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# Explicit asymptotic secret key rate of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with an arbitrary modulation

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
# Outline

1. Motivation, main result and methods
2. Applications and extensions


1<sup>st</sup> part: Motivation, main result and methods

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# Quantum key distribution (QKD)



# Continuous-variable (CV) QKD




Wigner function of the coherent state  $|\alpha\rangle$   
with  $\alpha = 1 + i$

- ❖ Historically, discrete-variable (DV) protocols such as BB84
- ❖ DV QKD requires single-photon detectors → expensive
- ❖ Continuous variables [Ralph 1999] :
  - encoding on the quadratures of the quantified electromagnetic field + coherent detection
  - experimentally friendlier
  - But harder proofs (infinite-dimensional Fock space), and less tolerant to loss


# Discretely modulated (DM) CVQKD

- ❖ Gaussian modulation : Alice sends  $|\alpha\rangle$  with  $\alpha \sim N(0, V_A)$  [Grosshans, Grangier 2002]  
(Almost complete) security proof [Garcia-Patron, Cerf 2006; Navascues, Grosshans, Acín 2006, Leverrier 2017]
  - ❖ Infinite continuous constellation  $\neq$  modulators have a finite precision and range  
→ unrealistic
- ⇒ Discretely modulated CVQKD protocols


QPSK  
(quadrature phase  
shift keying)



M-PSK  
(M-phase shift  
keying)



QAM  
(quadrature amplitude  
modulation)



Security  
proofs ?

# (Prepare and measure) Protocol

## Quantum

### part

(repeated many times)

1. Alice randomly chooses one coherent state  $|\alpha_k\rangle$  with probability  $p_k$  from a set of coherent states  $\{|\alpha_k\rangle\}_{k \in I}$  and sends it to Bob.

$$\tau = \sum_{k \in I} p_k |\alpha_k\rangle\langle\alpha_k|$$

2. Bob measures the quadratures of the states he receives, using coherent detection, and obtains  $\beta_k$ .

## Classical

### post-

### processing

1. Discretisation of Bob's variables
2. Reconciliation step
3. Parameter estimation
4. Privacy amplification



# Main result: analytical bound on the asymptotic secret key rate of DM CV QKD

- ❖ Security proof in the asymptotic regime, under the restriction to coherent attacks
- ❖ Asymptotic secret key rate = Important figure of merit to compare various protocols
- ❖ Numerical bounds [Ghorai et al PRX 2019; Lin et al PRX19], but : computationally-expensive, time-consuming, difficult to optimise over parameters, less reliable.
- ❖ Result : explicit analytical bound on the asymptotic secret key rate of any DM CV QKD protocol

# Equivalent entanglement-based protocol and Devetak Winter bound

❖ Devetak-Winter bound :

Mutual information between Alice and Bob

$$\text{Secret key rate } k = I(X; Y) - \sup_{N:A' \rightarrow B} \chi(Y; E)$$

❖ (Symmetrised) Covariance matrix :

Fixed by modulation  $V = (V_A + 1)$

$$\Gamma = \begin{bmatrix} V I_2 & Z \hat{\sigma}_z \\ Z \hat{\sigma}_z & W I_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Measured locally by Bob

Extremality of Gaussian states [García Patró, Cerf 2006, Navascués, Grosshans, Acín2006]

→ upper bound on Holevo information depends on  $\Gamma$  and on the type of coherent detection used :

$$\sup_{N:A' \rightarrow B} \chi(Y; E) \leq f(\Gamma)$$

⇒ Goal : Bound on  $Z = \text{tr}(\rho(\hat{a}\hat{b} + \hat{a}^\dagger\hat{b}^\dagger))$

## Semidefinite Program

The diagram shows a Semidefinite Program (SDP) with the following components:

- Objective:**  $\min_{\rho} \text{tr}(\rho C)$
- Constraints (s.t.):**
  - $\text{tr}_B(\rho) = \bar{\tau}$
  - $\text{tr}(\rho C_1) = 2c_1$
  - $\text{tr}(\rho C_2) = 2c_2$
  - $\text{tr}(\rho(I \otimes b^\dagger b)) = n_b$
  - $\rho \succcurlyeq 0$

Explanatory text boxes with arrows pointing to the constraints:

- $\rho$  : state shared by Alice and Bob ;  $C = \hat{a}\hat{b} + \hat{a}^\dagger\hat{b}^\dagger$
- $\rho$  is obtained by applying a channel to the bipartite state prepared by Alice ;  $\tau = \sum_k p_k |\alpha_k\rangle\langle\alpha_k|$ .
- Constraints obtained from observed statistics in the prepare & measure protocol :
  - First moment constraints
  - Second moment constraint
- $\rho$  is a density matrix

