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To cite this version:
Pooya Farshim, Georg Fuchsbauer, Alain Passelègue. Alternative Constructions of Asymmetric Primitives from Obfuscation: Hierarchical IBE, Predicate Encryption, and More. Indocrypt 2020 - 21st International Conference on Cryptology, Dec 2020, Virtual conference, India. hal-03120656

HAL Id: hal-03120656
https://inria.hal.science/hal-03120656
Submitted on 16 Jun 2021

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Simpler Constructions of Asymmetric Primitives from Obfuscation

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Abstract. We revisit constructions of asymmetric primitives from obfuscation and give simpler alternatives. We consider public-key encryption, (hierarchical) identity-based encryption ((H)IBE), and predicate encryption. Obfuscation has already been shown to imply PKE by Sahai and Waters (STOC’14) and full-fledged functional encryption by Garg et al. (FOCS’13). We simplify all these constructions and reduce the necessary assumptions on the class of circuits that the obfuscator needs to support. Our PKE scheme relies on just a PRG and does not need any puncturing. Our IBE and bounded HIBE schemes convert natural key-delegation mechanisms from (recursive) applications of puncturable PRFs to IBE and HIBE schemes. Our most technical contribution is an unbounded HIBE, which uses (public-coin) differing-inputs obfuscation for circuits and whose proof relies on a recent pebbling-based hybrid argument by Fuchsbauer et al. (ASIACRYPT’14). All our constructions are anonymous, support arbitrary inputs, and have compact keys and ciphertexts.

Keywords. Obfuscation, public-key encryption, identity-based encryption, hierarchical IBE, predicate encryption, puncturable PRF, pebbling.

1 Introduction

Indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+12, GGH+13] has rekindled interest in the search for a unified approach to constructions of cryptographic primitives. It has been proven sufficient to build almost every primitive, from the most basic such as public-key encryption or short signatures, to powerful ones such as functional encryption for all circuits. Indistinguishability obfuscation has been used extensively as a building block for many other constructions [GGH+13, SW14, HSW14, BZ14, BLR+15, HW15, CLP15, PPS15, AS16].

1.1 Motivation

In this paper, we take a second look at constructions of basic cryptographic primitives and try to obtain the simplest possible constructions. Devising simple
constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) presents multiple interests. iO for NC$^1$, and even for smaller classes, can be extended to iO for P/poly via bootstrapping theorems [GGH$^+$13, CLTV15, Lin16] at the cost of strong assumptions such as sub-exponentially secure pseudorandom generators in NC$^0$ or the sub-exponential hardness of the learning with errors problem. On the other hand, certain simple circuits, such as those with logarithmic input lengths or point functions, can be easily obfuscated, and more advanced circuits such as “compute-and-compare” programs (of the form “if $C(x) = z$ then output $m$,” where $x$ is the input, $C$ a circuit, $m$ a string and $z$ a long pseudorandom secret string) can be obfuscated assuming only the learning with errors assumption [WZ17, GKW17, CVW18].

Therefore, depending on the class of circuits, assuming the existence of iO can be either a weak or an extremely strong assumption. In particular, there seems to be an enormous gap between assuming the existence of iO for P/poly or “bootstrappable” classes of circuits and those for small sets of circuits. Hence, understanding the minimal class of circuits that one needs to obfuscate in order to build various cryptographic primitives is an interesting theoretical measure of their “cryptographic complexity”, and constructing primitives using indistinguishability obfuscation for a small enough class of circuits could lead to efficient constructions based on standard assumptions.

1.2 Contributions

In this work, we study public-key encryption (PKE), (hierarchical) identity-based encryption (IBE) and predicate encryption with the goal of minimizing the required class of obfuscatable circuits.

Our PKE scheme, which we sketch below, will demonstrate the core (conceptual) idea behind all schemes that we study in this work: using iO we can convert a (trivial) key-delegation mechanism for a single user (namely a single secret key for that user) to an asymmetric encryption scheme that supports this key delegation.

We show that this idea lends itself to natural generalizations. The key delegation underlying an IBE can be seen as a tree of height one with the trusted authority sitting at the root and the users at its leaves. Keys are derived by applying a pseudorandom function (PRF) to leaf identities under the root key. A hierarchical delegation generalizes this to trees of arbitrary height with a PRF iteratively applied to identities along a path. We show the technique underlying our PKE can convert these key-delegation schemes to encryption schemes that support them respectively.

The HIBE construction just sketched supports a bounded number of levels. As we shall discuss shortly, a number of obstacles prevent us from directly extending the bounded HIBE to an unbounded one. Nevertheless, we show that these obstacles can be overcome by introducing a somewhat more involved key delegation (which ensures the compactness of the key delegation operation) and
We see this result as the main technical contribution of the paper.

Public-key encryption. Following [GGSW13, BNPW16], we start by constructing a simple public-key encryption scheme. The secret key of the scheme is a random seed $sk \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and the corresponding public key is $G(sk)$ where $G$ is a length-doubling pseudorandom generator (PRG). Encrypting a message $M$ under $pk$ consists of obfuscating a circuit that takes as input some $sk' \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and checks if $G(sk') = pk$, in which case it outputs the message $M$, and ⊥ otherwise. To decrypt, a user runs the ciphertext (which is an obfuscated circuit) on input the secret key $sk$. If $sk$ corresponds to the public key, the check passes and the message $M$ is returned; the scheme is thus correct.

A similar idea was also used in [BZ14] to construct $n$-party non-interactive key-exchange: Intuitively, the setup outputs a public obfuscated program that allows to evaluate a hardwired PRF $F_k$ on inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_n, s$ if and only if $x_i = G(s)$ for some $i$ for a PRG $G$. A group key is then obtained via each party publishing a PRG evaluation $G(s_i)$ for a private seed $s_i$ and running the obfuscated program on inputs $G(s_1), \ldots, G(s_n), s_i$.

Security of our PKE follows from the security of the PRG, which ensures the public key $G(sk)$ is indistinguishable from a random bit string of the same length. Now, if $pk$ is outside of the range of $G$, there is no $sk'$ for which $G(sk') = pk$ and encryptions under $pk$ are (obfuscated) circuits that always output ⊥. By the security of the obfuscator, this circuit reveals no more information than a circuit that is independent of the message and always returns ⊥. This arguably very simple construction can also be shown to be anonymous, meaning that its ciphertexts do not reveal their intended recipients.

Due to its simplicity, we show that our construction can be efficiently instantiated based on the standard DDH assumption. In particular, we give a PRG and an indistinguishability obfuscator based on DDH, that when used within the construction result in an anonymous (and lossy) version of ElGamal.

Identity-based encryption. We now apply the idea to key-delegation mechanism for IBEs. In our scheme the secret key of an identity $id$ is the output of a pseudorandom function $F(K, id)$, where $K$ is the master secret key. The master public key is an obfuscated circuit that on input $id$ outputs its public key $pk_{id} := G(F(K, id))$. Encryption and decryption work as in the PKE scheme.

To prove the security of the scheme, similarly to our PKE, we need to switch the public key of the challenge identity $id^*$ from $G(F(K, id^*))$ to a random value. Intuitively, this should follow from the pseudorandomness of $F$. But the IBE game also contains an obfuscated circuit depending on the master key $K$, and furthermore key extraction for identities $id \neq id^*$ should be simulated. This restriction in the IBE security game precisely matches the functionality and security of puncturable PRFs: from $K$ we can derive a punctured key $K^*$ that allows evaluating the PRF everywhere except at $id^*$ and $F(K, id^*)$ is in-

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4 Although the proof of this construction is somewhat complex, the construction itself is relatively simple given that it achieves an unbounded number of levels.
distinguishable from random even in the presence of $K^*$. (Such PRFs can be based on the GGM [GGM86] construction only assuming the existence of PRGs [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13].) As for our PKE, since ciphertexts are indistinguishable from obfuscations of a constant circuit, they hide both their underlying plaintexts and recipient identities, giving rise to an IBE that is anonymous and can therefore be used, for example, in the context of public-key encryption with keyword search [ABC05].

We leave it as an interesting open problem to instantiate the IBE construction based on standard assumptions (as we did for PKEs via ElGamal). Doing so could shed further light on the construction of these primitives and conceptually clarify the rationale behind them through their lens of obfuscation.

**Bounded HIBE.** In an HIBE, identities take the form $id = (id_1,\ldots, id_i)$ and a key for $(id_1,\ldots, id_i)$ allows deriving keys for $(id_1,\ldots, id_{i+1})$ for any $id_{i+1}$. By recursively applying the PRF to identities along a path we arrive at a hierarchical key-delegation mechanism. Following the PKE construction, we can then convert this to an HIBE scheme as follows. Our scheme defines the master secret key as a random value $sk_0 = K$, and sets the key for $id_1$ to $sk_1 := F(K, id_1)$, that for $(id_1, id_2)$ to $sk_2 := F(sk_1, id_2)$, and so on. We follow the encryption and decryption procedures of the PKE scheme to arrive at a full scheme. When the puncturable GGM PRF is used, it is easy to see how the puncturability of the PRF maps to the ability to extract keys for identities that are not parents of the challenge identity.

This HIBE only supports an a priori bounded number of levels. To prove security, we need to replace the public key for the challenge identity $id^*$, computed as

$$pk^* = G(F(\ldots F(F(K, id_1^*), id_2^*) \ldots, id_n^*)$$

by a random value. To this end, we first define a game where we change the master circuit (used to compute public keys) and hardwire all values that we will change later in the proof. In more detail, we replace $K$ by $K^*$ punctured at $id_1^*$, then from $sk_1^* = F(K, id_1^*)$ we derive a key punctured at $id_2^*$ (which allows to derive public keys for all $(id_1^*, id_2,\ldots)$ with $id_2 \neq id_2^*$) and so on until we finally hardwire the public key $pk^* = G(sk_n^*)$ at the lowest level. As we did not change the functionality of the circuit, its obfuscation is indistinguishable from an honestly generated master public key. Note, however, that we did change the size of the circuit, and thus need to pad the master circuit in the scheme to the maximum size of the circuits that will be used in the proof. (This issue will reappear when extending the construction to an unbounded HIBE.) The rest of the proof proceeds via a sequence of hybrids where we iteratively replace $sk_1^*$ by a random value, then $sk_2^*$, etc., until we arrive at a random $sk_n^*$, which together with PRG security allows us to replace $pk^* = G(sk_n^*)$ by a random value.

**Unbounded HIBE.** There are a number of challenges when extending the HIBE to support an unbounded number of levels (analogously to direct constructions of unbounded HIBEs [LW11]). An obvious one is that circuits cannot take identities of arbitrary lengths as inputs. We could define a Turing machine (TM)
that accepts identities of arbitrary lengths and carries out the recursive PRF evaluation to derive its public key. Using the TM-obfuscator of Ishai, Pandey, and Sahai [IPS15], we could then obfuscate this TM. However, when using puncturing, we still need to hardwire random values in the circuit in the proof, which would result in a TM whose description size is not a priori bounded. The problem seems to stem from the fact that in order to replace key $sk_1^*$ corresponding to $(id_1^*,...,id_n^*)$ with a random value, we first need to replace all intermediate values $sk_1^* := F(K, id_1^*)$, $sk_2^* := F(sk_1^*, id_2^*)$, ... with random.

While it is true that we can only replace a value $sk_i^* = F(sk_{i-1}^*, id_i^*)$ by random if $sk_{i-1}^*$ is already random (since the reduction would not know $sk_{i-1}^*$), the previous values do not have to be random for this specific game hop. Let $S_i \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$ denote the set of indices $j$ for which $sk_j^*$ is random in hybrid $i$. In the proof of the bounded HIBE, the $i$-th hybrid replaces $sk_i^*$ by a random value, so we have $S_0 := \{1, \ldots, i\}$. For the proof to go through, the sequence of sets $S_0, S_1, \ldots, S_\ell$ needs to have the following properties: (A) $S_0 = \emptyset$ and $n \in S_\ell$, and (B) every two consecutive sets differ in exactly one element $j$, and $j - 1 \in S_i$ belongs to both sets. Set $S_0$ with no random values corresponds to the original game and $S_\ell$ makes the last value corresponding to $sk_n^*$ random. To go from one hybrid to the next, we can replace an additional value by random, since its ancestor is already random (by property (B)).

Similarly to the pebbling strategy used in the context of reversible computation in [Ben89], Fuchsbauer et al. [FKPR14] give such a sequence where $\ell = n^{3 \log_2 3}$ and with the property that $|S_i| \leq \log n$ (this corresponds to a pebbling of a path in the GGM tree with logarithmically many pebbles). Letting $n$ be an upper bound on the length of the challenge identity the adversary chooses (which is polynomial in the security parameter $\lambda$), we would have a polynomial number $\ell$ of hybrids, while in each hybrid step we only need to hardwire a logarithmic number of values. It seems that we can thus pad the actual scheme to support an exponential number of levels in the hierarchy.

Alas, this approach does not work: we also need to hardwire the positions $(id_1^*,...,id_n^*)$ of these values for which there is no upper bound. We therefore use a different approach and hash the identities to obtain compact representations of them. We define the secret key for $id$ as $F(K, H(id))$. The problem now is that hashing completely destroys the hierarchical relationship between the identities and we thus need to implement key delegation differently. We do this by adding a second functionality to the public parameters that given a valid secret key $sk$ for a identity $id$ and a value $id'$ returns a secret key $sk' = F(K, H(id, id'))$ for $(id, id')$.

Rather than relying on TM-obfuscators, which can be constructed from public-coin differing-input obfuscation (pc-diO) for circuits\(^5\) [IPS15], we devise circuits for computing public keys and delegating secret keys so that we directly rely on pc-diO for circuits. One benefit of this approach is that any (natural) iO for circuits is conjecturally also a public-coin differing-input obfuscator for

\(^5\) We note that public-coin diO is not known to suffer from impossibility results that apply to its private-coin counterpart [GGHW14, BSW16].
circuits. Hence we avoid the overheads associated with the complex constructions of [IPS15]. Computing public keys can easily be done by defining a circuit $C^{\text{gen}}(h)$ that returns $G(F(K, h))$ and to get a public key for $id$ we simply run $C^{\text{gen}}(H(id))$.

The delegation circuit $C^{\text{del}}$, on the other hand, needs to ensure it only works for descendants. If we relied on pc-diO for Turing machines, we could define $C^{\text{del}}$ on input $(sk, id, id')$ to check whether $G(sk) = G(F(K, H(id)))$, and if so return $F(K, H(id, id'))$. This results in a fairly simple construction of an unbounded HIBE (whose proof is nevertheless somewhat involved). At the expense of slightly increasing the complexity of the scheme, we modify this construction so as to only rely on pc-diO for circuits (as discussed above). To do this, we require a user to compactly prove (to the circuit) that two hash values $(h, h')$ correspond to $(id, id')$ with $h = H(id)$ and $h' = H(id, id')$. For this we use a succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) system and define $C^{\text{del}}$ as follows: On input $(sk, h, h', \pi)$ the delegation circuit checks the validity of the proof $\pi$ for $(h, h')$, then checks that $G(sk) = G(F(K, h))$, and if so returns $F(K, h')$.

To bound the number of hardcoded values, our proof strategy follows the above ideas. For a set system $S_0, \ldots, S_t$ satisfying properties (A) and (B), we define game $G_i$ as one that replaces the values $pk^*_{j} = G(F(K, H(id^*_1, \ldots, id^*_t)))$ by random values for all $j \in S_i$. That is, these values are hardcoded into the circuits $C^{\text{gen}}$ and $C^{\text{del}}$. Games $G_i$ and $G_{i+1}$ differ in that $pk^*_{j}$ is random in only one of them, with $j$ defined as $\{j\} := S_i \triangle S_{i+1}$ (where $\triangle$ denotes the symmetric difference). To show that these games are indistinguishable, we puncture $K$ at $H(id^*_1, \ldots, id^*_t)$ and use this $K^*$ in $C^{\text{gen}}$ and $C^{\text{del}}$. Since we can first hardwire $pk^*_{j}$, this does not change the behavior of $C^{\text{gen}}$, and thus we can rely on iO security.

The behavior of $C^{\text{del}}$, on the other hand, does change, which is why we require (public-coin) differing-inputs obfuscation and must show that it is hard to actually find a differing input. Suppose an adversary finds an input $(sk, h, h', \pi)$ for which $C^{\text{del}}$ behaves differently when using the punctured key. This means $h' = H(id^*_1, \ldots, id^*_t)$; but $\pi$ (together with the collision-resistance of $H$) guarantees that $h = H(id^*_{j-1}, \ldots, id^*_{j-1})$. By property (B) of our set system: $j = S_i \triangle S_{i+1}$; thus the value $pk^*_{j-1}$, corresponding to $G(F(K, H(id^*_1, \ldots, id^*_{j-1})))$, and thus $G(F(K, h))$, was replaced by random, and hence no $sk$ will satisfy $G(sk) = pk^*_{j-1}$. But this means that $C^{\text{del}}$ returns $\perp$, which contradicts $(sk, h, h', \pi)$ being a differing input. Consistently, we require $H$ to be public-coin and collision-resistant [HR04] and the SNARK to be in the common-random-string model [IPS15].

