 Ideal to isogeny translation

Below, we introduce the new `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  algorithm. We remind the reader that the goal of this algorithm in SQISign is to derive the response isogeny. It takes an ideal computed with `SigningKLPT` as input and outputs the response isogeny.

The specifications are exactly the same as those of [9, Algorithm 9] and we follow the same idea to apply sequentially a sub-algorithm that performs the translation for ideals of small norm. In our case, this sub-algorithm is called `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$` , we introduce it below as Algorithm 4, and it works for ideals of norms  $\ell^f$  (it is analogous to [9, Algorithms 7 and 8]). Overall, our algorithm `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  builds upon three sub-routines: `IdealTolsogeny $_D$`  that is [14, Algorithm 2] (performing the ideal-to-isogeny translation on  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideals by performing operations on the  $D$ -torsion), `SpecialEichlerNorm` presented in Algorithm 3 (that replaces KLPT) and `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$` . For the rest of this section, we fix the prime  $p$  and we take  $f$  as the largest exponent such that  $\ell^f \mid (p^2 - 1)/2$ . We also fix a parameter  $T$  coprime with  $\ell$  dividing  $p^2 - 1$  and assume that  $T > p^{5/4}$ .

**The sub-algorithm.** `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  describes a way to translate  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideals of norm  $\ell^f$  into  $\ell^f$ -isogenies of domain  $E$  where  $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ , using one evaluation of an element of  $\text{End}(E)$ . Intuitively, the idea is to choose an endomorphism  $\theta$  such that  $P, \theta(P)$  constitutes a basis of the  $\ell^f$ -torsion for some point  $P$  given in input. We now present Lemma 8 to explain how the generator of the kernel of the desired isogeny can be obtained as a linear combination of  $P, \theta(P)$

**Lemma 8.** *Let  $E$  be a supersingular curve and  $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$  be a maximal order. Let  $K$  and  $I$  be two  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideals of norm  $\ell^f$  not contained in  $\ell\mathcal{O}$ . Let  $\theta \in \mathcal{O} \setminus (\mathbb{Z} + K + \ell\mathcal{O})$  have norm coprime to  $\ell$ . Let  $E[K] = \langle P \rangle$ , then  $E[I] = \langle [C]P + [D]\theta(P) \rangle$  iff  $\text{gcd}(C, D, \ell) = 1$  and  $\alpha \circ (C + D\theta) \in K$  for any  $\alpha$  s.t  $I = \mathcal{O}\langle \alpha, \ell^f \rangle$ .*

*Proof.* Let us take  $Q = [C]P + [D]\theta(P)$  and assume that  $E[I] = \langle Q \rangle$ . Since  $Q$  has order  $\ell^f$ , it is clear that  $\text{gcd}(C, D, \ell) = 1$ . Let us take  $\alpha \in I$  such that  $I = \mathcal{O}\langle \alpha, \ell^f \rangle$ . This condition is equivalent to  $\ker \alpha \cap E[\ell^f] = E[I]$ . We want to show that  $\alpha \circ (C + D\theta) \in K$  i.e. that  $\alpha \circ (C + D\theta)(P) = 0$  which is straightforward since  $E[I] = \langle [C]P + [D]\theta(P) \rangle$ . Conversely, let us assume that  $\text{gcd}(C, D, \ell) = 1$  and  $\alpha \circ (C + D\theta) \in K$  for any  $\alpha$  s.t  $I = \mathcal{O}\langle \alpha, \ell^f \rangle$ . Taking such an  $\alpha$  we get that  $\alpha \circ (C + D\theta)(P) = 0$  which must imply that  $[C]P + [D]\theta(P) = \lambda Q$  for some  $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $Q$  such that  $E[I] = \langle Q \rangle$ . If we show that  $\text{gcd}(\lambda, \ell^f) = 1$  then we will have shown our result as  $P$  and  $\theta(P)$  have order  $\ell^f$ . Let us assume this is not the case. We have  $\text{gcd}(\lambda, \ell^f) = \ell^{e_0}$  for  $e_0 > 0$ . Then the point  $P_0 = [\ell^{f-e_0}]P$  of order  $\ell^{e_0}$  satisfies  $[D]\theta(P_0) = [-C]P_0$ . Since  $\text{gcd}(C, D, \ell) = 1$ , we must have  $\text{gcd}(D, \ell) = 1$  and so  $\theta(P_0) = [\mu]P_0$  where  $\mu = -C/D \pmod{\ell^{e_0}}$ . This proves that we have  $\theta \in \mathbb{Z} + K + \ell^{e_0}\mathcal{O} \subset \mathbb{Z} + K + \ell\mathcal{O}$  which contradicts our initial assumption. Hence,  $\text{gcd}(\lambda, \ell^f) = 1$  and we have proven the result.

Let us go back to `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$` . The correct endomorphism  $\theta$  is computed during Step 2, then the computation of  $\alpha, C, D$  as in Lemma 8 is performed during Steps 3 and 4. The representation of  $\text{End}(E)$  that we use to compute  $\theta$  is based on an isogeny  $\varphi_J : E_0 \rightarrow E$  of norm in  $\ell^\bullet$ . The ideal  $J$  and the corresponding isogeny  $\varphi_J$  are included in the inputs, and we use them during Step 6 to compute the isogenies  $\varphi_1, \varphi_2$  that compose the endomorphism  $\theta$ ; in this step,  $[J]^*H$  denotes the *pullback* of  $H$  by  $J$  and  $\varphi = [\varphi]_*\psi$  the *pushforward* of  $\psi$  by  $\varphi$  (see [9, Section 4.1]). After that, we evaluate  $\theta$  on the point  $P$  during Step 7 and then, we apply Lemma 8 during Step 8 to compute the kernel of  $\varphi_I$ . In the execution of `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  during `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^\bullet}$` ,  $\varphi_J$  will be composed of all the  $\ell^f$  isogenies computed during the previous iterations. The point  $P$  will then be a generator of the kernel of the dual of the isogeny computed in the previous step. For efficiency, we will take  $\theta$  of norm dividing  $T^2$  so we can represent  $\theta$  using two isogenies  $\varphi_1, \varphi_2$  of degree  $n_1, n_2$  dividing  $T$  such that  $\theta = \varphi_2 \circ \hat{\varphi}_1$ .

**Proposition 9.** *Under plausible heuristics, `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  is correct and terminates with overwhelming probability.*



---

**Algorithm 4**  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^f}(\mathcal{O}, I, J, \varphi_J, P)$

---

**Input:**  $I$  a left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal of norm  $\ell^f$ , an  $(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$ -ideal  $J$  of norm  $\ell^\bullet$  and  $\varphi_J : E_0 \rightarrow E$  the corresponding isogeny, a generator  $P$  of  $E[\ell^f] \cap \ker(\hat{\varphi}_J)$ .

**Output:**  $\varphi_I$  of degree  $\ell^f$

- 1: Set  $K = \bar{J} + \mathcal{O}\ell^f$ .
  - 2: Compute  $\theta = \text{SpecialEichlerNorm}_T(\mathcal{O}, K + \mathcal{O}\ell)$  of norm dividing  $T^2$ .
  - 3: Select  $\alpha \in I$  s.t  $I = \mathcal{O}\langle \alpha, \ell^f \rangle$ .
  - 4: Compute  $C, D$  s.t.  $\alpha \cdot (C + D\theta) \in K$  and  $\gcd(C, D, \ell) = 1$  using linear algebra.
  - 5: Take any  $n_1|T$  and  $n_2|T$  s.t  $n_1n_2 = n(\theta)$ . Compute  $H_1 = \mathcal{O}\langle \theta, n_1 \rangle$  and  $H_2 = \mathcal{O}\langle \bar{\theta}, n_2 \rangle$ .
  - 6: Compute  $L_i = [J]^*H_i$ , and  $\varphi_i = [\varphi_J]^*\text{IdealTolsogeny}_{n_i}(L_i)$  for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .
  - 7: Compute  $Q = \hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1(P)$ .
  - 8: Compute  $\varphi_I$  of kernel  $\langle [C]P + [D]Q \rangle$ .
  - 9: **return**  $\varphi_I$ .
- 

*Proof.* By Proposition 6, we have that  $\text{SpecialEichlerNorm}$  is correct and terminates with overwhelming probability under plausible heuristics. Apart from the execution of  $\text{SpecialEichlerNorm}$ , the only step that needs justification is Step 4. First, it is not clear that such a solution must always exist. In fact, the existence of such  $C, D$  follows from  $\theta \notin \mathbb{Z} + (K + \ell\mathcal{O})$ . This condition implies that  $P, \theta(P)$  form a basis of  $E[\ell^f]$ , for otherwise we would have  $[\ell^{f-1}]P = [\ell^{f-1}]\theta(P)$  and so  $\theta \in \mathbb{Z} + (K + \ell\mathcal{O})$ , since  $E[K] = \langle P \rangle$ . When it exists, a solution  $C, D$  can easily be found using linear algebra in a similar fashion to  $\text{EichlerModConstraint}$ .