# Bound on a solution of the SDP

$$K = z (A - x P^\dagger) + \frac{1}{z} B^\dagger$$

where  $x, z$  et  $P$  are parameters that we later optimise

$$KK^\dagger = E - C$$

$$KK^\dagger \succeq 0 \Rightarrow \text{tr}(\rho C) \leq \text{tr}(\rho E)$$

Depends on the modulation

$$\text{tr}(\rho C) \geq 2c_1 - 2 \left( \left( n_B - \frac{c_2^2}{\langle n \rangle} \right) w \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} := Z^*$$

↑ Estimated experimentally
↑ Average photon number in the modulation

# Continuity with known results: Gaussian modulation

❖ Recall :  $tr(\rho C) \leq 2 c_1 - 2 \left( \left( n_B - \frac{c_2^2}{\langle n \rangle} \right) w \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$


❖  $w$  vanishes for a Gaussian modulation

❖ If the transmittance channel is  $T$ , recover


$$tr(\rho C) = 2\sqrt{T (\langle n \rangle^2 + \langle n \rangle)}$$

⇒ tight bound in the case of a Gaussian modulation.

# Continuity with known results: Quadrature Phase Shift Keying



Numerical bounds [from Ghorai et al PRX 2019] and our analytical bounds match except for transmittances very close to 1.



## 2<sup>nd</sup> part: Applications

Study of M-PSK & QAM, other applications, extensions

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# Methods to get practical results

- ❖ Typical Gaussian channel with transmittance  $T$  and excess noise  $\xi$

$$\Gamma = \begin{bmatrix} (V_A + 1) I_2 & Z^* \hat{\sigma}_z \\ Z^* \hat{\sigma}_z & (1 + T V_A + T \xi) I_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Z^* = 2 \sqrt{T} \operatorname{tr}(\tau^{1/2} a \tau^{1/2} a^\dagger) - \sqrt{2 T \xi w}$$

- ❖ Reconciliation efficiency


- ❖ Heterodyne detection

$$k = \beta I(X; Y) - \sup_{N: A' \rightarrow B} \chi(Y; E) \leq \beta I(X; Y) - f(\Gamma)$$



# Phase-shift keying modulations (PSK)



Constellation made of coherent states regularly arranged on a circle in phase space, drawn with equal probability.



8-PSK constellation

# Phase-shift keying modulations

- ❖ When the modulation amplitude is optimised, going beyond  $M=5$  is essentially useless.
  - ❖ But increasing  $M$  allows for larger possible values of the modulation amplitude.
- ⇒ The method of [Lin, Upadhyaya, Lütkenhaus 2019; Upadhyaya et al 2021] seems to give better bounds for M-PSK modulations.





Asymptotic secret key rate for the M-PSK modulation schemes.  $\xi=0.01$  ;  $\beta=0.95$ .

# Quadrature-amplitude modulations (QAM)

Constellation : coherent states regularly arranged on a grid in phase space, drawn according to a certain distribution (e.g. binomial or discretised Gaussian distribution).


→ what people want to do in practise to use standard telecom equipment



Colors indicate the probabilities corresponding to each state.

# Quadrature amplitude modulations

- ❖ 64-QAM already gives performances close to that of the Gaussian.
- ❖ Increasing the constellation size enables to work at higher signal-to-noise ratio.




Secret key rate at 50 km as a function of the modulation variance  $V_A$ , for various modulation schemes.

Parameters :  $\xi = 0.02$  ,  $\beta = 0.95$ .


For this choice of distance and excess noise, our bound gives a vanishing secret key rate for the QPSK scheme.

# Comparison of QAM constellations

For the 16-QAM, the discrete Gaussian (with optimal parameter) outperforms the binomial distribution.



For a 64-QAM both distributions yield essentially the same performance.




Bound on the asymptotic secret key rate as a function of the distance.

Fixed parameters parameters :  $V_A = 5$ ,  $\xi = 0.02$ ,  $\beta = 0.95$

# Maximum tolerable excess noise

- ❖ Maximum value of the excess noise  $\xi$  which gives a positive secret key rate?
  - 64-QAM : performance close to the Gaussian modulation
  - 256-QAM : almost indistinguishable from the Gaussian modulation.



Maximum value  $\xi_{\max}$  of excess noise compatible with a positive key rate as a function of distance, for various QAM sizes (with binomial distribution).  $\beta = 0.95$ ,  $V_A$  is optimized for each point.

# Arbitrary modulations

- ❖ Similar method (with a different  $K$  operator)
  
- ❖ Applications :
  - protocols with e.g. thermal states
  - assess impact of imperfect state preparation on the security
  
- ❖ Bound has one more term  $\rightarrow$  tightness : open question

# Conclusion

Main result: Analytical bound on the asymptotic secret key rate of CV QKD protocols with an arbitrary modulation of coherent states (and more generally any arbitrary modulation)

## Most impactful applications:

- Choice of modulation sizes (e.g. 64 states)
- Step towards full security proof

## Other benefits:

Makes possible the

- Study of optimal constellations
- Study of the impact of imperfect state preparation on the security

## Open questions:

- Tightness of bounds
- Extensions to other schemes
- Optimality of collective attacks among general attacks



Thank you !