We observe that if identities are restricted to be of bounded length, the hash function can be replaced with the identity function, and the SNARK with a trivial one that simply outputs the witness. These in turn allow us to rely on iO (for circuits) in the $C^{\text{del}}$ circuit.

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6 Since our construction relies on public-coin diO, it must be hard to find a differing input even when given the coins used to sample the circuits (whose obfuscations should be indistinguishable). As a hash collision results in a differing input, it must be hard to find one even given the coins used to sample the hash function.
**Predicate encryption.** Predicate encryption (PE) \[BW07, KSW08\] is a powerful type of public-key encryption that can support, for example, searching for complex queries on encrypted data and encompasses other forms of PKE such as attribute-based encryption \[GPSW06, LOS+10\]. A natural construction of a PE scheme also falls out from our techniques. Intuitively, we identify attributes with identities. A secret key \(sk_P\) for a predicate \(P\) is then an obfuscated circuit with \(K\) and \(P\) hardwired that on input an attribute \(\gamma\) outputs \(F(K, \gamma)\) if \(P(\gamma) = 1\) and \(\bot\) otherwise. We defer the details of the construction to Appendix F.

**Complexity of circuits.** All of our constructions except PKE obfuscate a puncturable PRF. Thus, the classes of circuits used in these constructions are potentially amenable to further simplifications. However, it is worth noting that the obfuscated circuits corresponding to a ciphertext in all of our constructions (specifically, a circuit that evaluates a PRG and possibly a puncturable PRF and outputs a message if the evaluation matches a certain value \(z\)) fall into the class of “compute-and-compare” functionalities. Unfortunately, in our case, the string \(z\) is a public (pseudorandom) string, while obfuscation of compute-and-compare programs from standard assumptions \[WZ17, GKW17, CVW18\] is, for now, only known when \(z\) is secret. Yet, these recent works show that certain classes of programs that appear non-trivial to obfuscate can actually be obfuscated under standard assumptions. This strengthens our belief that simpler constructions based on special-purpose obfuscation is an interesting direction to pursue.

We finally note that puncturing is only required in the proofs. Thus, it would be interesting to devise new PRFs that are easily obfuscatable even though neither puncturing them nor obfuscating their punctured evaluation procedures are efficient. For example, assuming one can obfuscate AES, we either obtain a secure AES-based IBE, or deduce that either AES cannot be punctured or its punctured circuit cannot be obfuscated.

### 1.3 Related works

Canetti, Rothblum, and Varia \[CRV10\] adopt a similar approach for building leakage-resilient one-time signatures by first constructing a special-purpose obfuscator for testing hyperplane membership. Similarly, Matsuda and Hanaoka \[MH14\] propose a construction of CCA-secure encryption based on rerandomizable and composable point function obfuscators.

Garg et al. \[GGSW13\] show that witness encryption (which is implied by iO) and unique signatures imply identity-based encryption. Such unique signatures can be based on iO and injective one-way functions (or just one-way functions for constructions in the CRS model) \[BP15\]. Combining these results, one obtains an IBE from (injective) one-way functions and iO, but the construction is fairly complex. In particular, encrypting consists of obfuscating a circuit that runs the verification circuit of a signature scheme, which is itself an obfuscated circuit. Our construction relies on iO and one-way functions and is much simpler. Garg et al. also show that witness encryption combined with a perfectly binding
non-interactive commitment scheme implies (key-policy) attribute-based encryption. In particular, their scheme does not guarantee privacy of the attributes, while our predicate encryption scheme does. Garg et al. [GGH+13] also show that full-fledged functional encryption is implied by iO and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (and hence so is predicate encryption). Our construction is conceptually simpler, avoids NIZKs, and relies on iO and one-way functions only.

A simple construction of a (semi-adaptive) functional encryption from indistinguishability obfuscation is also described in [Wat15], but it relies on the full power of obfuscation, since a functional secret key for $f$ is an obfuscated circuit that evaluates $f$ (amongst other things). Our PE construction follows a different path and obfuscates constrained PRFs. Obfuscating the latter could imply the existence of iO that can be bootstrapped to full iO. Thus our PE construction should be seen as an alternative route to more expressive primitives.

Finally, Brakerski et al. in recent work [BCG+17] construct a hierarchical notion of functional encryption. This implies bounded HIBEs from LWE or low-complexity PRGs and public-key encryption (for their constant-depth and polynomially bounded width delegation structure), and a construction of unbounded HIBE based on unbounded-collision functional encryption (which implies iO for $P/poly$ assuming subexponential security). Their construction is fairly simple, which is not surprising as functional encryption is powerful enough to subsume IBEs. Since their construction relies on re-encryption techniques, it is inherently public-key. Our construction takes a very different route and relies on potentially weaker special-purpose obfuscation, while re-encryption techniques lead to indistinguishability obfuscation for any circuit supported by the underlying functional encryption scheme [BV15].

As we aim at using special-purpose obfuscation, we do not discuss recent advances in constructions and cryptanalysis of candidate general-purpose indistinguishability obfuscators and refer the reader to discussions in [AS17, LT17, CGH17, MZ17, ADGM17] for details.

**Paper Organization.** The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the main cryptographic tools used throughout the paper in Section 2. Then we successively introduce our constructions of PKE, IBE, and unbounded HIBE in Sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Additional cryptographic notions used locally as well as proofs and constructions of bounded HIBE and PE are detailed in the Appendix.

## 2 Preliminaries

We briefly recall various cryptographic primitives that we will use throughout the paper. For the sake of completeness, the formal definitions are included in Appendix A. A *pseudorandom generator* is a deterministic algorithm $\text{PRG}$ that takes as input a string $x$ and outputs a longer string $y$. PRG outputs on uniform inputs must be indistinguishable from uniform elements in the output space. We call a hash function *public-coin* if its key generation algorithm simply outputs
its random coins. We will assume public-coin hash functions that are collision-resistant.

A puncturable pseudorandom function (PPRF) is a tuple \((\text{CPRF}, \text{Cons})\), where \(\text{CPRF}(K, x)\) evaluates the PRF on input \(x\) under key \(K\). For a set \(S\), let \(C[S](x)\) denote the circuit that returns 1 iff \(x \notin S\). Algorithm \(\text{Cons}(K, C[S])\) outputs a constrained key \(K_{C[S]}\) that allows evaluating the PRF anywhere except on set \(S\). Given \(K_{C[S]}\), PRF evaluations on points inside \(S\) should be indistinguishable from uniform.

An obfuscator is an algorithm \(\text{Obf}\) that on input a circuit \(C\) outputs an obfuscated circuit \(\overline{C}\). Perfect correctness requires that for all \(C \leftarrow \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C)\) and all \(x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda: C(x) = \overline{C}(x)\). Indistinguishability obfuscation requires the outputs of the obfuscator on two functionally equivalent (and equal-size) circuits to be indistinguishable. Public-coin differing-input obfuscation requires this same for circuits sampled from a public-coin distribution and for which it is hard to find an input on which the outputs of the circuits differ.

### 3 Public-Key Encryption

We start by presenting our simple PKE construction based on iO and a pseudorandom generator with sparse image. Our construction uses an obfuscator that only needs to support simple circuits. In particular, we show this class is simple enough to be instantiated based on the DDH assumption. We will prove the scheme IND-CPA as well as anonymous, meaning that ciphertexts do not reveal their intended recipients.

#### 3.1 Construction

We now formalize our public-key encryption scheme, for which we have given a high-level description in the introduction. The details of the construction are shown in Figure 1. The proof of the following theorem follows the ideas outlined in the introduction and can be found in Appendix B.

**Theorem 1.** Scheme PKE in Figure 1 is AI-CPA secure if its underlying pseudorandom generator \(\text{PRG}\) and obfuscator \(\text{Obf}\) are secure. More precisely, for
any PPT adversary $A$ against PKE there are PPT adversaries $B_1$ and $B_2$ against PRG and Obf, respectively, such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE},A}^{\text{ai-cca}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B_1}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf},B_2}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).$$

Algorithm $B_2$ places the same number of queries to its (obfuscation) LR oracle as $A$ does to its (encryption) LR oracle.

### 3.2 A DDH-based instantiation

In this section we show that the above construction can be instantiated under the standard DDH assumption. That is, we provide a DDH-based PRG and an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of circuits used in the above construction. The resulting PKE scheme is defined over the message space $\mathbb{G} - \{1\}$ where we identify the element 1 with the error symbol $\perp$.

We now describe our construction, which is basically a *lossy* version of the El-Gamal PKE scheme [ElGamal84], meaning that one can define lossy public keys, which are indistinguishable from regular ones, but for which ciphertexts statistically hide all information about their underlying plaintexts.

A DDH-BASED PRG. Let $\mathbb{G}$ denote a cyclic group of order $q$ generated by $g$. The public parameters are $(\mathbb{G}, q, g, Y)$ with $Y$ a random element in $\mathbb{G}^*$. Algorithm $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{Z}_q^* \rightarrow (\mathbb{G}^*)^2$ is defined as $\text{PRG} : x \mapsto (g^x, Y^x)$. Under the DDH assumption, the outputs of $\text{PRG}$ are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random elements in $(\mathbb{G}^*)^2$. Plugging this into our PKE construction in Section 3, secret keys take the form $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and public keys $\text{PK} = (g^x, Y^x)$.

THE CIRCUIT CLASS. We next define an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of circuits $\mathbb{C}[\text{PK}, M]$ associated with the PRG above. This class consists of circuits defined in Figure 2 (left) for $\text{PK} = (X, Z) \in (\mathbb{G}^*)^2$ and $M \in \mathbb{G}^*$, where we identify the identity group element 1 with the error symbol $\perp$.

THE OBFUSCATOR. Given a description $(X, Z, M)$ of the circuit $\mathbb{C}[X, Z, M]$, we define our obfuscator as shown in Figure 2 (middle), which takes randomness $(r_1, r_2, r_3, s_1, s_2, s_3) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and returns a circuit $\mathbb{C}[h_{11}, h_{12}, h_{21}, h_{22}, h_{31}, h_{32}]$ as described on the right of Figure 2. Intuitively, $(h_{31}, h_{32})$ is an encryption of $M$ if $(X, Z)$ is in the range of $\text{PRG}$, whereas it is a random pair otherwise. Similarly,
(h_{11}, h_{12}) and (h_{21}, h_{22}) are encryptions of 1, which let C check whether (X, Z) is in the range of PRG. If this is the case then the obfuscated circuit is functionally equivalent to C[X, Z, M]. However, if (X, Z) is not in the range of PRG then C[X, Z, M] always returns 1, whereas with negligible probability over the coins of Obf, for C there is one input on which it returns a different value (since h_{11}, h_{12}, h_{21}, h_{22} are uniformly random, the probability that there exists x with h_{11} = h_{12} and h_{21} = h_{22} is negligible).

**Lemma 1.** The obfuscator described in Figure 2 is an indistinguishability obfuscator with statistical correctness and statistical indistinguishability.

Consider an adversary outputting two functionally equivalent circuits C[X, Z, M] and C[X', Z', M']. Both of them always return 1 iff (X, Z) and (X', Z') are not in the range of PRG, in which case the obfuscator returns a random tuple (h_{11}, h_{12}, h_{21}, h_{22}, h_{31}, h_{32}). If X = g^x and Z = Y^x then C[X, Z, M] returns M on input x and 1 otherwise. For C[X', Z', M'] to be functionally equivalent to C[X, Z, M], we must thus have X' = X, Z' = Z and M' = M. This shows the iO security of the obfuscator. A formal proof is given in Appendix C.

4 Identity-Based Encryption

We now present a simple construction of identity-based encryption, again based on an indistinguishability obfuscator and a pseudorandom generator. In addition, we will use a pseudorandom function, which we assume to be puncturable. We prove that our scheme is both IND-CPA secure and anonymous in the selective-ID model. Anonymity means that ciphertexts do not leak the identity of the intended recipients; a property that can be leveraged to construct public-key encryption with keyword search [ABC+05].

4.1 Construction

Our IBE construction generalizes the PKE scheme as follows. The master secret key MSK is a random PRF key. The secret key for user ID is simply the PRF evaluated at the identity, that is PRF(MSK, ID). The master public key MPK is an obfuscation of a circuit C_{gen} that computes a public key PK_{ID} for ID by computing PRG(Prf(MSK, ID)), as in our PKE scheme. Hence we use a PRF to "compress" exponentially many public keys into the master public key MPK (by generating their secret key using the PRF). A message is encrypted by first deriving PK_{ID} for the identity using MPK and then obfuscating the same circuit as the PKE scheme. Decryption is identical to the PKE. The details of the scheme are shown in Figure 3 (with S_{gen} defined below).

In our security analysis we will rely on the puncturability of the PRF to simulate key-extraction queries. That is, we use a PRF key punctured at \{ID_0, ID_1\} to derive keys for all other users. We will use the indistinguishability security of

\footnote{Note that this is not the case if we only use one encryption of 1 (i.e. if we remove \(h_{21}\) and \(h_{22}\)}
the obfuscator in conjunction with this to form the master public key. Hence we need to pad the circuit $C^{gen}$ so that its size matches that of the modified circuit used in the proof. We define $S^{gen}(\lambda)$ as (an upper bound on) the maximum size of circuits defined by

\[
\tilde{C}^{gen}[K, r, x_0, x_1](x) := \begin{cases} 
\text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{Cons}(K, C[[x_0, x_1]]; r), x)) & \text{if } x \notin \{x_0, x_1\} \\
\text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K, x_0)) & \text{if } x = x_0 \\
\text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K, x_1)) & \text{if } x = x_1
\end{cases}
\]

Here the maximum is taken over $(K, r, x_0, x_1) \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times \{0, 1\}^{t_{\text{Cons}}(\lambda)} \times \{0, 1\}^{m(\lambda)}$, where $t_{\text{Cons}}$ is the polynomial bounding the runtime of $\text{Cons}$. We recall that $\text{Cons}$ denote the puncturing algorithm of the puncturable PRF.

**Theorem 2.** Scheme IBE in Figure 3 is Sel-AI-CPA secure if the underlying pseudorandom generator PRG, the puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF, and the obfuscator Obf are secure. More precisely, for any ppt adversary $A$ against IBE there are ppt adversaries $B_1$, $B_2$, and $B_3$ against PRG, PPRF, and Obf respectively such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{IBE}, A}^{\text{sel-ai-cpa}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf}, B_1}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF}, B_2}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG}, B_3}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).
\]

Algorithm $B_1$ places at most the same number of queries to its (obfuscation) LR oracle that $A$ does to its (encryption) LR oracle.

The proof is detailed in Appendix D.

**ID space.** The ID space $\mathcal{IDSp}_\lambda$ of the construction matches the input space $\{0, 1\}^{m(\lambda)}$ of PPRF. An IBE with $\mathcal{IDSp}_\lambda = \{0, 1\}^*$ can be obtained in the standard way by hashing the identities using a collision-resistant hash function. An alternative route would be to use a variable-input-length puncturable PRF. A statistically correct puncturable PRF is needed when used in conjunction

---

**Fig. 3.** Identity-based encryption from a PRG, a puncturable PRF, and an iO.
with an indistinguishability obfuscator. However, such PRFs with unbounded domain cannot have compact punctured keys (as a punctured key information-theoretically determines the punctured point). This means that there is no a priori bound on the size of the circuit $\tilde{C}^{gen}$ used in the security proof in $G_1$. We note, however, that the GGM PRF can be turned into a PRF with unbounded input length [Gol01], whose keys can be punctured in the same way as those of the original construction.

Adaptive security. We have established the selective security of the IBE based on the selective security of the puncturable PRF. This raises the question if the theorem naturally extends to the adaptive-ID model under the adaptive security of the puncturable PRF. This turns out not to be the case: during the proof we need to puncture the MPK, which is given to the adversary at the onset. It is unclear at which point the underlying MSK should be punctured, even with a reduction down to the adaptive security of the PPRF. On the other hand, adaptive security can be obtained with a sub-exponential loss (on all underlying primitives) through complexity leveraging, or with only a polynomial loss in the random-oracle model. The recent work of Zhandry [Zha16] on extremely lossy functions (ELFs) proposes a generic selective-to-adaptive transformation for IBEs in the standard model that also results in a polynomial loss in security from a single exponential assumption. This transformation can be also applied to our IBE and we obtain an adaptive IBE with only a polynomial loss in security.

4.2 Extensions to bounded HIBE and predicate encryption

Bounded HIBE. Our IBE construction generalizes that for PKEs by using a PRF, instead of a single secret corresponding to the PRG seed, to derive many secret keys. Similarly, we can further generalize the IBE construction to a hierarchical IBE by considering a tree of (puncturable) PRFs (as in the GGM construction). The secret key for a vector of identities $\text{ID} := (\text{ID}_1, \ldots, \text{ID}_n)$ corresponds to the iterative PRF applications via $SK_i \leftarrow \text{PRF}(SK_{i-1}, \text{ID}_i)$ where $SK_0$ is the master secret key. We can then use the puncturing property of the PRF to replace, via a sequence of hybrids, the PRF value corresponding to any identity $(\text{ID}_1, \ldots, \text{ID}_n)$ with random values one at a time. This then allows us to apply the PRG game hop (as for IBEs) at the leaf nodes to conclude the proof. We formalize this construction and prove its security in Appendix E. We refer the reader to the introduction for why this construction does not yield an unbounded HIBE.