Correctness follows from Lemma 8. When we identify the endomorphisms  $\alpha$  and  $[C] + [D]\theta$  in  $\text{End}(E)$  with their image through the isomorphism between  $\text{End}(E)$  and  $\mathcal{O}$ , we get that the composition  $\alpha \circ (C + D\theta)$  becomes the multiplication of the quaternion elements  $\alpha \cdot (C + D\theta)$ . Thus, by Lemma 8, the values  $C, D$  computed at Step 4 are such that  $\ker \varphi_I = \langle [C] + [D]\theta(P) \rangle$ . By definition of  $H_1, H_2$ , we have that  $\theta = \hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1$  and this concludes the proof that the output isogeny is indeed the one corresponding to  $I$  through the Deuring Correspondence.

**The full algorithm.** Now we are ready for our full algorithm. For simplicity, we assume in Algorithm 5 that the ideal input to  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^\bullet}$  has norm  $\ell^e$ , where  $e = fg$  for some  $g \in \mathbb{N}$ . The general case is easily derived.

**Proposition 10.** *Under plausible heuristics,  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^\bullet}$  is correct and terminates with overwhelming probability.*

*Proof.* It is easily verified that the  $\mathcal{O}_i, I_i, J_i, \varphi_J \circ \varphi_I, P_i$  are correct inputs to  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^f}$ . Thus, the result follows from Proposition 9.

Below, we explain more precisely how to perform Step 7 of  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^f}$ . The technical details were left out of the description in Algorithm 4 to clarify the explanations but they are important for an efficient implementation. Throughout this entire section, we have avoided the issues of potential failures



---

**Algorithm 5** IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^\bullet}(I, J, \varphi_J)$ 

---

**Input:**  $I$  a left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal of norm  $\ell^e$  with  $e = fg$ , an  $(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$ -ideal  $J$  of norm  $\ell^\bullet$  and  $\varphi_J : E_0 \rightarrow E$  the corresponding isogeny

**Output:**  $\varphi_I$  of degree  $\ell^e$ .

- 1: Set  $J_i = J$ ,  $I_i = I + \ell^f \mathcal{O}$ ,  $I'_i = I_i^{-1} I$ ,  $\mathcal{O}_i = \mathcal{O}$ .
  - 2: Set  $\varphi_i$  of degree  $\ell^f$  as the isogeny such that  $\hat{\varphi}_J = \varphi' \circ \varphi_i$
  - 3: Set  $\varphi_I = [1]_E$  and  $E_i = E$ .
  - 4: **for**  $i \in [1, g]$  **do**
  - 5: Compute  $P_i \in E_i[\ell^f]$  s.t  $\ker \varphi_i = \langle P_i \rangle$ .
  - 6: Compute  $\varphi_{I_i} = \text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^f}(\mathcal{O}_i, I_i, J_i, \varphi_I \circ \varphi_J, P_i)$ .
  - 7: Set  $\varphi_i = \hat{\varphi}_{I_i}$ ,  $\varphi_I = \varphi_{I_i} \circ \varphi_I$  and  $E_i$  is the codomain of  $\varphi_{I_i}$ .
  - 8: Set  $J_i = J_i \cdot I_i$ ,  $\mathcal{O}_i = \mathcal{O}_L(I'_i)$ ,  $I_i = I'_i + \ell^f \mathcal{O}_i$  and  $I'_i = I_i^{-1} I'_i$ .
  - 9: **end for**
  - 10: **return**  $\varphi_I$ .
- 

of SpecialEichlerNorm that were mentioned at the end of Section 3.2. We will discuss in Section 4.3 how to perform the computation in this eventuality.

## 4.2 A detailed description of the ideal translation algorithm.

**Endomorphism evaluation.** In Step 7 of IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$  we need to evaluate the endomorphisms  $\theta = \hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1$  after the two isogenies  $\varphi_1, \varphi_2$  have been computed. One might assume that it suffices to push  $P$  through  $\varphi_1$  and then do the same through  $\hat{\varphi}_2$ . This apparently simple algorithm is not so easy to implement. The first problem lies with signs. Efficient isogeny algorithms are using  $x$ -only arithmetic which imply that we can only evaluate isogenies up to signs. This is problematic as the ultimate goal is to compute  $[C]P + [D]\theta(P)$ . Solving this issue requires to evaluate several other points through  $\varphi_1, \varphi_2$  and there does not seem to be another easy way to remove the ambiguity. The second issue is with the dual computation in itself. For an isogeny  $\varphi$  of degree  $T$  and kernel  $\langle P \rangle$ , computing  $\hat{\varphi}(R)$  for some point  $R$  would first require to compute  $\varphi(Q)$  where  $Q$  is of order  $T$  and orthogonal to  $P$  to get  $\ker \hat{\varphi}$ , before using this kernel to compute  $\hat{\varphi}(R)$ . In the context of SQISign where  $T$ -isogenies have kernel made of two points, this is already 2  $T$ -isogeny computations and 3 evaluations (see Section 5.1 for a more detailed account on operation estimates). Together with the computation of  $\varphi_1(P)$ , we have a total of 3  $T$ -isogeny computations and 4 evaluations and this is without whatever would be required to lift the sign ambiguity.

Targeting the application to IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$ , we present in Algorithm 6 a method to compute the kernel of  $\varphi_I$  in Step 8 of Algorithm 4, without computing the intermediate value  $Q$  in Step 7. This method evaluates an endomorphism of the form  $C + D\theta$ , where  $\theta = \hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1$ , at an arbitrary point  $P$ ; it requires only 2  $T$ -isogeny computations and 5 evaluations, plus a few discrete logarithms, which are efficient as long as  $P$  has smooth order.

Here is a sketch of how the method works, using  $x$ -only arithmetic. Let  $(P, Q)$  be a basis of the  $\ell^f$ -torsion. The main principle is to express  $\varphi_1(P)$  as a linear combination of  $\varphi_2(P), \varphi_2(Q)$  and see that  $\hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1(P)$  is a multiple of the linear combination of  $P, Q$  with the same coefficients. When dealing with  $x$ -only arithmetic we need also to compute  $\varphi_2(P + Q)$  to perform the discrete log computations. Finally, to lift the ambiguity (the linear combination that we obtain is only up to sign) we use the trace of  $\theta = \hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1$  (which can be computed by expressing  $\theta$  in the basis  $\langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$ ). In the basis  $P, Q$ , the action of  $\theta$  can be seen as a matrix of  $\mathbb{M}_2(\mathbb{Z}/\ell^f\mathbb{Z})$ . This matrix is essentially the one we obtain with the coefficient of the two discrete logarithms and so it suffices to check the value of the trace to lift any sign ambiguity.

In Algorithm 6 we call to a function  $\text{xBIDIM}(x(R), x(P), x(Q), x(P + Q))$ , which computes the two-dimensional discrete logarithm of  $R$  to base  $(P, Q)$ , i.e. a pair of scalars  $a, b$  such that  $x(R) = x([a]P + [b]Q)$ . Assuming  $R, P, Q$  have order  $\ell^f$ , it has complexity  $O(f)$ .

---

**Algorithm 6**  $\text{EndomorphismEvaluation}_{\ell^f}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, C, D, t, P)$

---

**Input:** Two isogenies  $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 : E \rightarrow E'$ , scalars  $C, D$ , the trace  $t = \text{tr}(\hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1)$  and a point  $P$  of order  $\ell^f$

**Output:**  $[C]P + [D]\hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \varphi_1(P)$

- 1: Compute  $Q$  such that  $P, Q$  is a basis of  $E[\ell^f]$  and compute  $P + Q$ .
  - 2: Compute  $x(\varphi_1(P)), x(\varphi_1(Q)), x(\varphi_2(P)), x(\varphi_2(Q)), x(\varphi_2(P + Q))$ .
  - 3: Compute  $x_1, x_2 = \text{xBIDIM}(x(\varphi_1(P)), x(\varphi_2(P)), x(\varphi_2(Q)), x(\varphi_2(P + Q)))$  and  $x_3, x_4 = \text{xBIDIM}(x(\varphi_1(Q)), x(\varphi_2(P)), x(\varphi_2(Q)), x(\varphi_2(P + Q)))$ .
  - 4: Change the signs of  $(x_1, x_2), (x_3, x_4)$  until  $(x_1 + x_4) \deg \varphi_2 = t \pmod{\ell^f}$ .
  - 5: Set  $a = C + x_1D$  and  $b = x_2D$ .
  - 6: Compute  $R = [a]P + [b]Q$ .
  - 7: **return**  $R$ .
- 

*Remark 11.* For the signature, one needs to compute a canonical representation of the output of  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^f}$ . The method from [9, Section 8.5] is to compute a deterministic basis at each intermediate curve  $E_i$  and represent the kernel of the next step as a linear combination of this basis. The first point of the basis can be taken as the kernel of the previous isogeny, so it suffices to pick one other point. Typically, this would be done in Step 1 of  $\text{EndomorphismEvaluation}$  in the choice of  $Q$ .

