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Article Dans Une Revue IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid Année : 2021

Moving-Target Defense Against Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids via Game Theory

Résumé

This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of their physical attack by actively perturbing the grid's transmission line reactances via distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. The proposed MTD design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize the defense cost during the system's operational time, we formulate a zero-sum game to identify the best subset of links to perturb (which will provide adequate protection) against a strategic attacker. The Nash equilibrium robust solution is computed via exponential weights, which does not require complete knowledge of the game but only the observed payoff at each iteration. Extensive simulations performed using the MAT-POWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator's defense cost.

Dates et versions

hal-03306825 , version 1 (29-07-2021)

Identifiants

Citer

Subhash Lakshminarayana, Elena Veronica Belmega, H. Vincent Poor. Moving-Target Defense Against Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids via Game Theory. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2021, 12 (6), pp.5244-5257. ⟨10.1109/TSG.2021.3095083⟩. ⟨hal-03306825⟩
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