Predicate Encryption. Our IBE also generalizes to predicate encryption fairly easily. A natural way to build a PE scheme would be to modify the IBE construction so that instead of a puncturable PRF it uses a constrained PRF. The idea is that a constrained key for a circuit $C$ can evaluate a PRF value on $\gamma$ correctly if $C(\gamma) = 1$. This approach does not work directly, as the puncturability of the PRF is used to simulate the key-extraction queries in the IBE game. Hence, an analogous form of puncturing would be also needed to derive
constrained keys. Luckily, a natural construction of a constrained PRF from a puncturable PRF due Boneh and Waters [BW13] already enjoys this property. We formalize this construction and prove its security in Appendix F.

5 Unbounded HIBE

A hierarchal IBE (HIBE) [GS02] generalizes IBEs to a setting where a user with a secret key for identity ID can derive secret keys for child identities with prefix ID. In this section we present a construction of an unbounded HIBE, where key delegation can be carried out for an exponential number of prefixes.

As before, we use a PRG and a puncturable PRF. We however also rely on a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator (pc-diO) for circuits, an indistinguishability obfuscator, a public-coin collision-resistant (pc-CR) hash function, and a SNARK proof system with a common random string.

Given a public-coin hash function \( H \), we rely on SNARKs for the relation \( \text{Rel}(1^\lambda, (k, h_1, h_2), (w_1, w_2)) \) that checks \( |k| = \lambda \land H(k, w_1) = h_1 \land H(k, w_1|w_2) = h_2 \land w_2 \neq \varepsilon \).

In our construction, the obfuscation of a delegation circuit \( C_{\text{del}} \) with a hard-wired master key will be made public. This circuit takes as input a user secret key \( SK \), two hash values \( h', h \), and a SNARK proof \( \pi \). The circuit checks that the proof \( \pi \) verifies (and hence proves knowledge of \( ID, ID \) such that \( h = H(k, ID) \) and \( h' = H(k, ID|ID) \)). This is done explicitly by computing a public key for \( h \) using the master key and checking if the result matches the one derived from \( SK \). (Comparison with the public key rather than the secret key is needed as in the security proof we have to forget the \( SK \) at some point). If all checks pass, a secret key for \( h' \) (i.e., the hash of child identity \( ID|ID \)) is returned. The other algorithms operate as in the IBE scheme on hashed identities. The details of the construction are shown in Figure 4. As for our IBE construction in Figure 3, we pad the circuits \( C_{\text{gen}} \) and \( C_{\text{del}} \) respectively to the maximum size of any circuit \( \tilde{C}_{\text{gen}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{del}} \) used in the proof (and argue that these sizes are polynomially bounded).

**Theorem 3.** Scheme HIBE in Figure 4 is Sel-AI-CPA secure if PRG and PPRF are secure, \( H \) is public-coin collision-resistant, the obfuscator iO is an indistinguishability obfuscation, and the obfuscator diO is public-coin differing-input secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \( A \) against HIBE there exist PPT adversaries \( B_1 \) against iO, diO-legitimate \( B_2 \) against diO, \( B_3 \) against \( H \), \( B_4 \) against PPRF and \( B_5 \) against PRG such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{HIBE},A}^\text{sel-ai-cpa}(\lambda) \leq (4p(\lambda) + 1) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{iO},B_1}^\text{ind}(\lambda) + 4p(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{diO},B_2}^\text{ind}(\lambda) + 4p(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}_{H, B_3}^{\text{cr}}(\lambda) + 2p(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF},B_4}^\text{ind}(\lambda) + 2p(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B_5}^\text{ind}(\lambda),
\]

where \( p(\lambda) = (n(\lambda))^3 + 1 \) and \( n(\lambda) \) is such \( |ID^{(0)}|, |ID^{(1)}| \leq n(\lambda) \). Furthermore, \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \) are iO and diO-legitimate respectively.
We refer the reader to the introduction for a high-level overview of the proof. The detailed proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Appendix H.

Remark. Suppose we define $H(k, ID) := ID$ for all $k, ID$ and $Prove(crs, (h, h'), w) := w$. Then there are no collisions for $H$ and the SNARK proofs are perfectly extractable. This means that the diO adversary we constructed when showing that $G_i,δ,1$ and $G_i,δ,2$ in the proof of Theorem 3 are indistinguishable is actually iO-legitimate. It then suffices to use an indistinguishability obfuscator to obtain a bounded-depth HIBE from the above construction.

Acknowledgments Farshim was supported by the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013 Grant Agreement no. 339563 - CryptoCloud). Fuchsbauer was supported by the French ANR Project ANR-16-CE39-0002 EFTrEC. Passeleve was supported in part from a DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE award, NSF Frontier Award 1413955, NSF grants 1619348, 1228984, 1136174, and 1065276, BSF grant 2012378, a Xerox Faculty Research Award, a Google Faculty Research Award, an equipment grant from Intel, and an Okawa Foundation Research Grant.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HSetup</strong>($1^λ$)</td>
<td>$K \leftarrow {0,1}^λ; k \leftarrow {0,1}^\ell(λ)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$crs \leftarrow {0,1}^{cs(λ)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C^{gen} \leftarrow iO(1^λ, C^{gen}[K])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C^{del} \leftarrow diO(1^λ, C^{del}[K])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$MPK \leftarrow (crs, k, C^{gen}, C^{del})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$SK_0 \leftarrow PPRF(K, H(k, ε))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>return ($\langle SK_0, ε \rangle, MPK$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Circ. C^{gen}<a href="h">K</a></strong></td>
<td>$PK \leftarrow PRG(PPRF(K, h))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>return $PK$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Circ. C^{del}[K, k, crs](SK, h, h', π)</strong></td>
<td>if $Ver(crs, (k, h, h'), π) = 0$ return ⊥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$PK \leftarrow PRG(PPRF(K, h))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>if $PRG(SK) \neq PK$ return ⊥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>return $PPRF(K, H(k, h'))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEnc</strong>(MP, ID, M)</td>
<td>$PK \leftarrow C^{gen}(H(k, ID))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$CT \leftarrow iO(1^λ, C^{enc}[PK, M])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>return $CT$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDel</strong>(SK, ID, ID')</td>
<td>$h \leftarrow H(k, ID); h' \leftarrow H(k, ID'[ID'])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$π \leftarrow Prove(crs, (k, h, h'), (ID, ID'))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$SK' \leftarrow C^{del}(SK, h, h', π)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>return ($SK', ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDec</strong>(SK, ID, CT)</td>
<td>$M \leftarrow CT(SK)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>return $M$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 4. Unbounded HIBE from a PRG, a puncturable PRF, a pc-CR hash function and a pc-diO.


A Definitions

Here we define the different notions involved in this paper. We first define the basic tools that are common to all our constructions, and then the more specific notions.

A.1 Basic tools

We introduce basic cryptographic primitives that we use as tools throughout the paper. In particular, we recall the notions of pseudorandom generator, constrained (and puncturable) pseudorandom functions, and indistinguishability obfuscation. Definitions of various public-key primitives are deferred to the corresponding subsections.

**PRG.** A pseudorandom generator is a deterministic algorithm \( \text{PRG}(x) \) that takes as input an \( x \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and outputs a string \( y \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda + s(\lambda)} \) for a (positive) polynomial \( s(\cdot) \). We say \( \text{PRG} \) is secure if for all ppt \( A \)

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{PRG},A}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{IND}^d_{\text{PRG}}(\lambda)] - 1 \in \text{Negl},
\]

**Constrained PRFs.** A constrained pseudorandom function (C-PRF) for a boolean circuit family \( \mathcal{CSp} := \{\mathcal{CSp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \), where each \( \mathcal{C} \in \mathcal{CSp}_\lambda \) has input space \( \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \) for a polynomial \( m(\cdot) \), is a tuple of algorithms \( (\text{CPRF}, \text{Cons}) \) as follows. Algorithm \( \text{CPRF}(K, x) \) is deterministic and on input a key \( K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and \( x \in \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \) outputs a string \( y \in \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)} \) for a polynomial \( n(\cdot) \). Algorithm \( \text{Cons}(K, C) \) takes a key \( K \) and a boolean circuit \( C \in \mathcal{CSp}_\lambda \) and outputs a constrained key \( K_C \). We require that for any \( K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \), any \( C \in \mathcal{CSp}_\lambda \) and any \( x \in \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \)

\[
C(x) = 1 \implies \text{CPRF}(K, x) = \text{CPRF}(\text{Cons}(K, C), x).
\]

We say that CPRF is a secure constrained PRF if for all ppt \( A \)

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{CPRF},A}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{IND}^d_{\text{CPRF}}(\lambda)] - 1 \in \text{Negl},
\]

where game \( \text{IND}^d_{\text{CPRF},A}(\lambda) \) is shown in Figure 5.\(^8\) We say a constrained PRF is selectively secure if CHAL is queried at the onset and before PRF and KEY.

**Puncturable PRFs.** A puncturable pseudorandom function (PPRF) for a family of sets \( \mathcal{SSp} := \{\mathcal{SSp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \), where \( \mathcal{SSp}_\lambda \) is a set of polynomial-size sets (i.e., a set system), is a constrained PRF that supports the circuit family \( \mathcal{CSp} := \{\mathcal{CSp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) where \( \mathcal{CSp}_\lambda \) consists of all circuits of the form \( C[S](x) \) for \( S \in \mathcal{SSp}_\lambda \)

\(^8\) For simplicity, table \( T \) in Figure 5 is formally defined as a table of size \( 2^{m(\lambda)} \) which initially contains only \( \perp \) but it can easily be reduced to a polynomial-sized data structure by storing the queried inputs/outputs lazily.
that return 1 iff \( x \not\in S \). The class of circuits consisting of singleton sets \( S_{\text{Sp}} :=\{ \{ x \} : x \in \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \} \) correspond to singly puncturable PRFs and those consisting of \( S_{\text{Sp}} :=\{ \{ x_1, x_2 \} : x_1, x_2 \in \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \} \) to doubly puncturable PRFs. In this work, we will rely on selectively secure singly and doubly puncturable PRFs. Such puncturable PRFs can be based on a PRG via the GGM construction [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13].

**Public-coin hashing.** A public-coin hash function with key space \( \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \) and message space \( \{0,1\}^* \) is an algorithm \( H(k, x) \) that takes a key \( k \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \) and an input \( x \in \{0,1\}^* \) and outputs a string \( y \in \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)} \) for some polynomial \( n(\cdot) \). The public-coin hash function is collision resistant if for all PPT \( A \)

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{CR}}_{H,A}(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ \text{CR}^A_{H}(\lambda) \right] \in \text{Negl}.
\]

**Obfuscators.** A PPT algorithm \( \text{Obf} \) is called an obfuscator for the (deterministic) circuit class \( \mathbb{C}_{\text{Sp}} :=\{ \mathbb{C}_{\text{Sp}} \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \), where each \( C \in \mathbb{C}_{\text{Sp}} \) has input space \( \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \), if \( \text{Obf} \) on input the security parameter \( 1^{\lambda} \) and the description of a circuit \( C \in \mathbb{C}_{\text{Sp}} \) outputs a (deterministic) circuit \( \overline{C} \). We require \( \text{Obf} \) to be perfectly correct in the sense that for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), all \( C \in \mathbb{C}_{\text{Sp}} \), all \( \overline{C} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(1^{\lambda}, C) \) and all \( x \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \) we have that \( C(x) = \overline{C}(x) \).

In order to formalize security, we say an adversary \( A \) is \textit{diO-legitimate} if for every PPT extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) we have

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{eq}}_{\text{Obf},A,\mathcal{E}}(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ \text{EQ}^A_{\text{Obf},A}(\lambda) \right] \in \text{Negl},
\]

where game \( \text{EQ}^A_{\text{Obf},A}(\lambda) \) is shown in Figure 6 (right). Algorithm \( A \) is said to be iO-legitimate if the same holds for every \textit{unbounded extractor} \( \mathcal{E} \).\footnote{This is equivalent to requiring that for every query \((C_0, C_1)\) queried to LR we have \( C_0(x) = C_1(x) \) for all \( x \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \), i.e., that \( C_0 \) and \( C_1 \) are functionally equivalent.} An obfuscator \( \text{Obf} \) is a public-coin differing-input obfuscator if any diO-legitimate PPT adversary \( A \) we have

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ind}}_{\text{Obf},A}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr \left[ \text{IND}^A_{\text{Obf}}(\lambda) \right] - 1 \in \text{Negl},
\]
where game \( \text{IND}_{\text{Obf}}^A(\lambda) \) gives \( A \) access to a left/right (LR) oracle and is shown in Figure 6. We denote such an obfuscator by \( \text{diO} \). An obfuscator \( \text{Obf} \) is an indistinguishability obfuscator if \( \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf},A}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) \) is negligible for any iO-legitimate PPT adversary \( A \). We denote such an obfuscator by \( \text{iO} \).

**THE DDH ASSUMPTION.** Let \( G(1^\lambda) \) be a group generation algorithm that outputs the description of a cyclic group \( G \) of order \( q \) generated by \( g \). Let \( G^* := G \setminus \{1\} \). The decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption for \( G \) requires that for any PPT adversary \( A \),

\[
\text{Adv}_{G,A}^{\text{ddh}}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr \left[ \text{DDH}_G^A(\lambda) \right] - 1 \in \text{Negl}.
\]

### A.2 Public-key encryption

A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme for message space \( \text{MSp} := \{\text{MSp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) is a tuple of PPT algorithms \( \text{PKE} := (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \).

- **Gen\((1^\lambda)\):** This is the key-generation algorithm, which outputs a key pair \((\text{SK}, \text{PK})\).
- **Enc\((\text{PK}, M)\):** This is the encryption algorithm, which on input a public key \( \text{PK} \) and a message \( M \) outputs a ciphertext CT.
- **Dec\((\text{SK}, CT)\):** This is the deterministic decryption algorithm, which on input a secret key \( \text{SK} \) and a ciphertext CT outputs a message \( M \) or the error symbol \( \perp \).

The correctness of a PKE scheme requires that for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), any \((\text{SK}, \text{PK}) \leftrightarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\), any \( M \in \text{MSp}_\lambda \), and \( \text{CT} \leftrightarrow \text{Enc}(\text{PK}, M) \) we have \( \text{Dec}(\text{SK}, \text{CT}) = M \).

The anonymous and indistinguishable security of a PKE scheme under chosen-plaintext attacks (AI-CPA) [BBDP01] requires that for any PPT adversary \( A \),

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE},A}^{\text{ai-cca}}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr \left[ \text{AI-CPA}_{\text{PKE}}^A(\lambda) \right] - 1 \in \text{Negl}.
\]
where game $\text{AI-CPA}^A_{\text{PKE}}(\lambda)$ is shown in Figure 7. Besides anonymity, this definition implies the standard IND-CPA definition. To see this note that by AI-CPA security, $\text{Enc}(\text{PK}_0, M_0)$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Enc}(\text{PK}_1, M_1)$. Furthermore $\text{Enc}(\text{PK}_1, M_1)$ is also indistinguishable from $\text{Enc}(\text{PK}_0, M_1)$ as the adversary can set $M_1 = M_0$. Combining the two we get that $\text{Enc}(\text{PK}_0, M_0)$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Enc}(\text{PK}_0, M_1)$, as required.

A.3 Identity-based encryption

An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme for message space $\text{MSp} := \{\text{MSp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and identity space $\text{IDSp} := \{\text{IDSp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a tuple of ppt algorithms $\text{IBE} := (\text{IBSetup}, \text{IBEnc}, \text{IBGen}, \text{IBDec})$ as follows:

$\text{IBSetup}(1^\lambda)$: This is the master key generation which outputs a key pair $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK})$.

$\text{IBGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID})$: This is the key-generation algorithm, which on input a master secret key MSK and an identity ID outputs a (user) key SK.

$\text{IBEnc}(\text{MPK}, \text{ID}, M)$: This is the encryption algorithm, which on input a master public key MPK, an identity ID, and a message M outputs a ciphertext CT.

$\text{IBDec}(\text{SK}, \text{CT})$: This is the deterministic decryption algorithm that on input an SK and a ciphertext CT outputs a message M or the error symbol $\perp$.

Correctness requires that for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{IBSetup}(1^\lambda)$, any ID $\in \text{IDSp}_\lambda$, any SK $\leftarrow \text{IBGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID})$, any $M \in \text{MSp}_\lambda$ and any CT $\leftarrow \text{IBEnc}(\text{MPK}, \text{ID}, M)$, we have that $\text{IBDec}(\text{SK}, \text{CT}) = M$.

The selective anonymous and indistinguishable security of IBE under chosen-plaintext attacks [ABC+05] (Sel-AI-CPA) requires that for any ppt adversary $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{sel-al-cpa}}_{\text{IBE}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{Sel-AI-CPA}^A_{\text{IBE}}(\lambda)] - 1 \in \text{NEGL},$$

where game $\text{Sel-AI-CPA}^A_{\text{IBE}}(\lambda)$ is shown in Figure 8. This notion implies IND-CPA security by setting $\text{ID}_0 = \text{ID}_1$. 