**On  $T$ -isogenies computation.** The computation of  $T$ -isogenies during Step 6 is an important part of  $\text{IdealTolsogenyEichler}_{\ell^f}$ . The optimization we describe next was already used in the code implementing [9], but no explanation was given. We simply fill this void. The task at hand can be divided in two parts: the  $\text{IdealTolsogeny}_{n_i}$  and the push-forward through  $\varphi_J$ . Since  $\text{IdealTolsogeny}_{n_i}$  is always performed on the special order  $\mathcal{O}_0$ , the action of a basis of  $\text{End}(E_0) \cong \mathcal{O}_0$

on a basis of the  $T$ -torsion can be precomputed (and stored as matrices). Then, for an ideal given in input, it suffices to decompose the elements of this ideal on the basis of  $\mathcal{O}_0$  and use the precomputed matrices to get the action of these elements on the  $T$ -torsion basis before doing some linear algebra to find the linear combination of the basis that will generate the kernel of the desired isogeny. After the execution of `IdealTolsogeny $_{n_i}$` , it suffices to push the generators of the kernels through  $\varphi_J$ . For a given execution, we do not know how to do better than what is described above. However `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  is executed sequentially with an isogeny  $\varphi_J$  of increasing size, thus, if we do it naively, we will end up evaluating the first isogenies many times. To avoid this extra computation, it suffices to push the basis of the  $T$ -torsion through each  $\varphi_I$  and store it. If the basis is the same as the one used to precompute the action of  $\text{End}(E_0)$ , it suffices to apply the linear combination obtained from `IdealTolsogeny $_{n_i}$`  to the pushed basis to obtain directly the generator of the kernel. Over the course of the entire execution, this will save a non-negligible amount of  $\ell^f$ -isogeny computations.

### 4.3 Handling special failure cases

In the analysis proposed at the end of Section 3.2, we explained that there are some inputs  $\mathcal{O}, K$  for which the computation of `SpecialEichlerNorm $_T$` ( $\mathcal{O}, K$ ) will fail if  $T \approx p^{5/4}$ . In rare occasions, we will encounter an order  $\mathcal{O}_i$  that is one of those bad orders, causing the execution of `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  at the  $i$ -th iteration in `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell^f}$`  to fail. Since we cannot afford to increase the size of  $T$ , we can handle this issue in two manners: revert to the method of [8] to perform the translation, or use a special extremal order other than  $\mathcal{O}_0$  with `SpecialEichlerNorm`.

**Applying the `IdealTolsogeny $_{\ell^f}$`  from [8].** At first glance going back to the old method might seem like an odd thing to do. However, the failure cases for `SpecialEichlerNorm` are actually good cases for the method from [8] because there is an ideal of norm  $M \ll p^{1/2}$  connecting  $\mathcal{O}_0$  and  $\mathcal{O}$ . As we explained, this is only a bad thing for `SpecialEichlerNorm` because we have an additional constraint with the ideal  $K$  but `IdealTolsogeny $_{\ell^f}$`  does not suffer from the same limitation. `IdealTolsogeny $_{\ell^f}$`  relies on the KLPT algorithm that will succeed in finding an element of norm  $T^2$  if  $T \approx pM$ . Hence, when  $M < p^{1/4}$ , we can hope to make it work with  $T \approx p^{5/4}$ . However, there is an obvious range of degrees  $p^{1/4} \ll M \ll p^{1/2}$  where this solution will not work. This is why in practice, we will use the second method described below.

**Using another special extremal order.** The bad property depends on the special extremal order  $\mathcal{O}_0$  that we use. In practice, when  $p = 3 \pmod 4$ , it is standard in the literature to use the maximal extremal order  $\langle 1, i, \frac{1+k}{2}, \frac{i+j}{2} \rangle$ , but this canonical example is not the only maximal order matching the definition of extremal orders given in [16]. We recall that a maximal order in  $B_{p,\infty}$  containing

a given quadratic order  $\mathfrak{D}$  exists when  $p$  is an inert prime in the quadratic imaginary field associated to  $\mathfrak{D}$ . Even if other quadratic orders will not be as efficient as  $\mathbb{Z}[i] \subset \mathcal{O}_0$ , the complexity of `SpecialEichlerNorm` is logarithmic in disc  $\mathfrak{D}$  and so we can expand the range of choices without affecting the performance too much. Thus, we can gather a small list of good candidates for  $\mathcal{O}_0$  and enumerate through that list until we find one that does not have the bad property. To prove that this idea works, we need to make sure that a maximal order  $\mathcal{O}$  will not have the bad property with all the extremal orders. Unfortunately, we do not have a definitive proof of this fact and are reduced to make it a heuristic assumption. Boneh and Love [19] showed that maximal quaternion orders admitting embeddings of small quadratic orders are far apart in the isogeny graph. While this conveys the right idea, their bound in [19, Proposition 4.5] is too loose to help us. In practice, switching to another maximal order seems to work well enough in our implementation.

## 5 Parameters and Implementation for SQISign

We now present our methodology to set parameters for SQISign using our new ideal-to-isogeny algorithm, and report on our implementation. We start with a method to give a rough estimate of the relative efficiency of two parameter choices. Based on these estimates, we report on our search for new primes better suited to our new algorithm. Finally, we benchmark our implementation, including the improvements provided by the state-of-the-art algorithms for the arithmetic over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  [18], and compare it to the original SQISign implementation.

For the rest of this section we let  $p$  be a prime such that  $\ell^f T \mid (p^2 - 1)$ , where  $T$  is smooth and coprime with  $\ell$ . Following [8], we will take  $\ell = 2$ , as this leads to the fastest verification and simplest implementation overall. It is an interesting question whether other choices for  $\ell$  could lead to useful compromises. With the choice of  $\ell = 2$ , the authors from [8] advised to take a  $\sigma$  of degree  $2^{1000}$ .

### 5.1 Cost estimate

It was already observed in [8] that algebraic operations over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  make up for most of the cost of SQISign: up to  $\approx 90\%$  in our experiments. It is thus reasonable to ignore computations over the quaternions and linear algebra, and focus on these. Ideally, we would count the number of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ -operations performed for each choice of parameters, however this is already difficult given the complexity of the algorithms. Instead, we will use a much coarser metric based on four indicators.

We are only going to compare [9, Algorithm 9] and Algorithm 5. Both algorithms decompose an ideal of norm  $\ell^e$  into ideals of smaller norm. The former decomposes into ideals of norm  $\ell^{2f+\Delta}$  for some constant  $\Delta$ , which are then translated to isogenies by [9, Algorithm 8]. The latter decomposes into ideals of norm  $\ell^f$ , which are translated by Algorithm 4. Both sub-algorithms consist mostly of isogeny computations of degree  $T$  and  $\ell^f$ . For each of them, we will count:

( $T_c$ ) How many isogenies of degree  $T$  are *computed*;

- ( $T_e$ ) On how many points the isogenies of degree  $T$  are *evaluated*;
- ( $\ell_c$ ) How many isogenies of degree  $\ell^f$  are computed/evaluated;
- ( $\Delta_c$ ) How many meet-in-the-middle searches for isogenies of degree  $\ell^\Delta$  are performed (this is exclusive to [9, Algorithm 8]).

The costs of  $T_c$  and  $T_e$  depend on the factorization of  $T$ . Instead of using the full factorization, we will only base our estimate on a bound  $B$  such that all prime factors of  $T$  are  $< B$ . Using [2], the costs of computing and evaluating an isogeny of prime degree  $n$  grow as  $\sqrt{n}$  (ignoring logarithmic factors), we will thus multiply  $T_c$  and  $T_e$  by  $\sqrt{B}$ . Since  $\ell$  is small, the cost of computing and evaluating an isogeny of degree  $\ell^f$  grows as  $f \log(f)$  (ignoring the dependency in  $\ell$ ), we shall thus multiply  $\ell_c$  by this factor. Finally, the meet-in-the-middle requires to compute all  $\sqrt{\ell^\Delta}$  isogenies, so we multiply  $\Delta_c$  by  $\sqrt{\ell^\Delta}$ .

Given an ideal of norm  $\ell^e$ , SQISign will call [9, Algorithm 8]  $\approx e/(2f + \Delta)$  times, whereas our new method will call Algorithm 5  $\approx e/f$  times. For this reason, we shall divide all counts by  $2f + \Delta$  and  $f$ , respectively.

Summarizing, for [9, Algorithm 8] we will use the following 4-valued estimator:

$$(T_c \sqrt{B}, T_e \sqrt{B}, \ell_c f \log(f), \sqrt{\ell^\Delta} \Delta_c) / (2f + \Delta), \quad (1)$$

where the division is applied component-wise. For Algorithm 5, given that it does not use a meet-in-the-middle search, we will instead use

$$(T_c \sqrt{B}/f, T_e \sqrt{B}/f, \ell_c \log(f)). \quad (2)$$

*Original method.* For convenience, Algorithm 7 reproduces [9, Algorithm 8] without modifications. Some of the steps therein are quite vague, so we also refer to the code at <https://github.com/SQISign/sqisign>.

