A toolbox for verifiable tally-hiding e-voting systems - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2021

A toolbox for verifiable tally-hiding e-voting systems

Résumé

In most verifiable electronic voting schemes, one key step is the tally phase, where the election result is computed from the encrypted ballots. A generic technique consists in first applying (verifiable) mixnets to the ballots and then revealing all the votes in the clear. This however discloses much more information than the result of the election itself (that is, the winners) and may offer the possibility to coerce voters. In this paper, we present a collection of building blocks for designing tally-hiding schemes based on multi-party computations. As an application, we propose the first tally-hiding schemes with no leakage for four important counting functions: D'Hondt, Condorcet, STV, and Majority Judgment. We also unveil unknown flaws or leakage in several previously proposed tally-hiding schemes.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
2021-491.pdf (603.2 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03367930 , version 1 (06-10-2021)
hal-03367930 , version 2 (29-09-2022)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03367930 , version 1

Citer

Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Quentin Yang. A toolbox for verifiable tally-hiding e-voting systems. 2021. ⟨hal-03367930v1⟩
224 Consultations
248 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More