23
**A.4 Hierarchical IBE**

**Hierarchical IBE.** In HIBE schemes, identities are of the form $\mathbf{ID} = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_n) \in ID_{Sp}^n$ for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$. For $m \leq n$ we write $\mathbf{ID}_{[m]}$ for $(ID_1, \ldots, ID_m)$. An (unbounded) HIBE scheme for message space $MSp := \{MSp_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, identity space $ID_{Sp} := \{ID_{Sp_\lambda}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and depth $d(\cdot)$ is a tuple of ppt algorithms $\text{HIBE} := (\text{HSetup, HEnc, HDel, HDec})$ as follows.

**HSetup($1^\lambda$):** The master key-generation algorithm outputs a pair $(SK_0, MPK)$.

**HEnc(MPK, ID, M):** The encryption algorithm, on input a master public key $MPK$, a vector of identities $ID$ and a message $M$, outputs a ciphertext $CT$.

**HDel(SK, ID):** The delegation algorithm, on input a secret key $SK$ and an identity $ID$, outputs a (user) key $SK'$.

**HDec(SK, CT):** The deterministic decryption algorithm, on input a secret key $SK$ and a ciphertext $CT$, outputs a message $M$ or the error symbol $\bot$.

We require correctness of the HIBE scheme: For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $d := d(\lambda)$, any $(SK_0, MPK) \leftarrow \text{HSetup}(1^\lambda)$, any $M \in MSp$, any $\mathbf{ID} = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_d) \in ID_{Sp}^d$, any $CT \leftarrow \text{HEnc}(MPK, \mathbf{ID}, M)$, any $SK_i \leftarrow \text{HDel}(SK_{i-1}, ID_i)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, d$ we have that $\text{HDec}(SK_d, CT) = M$. We call an HIBE *bounded* if correctness (and security; see below) hold for a polynomial $d(\cdot)$. We call the HIBE *unbounded* if this holds for $d(\lambda) = 2^\lambda$.

The Sel-AI-CPA security of HIBE requires that for any legitimate ppt adversary $A$,  
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{HIBE}, A}^{\text{sel-ai-cpa}}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \text{Pr} \left[ \text{Sel-AI-CPA}_{\text{HIBE}}(\lambda) \right] - 1 \in \text{Negl},
\]

where game Sel-AI-CPA$^A_{\text{HIBE}}(\lambda)$ is shown in Figure 9. We note that the adversary might choose two identities of different depths, and hence an anonymous HIBE, according to our definition, also hides the receipt’s level in the hierarchy. In a Sel-AI-CPA-secure bounded HIBE scheme we relax the model and require the adversary to always output a tuple of challenge vectors $(\mathbf{ID}_0, \mathbf{ID}_1)$ of depth exactly $d(\lambda)$.

Fig. 8. Selective AI-CPA security of an IBE scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game Sel-AI-CPA$^A_{\text{HIBE}}(\lambda)$:</th>
<th>Proc. LR$(M_0, M_1)$:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(\mathbf{ID}_0, \mathbf{ID}_1, st) \leftarrow A(1^\lambda)$</td>
<td>CT $\leftarrow$ IBE$\text{Enc}(MPK, ID_b, M_b)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b \leftarrow {0, 1}$</td>
<td>$L_1 \leftarrow L_1 \cup {(M_0, M_1)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\text{MSK, MPK}) \leftarrow \text{IBSetup}(1^\lambda)$</td>
<td>return CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b' \leftarrow A^{\text{LR, Ext}}(\text{MPK}, st)$</td>
<td>Proc. Ext$(ID)$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for $(M_0, M_1) \in L_1, ID \in L_2$</td>
<td>$\text{SK} \leftarrow \text{IBGen}(\text{MSK}, ID)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if $ID \in {\mathbf{ID}_0, \mathbf{ID}_1}$ then $b' \leftarrow 0$</td>
<td>$L_2 \leftarrow L_2 \cup {ID}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if $</td>
<td>M_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return $(b = b')$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24
A relation \( \text{Rel}(\lambda, \eta, w) \) is a PPT Turing machine in the length of its inputs (rather than the security parameter) which on input the security parameter, a statement \( \eta \in \{0,1\}^* \), and a witness \( w \in \{0,1\}^* \) outputs 0 or 1. We say \( \eta \in \text{Rel}_\lambda \) if there exists \( w \in \{0,1\}^* \) such that \( \text{Rel}(\lambda, \eta, w) = 1 \).

**SNARKs.** A succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) is a non-interactive proof-of-knowledge system whose proofs lengths and verification time are independent of the witness size and only bounded by an a priori fixed polynomial in the statement length. Formally a SNARK for a relation \( \text{Rel} \) is a pair of PPT algorithms \( \text{Prove}, \text{Ver} \) such that \( \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, \eta, w) \) outputs a proof \( \pi \) and \( \text{Ver}(\text{crs}, \eta, \pi) \) outputs 0 or 1. We call the SNARK complete (or correct) if for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), any \( (\eta, w) \) with \( \text{Rel}(\lambda, \eta, w) = 1 \), any \( \text{crs} \in \{0,1\}^{p_\mathbb{P}(\lambda)} \) and any \( \pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, \eta, \pi) \) we have that \( \text{Ver}(\text{crs}, \eta, \pi) = 1 \). We call the SNARK succinct if there exist polynomials \( p(\cdot), l(\cdot) \) and \( q(\cdot) \) such that for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), any \( \text{crs} \in \{0,1\}^{p_\mathbb{P}(\lambda)} \), any \( (\eta, w) \in \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \) with \( \text{Rel}(\lambda, \eta, w) = 1 \), and any \( \pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, \eta, w) \) we have that \( |\pi| \leq l(\lambda + |\eta|) \), \( \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, \eta, w) \) runs in time \( q(\lambda + |\eta|) \), and \( \text{Ver}(\text{crs}, \eta, \pi) \) runs in time \( p(\lambda + |\eta|) \).

We call the SNARK (adaptively) extractable if for any PPT \( \mathcal{A} \) there exists a PPT extractor \( \mathcal{E}_A \) such that \( \text{Adv}_{\text{SNARK}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}_A}^\text{ext}(\lambda) : = \Pr[\text{Ext}_{\text{SNARK}, \mathcal{A}}^\text{ext}(\lambda) \in \text{NEGL}, \text{game Ext}_{\text{SNARK}}^\mathcal{A}(\lambda) \text{ is shown in Figure 10}].}
A.6 Predicate encryption

A predicate encryption (PE) scheme for message space $\mathbb{M}_p := \{\mathbb{M}_p^\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and predicate space $\mathbb{P}_p := \{\mathbb{P}_p^\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\text{PE} := (\text{PSetup}, \text{PGen}, \text{PEnc}, \text{PDec})$ as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{PSetup}(\lambda): & \text{ The master key-generation algorithm outputs a pair (MSK, MPK).} \\
\text{PGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{P}): & \text{ The key-generation algorithm, on input a master secret key MSK and a boolean circuit (predicate) P, outputs a key SK.} \\
\text{PEnc}(\text{PK}, \gamma, \text{M}): & \text{ The encryption algorithm, on input a master public key MPK, an attribute } \gamma \text{ and a message M, outputs a ciphertext CT.} \\
\text{PDec}(\text{SK}, \text{CT}): & \text{ The deterministic decryption algorithm, on input an SK and a ciphertext CT, outputs a message M or the error symbol } \bot.
\end{align*}

The correctness of a PE scheme requires that for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any (MSK, MPK) $\leftarrow \text{PGen}(\lambda)$, any $\text{P} \in \mathbb{P}_p^\lambda$ and any $\text{SK} \leftarrow \text{PGen}(\text{MSK}, \text{P})$, any $\text{M} \in \mathbb{M}_p^\lambda$, any $\gamma \in \mathbb{A}_p^\lambda$, and any $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{PEnc}(\text{MPK}, \gamma, \text{M})$, we have that if $\text{P}(\gamma) = 1$ then $\text{PDec}(\text{SK}, \text{CT}) = \text{M}$.

In an attribute-hiding PE scheme, on top of plaintexts, the ciphertexts should not reveal the attributes used in encryption. Formally, the selective attribute-hiding (Sel-AI-CPA) security of an PE scheme requires that for any PPT $A$,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PE,A}}^{\text{sel-ai-cpa}}(\lambda) := 2 \cdot \Pr [\text{Sel-AI-CPA}_{\text{PE}}^A(\lambda)] - 1 \in \text{Negl}$$

where game Sel-AI-CPA$_{PE}^A(\lambda)$ is shown in Figure 11. We define the selective and weak attribute-hiding security similarly through game Sel-WAI-CPA that is also shown in Figure 11. In this game the adversary is restricted to only query keys for predicates that evaluate to 0 on the challenge attributes.

B Proof of Theorem 1

We prove the theorem via a sequence of games as follows.
G₀: This is the AI-CPA game with respect to PKE in Figure 1. By definition we have

\[ 2 \cdot \Pr[G₂] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE},A}^{\text{ai-cca}}(\lambda). \]

G₁: This game replaces PK₀ with a truly random bit string of length \( \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \).

We justify this transition based on the security of PRG. Let \( A \) be any adversary that distinguishes G₀ from G₁. Consider the following PRG adversary \( B \). Algorithm \( B \) receives a challenge PRG value \( y \), sets PK₀ := \( y \), generates a key pair (SK, PK₁), picks a random bit \( b \), and runs \( A(\text{PK₀,PK₁}) \). When \( A \) queries LR on \( (M₀,M₁) \) algorithm \( B \) uses PK₁ to encrypt \( M₀ \) and obtains a ciphertext CT, which it sends to \( A \). When \( A \) outputs a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B \) returns \( (b = b') \). When \( y \) is a PRG output, \( A \) is run with respect to G₀; when \( y \) is truly random, \( A \) is run with respect to G₁. Furthermore, \( B \) outputs a bit that matches the output of G₀ or G₁ when run with \( A \). Hence

\[ \Pr[G₂] - \Pr[G₄] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda). \]

G₂: This game replaces PK₁ with a truly random bit string of length \( \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \).

Using a virtually identical reduction to that in G₁ for PK₁ we get that for any \( A \) distinguishing G₁ from G₂ there is an adversary \( B \) such that

\[ \Pr[G₂] - \Pr[G₄] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda). \]

G₃: This game generates the challenge ciphertexts by obfuscating \( \text{C}[\text{PK₀,M₀}] \) (irrespective of the bit \( b \)).

We justify this transition based on the security of Obf as follows. Suppose an adversary \( A \) distinguishes game G₂ from G₃. Consider adversary \( B \) against Obf as follows. Adversary \( B \) generates two random \( y₀, y₁ \in \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \), sets PKᵢ := \( yᵢ \), for \( i = 0, 1 \), and runs \( A(\text{PK₀,PK₁}) \) (as in G₂). \( B \) picks a random bit \( b \) and whenever \( A \) queries its LR on two messages \( (M₀,M₁) \), it queries its own (obfuscation) LR oracle on \( (\text{C}[\text{PK₀,M₀}],\text{C}[\text{PK₀,M₀}]) \) and receives an obfuscated circuit CT, which it sends to \( A \). When \( A \) terminates outputting a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B₂ \) returns \( (b = b') \). It is clear that according to the challenge bit in the obfuscation game algorithm \( B \) runs \( A \) according to either game G₂ or G₃. Furthermore, \( B \) outputs a bit that matches the output of G₂ or G₃ when run with \( A \). Hence

\[ \Pr[G₂] - \Pr[G₄] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf},B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda). \]

It remains to show that the circuits \( \text{C}[\text{PK₀,M₀}] \) and \( \text{C}[\text{PK₀,M₀}] \) that \( B \) queries to its obfuscation LR oracle are functionally equivalent and of the same size. Since PK₀ and PK₁ are truly random bit strings of length \( 2\lambda \), for each value of SK and b we have that \( \Pr[\text{PRG}(SK) = \text{PK₁}] = 1/2^{2\lambda} \). Hence by the union bound

\[ \Pr[∃SK \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda}, b \in \{0,1\} : \text{PRG}(SK) = \text{PK₀}] \leq 2^{\lambda+1}/2^{2\lambda} = 2/2^{\lambda}. \]

27
This means with probability at least $1 - 2/2^k$ over the choice of $\text{PK}_b$ the circuits $C[\text{PK}_b, M_b]$ both implement a circuit always returning $\perp$. The circuits are of equal size as long as the two messages are of equal size.

Finally note that $G_3$ is independent of the bit $b$ as $C[\text{PK}_b, M_0]$ is always obfuscated. Hence for any (even unbounded) adversary $\mathcal{A}$ we have that $\Pr[G_3] = 0$. The theorem follows from the above inequalities.

\section*{C Proof of Lemma 1}

\textsc{Correctness.} Correctness of the obfuscator means that circuits $C[X, Z, M]$ and $\overline{C}[h_{11}, h_{12}, h_{21}, h_{22}, h_{31}, h_{32}] = \text{Obf}(C[X, Z, M])$ are functionally equivalent. Our obfuscator only achieves statistical correctness, meaning that with negligible probability over the choice of $r_1, r_2, r_3, s_1, s_2, s_3$ the obfuscated circuit might differ from the original one. This comes from the fact that there might exist $x'$ such that $h'_{11} = h_{12}$ and $h'_{21} = h_{22}$, even though there does not exist any $x'$ such that $(y^x, y^{x'}) = (X, Z)$ in the original circuit. Letting $x, y, z$ denote the respective discrete logarithms of $X, Y, Z$, $h'_{21} = h_{12}$ is equivalent to $(r_1 + ys_1)x' = xr_1 + zs_1$, so $x_1 = \frac{xr_1 + zs_1}{r_1 + ys_1}$ always satisfies this equation (assuming $r_1 + ys_1 \neq 0$).

Similarly, we have $h'_{21} = h_{22}$ if and only if $(r_2 + ys_2)x' = xr_2 + zs_2$, so assuming $r_1 + ys_1 \neq 0$, we have that $x_2 = \frac{xr_2 + zs_2}{r_2 + ys_2}$ satisfies this equation.

Note that if $z = xy$, then $x_1 = x_2 = x$ and we have perfect correctness, but if $z \neq xy$, $x_1 = x_2$ and $x_1 \neq x$, the obfuscated circuit differs on this point. Thus the statistical correctness of our obfuscator, since the obfuscated circuit might not be functionally equivalent, but this only happens with negligible probability (when $x_1 = x_2$ and $x_1 \neq x$).

This is not an issue for our construction. In particular, since obfuscator is perfectly correct when the public key is well-formed ($z = xy$), our encryption scheme satisfies perfect correctness.

\textsc{Indistinguishability.} Let us now prove the indistinguishability security of the obfuscator. Let $C_1[X, Z, M]$ and $C_2[X', Z', M']$ be two functionally equivalent circuits. It is clear that if $(X, Z)$ is a well-formed public-key (meaning that $Z = Y^{\log(X)}$) then one needs to have $X' = X$, $Z' = Z$, and $M' = M$, otherwise circuits $C_1$ and $C_2$ would differ on input $x = \log(X)$, since $C_1$ would output $M$ (and we have by definition $M \neq 1$) and $C_2$ would output either a different message $M' \neq (g_x, Y^{x})$. Hence, if $(X, Z)$ is a well-formed public-key and $C_2$ is functionally equivalent to $C_1$, then $C_2 = C_1$ and there obfuscations are (perfectly) indistinguishable.

Let us now assume $(X, Z)$ is not a well-formed key (so $Z \neq Y^{\log(X)}$). Then, any circuit $C_2[X', Z', M']$ such that $(X', Z')$ is also not a well-formed key is functionally equivalent to $C_1[X, Z, M]$, since they both always output 1 (and any circuit $C_2[X', Z', M']$ with $X', Z'$ well-formed \emph{is not} functionally equivalent to $C_1[X, Z, M]$ since the message space is $\mathbb{G}^* = \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}$). Thus, we just need to show that the obfuscations of any such two circuits are indistinguishable and the indistinguishability of our obfuscator will follow. To do so, it is sufficient to
prove that the two distributions

\[
\left( g^{r_1}Y^{s_1}, X^{r_2}Z^{s_2}, g^{r_3}Y^{s_3}, M \cdot X^{r_3}Z^{s_3} \right) \\
\left( g^{r_4}Y^{s_4}, X^{r_5}Z^{s_5}, g^{r_6}Y^{s_6}, M' \cdot X^{r_6}Z^{s_6} \right)
\]

for \((r_1, r_2, r_3, s_1, s_2, s_3) \neq Z_q^6\) are identical. Letting \(x, y, z, m, x', z', m'\) denote the respective discrete logarithms of \(X, Y, Z, M, X', Z', M'\), we thus just want to prove that the distributions

\[
\left( r_1 + y s_1, \ x r_1 + z s_1, \ r_2 + y s_2, \ x r_2 + z s_2, \ r_3 + y s_3, \ m + x r_3 + z s_3 \right) \\
\left( r_1 + y s_1, \ x' r_1 + z' s_1, \ r_2 + y s_2, \ x' r_2 + z' s_2, \ r_3 + y s_3, \ m' + x' r_3 + z' s_3 \right)
\]

for \((r_1, r_2, r_3, s_1, s_2, s_3) \neq Z_q^6\) are identical, when \(z \neq xy\) and \(z' \neq x'y\). This immediately follows from the facts that:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  r_1 + y s_1 \\
  x r_1 + z s_1 \\
  r_2 + y s_2 \\
  x r_2 + z s_2 \\
  r_3 + y s_3 \\
  m + x r_3 + z s_3
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
  1 y 0 0 0 0 \\
  x z 0 0 0 0 \\
  0 0 1 y 0 0 \\
  0 0 x z 0 0 \\
  0 0 0 0 1 y \\
  0 0 0 0 x z
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
  r_1 \\
  s_1 \\
  r_2 \\
  s_2 \\
  r_3 \\
  s_3
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
  0 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  m
\end{pmatrix}
\]

and that the above two matrices are invertible if and only if \(z \neq xy\) and \(z' \neq x'y\).