The operation count for Algorithm 7 goes as follows: Step 3 is  $2 T_e$  (push ker  $\varphi_1$  through  $\varphi_J$ ) and  $1 \ell_c$  (compute  $\varphi_1$ ), Step 8 is  $1 T_c$  (compute  $\psi_1$ ), Step 9 is  $1 T_e$ ,  $1 T_c$  (compute  $\psi_2$  and ker  $\rho_2$ ) and  $1 \ell_c$  (compute  $\varphi_2$ ), Step 10 is  $1 \Delta_c$ , Step 11 is  $2 T_e$  (compute ker  $\hat{\psi}_1$ ),  $2 \ell_c$  (push ker  $\hat{\psi}_1$  through  $\rho_2 \circ \eta$ ),  $1 T_c$  and  $1 T_e$  (compute  $\psi'_1$  and ker  $\hat{\varphi}_2$ ),  $1 \ell_c$  (compute  $\varphi_2$ ) and  $1 \Delta_c$  (compute  $\theta$ ). Thus a total of  $3 T_c$ ,  $6 T_e$ ,  $2 \Delta_c$  and  $5 \ell_c$ .

*New Method.* Step 7 requires to solve a DLP instance over the  $\ell^f$ -torsion and we overestimate the complexity by saying that this is equivalent to  $1 \ell_c$  operation (asymptotically it is the same cost but the DLP is faster in practice). We obtain the following count:  $2 T_c$  for Step 6,  $5 T_e$  and  $1 \ell_c$  for Step 7 (see Algorithm 6), Step 8 is  $1 \ell_c$ . Overall, we get  $2 T_c$ ,  $5 T_e$  and  $2 \ell_c$ .

## 5.2 New prime search

Recall that the main advantage of our new ideal-to-isogeny algorithm is to decrease  $T$  from  $\sim p^{3/2}$  to  $\sim p^{5/4}$ . Primes  $p$  such that  $\ell^f T \mid (p^2 - 1)$  for such large  $T$  are rare, and thus a search must be performed in order to instantiate SQISign.

**Algorithm 7**  $\text{IdealTolsogeny}_{\ell^{2f+\Delta}}(I, J, K, \varphi_J, \varphi_K)$  [9, Algorithm 8]

---

**Input:**  $I$  a left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal of norm dividing  $T^2\ell^{2f+\Delta}$ , an  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal in  $J$  containing  $I$  of norm dividing  $T^2$ , and an ideal  $K \sim J$  of norm a power of  $\ell$ , as well as  $\varphi_J$  and  $\varphi_K$ .

**Output:**  $\varphi = \varphi_2 \circ \theta \circ \varphi_1 : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $\ell^{2f+\Delta}$  such that  $\varphi_I = \varphi \circ \varphi_J$ ,  $L \sim I$  of norm dividing  $T^2$  and  $\varphi_L$ .

- 0: Write  $\varphi_J, \varphi_K : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ .
- 1: Let  $I_1 = I + \ell^f \mathcal{O}_0$ .
- 2: Let  $\varphi'_1 = \text{IdealTolsogeny}_{\ell^f}(I_1)$ .
- 3: Let  $\varphi_1 = [\varphi_J]_* \varphi'_1 : E_1 \rightarrow E_3$ .
- 4: Let  $L = \text{KLPT}_T(I)$ .
- 5: Let  $\alpha \in K$  such that  $J = \chi_K(\alpha)$ .
- 6: Let  $\beta \in I$  such that  $L = \chi_I(\beta)$ .
- 7: Let  $\gamma = \beta\alpha/n(J)$ . We have  $\gamma \in K$ ,  $\bar{\gamma} \in L$ , and  $n(\gamma) = T^2\ell^{2f+\Delta}n(K)$ .
- 8: Let  $H_1 = \langle \gamma, n(K)\ell^f T \rangle$ . We have  $\varphi_{H_1} = \psi_1 \circ \varphi_1 \circ \varphi_K : E_0 \rightarrow E_5$ , where  $\psi_1$  has degree  $T$ .
- 9: Let  $H_2 = \langle \bar{\gamma}, \ell^f T \rangle$ . We have  $\varphi_{H_2} = \rho_2 \circ \psi_2 : E_0 \rightarrow E_6$ , where  $\psi_2$  has degree  $T$  and  $\rho_2$  has degree  $\ell^f$ .
- 10: Find  $\eta : E_5 \rightarrow E_6$  of degree  $\ell^\Delta$  with meet-in-the-middle.
- 11: Let  $\varphi_2 \circ \theta = [\hat{\psi}_1]_* \hat{\rho}_2 \circ \eta : E_3 \rightarrow E_2$  and  $\psi'_1 = [\hat{\varphi}_2 \circ \eta]_* \hat{\psi}_1$ .
- 12: **return**  $\varphi = \varphi_2 \circ \theta \circ \varphi_1$ ,  $L$  and  $\psi'_1 \circ \psi_2$ .

---

Following [8], we focus on primes of  $\approx 256$  bits, which offer  $\approx 128$  bits of classical security. In [8], the prime  $p$  with

$$\begin{aligned}
p + 1 &= 2^{33} \cdot 5^{21} \cdot 7^2 \cdot 11 \cdot 31 \cdot 83 \cdot 107 \cdot 137 \cdot 751 \cdot 827 \cdot 3691 \cdot 4019 \cdot 6983 \\
&\quad \cdot 517434778561 \cdot 26602537156291, \\
p - 1 &= 2 \cdot 3^{53} \cdot 43 \cdot 103^2 \cdot 109 \cdot 199 \cdot 227 \cdot 419 \cdot 491 \cdot 569 \cdot 631 \cdot 677 \cdot 857 \cdot 859 \\
&\quad \cdot 883 \cdot 1019 \cdot 1171 \cdot 1879 \cdot 2713 \cdot 4283
\end{aligned}$$

is recommended, giving  $f = 33$  and a  $T > 2^{393}$  that is  $2^{13}$ -smooth. We shall call it  $p_{6983}$ , after the largest factor in  $T$ . This prime can be used both for the old and the new method, however in our new method we can discard some of the largest factors of  $T$ , getting down to a  $T' > 2^{333}$  that is  $2^{11}$ -smooth. Knowing that  $\Delta = 14$  in [8], we can already use our estimator to compare the two methods. The values are reported in Table 4. Based on this metric, it appears that the new method could be slightly faster than the old one.

However, a less stringent requirement on  $T$  makes the search for  $p$  considerably easier, it is thus natural to look for a new one that is better adapted to our method. The prime  $p_{6983}$  was found using an XGCD-based method described in [9, Appendix C], which we used to find more primes. In the meantime, more algorithms to find primes such that  $p^2 - 1$  is smooth were introduced in [5,6]. Unfortunately, only the sieve of [5], when looking for primes of the form  $p = 2x^n - 1$ , adapts well to the requirement of having  $2^f \mid (p^2 - 1)$  for some moderately large  $f$ . Indeed, we can modify this method by forcing  $2^{\lceil f/n \rceil} \mid x$ . Trying to do the same in the sieve of [6] leads to a search space too small to yield any primes.

Regardless of the method we use, given that we look for a smaller  $T$ , we can choose to either increase  $f$  or decrease the smoothness bound  $B$  on  $T$ . Looking at estimator (2), it appears that we can divide the first two entries by 2 in one of two ways: multiplying  $f$  by 2, or dividing  $B$  by 4. We experimented with both. We used the method of [5] to look for primes  $p = 2^{61}x^4 - 1$ , sieving the whole interval  $x \in [2^{47}, 2^{49}[$  in approximately 360 cpu-days. We found 398 integers such that  $p^2 - 1$  has a  $2^{11}$ -smooth odd factor of more than 330 bits, of which 15 were prime (see Table 2); none of them has a large enough  $2^{10}$ -smooth factor.

|                 |                 |                 |                 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 143189100303149 | 369428710635531 | 391443251922757 | 411099446409699 |
| 424067696488337 | 431716591494287 | 491224940548057 | 491531434028942 |
| 512391149388477 | 512583833108361 | 514414280000642 | 515727186701509 |
| 548396183941255 | 550470785518701 | 562456538440551 |                 |

Table 2: List of integers  $x \in [2^{47}, 2^{49}[$  such that  $2^{61}x^4 - 1$  is prime and  $x^4(2^{15}x - 1)(2^{15}x + 1)(2^{30}x^2 + 1)$  contains a  $2^{11}$ -factor  $> 2^{330}$ .

