EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2021

EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography


EasyCrypt is a formal verification tool used extensively for formalizing concrete security proofs of cryptographic constructions. However, the EasyCrypt formal logics consider only classical attackers, which means that post-quantum security proofs cannot be formalized and machine-checked with this tool. In this paper we prove that a natural extension of the EasyCrypt core logics permits capturing a wide class of post-quantum cryptography proofs, settling a question raised by (Unruh, POPL 2019). Leveraging our positive result, we implement EasyPQC, an extension of EasyCrypt for post-quantum security proofs, and use EasyPQC to verify postquantum security of three classic constructions: PRF-based MAC, Full Domain Hash and GPV08 identity-based encryption.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
2021-1253.pdf (875.19 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03529301 , version 1 (17-01-2022)



Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Xiong Fan, Benjamin Grégoire, Shih-Han Hung, et al.. EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography. ACM CCS 2021 - ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2021, Virtual Event, South Korea. pp.2564-2586, ⟨10.1145/3460120.3484567⟩. ⟨hal-03529301⟩
43 View
100 Download



Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More