This concludes the proof of security of our obfuscator.

\(\square\)

### D  Proof of Theorem 2

**Theorem 4 (Theorem 2, restated).** Scheme IBE in Figure 3 is Sel-AI-CPA secure as long as its underlying pseudorandom generator PRG, the puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF, and the obfuscator Obf are secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \(A\) against IBE there are PPT adversaries \(B_1, B_2,\) and \(B_3\) against PRG, PPRF, and Obf respectively such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{IBE}, A}^{\text{sel-ai-cpa}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf}, B_1}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF}, B_2}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG}, B_3}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda)
\]

Algorithm \(B_1\) places at most the same number of queries to its (obfuscation) LR oracle that \(A\) does to its (encryption) LR oracle.

**Proof.** We prove the theorem via a sequence of games as follows.
G₀: This is the Sel-AI-CPA game with respect to scheme IBE in Figure 3:

\[2 \cdot \Pr[G₀^A] - 1 = \text{Adv}^\text{sel-ai-cpa}_{\text{IBE}, A}(\lambda).\]

G₁: This game modifies the generation of the master public key as follows. After A outputs \((\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1)\) the game generates a key MSK, computes a punctured key MSK* at the challenge identity set \{\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1\} and defines \(y_i := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID}_i))\) for \(i = 0, 1\). The master public key is generated by obfuscating the circuit

\[\hat{C}^\text{gen}[\text{MSK}^*, y_0, y_1](\text{ID}) := \begin{cases} \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}^*, \text{ID})) & \text{if } \text{ID} \notin \{\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1\} \\ y_0 & \text{if } \text{ID} = \text{ID}_0 \\ y_1 & \text{if } \text{ID} = \text{ID}_1 \end{cases}\]

and padding it so its size is \(S^\text{gen}(\lambda)\). Note that this circuit is functionally equivalent to and has the same size as the original circuit \(C^\text{gen}[\text{MSK}]\).

We show that G₀ and G₁ are indistinguishable. Let A be an adversary that distinguishes game G₀ from game G₁. We use A to build an adversary B against Obf as follows. Algorithm B picks a random bit \(b\) and runs A until it outputs \((\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1, st)\). Then, B samples a PPRF key MSK and punctures it at \{\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1\} to compute MSK*. It also computes \(y_i := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID}_i))\) for \(i = 0, 1\). Algorithm B uses these values to generate two circuits \(C^\text{gen}\) and \(C^\text{gen}\) as above and queries them to its (obfuscation) LR oracle to receive an obfuscated circuit which B defines to be MPK. Algorithm B answers the encryption queries of A on \((M_0, M_1)\) by computing a ciphertext using MPK and \((\text{ID}_0, M_0)\). Key-extraction queries on ID are handled using the (un-punctured) key MSK. When A returns a bit \(b'\), algorithm B returns \(b = b'\). It is easily seen that according to the bit chosen by B’s (obfuscation) game, algorithm A is run either with respect to game G₀ or G₁ and the output of B matches the output of these games when run with A. Hence

\[\Pr[G₀^A] - \Pr[G₁^A] \leq \text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{Obf}, B}(\lambda).\]

G₂: This game no longer sets \(y_i := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID}_i))\), but instead computes it by first sampling two \(S_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda\) and then setting \(y_i := \text{PRG}(S_i)\).

Let A be an adversary that distinguishes G₁ and G₂. We use A to build an adversary B against the selective security of the puncturable PRF as follows. Algorithm B picks a random bit \(b\) and runs A until it outputs \((\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1, st)\). Then, B queries a punctured key MSK* at \{\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1\}. Algorithm B also queries the PPRF challenge oracle on \(\text{ID}_0\) and \(\text{ID}_1\) to receive \(S_0\) and \(S_1\) which are either \(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID}_0)\) and \(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, \text{ID}_1)\) or truly random values. (Note that B’s query is legitimate.) Algorithm B uses MSK* and \(y_i := \text{PRG}(S_i)\) to compute MPK. It resumes A on \((\text{MPK}, st)\) and answers its extraction queries using the punctured key MSK*. By the rules of the Sel-AI-CPA game the key extraction
oracle will be never queried on ID$_0$ or ID$_1$, and hence MSK$^*$ can be used to perfectly simulate the key extraction oracle. For an LR query by $\mathcal{A}$ on $(M_0, M_1)$, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ encrypts $(ID_b, M_b)$ using MPK. When $\mathcal{A}$ terminates with a bit $b'$, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ returns $(b = b')$. It is easy to see that if $S_i$ is $\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, ID_i)$, algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is run in game $G_1$, and when $S_i$ are random, $\mathcal{A}$ is run with respect to $G_2$. Hence,

$$\Pr[G_1^A] - \Pr[G_2^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF}, \mathcal{B}}(\lambda) .$$

$G_3$: This game modifies $y_0$ further as follows. Instead of setting it to $\text{PRG}(S_0)$ it directly samples $y_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$.

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that distinguishes $G_2$ from $G_3$. We use $\mathcal{A}$ to build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the security of PRG as follows. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ receives a value $y_0$ which is either $\text{PRG}(S_0)$, for a uniformly random $S_0$ or $y_0$ is truly random. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ picks a random bit $b$ and runs $\mathcal{A}$ until it outputs $(ID_0, ID_1, st)$. It generates a PRF key $\text{MSK}$, computes a punctured key $\text{MSK}^*$ at $(ID_0, ID_1, st)$, and uses $\text{MSK}^*$, $y_0$ and $y_1 := \text{PRG}(S_1)$ for a random $S_1$ to compute MPK. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ resumes $\mathcal{A}$ on $(\text{MPK}, st)$ and answers its extraction queries. For the LR query $(M_0, M_1)$, $\mathcal{B}$ encrypts $(ID_b, M_b)$ using MPK. When $\mathcal{A}$ terminates with a bit $b'$, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ returns $(b = b')$. It is easy to see that if $y_0$ is $\text{PRG}(S_0)$, algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is run in game $G_2$ and when it is truly random it is run with respect to $G_3$. Hence,

$$\Pr[G_2^A] - \Pr[G_3^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG}, \mathcal{B}}(\lambda) .$$

$G_4$: This game modifies $y_1$ analogously to $G_3$. That is, instead of setting it to $\text{PRG}(S_1)$ it directly samples $y_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$.

As in $G_3$ we have that for any $\mathcal{A}$ that distinguishes $G_3$ from $G_4$, there is a $\mathcal{B}$ such that

$$\Pr[G_3^A] - \Pr[G_4^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG}, \mathcal{B}}(\lambda) .$$

$G_5$: This game generates the challenge ciphertexts by always encrypting $M_0$ for identity $ID_0$ (independently of $b$).

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that distinguishes $G_4$ and $G_5$. We use $\mathcal{A}$ to build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the security of $\text{Obf}$ as follows. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ picks a random bit $b$, generates $\text{MSK}$ and runs $\mathcal{A}$ answers until it outputs $(ID_0, ID_1, st)$. It uses $\text{MSK}$ to compute a key $\text{MSK}^*$ punctured at these identities. It then samples $y_0, y_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ and computes MPK using all these values. It resumes $\mathcal{A}$ on MPK and answers $\mathcal{A}$’s extraction queries. The LR query on $(M_0, M_1)$ is

---

10 This raises the question whether or not $G_2$ should use $\text{MSK}^*$ and $S_i$ in key-extraction queries as well. This can be done at this stage, and as a result we would not need to rely on the legitimacy rules of the IBE game. However, in the next two games we will use the security of the PRG to replace $y_i$ with truly random values. To this end, we must ensure that the $S_i$’s are not used in MPK and only their PRG values are. Hence we rely on IBE legitimacy rules to avoid using $S_i$ later on. Note also that IBE legitimacy makes it inconsequential whether $\text{MSK}^*$ or $\text{MSK}$ is used.
answered by choosing a bit $b$ at random and calling the (obfuscation) LR oracle on $(C^{enc}[y_0, M_0], C^{enc}[y_1, M_1])$. Algorithm $B$ continues in this manner until $A$ outputs a bit $b'$ and $B$ returns $(b = b')$. It is easy to see that according to the challenge bit in the obfuscation game, $A$ is run in game $G_4$ or $G_5$. Hence

$$\Pr [G_4^A] - \Pr [G_5^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf}, B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).$$

It remains to show that the circuits queried by $B$ to its challenge oracle are functionally equivalent. Since $y_0$ and $y_1$ are truly random bit strings of length $2\lambda$, for each value of $SK$ and $b$ we have that $\Pr[\text{PRG}(SK) = y_b] = 1/2^{2\lambda}$. Hence by the union bound

$$\Pr[\exists SK \in \{0,1\}^\lambda, b \in \{0,1\} : \text{PRG}(SK) = y_b] \leq 2^{\lambda+1}/2^{2\lambda} = 2/2^\lambda.$$

This means with probability at least $1 - 2/2^\lambda$ over the choice of $y_b$ the circuits $C^{\text{gen}}[y_b, M_b]$ both are functionally equivalent to a circuit that always outputs $\bot$. Note also that the two circuits are of equal size as long as the two messages are of equal size.

Finally note that $G_5$ is independent of the bit $b$ and hence for any (even unbounded) adversary $A$ we have $2 \Pr[G_5^A] - 1 = 0$. The theorem follows.

AVOIDING DOUBLE PUNCTURING. Although in the above proof we relied on puncturing at two points, this can be avoided at the cost of introducing additional game hops. Roughly speaking, we can proceed along the above sequence of games for each $b$ until we reach game $G_5$. In these games (for the two bits) we switch the master circuit back to one that uses the original master secret key, keeping the public key for ID$_b$ random. We would then puncture the key at ID$_{1-b}$ and replace its public key with a random value, and the switch back to a master circuit that uses the original master secret key, keeping the public key for ID$_{1-b}$ random. These modifications result in a game where the master circuit is no longer punctured for any particular identity and hence is independent of the challenge bit.

E  Bounded HIBE

The GGM construction, on top of offering puncturing of keys permits a delegation mechanism whereby a punctured key for a set $S$ of points can be used to derive a more restricted punctured key for subset of $S$. We leverage this property to extend our IBE construction from Section 4 to an HIBE for a priori bounded number of polynomial levels in the hierarchies. The reason that our construction supports only a bounded-depth hierarchy is that the master secret key underlying the generation of the master public key will be punctured at a number of points that is proportional to the depth of challenge identities. Therefore, to use indistinguishability obfuscation the circuit for the original master public key should be padded to the maximum depth of identities queried.
We present our construction based on (a tree of) punctured PRFs that allows directly handling large identities at each level. Our construction is shown in Figure 12. For this scheme, the PPRF needs to have identical key space and domain, i.e., $m^{\lambda}(\lambda) = \lambda$ using the notation from Section 2.

**Theorem 5.** The $d(\cdot)$-bounded HIBE scheme in Figure 12 is Sel-AI-CPA secure as long as its underlying pseudorandom generator PRG, puncturable PRF PPRF, and obfuscator Obf are secure. More precisely, for any ppt adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against HIBE there are ppt adversaries $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2$, and $\mathcal{B}_3$ against Obf, PPRF, and PRG respectively such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{sel-ai-}\text{-cpa}}^{\text{HIBE, } \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{ind}}^{\text{Obf, } \mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + (2 \cdot d(\lambda) - 1) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{ind}}^{\text{PPRF, } \mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{ind}}^{\text{PRG, } \mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda).$$

**Proof.** We prove the theorem via a sequence of games as follows.

**G₀:** This is the Sel-AI-CPA game with respect to scheme HIBE in Figure 12. By definition we have

$$2 \cdot \Pr[G_0^d] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{\text{SEL-} \text{AI-CPA}}^{\text{HIBE, } \mathcal{A}}(\lambda).$$

**G₁:** This game modifies the generation of the master public key as follows. Let $\mathcal{I}_0 = (\mathcal{I}_{0,1}, \ldots, \mathcal{I}_{0,d})$ and $\mathcal{I}_1 = (\mathcal{I}_{1,1}, \ldots, \mathcal{I}_{1,d})$ be the identity vectors that $\mathcal{A}$ chooses. Let $(\mathcal{I}_d, \ldots, \mathcal{I}_0)$ be the longest common prefix of $\mathcal{I}_0$ and $\mathcal{I}_1$. That is, $\mathcal{I}_{0,i} = \mathcal{I}_{1,i} = \mathcal{I}_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$. (Note that $\ell$ might be 0.) The game generates a master key $SK_0$, it defines $SK_{0,0} := SK_{1,0} := SK_0$, and for $i = 1, \ldots, d$ and $b = 0, 1$ generates correct PRF values for internal
nodes associated to ID_{b,i}:

\[ SK_{b,i} := PRF(SK_{b,i-1}, ID_{b,i}). \]  

(1)

Note that \( SK_{0,i} = SK_{1,i} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, \ell \) and there are \( 2d - \ell \) such values in total. For \( i = 0, \ldots, d - 1 \) and \( b = 0, 1 \) the game also generates punctured keys

\[ SK^*_b := \begin{cases} \text{Cons}(SK_{b,i}, \{ID_{b,i+1}\}) & \text{if } i \neq \ell \\ \text{Cons}(SK_{b,i}, \{ID_{0,i+1}, ID_{1,i+1}\}) & \text{if } i = \ell \end{cases} \]

(2)

Note that \( SK^*_{b,i} = SK^*_{1,i} \) for \( i = 0, \ldots, \ell \) and that there are \( 2d - \ell - 1 \) punctured keys.

The keys \( \{SK^*_{b,i}\}_{i=0}^{d-1} \) and \( \{SK_{b,i}\}_{i=1}^{d} \) for \( b = 0, 1 \) contain sufficient information to iteratively compute \( PRG(PPRF(SK_0, ID)) \) for any \( ID \). Roughly speaking, we can do this as follows. Given \( ID = (ID_1, \ldots, ID_d) \), we start with \( ID_1 \) and check if \( ID_1 \) is one of the level-one challenge identities \( ID_{0,1} \) or \( ID_{1,1} \). If not, then we can use \( SK^*_{0,0} = SK^*_{1,0} \) to successfully compute the PRF at this point, and continue iteratively until we reach level \( d \), where we return \( PK = PRG(SK_d) \). Else we use the hardwired values \( SK_{b,1} \) for the correct value of \( b \) according to whether \( ID_1 = ID_{0,1} \) or \( ID_1 = ID_{1,1} \) to compute the PRF once. Suppose \( b = 0 \) at this stage. In the stage, if \( ID_2 \) is not one of \( ID_{0,2} \) or \( ID_{1,2} \), then once gain we use the punctured key \( SK^*_{0,1} \) (which is computed from the correct value \( SK_{0,1} \) at \( \{ID_{0,2}, ID_{1,2}\} \)) to compute the PRF and continue iteratively to level \( n \). Otherwise, we use the correct hardwired values \( SK_{0,2} \) to compute the PRF. Case \( b = 1 \) is dealt with similarly. We continue in this manner for all \( ID_i \) until we reach level \( d \), where we return \( PRG(SK_d) \). Note that the intermediate correct values of the PRF at the challenge identities are not really used in this computation as public keys at two leaf nodes need to be computed. Hence we do not need to hardwire these values. Furthermore, at the two leaf nodes, instead of the PRF values we directly hardwire the public keys, i.e., \( y_b := PRG(PPRF(MSK_{d-1}, ID_d)) \) for \( b = 0, 1 \). The details of this procedure are shown in Figure 13.

Game \( G_1 \) returns an obfuscation of this circuit as MPK.

We show that games \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) are indistinguishable. Let \( A \) be an adversary that distinguishes \( G_0 \) from \( G_1 \). We use \( A \) to build an adversary \( B \) against \( Obf \) as follows. Algorithm \( B \) picks a bit \( b \) at random runs \( A \) until it outputs \((ID_0, ID_1)\). It then samples a \( PPRF \) key \( SK_0 \) and computes \( \{SK^*_{b,i-1}\}_{i=1}^{d} \) as per Equations (1) and (2) and the public key values \( y_0 \) and \( y_1 \). It then forms the functionally equivalent circuits \( C^{gen}[SK_0] \) and \( C^{gen}[\{SK^*_{b,i-1}, ID_{b,i}, y_b\}_{i=1}^{d}] \) as above, pads them to the appropriate size, and queries them to its LR oracle to get an obfuscated circuit MPK. Algorithm \( B \) answers the encryption queries

---

\(^{11}\) Formally a node is associated to a vector of identities. Since the challenge identity vectors are fixed, we simply speak of the final identity in this vector to simplify notation.
of $A$ on $(M_0, M_1)$ by computing a ciphertext using MPK and $(\mathbb{ID}_b, M_b)$. Key-extraction queries on $\mathbb{ID}$ are handled using the (un-punctured) key $SK_0$. When $A$ returns a bit $b'$, algorithm $B$ returns $(b = b')$. It is easily to see that according to the bit chosen by $B$'s (obfuscation) game, algorithm $A$ is run either with respect to game $G_0$ or $G_1$ and the output of $B$ matches the output of these games when run with $A$. Hence

$$\Pr[G_0^A] - \Pr[G_1^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf}, B}(\lambda).$$

We will now define games $G_{2,i}$ for $i = 0, \ldots, 2d - \ell$, which gradually replace the iteratively computed PRF values $SK_{b,i}$ with truly random values. In doing so, we will rely on the security of PPRF. (At a single stage we will rely on “double” puncturing.) Starting from the root of the tree, we will replace the level-one values $SK_{b,1}$ with truly random values. Next, relying on these already replaced values and PPRF security, we replace the level-two $SK_{b,2}$ values with random, etc., until all values, including those at the leaf nodes, are replaced by random values.