Using the XGCD method of [9], we found out that we could obtain primes with  $f \approx 64$  and  $B = 2^{12}$  at a reasonable cost. The best candidate we found, which we name  $p_{3923}$ , has 254 bits and

$$\begin{aligned}
 p + 1 &= 2^{65} \cdot 5^2 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 19 \cdot 29^2 \cdot 37^2 \cdot 47 \cdot 197 \cdot 263 \cdot 281 \cdot 461 \cdot 521 \\
 &\quad \cdot 3923 \cdot 62731 \cdot 96362257 \cdot 3924006112952623, \\
 p - 1 &= 2 \cdot 3^{65} \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 43 \cdot 79 \cdot 157 \cdot 239 \cdot 271 \cdot 283 \cdot 307 \cdot 563 \cdot 599 \\
 &\quad \cdot 607 \cdot 619 \cdot 743 \cdot 827 \cdot 941 \cdot 2357 \cdot 10069.
 \end{aligned}$$

Despite the slightly larger smoothness bound, we found that  $p_{3923}$  performs better in practice than primes of the form  $2^{61}x^4 - 1$ , probably owing to the large power of 3, which contributes favorably to  $T$ -isogeny computations. Moreover, the fact that  $p' = -p^{-1} \bmod 2^w \equiv 1$  for standard computer wordlengths like  $w = 32, 64$  bits enables the use of variants of [18, Alg. 5] to implement the multiplication over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  (in contrast, primes like  $p_{6983}$  are limited to use the slightly more complex [18, Alg. 2]; see §5). Finally, practical implementations of the underlying field arithmetic can also benefit from the extra room at the word boundary that the 254-bit length provides.

Reporting the estimator values for  $p_{3923}$  in Table 3, we see that applying our new algorithm to the new prime yields a significant gain during  $T$ -isogeny computations and meet-in-the-middle at the cost of a modest loss during  $\ell^f$ -isogeny computations. Since the former tends to affect performance much more than the latter, in practice, we expect our new method to compare favorably to the old one. We will see in the next section that, in practice, the gain is even larger than predicted by our rough estimator. Finding more accurate estimators to guide the prime search in SQISign is an interesting problem for future research.



| algorithm | $p$        | $\log(p)$ | $f$ | $B$      | $T_c$ | $T_e$ | $\ell_c$ | $\Delta_c$ | estimator             |
|-----------|------------|-----------|-----|----------|-------|-------|----------|------------|-----------------------|
| Old       | $p_{6983}$ | 256       | 33  | $2^{13}$ | 3     | 6     | 5        | 2          | (3.4, 6.8, 10.4, 3.2) |
| New       | $p_{6983}$ | 256       | 33  | $2^{11}$ | 2     | 5     | 2        | -          | (2.7, 6.9, 10.1)      |
| New       | $p_{3923}$ | 254       | 65  | $2^{12}$ | 2     | 5     | 2        | -          | (2.0, 4.9, 12.0)      |

Table 3: Operation estimates for several variants of *ideal-to-isogeny* translation.  $B$  is the smoothness bound of  $T$ .

**Other changes.** Having a smaller  $T$  forces some other changes to SQISign’s challenge and commitment steps. To get  $\lambda$  bits of security, the commitment must have degree  $T' \geq 2^{2\lambda}$ , while the challenge must have degree  $D_c \geq 2^\lambda$  coprime to  $T'$ . The authors of [8] could take  $T'D_c = T \approx p^{3/2} \approx 2^{3\lambda}$ . To optimize verification, they chose  $D_c$  to be as smooth as possible, i.e.,  $D_c = 3^{53}5^{21}$ .

However, with a smaller  $T$ , we can no longer have  $T = T'D_c$ . Instead, we incorporate some powers of  $\ell$  in  $D_c$ ; incidentally, this happens to increase verification speed. For  $p_{3923}$ , we take  $D_c = 2^{65}3^{40}$ , which is a marked improvement over  $D_c = 3^{53}5^{21}$ . Of course, one could also incorporate powers of 2 to  $D_c$  with  $p_{6983}$ . But  $p_{6983} + 1$  only contains a factor  $2^{33}$ , so verification with  $p_{3923}$  still beats  $p_{6983}$ .

In fact, at the cost of increasing the signer’s work, it is possible to take  $D_c$  as a power of  $\ell$ , which could further decrease verification time. The concrete gain for the instantiation with  $p_{3923}$  will be the difference between a  $2^{64}$ -isogeny computation and a  $3^{40}$ -isogeny computation. This is a marginal gain compared to the cost for the signer (at least several additional executions of `IdealTolsogenyEichler $_{\ell f}$` ), so we chose not to pursue this idea further.

### 5.3 C implementation

We took the official SQISign implementation<sup>8</sup> and incorporated our new ideal-to-isogeny algorithm plus some other minor improvements. In particular, we implemented the compression method described in [9, §8.5] for verification, which, along with the use of powers of 2 in the challenge degree  $D_c$ , explains the faster verification. In addition, we fully rewrote the hand-optimized assembly implementation of the  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  arithmetic layer and, more importantly, adapted to our primes the faster multiplication algorithms over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  from [18] (specifically, we use Algorithm 2 for  $p_{6983}$  and adapted Algorithm 5 to  $p_{3923}$ ).

Our code is available at <https://github.com/SQISign/sqisign-ec23>. We ran benchmarks on two platforms: a 3.4GHz Intel Core i7-6700 (Skylake) processor, and a 3.2GHz Intel Core i7-8700 (Coffee Lake) processor. As is standard practice, Turbo Boost was deactivated during the tests. The results are summarized in Table 4. With all our improvements, and moving from  $p_{6983}$  to  $p_{3923}$ , we observe a more than  $4\times$  speedup in key generation and verification, while signing is sped up by more than  $3\times$ . For instance, we report signing computations averaging 424 msec. on a 3.2GHz Intel machine, well below the over a second

<sup>8</sup> <https://github.com/SQISign/sqisign>.



|   | SQISign [8] | New/ $p_{6983}$ |      |       |      | New/ $p_{3923}$ |     |              |     |
|---|-------------|-----------------|------|-------|------|-----------------|-----|--------------|-----|
|   | $p_{6983}$  | Std.            | %    | Opt.  | %    | Std.            | %   | Opt.         | %   |
| 3.4GHz Intel Core i7-6700 (Skylake)     |             |                 |      |       |      |                 |     |              |     |
| Keygen                                  | 1,828       | 2,792           | -53% | 2,243 | -23% | 670             | 63% | <b>421</b>   | 77% |
| Sign                                    | 7,020       | 6,074           | 13%  | 4,178 | 40%  | 3,311           | 53% | <b>1,987</b> | 72% |
| Verify                                  | 143         | 87              | 39%  | 52    | 64%  | 66              | 54% | <b>30</b>    | 79% |
| 3.2GHz Intel Core i7-8700 (Coffee Lake) |             |                 |      |       |      |                 |     |              |     |
| Keygen                                  | 1,242       | 1,916           | -54% | 1,529 | -19% | 463             | 63% | <b>286</b>   | 77% |
| Sign                                    | 4,811       | 4,086           | 15%  | 2,850 | 41%  | 2,274           | 53% | <b>1,354</b> | 72% |
| Verify                                  | 99          | 60              | 39%  | 37    | 63%  | 46              | 54% | <b>21</b>    | 79% |

Table 4: Performance comparison between the original implementation of SQISign [8] and our implementations using the proposed optimizations. Results are shown in millions of cycles (rounded to the nearest  $10^6$ ), and correspond to the average counts of 100 runs for key generation and signature, and of 250 runs for verification. The columns “Std.” correspond to results using standard implementations for the arithmetic over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ , while the columns “Opt.” report results using the optimized  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  algorithms from [18]. The cost reductions obtained for each operation, relative to the results from [8], are shown in the columns “%”.

computation reported in [8]. Meanwhile, verification times average 6.7 msec. on the same machine, which is  $\sim 4.6\times$  faster than the mark obtained by [8].

We note that the proposed prime  $p_{3923}$  gets an additional boost in performance because of its synergy with the techniques from [18]. Indeed, this prime facilitates the use of a variant of [18, Alg. 5] by exploiting the fact that  $p' = -p^{-1} \bmod 2^w \equiv 1$  for a computer wordlength of  $w = 64$  bits, in contrast to  $p_{6983}$  which is limited to use the somewhat slower [18, Alg. 2].

## 6 Cryptanalysis

In this section, we present a distinguisher against one of the computational assumptions underlying the security of SQISign. This distinguisher does not lead to an attack on the signature scheme but it invalidates the claimed hardness of the problem. We present a fix to protect the scheme against the distinguisher and propose further theoretical analysis and experimental results to argue that a modified assumption holds.

More concretely, we show in Section 6.1 that the set  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  involved in the formulation of Problem 14 has a problematic property that leads to a distinguisher. Fortunately, a slight change of SigningKLPT, explained in Section 6.1, seems to be enough to remove the problem. In Section 6.2, we analyse the new assumption more precisely, to argue that it does not suffer from a similar weakness.

Before getting to our contributions, we give a quick summary of some of the relevant content from [8] regarding the zero-knowledge property of the underlying

identification scheme. We start in Algorithm 8 with the description of the Signing-KLPT algorithm from [8].

---

**Algorithm 8** SigningKLPT( $I, I_\tau$ )
 

---

**Input:**  $I_\tau$  a left  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal and right  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal of norm  $N_\tau$ , and  $I$ , a left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal.

