

# MLS Architecture: analysis of the security, privacy and functional requirements

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### MLS Architecture

Preliminary analysis of the security, privacy and functional requirements

#### Benjamin Beurdouche




Figure 1: Example of MLS Architecture:

Services trusted for security, privacy and functionality

Services trusted for privacy and functionality

Services trusted for functionality (privacy can still be broken by looking at request patterns)

#### Description of a data flow within a typical infrastructure:

- (1) Alice provides a binder between her identity and a public signature key to the AS
- (2) Alice provides her CIKs signed by the authenticated key to the CS
- (3) Bob retrieves CIKs for Alice and Charlie at the CS
- (4) Bob retrieves the signature public keys for Alice and Charlie and authenticates their CIKs
- (5) Bob sends a message to the Group ABC to the IDS
- (6) The IDS maps the Group Identifier to a list of Members and anonymizes the MLS Ciphertext Header before providing the identity of the recipient and the anonymized messages
- (7) The ODS stores the randomized messages for Charlie and forget the recipients, then wait until the message is requested
- (8) Charlie retrieves the encrypted public data from the SDS

#### Description of the knowledge persisted and observed within this infrastructure:

#### 1. AS - Authentication Service

Security: The AS has the link between the identity and the signature key, potentially it may have the ability to generate such links depending on the concrete infrastructure. Privacy: It may reconstruct parts of existing or future groups depending on requests from clients.

#### 2. CS - Credential Retrieval Service

*Privacy:* The CS does store the CIKs and may reconstruct parts of existing or future groups depending on requests from clients.

#### 3. IDS - Message Reception Service

Privacy: The IDS has to map final recipients to group members, it can keep this information encrypted or might receive it from the client. Additionally it has to anonymize the header of messages received to make them unique to each recipient. Either the list or the key needs to be "forgotten" by the IDS after processing. A goal is to make sure that the IDS cannot prove group membership but only make a claim.

#### 4. ODS - Message Delivery Service

*Privacy:* The ODS stores the randomized messages for recipients, it has knowledge of the recipient identity and the association with its push token. It may reconstruct parts of existing or future groups depending on interactions with the IDS.

#### 5. SDS - Storage Delivery Service

*Privacy:* The SDS stores E2E encrypted data or metadata for groups. It may reconstruct parts of existing or future groups depending on requests from clients.