$G_{2,i}$ for $i = 0, \ldots, \ell$: We define $G_{2,0}$ as $G_1$. For $i > 0$, game $G_{2,i}$ modifies $G_{2,i-1}$ and replaces $SK_{0,i} = SK_{1,i}$ with a truly random value. (Note that $\mathbb{ID}_{0,i} = \mathbb{ID}_{1,i}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$.)

We will use the security of PPRF with puncturing at $\mathbb{ID}_{0,i} = \mathbb{ID}_{1,i}$ to justify these transitions. Let $A$ be an adversary that distinguishes $G_{2,i-1}$ from $G_{2,i}$. We build an adversary $B$ against PPRF as follows. Algorithm $B$ picks a random bit $b$ and runs $A$ until it outputs the challenge identity vectors $(\mathbb{ID}_0, \mathbb{ID}_1)$. Algorithm $B$ simulates the game implicitly setting $SK_{0,i-1}$ to the key of its challenger. $B$ uses its KEY oracle to obtain a key $SK_{0,i-1}$ punctured at $\mathbb{ID}_{0,i}$. It also requests a challenge at $\mathbb{ID}_{0,i}$, which it defines as $SK_{0,i}$ (which is either PPRF$(SK_{0,i-1}, \mathbb{ID}_{0,i})$ or random). PRF values for nodes that are descendants of node $\mathbb{ID}_{0,i}$ (i.e., those
at levels $\geq i + 1$) can be computed using $SK_{0,i}$. PRF values for the siblings of $ID_{0,i}$ (i.e., those at level $i$) can be computed using the punctured key $SK^*_i$. To compute the PRF values for nodes at levels $\leq i - 1$ algorithm $B$ proceeds as follows. It generates random values $SK_{0,j}$ for $0 \leq j < i - 1$ (level 0 corresponds to the root of the tree). It uses these values to compute PRF values for nodes at levels $\leq i - 1$, except for node $ID_{0,i-1}$; the PRF value for this node, according to the rules of game $G_{i-1}$, is an independent random value which $B$ implicitly defines as the (un-punctured) PRF key. We will disallow key extraction for identity $ID_{0,i-1}$, which is compatible with the legitimacy rules of the HIBE adversary. These computed PRF values and the punctured key $SK^*_i$ allows $B$ to also compute the punctured keys and PRF values at all nodes that are hardwired into the circuit underlying MPK. Algorithm $B$ generated these and uses them to form MPK. Algorithm $B$ answers $A$’s single LR query by encrypting $(\overline{ID}_0, M_b)$ under the generated MPK. When $A$ returns a bit $b'$, algorithm $B$ returns $(b = b')$. According to the challenge bit in the PPRF game, algorithm $B$ runs $A$ either in game $G_{2,i-1}$ or game $G_{2,i}$. Hence for any $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$ and any PPT $A$, there is a PPT $B$ such that

$$Pr[G^A_{2,i-1}] - Pr[G^A_{2,i}] \leq Adv^\text{ind}_{\text{PPRF},B}(\lambda).$$

$G_{2,\ell+1}$: At level $\ell + 1$, the identity vectors differ for the first time. This game modifies $G_{2,\ell}$ and replaces both $SK_{0,\ell+1}$ and $SK_{1,\ell+1}$ with truly random values.

We will use puncturing at $\{ID_{0,\ell+1}, ID_{1,\ell+1}\}$ to justify this transition. The reduction is similar to the previous game except that a doubly punctured key $SK^*_{i,\ell} = SK^*_{1,\ell}$ at $\{ID_{0,\ell+1}, ID_{1,\ell+1}\}$ is requested and the challenge PPRF oracle is queried on $ID_{0,\ell+1}$ and $ID_{0,\ell+1}$ to define $SK_{0,\ell+1}$ and $SK_{1,\ell+1}$. Algorithm $A$ is also barred from querying the key at $ID_{0,\ell} = ID_{1,\ell}$. Hence for any PPT $A$ there is a PPT $B$ such that

$$Pr[G^A_{2,\ell}] - Pr[G^A_{2,\ell+1}] \leq Adv^\text{ind}_{\text{PPRF},B}(\lambda).$$

$G_{2,\ell+1+j}$ for $j = 1, \ldots, d - \ell - 1$: Game $G_{2,\ell+1+j}$ simply modifies $G_{2,\ell+1+j-1}$ and replaces $SK_{0,\ell+1+j}$ with a truly random value.

We use puncturing at $ID_{0,\ell+1+j}$ as before to justify these transitions. Using a reduction similar to above we obtain that for $j = 1, \ldots, d - \ell - 1$ and any PPT $A$ there is a PPT $B$ such that

$$Pr[G^A_{2,\ell+1+j-1}] - Pr[G^A_{2,\ell+1+j}] \leq Adv^\text{ind}_{\text{PPRF},B}(\lambda).$$

$G_{2,d+j}$ for $j = 1, \ldots, d - \ell - 1$: These games replace $SK_{1,\ell+1+j}$ with random values and as before for any PPT $A$ there is a PPT $B$ such that

$$Pr[G^A_{2,d+j-1}] - Pr[G^A_{2,\ell+1+j}] \leq Adv^\text{ind}_{\text{PPRF},B}(\lambda).$$

12 We emphasize, however, that we are not relying on the full legitimacy of HIBE adversary in these games. In particular a key for ID$_{0,i}$ can be extracted by A.
Note that in game $G_{2,2d-\ell}$ all PRF values, includes those at the leaf nodes, are replaced by truly random values. Overall, the above transitions disallow $\mathcal{A}$ to extract keys for any identity that is a prefix of $(\text{ID}_{b,1}, \ldots, \text{ID}_{b,d-1})$ for $b = 0, 1$.

$G_{3,0}$: Instead of hardwiring $\text{PRG}(SK_{0,d})$ in the MPK circuit in Figure 13, this game samples a truly random value $y_{0,d}$, hardwires it to the MPK circuit.

We rely on the security of $\text{PRG}$ to bound this transition. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that distinguishes $G_{2,2d-\ell}$ from $G_{3,0}$. We build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against $\text{PRG}$ as follows. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ receives a $\text{PRG}$ challenge $y$. It chooses a bit $b$ at random and runs $\mathcal{A}$ until it outputs $(\text{ID}_0, \text{ID}_1)$. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ then generates random values for all nodes $\text{ID}_{b,i}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, d-1$ and a final random value for node $\text{ID}_{1,d}$, which it passes through $\text{PRG}$ to compute $y_1$. These values can also be used to generated all information required to form the MPK circuit in Figure 13. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ also hardwires $y_0 := y$ and $y_1$ into the circuit. Therefore, $\mathcal{B}$ implicitly defines the $\text{PRF}$ value at $\text{ID}_{0,d}$ as the $\text{PRG}$ seed. It resumes $\mathcal{A}$ on MPK, an obfuscation of this circuit. It answers the key-extraction queries, except the disallowed one at $\text{ID}_{0,d}$, using its internally generated values. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ answers $\mathcal{A}$'s LR queries by encrypting $(\text{ID}_b, M_b)$ under the generated MPK. When $\mathcal{A}$ returns a bit $b'$, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ returns $(b = b')$. According to whether $y$ is a real or fake $\text{PRG}$ value, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ in an environment identical to either $G_{2,2d-\ell}$ or $G_3$. Hence

$$\Pr[G^A_{2,2d-\ell}] - \Pr[G^A_{3,0}] \leq \text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{PRG},\mathcal{B}}(\lambda).$$

$G_{3,1}$: Instead of hardwiring $\text{PRG}(SK_{1,d})$ in the MPK circuit in Figure 13 this game also samples a truly random value $y_{1,d}$, hardwires it to the MPK circuit.

A reduction similar to that for game $G_{3,0}$ shows that for any ppt $\mathcal{A}$ there is a ppt $\mathcal{B}$ such that

$$\Pr[G^A_{3,0}] - \Pr[G^A_{3,1}] \leq \text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{PRG},\mathcal{B}}(\lambda).$$

$G_4$: This game replaces responds to $\mathcal{A}$'s LR queries $(M_0, M_1)$ by always encrypting $M_0$ for identity $\text{ID}_0$ under MPK.

Using the fact that $\text{PRG}$ has a sparse image, with overwhelming probability both $\text{PK}_{\text{ID}_0}$ and $\text{PK}_{\text{ID}_1}$ are not in the image of $\text{PRG}$. Thus the circuits $\text{C}_{\text{Enc}}[\text{PK}_{\text{ID}_1}, M_1]$ and $\text{C}_{\text{Enc}}[\text{PK}_{\text{ID}_0}, M_0]$ always return $\perp$. By iO-security, their obfuscations are thus indistinguishable and a reduction similar to that for the IBE scheme shows that for any ppt $\mathcal{A}$ there is a ppt iO-legitimate $\mathcal{B}$ such that

$$\Pr[G^A_{3,1}] - \Pr[G^A_{4}] \leq \text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{Obf},\mathcal{B}}(\lambda).$$

Finally note that $G_4$ is independent of the bit $b$ and hence the for any (even unbounded) adversary $\mathcal{A}$ we have $\Pr[G^A_{4}] = 0$. The theorem follows.
**Fig. 14.** Predicate encryption from a PRG, a constrained PRF, and an iO.

### Predicate Encryption

Predicate encryption [BW07, KSW08] is a powerful type of public-key encryption that, for example, supports searching on encrypted data. It includes other forms of PKEs, such as Attribute-Based Encryption [GPSW06, LOS+10] and IBEs. (See [SBC+07, GVW15] for further motivating applications.) We show our approach is flexible enough to also lend itself to constructions of predicate encryption schemes. This construction, which generalizes our IBE scheme, relies on a puncturable PRF, a PRG and an indistinguishability obfuscator, and is described in Figure 14.

We now show that our predicate encryption scheme is weakly and selectively attribute hiding. The reason that we can only achieve a weak level of attribute hiding is that keys for constrained keys for circuits that evaluate to 0 at the punctured point can be obtained under a punctured key. We prove the following theorem in Appendix G. We note that the attribute space of our PE scheme matches the input space of the puncturable PRF, and hence it supports a large universe of attributes.

**Theorem 6.** Scheme PE in Figure 14 is Sel-WAI-CPA secure if its underlying pseudorandom generator PRG, two-point puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF, and obfuscator Obf are secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary $A$ against PE there are PPT adversaries $B_1$, $B_2$, and $B_3$ against Obf, PPRF, and PRG respectively such that

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{PE},A}^{\text{sel-wai-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq (2 + Q(\lambda)) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf},B_1}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \\
\text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF},B_2}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B_3}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda),
$$

where $Q(\lambda)$ denotes the number of queries of $A$ to its key extraction oracle.
G Proof of Theorem 6

Theorem 7 (Theorem 6, restated). Scheme PE in Figure 14 is Sel-WAI-CPA secure if its underlying pseudorandom generator PRG, two-point puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF, and obfuscator Obf are secure. More precisely, for any ppt adversary \( A \) against the Sel-WAI-CPA security of PE there are ppt adversaries \( B_1, B_2, \) and \( B_3 \) against Obf, PPRF, and PRG respectively such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{sel-wai-cpa}, A}^{\lambda} \leq (2 + Q(\lambda)) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf}, B_1}^{\lambda} + \text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF}, B_2}^{\lambda} + 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG}, B_3}^{\lambda}.
\]

where \( Q(\lambda) \) denotes the number of queries of \( A \) to its key extraction oracle.

Proof. We prove the theorem via a sequence of games as follows:

\( G_0 \): This is the weak Sel-WAI-CPA game (Figure 11) with respect to scheme PE in Figure 14:

\[
2 \cdot \text{Pr}[G_0^A] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{\text{PE}, A}^{\lambda}.
\]

\( G_1 \): This game modifies the generation of the master public key as follows. After the first phase of \( A \) when the adversary outputs \((\gamma_0, \gamma_1, st)\) the game generates a key MSK, computes a punctured key MSK* at the challenge attribute set \{\(\gamma_0, \gamma_1\}\) and defines \(y_i := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}^*, \gamma_i))\) for \(i = 0, 1\). The master public key is generated by obfuscating the circuit

\[
\tilde{C}_{\text{gen}}^{\text{gen}}[\text{MSK}^*, y_0, y_1](\gamma) := \begin{cases} 
\text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}^*, \gamma)) & \text{if } \gamma \notin \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\} \\
y_0 & \text{if } \gamma = \gamma_0 \\
y_1 & \text{if } \gamma = \gamma_1
\end{cases}
\]

Note that this is functionally equivalent to the original circuit \( C_{\text{gen}}^{\text{gen}}[\text{MSK}] \).

We show that \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) are indistinguishable. Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an adversary that distinguishes game \( G_0 \) from game \( G_1 \). We use \( \mathcal{A} \) to build an adversary \( B \) against Obf as follows. Algorithm \( B \) picks a random bit \( b \) and runs \( \mathcal{A} \) until it outputs \((\gamma_0, \gamma_1, st)\). Then it samples a PPRF key MSK and punctures it at \{\(\gamma_0, \gamma_1\}\} to compute MSK*. It also computes \(y_i := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, \gamma_i))\) for \(i = 0, 1\). Algorithm \( B \) uses these values to generate two circuits \( C_{\text{gen}}^{\text{gen}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{gen}}^{\text{gen}} \) as above and queries them to its (obfuscation) LR oracle to receive an obfuscated circuit which \( B \) defines to be the MPK. Algorithm \( B \) answers the encryption queries of \( \mathcal{A} \) on \((M_0, M_1)\) by computing a ciphertext using MPK and \( M_b \). Key-extraction queries on P are handled using the (un-punctured) key MSK. When \( \mathcal{A} \) returns a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B \) returns \((b = b')\). It is easily to see that according to the bit chosen by \( B \)'s (obfuscation) game, algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) is run either with respect to game \( G_0 \) or \( G_1 \) and the output of \( B \) matches the output of these games when run with \( \mathcal{A} \). Hence

\[
\text{Pr}[G_0^A] - \text{Pr}[G_1^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf}, B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).
\]

39
G_2: Instead of obfuscating the circuit \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}, P] \) at key extraction, this game uses the punctured key \( \text{MSK}^* \) at \( \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\} \) and predicate \( P \) to form the circuit below and return an obfuscation of it.

\[
\hat{C}^{sk}[\text{MSK}^*, P](\gamma) := \begin{cases} 
\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}^*, \gamma) & \text{if } P(\gamma) = 1 \\
\bot & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

Note that by the legitimacy rules of the weak AI-CPA game, \( P(\gamma_0) = P(\gamma_1) = 0 \) for all extracted \( P \). Hence the above circuit is functionally equivalent to \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}, P] \) for any extracted \( P \).^{13}

Let \( A \) be an adversary that distinguishes \( G_1 \) from \( G_2 \). We use \( A \) to build an adversary \( B \) against the multi-challenge \( \text{Obf} \) as follows. Algorithm \( B \) picks a random bit \( b \) and runs \( A \) until it outputs \( (\gamma_0, \gamma_1) \). It then samples a PPRF key \( \text{MSK}^* \) and punctures it at \( \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\} \) to get \( \text{MSK}^* \). It also computes \( y_b := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(\text{MSK}, b)) \) for \( b = 0, 1 \). Algorithm \( B \) uses these values to generate \( C^{gen}[\text{MSK}^*, y_0, y_1] \) and obfuscates it to obtain \( \text{MPK} \) as in \( G_1 \). For each key-extraction query \( P \), algorithm \( B \) generates \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}, P] \) and \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}^*, P] \) as above and submits them to its (obfuscation) LR oracle to obtain an obfuscated circuit \( SK \). It answers the query using \( SK \). Algorithm \( B \) answers the encryption query of \( A \) on \( (M_0, M_1) \) by choosing a bit \( b \) at random and computing a ciphertext using \( \text{MPK} \) and \( (\gamma_b, M_b) \). When \( A \) returns a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B \) returns \( (b = b') \). It is easily to see that according to the bit chosen by \( B \)’s (obfuscation) game, algorithm \( A \) is run either with respect to game \( G_1 \) or \( G_2 \) and the output of \( B \) matches the output of these games when run with \( A \). Hence

\[
\Pr[G_1^A] - \Pr[G_2^A] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ind}_{\text{Obf}, B}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Q}(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{ind}_{\text{Obf}, B'}}(\lambda),
\]

where \( B' \) is a single-challenge adversary against the obfuscator.