**Output:**  $J \sim I$  of norm  $\ell^e$ , where  $e$  is fixed.

- 1: Compute  $K = \text{EquivalentRandomEichlerIdeal}(I, N_\tau)$
  - 2: Compute  $K' = [I_\tau]^* K$  and set  $L = \text{EquivalentPrimeIdeal}(K')$ ,  $L = \chi_{K'}(\delta)$  for  $\delta \in K'$  with  $N = n(L)$ . Set  $e_0 = e_0(N)$  and  $e_1 = e - e_0$ .
  - 3: Compute  $\gamma = \text{RepresentInteger}_{\mathcal{O}_0}(N\ell^{e_0})$ .
  - 4: Compute  $(C_0 : D_0) = \text{IdealModConstraint}(L, \gamma)$ .
  - 5: Compute  $(C_1 : D_1) = \text{EichlerModConstraint}(\mathbb{Z} + I_\tau, \gamma, \delta)$ .
  - 6: Compute  $C = \text{CRT}_{N_\tau, N}(C_0, C_1)$  and  $D = \text{CRT}_{N_\tau, N}(D_0, D_1)$ . If  $\ell^e p(C^2 + D^2)$  is not a quadratic residue, go back to Step 3.
  - 7: Compute  $\mu = \text{StrongApproximation}_{\ell^\bullet}(NN_\tau, C, D)$  of norm  $\ell^{e_1}$
  - 8: Set  $\beta = \gamma\mu$ .
  - 9: **return**  $J = [I_\tau]_* \chi_L(\beta)$ .
- 

In SQISign, the output  $J$  of SigningKLPT is converted into the corresponding isogeny  $\sigma$ , and the signature is a representation of this isogeny. The zero-knowledge property is proved assuming the hardness of Problem 14, described below. This assumption formalises that  $\sigma$  is indistinguishable from a random isogeny of the same degree.

The structure of this isogeny is analysed in [8], with more details in [9, Lemma 13] reproduced here as Lemma 12 for the reader's convenience.

**Lemma 12.** *Let  $L \subset \mathcal{O}$  and  $\beta \in L$  be as in steps 2, 8 respectively of Algorithm 8. The isogeny  $\sigma$  corresponding to the output  $J$  of Algorithm 8 is equal to  $\sigma = [\tau]_* \iota$ , where  $\iota$  is an isogeny of degree  $\ell^e$  verifying  $\beta = \hat{\iota} \circ \varphi_L$ .*

Before giving a precise statement of the distinguishing problem, we need to recall some notation from [8]. For what follows, we keep the notation introduced in Lemma 12 and Algorithm 8. For a given ideal  $L$  of norm  $N$ , we consider  $\mathcal{U}_{L, N_\tau}$  as the set of all isogenies  $\iota$  computed as in Lemma 12 from elements  $\beta = \gamma\mu \in L$  where  $\gamma$  is any possible output of the non-deterministic function  $\text{RepresentInteger}_{\mathcal{O}_0}(N\ell^{e_0(N)})$ , and  $\mu$  is computed as in Algorithm 8.

For an equivalence class  $\mathcal{C}$  in  $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O}_0)$  we write  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{C}, N_\tau}$  for  $\mathcal{U}_{L, N_\tau}$  where  $L = \text{EquivalentPrimeIdeal}(\mathcal{C})$  (recall that  $\text{EquivalentPrimeIdeal}$  is deterministic).

**Definition 13.**  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau} = \bigcup_{\mathcal{C} \in \text{Cl}(\mathcal{O}_0)} \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{C}, N_\tau}$

For  $D \in \mathbb{N}$  and a supersingular curve  $E$ , we define  $\text{Iso}_{D, j(E)}$  as the set of cyclic isogenies of degree  $D$ , whose domain is a curve inside the isomorphism class of  $E$ . When  $\mathcal{P}$  is a subset of  $\text{Iso}_{D, j(E)}$  and  $\tau : E \rightarrow E'$  is an isogeny with  $\gcd(\deg \tau, D) = 1$ , we write  $[\tau]_* \mathcal{P}$  for the subset  $\{[\tau]_* \varphi \mid \varphi \in \mathcal{P}\}$  of  $\text{Iso}_{D, j(E')}$ .

Finally, we denote by  $\mathcal{K}$  a probability distribution on the set of cyclic isogenies whose domain is  $E_0$ , representing the distribution of SQISign private keys. With these notations, we define the following computational problem:

*Problem 14.* Let  $p$  be a prime, and  $D$  a smooth integer. Let  $\tau : E_0 \rightarrow E_A$  be a random isogeny drawn from  $\mathcal{K}$ , and let  $N_\tau$  be its degree. Let  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau} \subset \text{Iso}_{D,j_0}$  as in Definition 13, and let  $O_\tau$  be an oracle sampling random elements in  $[\tau]_* \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ . Let  $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow \star$  of degree  $D$  where either

1.  $\sigma$  is uniformly random in  $\text{Iso}_{D,j(E_A)}$ ;
2.  $\sigma$  is uniformly random in  $[\tau]_* \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ .

The problem is, given  $p, D, \mathcal{K}, E_A, \sigma$ , to distinguish between the two cases with a polynomial number of queries to  $O_\tau$ .

### 6.1 An attack on SQISign's zero-knowledge assumption

Our distinguisher for Problem 14 is a consequence of the limitations pointed out in Section 3.1 and it occurs specifically when  $\ell = 2$  (which is the value used in [8] and in our implementation), so for the rest of this section and the next we take  $D = 2^e$ . Lemma 15 and the resulting Proposition 16 links the observations of Section 3.1 to a property on the set  $[\tau]_* \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ .

**Lemma 15.** *Let  $L$  be an  $\mathcal{O}_0$ -ideal of norm  $N$  and let  $\gamma$  be an element in  $\mathcal{O}_0$  of norm  $N\ell^e$  for some prime  $N$ . Let us take  $\mu \in \mathcal{O}_0$  such that  $\beta = \gamma\mu \in L$ . If  $\gamma \in \langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$ , then  $\chi_L(\beta) \subset \mathcal{O}_0 \langle 1 + i, 2 \rangle$ .*

*Proof.* We have  $\gamma \in \langle 1, i, j, k \rangle \subset \mathcal{O}_0 \langle 1 + i, 2 \rangle$ . Now,  $\chi_L(\beta) = \mathcal{O}_0 \langle \overline{\mu\gamma}, 2^e \rangle$ , hence  $\overline{\mu\gamma} \in \mathcal{O}_0 \overline{\gamma} \subseteq \mathcal{O}_0 \langle 1 + \bar{i}, 2 \rangle = \mathcal{O}_0 \langle 1 + i, 2 \rangle$ , which proves the proposition.

**Proposition 16.** *Let  $D = 2^e$  and  $\tau, N_\tau$  be as in Problem 14 and let the set  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  be defined from Algorithm 8. There exists an isogeny  $\iota_0 \in \text{Iso}_{2,j(E_0)}$  such that every  $\iota \in \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  can be decomposed as  $\iota = \iota_1 \circ \iota_0$  where  $\iota_1$  is an isogeny of degree  $2^{e-1}$ .*

*Proof.* Let  $J$  be the ideal corresponding to  $\sigma \in [\tau]_* \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ . By definition of  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ ,  $\iota$  corresponds to the ideal  $\chi_L(\gamma\mu)$ . It is easily verified that  $L, \gamma, \mu$  satisfy the requirements of Lemma 15 and that  $\gamma \in \langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$  since it is a possible output of  $\text{RepresentInteger}_{\mathcal{O}_0}$ . Thus, we can apply Lemma 15 and we get that  $\chi_L(\beta) \subset \mathcal{O}_0 \langle 1 + i, 2 \rangle$ . This proves the result by taking  $\iota_0$  to be the isogeny corresponding to the ideal  $\mathcal{O}_0 \langle 1 + i, 2 \rangle$ .

Thus, Proposition 16 implies that, when defined as in Definition 13, the family  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  satisfies one of the special properties introduced in [9, Appendix B.2]. Indeed, we obtain that  $I_\tau^1 = \{\iota_1 \text{ of degree } 2, \text{ s.t. } \exists \iota_2, \iota_2 \circ \iota_1 \in \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}\}$  has size 1 (instead of 3), and so a trivial distinguisher can be built against Problem 14 simply by looking at the distribution of the first step of  $\sigma$ .

*A fix against the attack.* To block the distinguisher, it suffices to use the FullRepresentInteger variant that we described in Algorithm 1 during Step 3 of Algorithm 8, instead of RepresentInteger. This alternate version of the algorithm was designed specifically to produce solutions  $\gamma$  that were not necessarily contained in  $\langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$ . If  $\gamma = (x' + y'i + z'j + t'k)/2$  it is easy to see that  $\gamma \notin \langle 1, i, j, k \rangle$  as soon as  $(x', y', z', t') \neq (0, 0, 0, 0) \pmod 2$ . Our analysis at the end of Section 3.1 showed that there were 4 possible configurations for  $(x', y', z', t') \pmod 2$  and each can be obtained when the value of  $m'$  is bigger than 1 (which we may assume). The reasoning above justifies that  $\#I_\tau^1 > 1$  but not that it reaches the desired value of 3. Let us write  $I_1, I_2$  the two other  $\mathcal{O}_0$  ideals of norm 2. It can be verified that  $I_1 = I_2i$ . Since  $(x' + y'i + z'j + t'k)i = -y' + x'i + t'j - z'k$ , it is easy to see that if some outputs of FullRepresentInteger are contained in  $I_1$ , then the same must be true for  $I_2$  (and conversely). This proves that  $\#I_\tau^1 = 3$ , i.e., all three first steps are possible. Yet, there could still be a bias in the distribution of that step, which would still give rise to an attack on Problem 14. We argue in the next section that there is no such exploitable bias. Note that with the modifications we just described, the set  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  must be updated accordingly to obtain security under the hardness of Problem 14.