G_3: This game no longer sets \( y_b := \text{PRG}(\text{CPRF}(\text{MSK}, b)) \) but rather computes these values by sampling \( S_b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) and setting \( y_b := \text{PRG}(S_b) \).

Let \( A \) be an adversary that distinguishes \( G_2 \) from \( G_3 \). We use \( A \) to build an adversary \( B \) against the security of the doubly puncturable PRF as follows. Algorithm \( B \) picks a random bit \( b \) and runs \( A \) until it outputs \( (\gamma_0, \gamma_1) \). It requests a punctured key \( \text{MSK}^* \) at \( \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\} \) and also queries its challenge oracle twice on \( \gamma_0 \) and \( \gamma_1 \) to receive two values \( S_0 \) and \( S_1 \). (Note that these queries are valid.) Algorithm \( B \) sets \( y_b := \text{PRG}(S_b) \), forms the circuit \( C^{gen}[\text{MSK}^*, y_0, y_1] \) and obfuscates it to get \( \text{MPK} \). It resumes \( A \) on \( \text{MPK} \) and answers its key-extraction queries on \( P \) by returning an obfuscation of the circuit \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}^*, P] \). The encryption queries are answered by choosing a bit \( b \) at random and encrypting \( (\gamma_b, M_b) \) under \( \text{MPK} \). When \( A \) returns a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B \) returns \( (b = b') \). It is easily to see that according to the bit chosen by \( B \)’s game, algorithm \( A \) is run either with respect to game \( G_1 \) or \( G_2 \), and the output of \( B \) matches the output of these games when run with \( A \). Hence

\[
\Pr[G_2^A] - \Pr[G_3^A] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ind}_{\text{PPRF}, B}}(\lambda).
\]

^{13} As in the IBE reduction we avoid hardwiring any PRF values that will be used as PRG seeds in the later games.
G₄: This game modifies the generation of \( y₀ \) further: instead of computing it as 
\[
\text{PRG}(S₀),
\]
it directly samples \( y₀ \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2λ} \).

Let \( A \) be an adversary that distinguishes \( G₃ \) from \( G₄ \). We use \( A \) to build an adversary \( B \) against the security of \( \text{PRG} \) as follows. Algorithm \( B \) receives a value \( y₀ \) which is either \( \text{PRG}(S₀) \) or is truly random. Algorithm \( B \) picks a bit \( b \) and runs \( A \) until it outputs an identity \((\text{ID}_0,\text{ID}_1)\). It generates a PRF key \( \text{MSK} \), computes a punctured key \( \text{MSK}^\ast \) at \( \{γ₀,γ₁\} \), and uses \( \text{MSK}^\ast \), \( y₀ \) and \( y₁ := \text{PRG}(S₁) \) for a random \( S₁ \) to compute \( \text{MPK} \). Algorithm \( B \) resumes \( A \) on \( \text{MPK} \) and answers its extraction queries by obfuscating \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}^\ast, \text{P}] \) as in \( G₃ \).

For the LR query \((M₀,M₁)\), \( B \) chooses a random bit \( b \) and encrypts \( (γ₀,M₀) \) using \( \text{MPK} \). When \( A \) terminates with a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B \) returns \( (b = b') \). It is easy to see that if \( y₀ \) is \( \text{PRG}(S₀) \), algorithm \( A \) is run in game \( G₂ \) and when it is truly random it is run with respect to \( G₃ \). Hence,

\[
\Pr[G₄¹] − \Pr[G₄²] ≤ \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B}^{\text{ind}}(λ).
\]

G₅: This game modifies the generation of \( y₁ \) analogously to that of \( y₀ \) in \( G₄ \).

Once again, using a reduction similar to that for the IBE scheme we deduce that for any \( \text{pPT} \) \( A \) there is a \( \text{pPT} \) \( B \) such that

\[
\Pr[G₅¹] − \Pr[G₅²] ≤ \text{Adv}_{\text{PRG},B}^{\text{ind}}(λ).
\]

G₆: This game generates the challenge ciphertexts by always encrypting \( M₀ \) for attribute \( γ₀ \) (independently of \( b \)).

Let \( A \) be an adversary that distinguishes \( G₅ \) and \( G₆ \). We use \( A \) to build an adversary \( B \) against the security of \( \text{Obf} \) as follows. Algorithm \( B \) picks a random bit \( b \) and runs \( A \) answers until it outputs \((γ₀,γ₁)\). It generates a PRF key \( \text{MSK} \) and computes a punctured key \( \text{MSK}^\ast \) at \( \{γ₀,γ₁\} \). It then samples random \( y₀, y₁ \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2λ} \) and computes \( \text{MPK} \) as obfuscation of \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}^\ast, y₀, y₁] \). It answers the key extraction queries on \( \text{P} \) by returning obfuscations of the circuits \( C^{sk}[\text{MSK}^\ast, y₀, y₁, \text{P}] \). It answers the encryption queries \((M₀,M₁)\) by calling its own (obfuscation) LR oracle on \((C^{enc}[y₀,M₀],C^{enc}[y₁,M₁])\) and receives CT. It resumes \( A \) on CT and answers its extraction queries as before. When \( A \) outputs a bit \( b' \), algorithm \( B \) returns \( (b = b') \). It is easy to see that according to the challenge bit in the obfuscation game, \( A \) is run in game \( G₅ \) or \( G₆ \). Hence

\[
\Pr[G₅] − \Pr[G₆] ≤ \text{Adv}_{\text{Obf},B}^{\text{ind}}(λ).
\]

It remains to show that the circuits queried by \( B \) to its challenge oracle are functionally equivalent. The argument is as before: Since \( y₀ \) and \( y₁ \) are truly random bit strings of length \( 2λ \), for each value of \( \text{SK} \) and \( b \) we have that
\[
\Pr[\text{PRG}(\text{SK}) = y₀] = 1/2^{2λ}.
\]
Hence by the union bound
\[
\Pr[\exists \text{SK} \in \{0,1\}^{λ}, b \in \{0,1\} : \text{PRG}(\text{SK}) = y₀] ≤ 2^{λ+1}/2^{2λ} = 2/2^{λ}.
\]
This means with probability at least \(1 - 2/2^\lambda\) over the choice of \(y_b\), the circuits \(C^\text{gen}[y_b, M_b]\) both implement the all-zero circuit. Note also that the two circuits are of equal size as long as the two messages are of equal size.

Finally note that the MPK and all oracle responses in \(G_6\) are independent of the bit \(b\). Hence the for any (even unbounded) IND-CPA adversary \(\Pr[G_6^A] = 0\). The theorem follows.

Through standard generic constructions, our scheme gives rise to a weakly secure functional encryption scheme (where the adversary is confined to keys \(SK_f\) for \(f\) which satisfy \(f(M_0) = f(M_1) = 0\)). A fully attribute-hiding PE scheme, on the other hand, is sufficient to obtain a full-fledged functional encryption scheme. Although iO is sufficient to obtain functional encryption \([GGH^{+}13]\), it requires the double-encryption technique of Naor and Yung \([NY90]\) and thus also non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. We leave it as open problem to see if simpler and analogous constructions for functional encryption from iO also exist.

H Proof of Theorem 3

Proof. For a fixed \(n\) we will use a sequence of sets \(S_0, S_1, \ldots, S_{\ell(n)}\) with \(S_i \subseteq \{0, \ldots, n\}\), where two consecutive sets only differ in exactly one element \(j\), and \(j - 1\) is contained in both sets. Formally, we require

(A) \(S_0 = \{0\}\) and \(n \in S_{\ell(n)}\);

(B) \(\forall i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell(n)\} \exists j : S_i \triangle S_{i+1} = \{j\}\) and \(j - 1 \in S_i \cap S_{i+1}\)

(where "\(\triangle\)" denotes symmetric difference) For notational convenience, we also define \(S_{-1} := \emptyset\). Fuchsbauer et al. \([FKPR14]\) give a sequence \(S_0, \ldots, S_{\ell(n)}\) with \(\ell(n) = n^{\log 3}\) and \(|S_i| \leq \log n + 2\) (defined in Appendix I). This logarithmic bound on \(S_i\) will be used to guarantee that the total size of the hardwired values grows slowly and hence when preparing the master public key circuit, it only needs to be padded to a logarithmic length in the maximum depth of identities.

We prove the theorem via a sequence of games illustrated in Figure 15. Game \(G_{i,\delta,L}\) for \(-1 \leq i \leq \ell(n_0)\): These games are defined as the original game, except that the public keys for all identities \(\overline{ID}_j^{(0)}\) (i.e., the length-\(j\) prefix of challenge identity \(\overline{ID}_j^{(0)}\)) for \(j \in S_i\) are replaced by random values. These values \(y_j^{(0)}\) are hardwired into the circuits \(C^\text{gen}\) and \(C^\text{del}\). The games are formally defined in Figure 15 (ignoring all boxes). Since \(S_{-1} = \emptyset\), we have that \(G_{-1}\) is the Sel-AI-CPA game and thus

\[2 \cdot \Pr[G_{-1}^A] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{\text{sel-ai-cpa}}^{\text{HIBE,}\ A}(\lambda).\]
\[
\text{GAME } G_1, \quad (G_{i, \delta} [1], G_{i, \delta} [2], G_{i, \delta} [3], G_{i, \delta} [4], G_{i, \delta} [5], G_{i, \delta} [6], G_{i, \delta} [7], G_{i, \delta} [8], G_{i, \delta} [9]):
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& (ID^{(0)}, ID^{(1)}, st) \leftarrow A(1^\lambda); \quad b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \\
& K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda; \quad k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda; \quad \text{crs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{r_{\text{crs}}(\lambda)}
\end{aligned}
\]

for \( j \in S_i \)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& h_j^{(0)} \leftarrow H(k, ID_{j}^{(0)})
& y_j^{(0)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda(\lambda)}
\end{aligned}
\]

let \( j^* \) s.t. \( S_{i+\delta} = S_i \cup \{j^*\} \)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& h_j^{(0)} \leftarrow H(k, ID_{j}^{(0)})
& y_j^{(0)} := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K, h_j^{(0)}))
& k^* \leftarrow \text{Cons}(K, C[[h_0^{(0)}]])
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& s_j^{(0)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}; \quad y_j^{(0)} := \text{PRG}(s_j^{(0)})
& y_j^{(0)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda(\lambda)}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& C_{\text{gen}} \leftarrow \text{iO}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{gen}})
& C_{\text{gen}} \leftarrow \text{iO}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{gen}})
& C_{\text{del}} \leftarrow \text{diO}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{del}})
& C_{\text{del}} \leftarrow \text{diO}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{del}})
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{MPK} \leftarrow (C_{\text{gen}}, C_{\text{del}})
& b' \leftarrow A^{\text{LR, Ext}}(\text{MPK}, st)
\end{aligned}
\]

for \( (M_0, M_1) \in L_1 \)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } |M_0| \neq |M_1| \text{ then } b' \leftarrow 0
& \text{for } ID = \{ID_1, \ldots, ID_n\} \in L_2, j = 1, \ldots, n
& \text{if } ID = ID_j^{(0)} \lor ID = ID_j^{(1)} \text{ then } b' \leftarrow 0
\end{aligned}
\]

return \( b = b' \)

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{Circ. } C_{\text{gen}}(h)
& \text{for } j \in S_i
& \text{if } h = h_j^{(0)} \text{ return } y_j^{(0)}
& \text{PK} \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K, h))
& \text{return PK}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{Circ. } C_{\text{del}}(SK, h, h', \pi)
& \text{if } \text{Ver}(\text{crs.}, (k, h, h'), \pi) = 0 \text{ return } \bot
& \text{PK} \leftarrow \bot
\end{aligned}
\]

for \( j \in S_i \)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } h = h_j^{(0)} \text{ then } PK \leftarrow y_j^{(0)}
& \text{if } \text{PK} = \bot
& \text{PK} \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K, h))
& \text{if } \text{PRG}(SK) \neq \text{PK} \text{ return } \bot
& \text{return } \text{PPRF}(K, h')
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{PROC. LR}(M_0, M_1): \\
& \quad \text{// assume } |M_0| = |M_1|
& \quad \text{PK} \leftarrow C_{\text{gen}}(ID^{(b)})
& \quad \text{CT} \leftarrow \text{iO}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{enc}}[\text{PK}, M_b])
& \quad L_1 \leftarrow L_1 \cup \{(M_0, M_1)\}
& \quad \text{return CT}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{Circ. } C_{\text{enc}}[\text{PK}, M](SK)
& \text{if } \text{PRG}(SK) \neq \text{PK} \text{ return } M
& \text{return } \bot
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{PROC. Ext}(ID): \\
& \quad \text{// assume } ID \notin \{ID^{(0)}, ID^{(1)}\}
& \quad \text{L}_1 \leftarrow \{ID^{(0)}, ID^{(1)}\}
& \quad \text{SK} \leftarrow \text{PPRF}(K, H(k, ID))
& \text{SK} \leftarrow \text{PPRF}(K, H(k, ID))
& \text{return } \text{SK}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{Circ. } C_{\text{gen}}(h)
& \text{for } j \in S_{i+\delta}
& \text{if } h = h_j^{(0)} \text{ return } y_j^{(0)}
& \text{PK} \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K^*, h))
& \text{return PK}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{Circ. } C_{\text{del}}(SK, h, h', \pi)
& \text{if } \text{Ver}(\text{crs.}, (k, h, h'), \pi) = 0 \text{ return } \bot
& \text{PK} \leftarrow \bot
\end{aligned}
\]

for \( j \in S_{i+\delta} \)
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } h = h_j^{(0)} \text{ then } PK \leftarrow y_j^{(0)}
& \text{if } PK = \bot
& \text{PK} \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K^*, h))
& \text{if } \text{PRG}(SK) \neq \text{PK} \text{ return } \bot
& \text{return } \text{PPRF}(K^*, h')
\end{aligned}
\]

\[\text{Fig. 15. The selective AI-CPA security of the HIBE scheme from Figure 4 (where we have simplified procedure Ext).}\]
We now show that $G_i$ and $G_{i+1}$ are indistinguishable. Suppose $S_i \subseteq S_{i+1} = S_{i+\delta}$ with $\delta = 1$. We show this by defining intermediate hybrid games $G_{i,1,1}, \ldots, G_{i,1,5}$ and showing that in the following sequence, two consecutive games are indistinguishable.

$$G_i, \ G_{i,1,1}, \ G_{i,1,2}, \ G_{i,1,3}, \ G_{i,1,4}, \ G_{i,1,5}, \ G_{i+1}$$

If $S_{i+1} \subseteq S_i$ then again we have $S_{i+1} \subseteq S_{(i+1)+\delta}$ with $\delta = -1$ and we simply invert the sequence of hybrids and show that in the following sequence all neighboring games are indistinguishable.

$$G_{i+1}, \ G_{i+1,1,1}, \ G_{i+1,1,2}, \ G_{i+1,1,3}, \ G_{i+1,1,4}, \ G_{i+1,1,5}, \ G_i$$

$G_{i,\delta,1}$: Let $j^*$ be the element that distinguishes $S_i$ and $S_{i+\delta}$, i.e., $S_{i+\delta} = S_i \cup \{j^*\}$. This game modifies the generation of MPK by replacing the obfuscation of $C^{\text{gen}}$ by an obfuscation of $\tilde{C}^{\text{gen}}$, which computes the public key for identities $\mathcal{ID}$ with $H(k, \mathcal{ID}) = h_{j^*}^{(0)} := H(k, \mathcal{ID}_{j^*})$ by using a hard-coded value $y_{j^*}^{(0)}$ (in addition to the hard-coded (and also random) values $y_j^{(0)}$ with $j \in S_i$). It uses a key $K^*$ punctured at $h_{j^*}^{(0)}$ for all other identities. Circuit $\tilde{C}^{\text{gen}}$ is also padded to the maximum size of any such circuit. (See Figure 15.) Note that $\tilde{C}^{\text{gen}}$ and $C^{\text{gen}}$ are functionally equivalent and have the same size.

Suppose there exists an adversary $A$ that distinguishes game $G_i$ from game $G_{i,\delta,1}$. We build an adversary $B$ against $\text{iO}$ as follows: $B$ simulates $G_{i,\delta,1}$ for $A$, constructs both $C^{\text{gen}}$ and $\tilde{C}^{\text{gen}}$, queries them to its (obfuscation) LR oracle to receive an obfuscated circuit which $B$ defines to be $\tilde{C}^{\text{gen}}$. $B$ continues the simulation of the game and when $A$ returns a bit $b'$, algorithm $B$ returns $b = b'$. Depending on the bit chosen by $B$'s (obfuscation) game, $A$ is run either in game $G_i$ or $G_{i,\delta,1}$ and the output of $B$ matches the output of these games. Hence

$$\Pr \left[ G_i^A \right] - \Pr \left[ G_{i,\delta,1}^A \right] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{iO},B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).$$

$G_{i,\delta,2}$: This game again modifies the generation of MPK by replacing the obfuscation of $C^{\text{del}}$ by an obfuscation of $\tilde{C}^{\text{del}}$. The latter differs from $C^{\text{del}}$ in two aspects: First, if $h = h_{j^*}^{(0)}$, it uses the hard-coded value $y_{j^*}^{(0)}$ to compute PK instead of using the key $K$. Since $h_{j^*}^{(0)}$ is never evaluated in the 6th line of $\tilde{C}^{\text{del}}$, $K$ can be replaced by a punctured key $K^*$ without affecting behavior. Second, if all checks pass, $C^{\text{del}}$ now returns $\text{PPRF}(K^*, h')$ (i.e., using a punctured key instead of $K$). Circuit $\tilde{C}^{\text{del}}$ is also padded to the maximum size of any such circuit.