## 6.2 Further analysis on the first steps of $\sigma$

We continue the analysis by looking at what happens beyond the first 2-isogeny of the elements  $\iota \in \mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ . Henceforth, we will consider the set  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  associated to a modified version of SigningKLPT. First, we replace RepresentInteger by FullRepresentInteger as suggested in Section 6.1. Second, we modify the computation of the exponent  $e_0$ . Instead of setting a unique value  $e_0(N)$  and then taking  $e_0 = e_0(N)$ , we propose to take  $e_0(N)$  as a range of values from which  $e_0$  will be sampled. The rationale behind this last modification is to cover more  $\gamma$ 's (and expand the size of  $I_\tau^k$  as a result) and it will play a role in the proof of Proposition 20. The proposed range for  $e_0(N)$  will be given precisely below.

For any  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  smaller than  $e$ , let us define  $\pi_k : \iota \mapsto \iota_k$  where  $\iota_k$  is the unique isogeny of degree  $2^k$  such that  $\iota = \iota' \circ \iota_k$ . We will study the sets  $I_\tau^k = \pi_k(\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau})$ . We will start by trying to estimate  $\#I_\tau^k$  for values of  $k \approx 1/2 \log(p)$ . Our analysis culminates in Proposition 20, which we prove under several plausible assumptions. Even though it does not prove that Problem 14 is hard, showing that  $\#I_\tau^k$  is exponential in the security parameter rules out attacks similar to the one outlined in Section 6.1.

A truly meaningful result would be to show that the distribution  $\mathcal{D}_\tau^k$  of the  $\pi_k(\iota)$  when  $\iota$  is uniformly random in  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on the isogenies of degree  $2^k$ . In the end of this section, we will try to argue that the  $\mathcal{D}_\tau^k$  are not biased for small values of  $k$ . The result we obtain are not very formal but we back them up with experimental results.

*The size of  $I_\tau^k$ .* Our goal is to show that  $I_\tau^k$  contains a good portion of the isogenies of degree  $2^k$  for values of  $k \approx p^{1/2}$ . Our final result is stated in Proposition 20 and basically follows from the fact that the isogenies of  $I_\tau^k$  only depend

on the quaternion element  $\gamma$  of norm  $N\ell^{e_0}$  when  $k \leq e_0$  (this fact follows from the analysis underlying Lemma 12). We recall that in the definition of  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ ,  $\gamma$  is a possible output of `FullRepresentInteger` such that the end of the computation in Algorithm 8 terminates. Thus, one of the main ingredients of our proof is a result (stated as Proposition 17) on the number of  $\gamma$  of norm  $M$  that can be obtained as output of `FullRepresentInteger`. We use the notation  $\Gamma_M$  for the set of primitive  $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$  of norm  $M$ .

For Proposition 17, we assume that the algorithm `Cornacchia` outputs  $\perp$  on input  $M'$  when  $M'$  is not a near-prime (the multiple of a prime by a smooth factor) or if  $M'$  is a near-prime but cannot be represented by the quadratic form  $x^2 + y^2$ . Otherwise, the algorithm outputs any of the possible solutions to the quadratic equation.

**Proposition 17.** *Let  $M > p$ . Under plausible heuristics, there exists a constant  $c_1 > 0$  such that the number of  $\gamma \in \Gamma_M$  that are possible outputs of `FullRepresentInteger` on input  $M$  is larger than  $\#\Gamma_M c_1 / \log(M)$ .*

*Proof.* Let  $2\gamma = x' + iy' + jz' + kt'$  and  $M' = 4M - p(f(z', t'))$ . Given our assumption on `Cornacchia`,  $\gamma$  is going to be an admissible output if and only if  $M'$  is a near-prime and the pair  $z', t'$  can be sampled during the first two steps of Algorithm 3. For  $z', t'$  it is easy to verify that this is the case. Indeed, the value of  $|z'|$  must be smaller than  $2m$ . Thus, there is a possibility that this value is picked. After that, we know that the correct value of  $|t'|$  must be smaller than  $m'$  and so there is also a possibility that the correct value is picked. Then, under the assumption that the  $M'$  behave as normal integers of the same size, we get that there exists a constant  $c_1$  such that a fraction  $c_1 / \log(M)$  of all the  $M'$  are near-primes. Thus, the same fraction of  $\gamma$  are going to be possible outputs of `FullRepresentInteger` and this concludes the proof.

Before proceeding to the last part of the proof, we will need some of the estimates used in [9, Section 6.4]. We give without proof a reformulation of [9, Lemmas 9 and 10] as Lemmas 18 and 19.

**Lemma 18.** *There exists  $\varepsilon = O(\log \log(p))$  such that for a random class  $\mathcal{C} \in \text{Cl}(\mathcal{O}_0)$ , the norm  $N$  of `EquivalentPrimeIdeal`( $\mathcal{C}$ ) verifies  $\log(p)/2 - \varepsilon < \log(N) < \log(p)/2 + \varepsilon$  with overwhelming probability.*

**Lemma 19.** *For any  $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ , there exists  $\eta_0 = O(\log \log(p) + \log(\kappa))$  such that for any  $e_0 \geq \log(p) - \log(N) + \varepsilon + \eta_0$ , the probability that there exists a solution  $\gamma = \text{FullRepresentInteger}_{\mathcal{O}_0}(N\ell^{e_0})$  that will lead to a correct execution of `SigningKLPT` is higher than  $1 - 2^{-\kappa}$ .*

We recall that we study  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$  for a modified version of `SigningKLPT` (the full list of changes is given in the beginning of this section) that samples the exponent  $e_0$  inside a range that we denote by  $e_0(N)$ . We define  $e_0(N) = [\log_2(p) - \log_2(N) + \varepsilon + \eta_0, \log_2(p) - \log_2(N) + \varepsilon + \eta_0 + \delta]$ , where  $\varepsilon, \eta_0$  are defined as in Lemmas 18 and 19 (these results tells us that the execution of `SigningKLPT` succeeds with overwhelming probability when  $e_0 \in e_0(N)$ ). We also introduce

the variable parameter  $\delta$  upon which the statement of Proposition 20 will depend. If we want that SigningKLPT terminates with overwhelming probability we need to have  $\delta = O(\log \log(p))$  so that  $e_1 = e - e_0$  remains in the range prescribed by [9, Lemma 11].

**Proposition 20.** *Let  $\delta$  be a positive value and  $\varepsilon, \eta_0$  be as defined for Lemmas 18 and 19. If  $k \in [\frac{\log_\ell(p)}{2} + \eta_0, \frac{\log_\ell(p)}{2} + 2\varepsilon + \eta_0 + \delta]$ , then under plausible heuristics there exists a constant  $c > 0$  such that*

$$\#I_\tau^k \geq c \cdot 2 \cdot 3^{k-1} / (\log(p) + \delta).$$

*Proof.* Let  $\varphi$  be an isogeny of degree  $2^k$ . We write  $I_\varphi$  for the corresponding ideal and  $L_\varphi = \text{EquivalentPrimeIdeal}(I_\varphi)$ ,  $N_\varphi = n(L_\varphi)$ . There exists a quaternion element  $\gamma_\varphi$  of norm  $N_\varphi 2^k$  such that  $\mathcal{O}_0 \gamma_\varphi = I_\varphi \cdot \overline{L}_\varphi$ . It can be easily verified that  $\varphi \in I_\tau^k$  if and only if  $\gamma_\varphi$  is in the set of possible  $\gamma$  involved in the definition of  $\mathcal{P}_{N_\tau}$ . We write this set  $\Gamma_\tau$ . For  $\gamma_\varphi$  to be in  $\Gamma_\tau$ , we need to verify the following things:  $k \in e_0(N_\varphi)$ ,  $\gamma_\varphi$  is a possible output of FullRepresentInteger on input  $N_\varphi 2^k$  and the rest of the computation of SigningKLPT (Step 4 to Step 7) must succeed from  $\gamma_\varphi$ .

Lemmas 18 and 19 and the definition of  $e_0(N)$  and  $k$  ensures that only a negligible number of isogenies  $\varphi$  would have  $k \notin e_0(N_\varphi)$ . After that, if we assume that  $\gamma_\varphi$  is distributed correctly in the  $\Gamma_{N_\varphi 2^k}$ , Proposition 17 tells us there exists a constant  $c_2 > 0$  such that more than a fraction  $c_2 / (\log(p) + \delta)$  of the  $\gamma_\varphi$  will be possible outputs of FullRepresentInteger. Finally, we can make the assumption that a constant fraction of those  $\gamma_\varphi$  will satisfy the last requirement (see the analysis led in [8] to justify this assumption). Thus, we obtain that there exists some constant  $c > 0$  such that a fraction bigger than  $c / (\log(p) + \delta)$  of all the  $\gamma_\varphi$  are contained in  $\Gamma_\tau$ , and we can conclude the proof.