The second change modifies the behavior of $\tilde{C}^{\text{del}}$, in particular $C^{\text{del}}$ and $\tilde{C}^{\text{del}}$ differ on inputs $(SK, h, h', \pi)$ of the following form:

1. Proof $\pi$ is valid for the statement $(h, h')$
2. If $h = h_j^{(0)}$ for some $j \in S_{i+\delta}$ then $\text{PRG}(SK) = y_j^{(0)}$
3. Otherwise $\text{PRG} (SK) = \text{PRG} (\text{PPRF}(K, h))$

4. $h' = h_j^{(0)}$ (i.e., $K^*$ is punctured at $h'$)

Suppose there exists an adversary $A$ that distinguishes game $G_{i, \delta, 1}$ from game $G_{i, \delta, 2}$. We build an adversary $B$ against diO, which simulates $G_{i, \delta, 1}$ for $A$, except that it constructs both $C^{\text{del}}$ and $C'_{\text{del}}$ and queries its (obfuscation) LR oracle to receive an obfuscated circuit which $B$ defines to be $C'_{\text{del}}$. When $A$ returns a bit $b'$, algorithm $B$ returns $(b = b')$. Depending on the bit chosen by $B$’s (obfuscation) game, $A$ is run either in $G_{i, \delta, 1}$ or $G_{i, \delta, 2}$ and the output of $B$ matches the output of these games when run with $A$. Hence

$$\Pr [G_{i, \delta, 1}^A] - \Pr [G_{i, \delta, 2}^A] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ind}}_{\text{diO}, B}(\lambda).$$

In order to argue that $\text{Adv}^{\text{ind}}_{\text{diO}, B}(\lambda)$ is negligible, it remains to show that $B$ is diO-legitimate; that is, for every PPT extractor $E$ we have $\text{Adv}^{\text{ind}}_{B, E}(\lambda) \in \text{NEGL}$.

Suppose there exists an extractor $E$ that given $B$’s coins returns an input on which $C^{\text{del}}$ and $C'_{\text{del}}$ differ, i.e., $E$ returns $(SK, h, h', \pi)$ that satisfies items (1)–(4) above. Then we show that $E$ can be used to construct a $B_S$ that breaks the extractability of SNARK or a $B_H$ that breaks the collision-resistance of $H$.

We define $B_S$ to be an algorithm that samples coins for $B$, runs $E$ on them to obtain $(SK, h, h', \pi)$ and returns statement $(h, h')$ and $\pi$. By the extractability property of the SNARK, for this $B_S$ there exists an extractor $E_S$ that on input the coins of $B_S$ outputs a witness $(\overline{ID}, \overline{ID}')$. In particular if item (1) above holds, we have

5. $h = H(k, \overline{ID})$ and $h' = H(k, \overline{ID}'(0))$ and $\overline{ID}' \neq \varepsilon$.

By definition we have $h_j^{(0)} = H(k, \overline{ID}^{(0)}_{j-1})$; combining this with items (4) and (5) yields

$$H(k, \overline{ID}'(0)) = H(k, \overline{ID}^{(0)}_{j-1}).$$

We now argue that with overwhelming probability we have that

6. If $j^* = 0$, we have $\overline{ID}^{(0)}_{j^*} = \varepsilon$, so (6) contradicts (5) and thus we have shown that no differing-input extractor exists.

If $j^* \geq 1$, then (6) implies $\overline{ID} = \overline{ID}^{(0)}_{j^* - 1}$; thus $h = H(k, \overline{ID}) = H(k, \overline{ID}^{(0)}_{j^*-1}) = h_j^{(0)}$. By property (B) of the set system $\{S_0, \ldots \}$ (see beginning of the proof),
we have $j^* - 1 \in S$, meaning $y_{j^* - 1}^{(0)}$ is a random value for which with over\-\emph{whelming} probability there is no pre-image SK under $\text{PRG}$, i.e., with $\text{PRG}(SK) = y_{j^* - 1}^{(0)}$. This however contradicts item (2), showing no differing-input extractor exists.

$G_{i, \delta, 3}$: This game modifies the previous game by using the key $K^*$ punctured at $H(k, \overline{ID}_{j^*})$ instead of $K$ when answering $A$’s queries to $\text{Ext}$.

Since $A$ is not allowed to query a key for $\overline{ID}_{j^*}$, the two games only differ if $A$ queries the oracle for an identity $\overline{ID}$ with $H(k, \overline{ID}) = H(k, \overline{ID}_{j^*})$. We can thus construct an adversary $B_H$, using the given randomness for $k$, simulates the rest of the game and outputs a collision $(\overline{ID}, \overline{ID}_{j^*})$. Hence

$$\Pr [G_{i, \delta, 2}^A] - \Pr [G_{i, \delta, 3}^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}, B}^\mathcal{H}(\lambda).$$

$G_{i, \delta, 4}$: This game no longer sets $y_{j^*}^{(0)} := \text{PRG}(\text{PPRF}(K, h_{j^*}^{(0)}))$, but instead computes it by sampling $s_{j^*}^{(0)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda(n)}$ and then setting $y_{j^*}^{(0)} := \text{PRG}(s_{j^*}^{(0)})$.

Let $A$ be an adversary that distinguishes $G_{i, \delta, 3}$ and $G_{i, \delta, 4}$. We use $A$ to build an adversary $B$ against the selective security of the puncturable PRF as follows. Algorithm $B$ runs $A$ until it outputs a pair $(\overline{ID}^{(0)}, \overline{ID}^{(1)})$. It then queries a punctured key $K^*$ at $H(k, \overline{ID}_{j^*})$ and it queries its PPRF challenge oracle on $h_{j^*}^{(0)} = H(k, \overline{ID}_{j^*})$ to receive $s_{j^*}^{(0)}$ (which is either $\text{PPRF}(K, h_{j^*}^{(0)})$ or truly random.) Note that $B$’s query is legitimate. Algorithm $B$ then simulates the rest of $G_{i, \delta, 3}$. Note that $B$ can do this because $K$, the un-punctured key, is not used anywhere. When $A$ terminates with a bit $b'$, algorithm $B$ returns ($b = b'$). If $s_{j^*}^{(0)}$ is $\text{PPRF}(K, h_{j^*}^{(0)})$ then $A$ is run in game $G_{i, \delta, 3}$, and when it is random then $A$ is run with respect to $G_{i, \delta, 4}$. Hence,

$$\Pr [G_{i, \delta, 3}^A] - \Pr [G_{i, \delta, 4}^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PPRF}, B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).$$

$G_{i, \delta, 5}$: This game modifies $y_{j^*}^{(0)}$ further: instead of setting it to $\text{PRG}(s_{j^*}^{(0)})$ it directly samples $y_{j^*}^{(0)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda(n)}$.

Let $A$ be an adversary that distinguishes $G_{i, \delta, 4}$ from $G_{i, \delta, 5}$. We use $A$ to build an adversary $B$ against the security of PRF as follows. Algorithm $B$ receives a value $y_{j^*}^{(0)}$ which is either $\text{PRG}(s_{j^*}^{(0)})$ for a uniformly random $s_{j^*}^{(0)}$, or is a truly random value. Algorithm $B$ simulates $G_{i, \delta, 4}$ for $A$, except that it uses the given $y_{j^*}^{(0)}$ (instead of running the code in boxes 4 and 5 in Figure 15). When $A$ terminates with a bit $b'$, algorithm $B$ returns ($b = b'$). If $y_{j^*}^{(0)}$ is $\text{PRG}(s_{j^*}^{(0)})$, algorithm $A$ is run in game $G_{i, \delta, 4}$ and when it is truly random it is run in $G_{i, \delta, 5}$. Hence,

$$\Pr [G_{i, \delta, 4}^A] - \Pr [G_{i, \delta, 5}^A] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PRF}, B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda).$$
We have thus arrived at a game, \( G_{i,\delta,5} \), in which all values \( y_j^{(0)} \) for \( j \in S_{i+\delta} \) are random. The only difference to game \( G_{i+\delta} \) is that the latter uses circuits \( C^{\text{gen}} \) and \( C^{\text{del}} \) and oracle \( \text{EXT} \), which have an un-punctured key \( K \) for the PPRF evaluations. Analogously to game hops \( 0 \to 1, 1 \to 2, \) and \( 2 \to 3 \), we can show that there exist \( iO \) adversary \( B_1 \), \( diO \) adversary \( B_2 \), and \( H \)-adversary \( B_3 \) with

\[
\Pr \left[ G_{i,\delta,5}^A \right] - \Pr \left[ G_{i+\delta}^A \right] \leq \text{Adv}_{iO,B_1}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{diO,B_2}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{H,B_3}^{\text{cr}}(\lambda) .
\]

So far we have thus shown that the Sel-AI-CPA game is indistinguishable from game \( G_{\ell(n(0))} \), in particular there exist \( B_1, \ldots, B_3 \) with

\[
\Pr \left[ G^A(\lambda) \right] - \Pr \left[ G_{\ell(n(0))} \right] \leq 2\ell(n(0)) + 1 \cdot \left( \text{Adv}_{iO,B_1}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{diO,B_2}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{PPTF,B_3}^{\text{cr}}(\lambda) \right) .
\]

By property (A) of our set system \( S_{-1}, \ldots, S_{\ell(n(0))} \), in \( G_{\ell(n(0))} \) the value \( y_j^{(0)} \) which corresponds to the public key for challenge identity \( \overline{ID}^{(0)} \), is random.

We now define a similar sequence of games \( G_{\ell(n(0)),j}^i := G_{\ell(n(0)),j_0}^{(0)}, G_{\ell(n(0)),j_1}^{(1)}, \ldots, G_{\ell(n(0)),j_{\ell(n(0))}}^{(\ell(n(0)))} \) where \( G_{\ell(n(0)),j}^{(i)} \) is defined by setting all values \( y_j^{(0)} \) for \( j \in S_{\ell(n(0))} \) and all values \( y_j^{(1)} \) for \( j \in S_j \) to be random. An analogous argument to the one above now shows that \( G_{\ell(n(0)),j}^{(i)} \) is indistinguishable from \( G_{\ell(n(0)),j}^{(i)} \). Together, this shows that the original game is indistinguishable from \( G_{\ell(n(1))}^{(i)} \), a game in which the public keys corresponding the challenge identities, i.e., the values \( y_{\ell(n(0))}^{(0)} \) and \( y_{\ell(n(1))}^{(1)} \) with overwhelming probability do not have preimages under \( \text{PRG} \).

***G^{(2)}***: This game is defined like \( G_{\ell(n(1)),j}^{(i)} \) but generates the challenge ciphertext by always encrypting \( M_0 \) for identity \( \overline{ID}^{(0)} \).

Let \( A \) be an adversary that distinguishes \( G_{\ell(n(1)),j}^{(i)} \) and \( G^{(2)} \). We use \( A \) to build an adversary \( B \) against the security of \( iO \) as follows. \( B \) simulates \( G_{\ell(n(1)),j}^{(i)} \) for \( A \) answering its LR queries on \( (M_0, M_1) \) by setting \( PK^{(i)} \rightarrow y_{\ell(n(i))}^{(i)} \) for \( i = 0, 1 \) (which implements \( PK^{(i)} \rightarrow C^{\text{gen}}(\overline{ID}^{(i)}) \)) and calling its (obfuscation) LR oracle on \( C^{\text{enc}}[PK^{(b)}, M_b] \) and \( C^{\text{enc}}[PK^{(0)}, M_0] \) and returning the received CT to \( A \). When \( A \) outputs \( b' \) then \( B \) returns \( (b = b') \). According to the challenge bit in the obfuscation game, \( A \) is run in game \( G_{\ell(n(1)),j}^{(1)} \) or \( G^{(2)} \). Hence

\[
\Pr \left[ (G_{\ell(n(1)),j}^{(i)})^A \right] - \Pr \left[ (G^{(2)})^A \right] \leq \text{Adv}_{iO,B}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) .
\]

It remains to show that the circuits queried by \( B \) to its challenge oracle are functionally equivalent. Since \( y_{\ell(n(0))}^{(0)} \) and \( y_{\ell(n(1))}^{(1)} \) are truly random bit strings of length \( 2n(\lambda) \), with overwhelming probability there do not exist \( SK^{(0)}, SK^{(1)} \) with \( \text{PRG}(SK^{(i)}) = y_{\ell(n(i))}^{(i)} \). With overwhelming probability over the choice of \( y_{\ell(n(0))}^{(0)} \) and \( y_{\ell(n(1))}^{(1)} \), the circuits \( C^{\text{enc}}[PK^{(b)}, M_b] \) and \( C^{\text{enc}}[PK^{(0)}, M_0] \) are both functionally equivalent to a circuit that always outputs \( \perp \). (And they are of the same size, since \( |M_b| = |M_0| \).)
Finally note that \( G^{(2)} \) is independent of the bit \( b \) and hence for any (even unbounded) adversary \( A \) we have \( \Pr[(G^{(2)})^A] = 0 \). The theorem follows.

I A Low-Weight Sequence of Sets

We describe the pebbling sets from [FKPR14] that we use in the proof of Theorem 3. For ease of notation we will work with ternary numbers, which we represent as strings of digits from \{0, 1, 2\} within angular brackets \( \langle \cdot \rangle \). We denote repetition of digits as \( 0^n = 0 \ldots 0 \) \((n \text{ times})\). Addition will also be in ternary, e.g., \( \langle 202 \rangle + \langle 1 \rangle = \langle 210 \rangle \).

Let \( N = 2^n \) be a power of 2. In the proof of Theorem 3 we will construct sets \( S_{\langle 0 \rangle}, \ldots, S_{\langle 10^n \rangle} \subset \{0, \ldots, N\} \). These sets will define the positions in the path to the challenge where we replace real values by random ones. The following definition measures how “close” sets (that differ in one element) are.

**Neighboring sets.** Let \( k > 0 \). Two distinct sets \( S, S' \subset \{0, \ldots, N\} \) are called \( k \)-neighboring if

1. \( S \triangle S' := (S \cup S') \setminus (S \cap S') = \{j\} \) for some \( j \in \{0, \ldots, N\} \), i.e., they differ in exactly one element \( j \).
2. \( j - k \in S \).
3. \( \forall i \in [k-1] : j - i \not\in S \).

We define the first set (with index 0 = \( \langle 0 \rangle \)) and the last set (with index \( 3^n = \langle 10^n \rangle \)) as

\[
S_{\langle 0 \rangle} := \{0\} \quad \text{and} \quad S_{\langle 10^n \rangle} := \{0, N\} .
\]

These will correspond to the real game, where only the root (at depth ‘0’) is random, and the random game, where the value at depth \( N \) is random too. The remaining (intermediate) sets are defined recursively as follows. For \( \ell = 0, \ldots, n \), we define the \( \ell \)-th level of sets to be all the sets of the form \( S_{\langle (n-\ell) \rangle} \) (i.e., whose index in ternary ends with \((n-\ell) \text{ zeros}\)). Thus, \( S_{\langle 0 \rangle} \) and \( S_{\langle 10^n \rangle} \) are the (only) level-0 sets.

Let \( S_I, S_{I'} \) be two consecutive level-\( \ell \) sets, by which we mean that 

\[
I' = I + \langle 10^{n-\ell} \rangle .
\]

By construction, these sets will differ in exactly one element \( \{j\} \) (i.e., \( S_I \neq S_{I'} \); and \( S_I \cup \{j\} = S_{I'} \) or \( S_{I'} \cup \{j\} = S_I \)). Then the two level-\((\ell + 1) \) sets between the level-\( \ell \) sets \( S_I, S_{I'} \) are defined as

\[
S_{I+\langle 10^{n-(\ell+1)} \rangle} := S_I \cup \{j - \frac{N}{2^{\ell+1}} \} \quad \text{and} \quad S_{I'+\langle 10^{n-(\ell+1)} \rangle} := S_{I'} \cup \{j - \frac{N}{2^{\ell+1}} \} .
\]

A concrete example for \( N = 2^3 = 8 \) is illustrated in Figure 16 (where the \( S_I \) is defined by the dark nodes).

An important fact we will use is that consecutive level-\( \ell \) sets are \( (\frac{N}{2^\ell}) \)-neighboring; in particular, consecutive level-\( n \) sets (the 4 lines in the box in Figure 16 illustrate 4 consecutive sets) are thus 1-neighboring, i.e.,

\[
\forall I \in \{\langle 0 \rangle, \ldots, \langle 2^n \rangle \} : S_I \triangle S_{I+\langle 1 \rangle} = \{j\} \quad \text{and} \quad j - 1 \in S_I ,
\]

meaning they satisfy the desired property.
Fig. 16. Example illustrating some of the set from $S_{(0)}, \ldots, S_{(1000)} = S_{27}$ where $n = 3$. 