Proposition 20 does not fully rule out a simple distinguisher. Proposition 20 proves that  $I_\tau^k$  is large, which is necessary for security. To rule out the distinguisher, one needs to understand the distribution, which is the matter of the following paragraph.

The distribution  $\mathcal{D}_\tau^k$  is another matter of importance. Biased distributions, especially for small values of  $k$ , can be easily detected which would break Problem 14. Once again, our analysis focuses on the quaternion element  $\gamma$  and on the distribution  $\mathcal{O}_0 \langle \gamma, \ell^k \rangle$  among the ideals of norm  $2^k$ . If  $2\gamma = x + yi + zj + tk$  for  $x, y, z, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ , it can be shown that  $\mathcal{O}_0 \langle \gamma, \ell^k \rangle$  will depend on the values of  $(x, y, z, t) \pmod{2\ell^k}$ . It is easy to argue that the values of  $z, t$  are sampled without any bias  $\pmod{2\ell^k}$  when  $m', m''$  are big enough compared to  $\ell^k$  (which we may assume since we look at small values of  $k$ ). After that, we can only argue informally that the near-primality condition on  $M - pf(z, t)$  should not introduce any bias on the value of  $z, t \pmod{2 \cdot \ell^k}$ . It also seems plausible that the output of Cornacchia on random near-prime inputs of a given size should not skew the distribution of  $x, y$  but we cannot really prove it.

The formulation of our new algorithm `FullRepresentInteger` avoids several pitfalls that would have lead to noticeable bias in the distribution of  $x, y, z, t \bmod 2$ . This is for instance the explanation behind Remark 5.

*Experimental evidence.* We present below in Fig. 2 the result of an experiment to study the distributions  $\mathcal{D}_\tau^k$  for small values of  $k$ . The results are consistent with our informal analysis.




Fig. 2: Distribution of the  $k$ -first steps of  $\sigma$  for 10 SQISign keys and random ideal in input over 1000 attempts.

## 7 Open problems

Arguably, the contributions presented in this work bring off solid progress towards the development of practical and secure SQISign signatures. Nevertheless, a number of questions remains open. The first one is about efficiency. In particular, we need finer cost metrics to improve our understanding of our algorithm’s behavior. This is important for both optimization and parameter selection. The second one is about further improvements of the ideal-to-isogeny procedure. Our new algorithm simplifies and improves upon the method from [8], yet it is still slow and the algorithm remains convoluted. Short of any radically new ideas, one might try to improve what we already have. The impact of improving the quality of the outputs of KLPT has been argued in [8], and the same is true for `SpecialEichlerNorm`. In general, any improvement in solving norm equations inside the lattices of  $B_{p,\infty}$  could have a positive impact on our scheme. Finally, cryptanalysis of SQISign still needs maturity. We provided some heuristic evidence that our proposed fixes prevent distinguishing attacks. However, future work should try to come up with a formal proof, even based on heuristics, that distributions of simulated transcripts are statistically close to real ones.

## References

1. Arpin, S., Chen, M., Lauter, K.E., Scheidler, R., Stange, K.E., Tran, H.T.N.: Orienting with one endomorphism. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/098 (2022), <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/098>



2. Bernstein, D.J., De Feo, L., Leroux, A., Smith, B.: Faster computation of isogenies of large prime degree. *Open Book Series* 4(1), 39–55 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.2140/obs.2020.4.39>
3. Castryck, W., Decru, T.: An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH (preliminary version). *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, Report 2022/975 (2022), <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975>
4. Cornacchia, G.: Su di un metodo per la risoluzione in numeri interi dell'equazione  $\sum_{h=0}^n c_h x^{n-h} y^h = p$ . *Giornale di Matematiche di Battaglini* 46, 33–90 (1908)
5. Costello, C.: B-SIDH: Supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman using twisted torsion. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) *ASIACRYPT 2020, Part II*. LNCS, vol. 12492, pp. 440–463. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2020). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64834-3\\_15](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64834-3_15)
6. Costello, C., Meyer, M., Naehrig, M.: Sieving for twin smooth integers with solutions to the prouhet-tarry-escott problem. In: Canteaut, A., Standaert, F.X. (eds.) *EUROCRYPT 2021, Part I*. LNCS, vol. 12696, pp. 272–301. Springer, Heidelberg (Oct 2021). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_10)
7. De Feo, L., de Saint Guilhem, C., Fouotsa, T.B., Kutas, P., Leroux, A., Petit, C., Silva, J., Wesolowski, B.: Seta: Supersingular encryption from torsion attacks. In: Tibouchi, M., Wang, H. (eds.) *ASIACRYPT 2021, Part IV*. LNCS, vol. 13093, pp. 249–278. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2021). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5\\_9](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_9)
8. De Feo, L., Kohel, D., Leroux, A., Petit, C., Wesolowski, B.: SQISign: Compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) *ASIACRYPT 2020, Part I*. LNCS, vol. 12491, pp. 64–93. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2020). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64837-4\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64837-4_3)
9. De Feo, L., Kohel, D., Leroux, A., Petit, C., Wesolowski, B.: SQISign: compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, Report 2020/1240 (2020), <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1240>
10. De Feo, L., Masson, S., Petit, C., Sanso, A.: Verifiable delay functions from supersingular isogenies and pairings. In: Galbraith, S.D., Moriai, S. (eds.) *ASIACRYPT 2019, Part I*. LNCS, vol. 11921, pp. 248–277. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2019). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34578-5\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34578-5_10)
11. Deuring, M.: Die Typen der Multiplikatorenringe elliptischer Funktionenkörper. *Abhandlungen aus dem Mathematischen Seminar der Universität Hamburg* 14(1), 197–272 (Dec 1941)
12. Eisenträger, K., Hallgren, S., Lauter, K.E., Morrison, T., Petit, C.: Supersingular isogeny graphs and endomorphism rings: Reductions and solutions. In: Nielsen, J.B., Rijmen, V. (eds.) *EUROCRYPT 2018, Part III*. LNCS, vol. 10822, pp. 329–368. Springer, Heidelberg (Apr / May 2018). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_11)
13. Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) *CRYPTO'86*. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (Aug 1987). [https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47721-7\\_12](https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47721-7_12)
14. Galbraith, S.D., Petit, C., Silva, J.: Identification protocols and signature schemes based on supersingular isogeny problems. *Journal of Cryptology* 33(1), 130–175 (Jan 2020). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-019-09316-0>
15. Kohel, D.: Endomorphism rings of elliptic curves over finite fields. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley (1996), <http://www.i2m.univ-amu.fr/perso/david.kohel/pub/thesis.pdf>



16. Kohel, D.R., Lauter, K., Petit, C., Tignol, J.P.: On the quaternion  $\ell$ -isogeny path problem. *LMS Journal of Computation and Mathematics* **17**(A), 418–432 (2014). <https://doi.org/10.1112/S1461157014000151>
17. Leroux, A.: A new isogeny representation and applications to cryptography. In: Agrawal, S., Lin, D. (eds.) *ASIACRYPT 2022, Part II*. LNCS, vol. 13792, pp. 3–35. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2022). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22966-4\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22966-4_1)
18. Longa, P.: Efficient algorithms for large prime characteristic fields and their application to bilinear pairings and supersingular isogeny-based protocols. *Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/367* (2022), <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/367>
19. Love, J., Boneh, D.: Supersingular curves with small noninteger endomorphisms. *Open Book Series* **4**(1), 7–22 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.2140/obs.2020.4.7>
20. Maino, L., Martindale, C.: An attack on SIDH with arbitrary starting curve. *Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/1026* (2022), <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1026>
21. Robert, D.: Breaking SIDH in polynomial time. *Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/1038* (2022), <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1038>
22. Silverman, J.H.: *The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves*, Graduate Texts in Mathematics, vol. 106. Springer-Verlag (1986)
23. Vélou, J.: Isogénies entre courbes elliptiques. *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Sciences, Séries A-B* **273**, A238–A241 (1971)
24. Waterhouse, W.C.: Abelian varieties over finite fields. *Annales scientifiques de l'École Normale Supérieure* **2**(4), 521–560 (1969)
25. Wesolowski, B.: Orientations and the supersingular endomorphism ring problem. In: Dunkelman, O., Dziembowski, S. (eds.) *EUROCRYPT 2022, Part III*. LNCS, vol. 13277, pp. 345–371. Springer, Heidelberg (May / Jun 2022). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07082-2\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07082-2_13)
26. Wesolowski, B.: The supersingular isogeny path and endomorphism ring problems are equivalent. In: *2021 IEEE 62nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)*. pp. 1100–1111 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS52979.2021.00109>