Byzantine-Tolerant Set-Constrained Delivery Broadcast
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Abstract

Set-Constrained Delivery Broadcast (SCD-broadcast), recently introduced at ICDCN 2018, is a high-level communication abstraction that captures ordering properties not between individual messages but between sets of messages. More precisely, it allows processes to broadcast messages and deliver sets of messages, under the constraint that if a process delivers a set containing a message $m$ before a set containing a message $m'$, then no other process delivers first a set containing $m'$ and later a set containing $m$. It has been shown that SCD-broadcast and read/write registers are computationally equivalent, and an algorithm implementing SCD-broadcast is known in the context of asynchronous message passing systems prone to crash failures.

This paper introduces a Byzantine-tolerant SCD-broadcast algorithm, which we call BSCD-broadcast. Our proposed algorithm assumes an underlying basic Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast abstraction. We first introduce an intermediary communication primitive, Byzantine FIFO broadcast (BFIFO-broadcast), which we then use as a primitive in our final BSCD-broadcast algorithm. Unlike the original SCD-broadcast algorithm that is tolerant to up to $t < n/2$ crashing processes, and unlike the underlying Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive that is tolerant to up to $t < n/3$ Byzantine processes, our BSCD-broadcast algorithm is tolerant to up to $t < n/4$ Byzantine processes. As an illustration of the high abstraction power provided by the BSCD-broadcast primitive, we show that it can be used to implement a Byzantine-tolerant read/write snapshot object in an extremely simple way.

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Keywords and phrases Algorithm, Asynchronous system, Byzantine process, Communication abstraction, Distributed computing, Distributed software engineering, Fault-tolerance, Message-passing, Modularity, Read/write snapshot object, Reliable broadcast, Set-constrained message delivery

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1 Introduction

Reliable broadcast in asynchronous crash-prone systems

Reliable broadcast is a communication abstraction central to fault-tolerant asynchronous distributed systems. It allows each process to broadcast, with well-defined delivery guarantees, messages to all processes in the presence of failures. More precisely, it guarantees that non-faulty processes deliver the same set of messages $M$, including all the messages they broadcast, and a subset of the messages broadcast by faulty processes before they crashed. The fundamental property of the reliable broadcast abstraction asserts that no two non-faulty processes deliver different sets of messages, and a faulty process delivers a subset of the messages delivered by the non-faulty processes (two distinct faulty processes possibly delivering different sets of messages).

Reliable broadcast in the presence of Byzantine processes (BR-broadcast)

Reliable broadcast has been studied in the context of Byzantine failures since the eighties. A process commits a Byzantine failure if it behaves arbitrarily (i.e., its behavior is not the one described by the algorithm it is assumed to execute) [10, 12]. Such a failure can be intentional (also called malicious) or the result of a transient fault which altered its intended behavior in an unpredictable way. Bracha [3] introduced an elegant signature-free Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm for the reliable broadcast abstraction in $n$-process message-passing asynchronous systems, where up to $t < n/3$ processes may be Byzantine.

Set-Constrained Delivery broadcast in asynchronous crash-prone systems

Set-Constrained Delivery broadcast (SCD-broadcast) was introduced in [9] in the context of crash failures. Rather than individual messages, a process delivers non-empty sets of messages, satisfying the following ordering property: if a non-faulty process delivers a set of message $ms_1$ containing a message $m$ and later delivers a set of message $ms_1'$ containing a message $m'$, no non-faulty process delivers first a set of message $ms_2$ containing $m'$ and later a set of message $ms_2'$ containing $m$. This communication abstraction is particularly efficient to build read/write implementable objects, such as the ones described in [14]. It is shown in [9] that, in asynchronous message-passing systems with up to $t$ crashed processes, (a) $t < n/2$ is necessary and sufficient to build SCD-broadcast, and (b) atomic R/W registers and SCD-broadcast have the same computability power.

Content of the paper

In this paper, we introduce a new communication abstraction, which we call BSCD-broadcast, that provides similar guarantees to SCD broadcast in the context of Byzantine failures. The specification and implementation of such a high-level abstraction has a direct practical interest when realizing many replicated objects. As an example, we show how a Byzantine-tolerant single-writer/multi-reader snapshot object [1] can be easily built on top of BSCD-broadcast. More generally, we believe a better understanding of how high-level broadcast abstractions can be implemented in a Byzantine context can help developers design novel and richer zero-trust applications, extending their use and applicability beyond the highly-publicized examples of cryptocurrencies [5, 11] and smart contract platforms [4].

We begin by defining a first abstraction (Section 3.2), BFIFO-broadcast, that guarantees that non-faulty processes deliver messages from each process in their sending order. Since
such a sending order cannot be defined for Byzantine processes, the only guarantee provided in that case is that all non-faulty processes deliver the messages from a given Byzantine process in the same order. Depending on the BR-broadcast algorithm used (e.g., [3, 8]), we obtain for BFIFO-broadcast either an algorithm which requires (i) \( t < n/3 \) and three sequential communication steps, or (ii) \( t < n/5 \) and two sequential communication steps.

This simple abstraction is then used to build a BSCD-broadcast algorithm (Section 3) under the assumption \( t < n/4 \). The design of our algorithm differs significantly from the SCD-broadcast algorithm described in [9], due to the fact that in the crash-failure model, a process behaves correctly until it possibly crashes, whereas a Byzantine process can exhibit an arbitrary behavior at any time. Precise definitions of both of these communication abstractions are provided in the paper. Our BSCD-broadcast algorithm requires two sequential BFIFO-broadcast steps for each BSCD-broadcast message. These two algorithms are built upon a signature-free Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive and are equally signature-free.

Finally, we build a Byzantine-tolerant snapshot object as an example application of BSCD-broadcast (Section 4). Let us notice that it has recently been shown that the snapshot object is instrumental in the implementation of cryptocurrencies [5]. It follows that the simple implementation (presented below) of such an object in message-passing systems where processes can exhibit Byzantine failures can benefit to cryptocurrencies and some other blockchain-based applications.

## 2 Computation Model

### 2.1 On the process side

#### Asynchronous processes

The system is made up of a finite set \( \Pi \) of \( n > 1 \) asynchronous sequential processes, namely \( \Pi = \{p_1, \ldots, p_n\} \). **Asynchronous** means that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary arbitrarily with time, and always remains unknown to the other processes.

#### Process failures

Up to \( t \) processes can exhibit a **Byzantine** behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. As a simple example, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to broadcast a message \( m \) to all the processes, can send a message \( m_1 \) to some processes, a different message \( m_2 \) to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the remaining processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to foil non-Byzantine processes. It is however assumed that a Byzantine process cannot send an infinite number of messages in a finite time, a necessary hypothesis in our proof of termination. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is also called **faulty**. Otherwise, it is **correct** or **non-faulty**.

### 2.2 On the communication side

#### The basic Byzantine reliable broadcast communication abstraction

This abstraction, denoted BR-broadcast, is a one-shot communication abstraction that provides two operations, \( \text{br\_broadcast()} \) and \( \text{br\_deliver()} \). “One-shot” means that a process executes \( \text{br\_broadcast()} \) at most once, and \( \text{br\_deliver()} \) at most \( n \) times (one per possible sender). As in [6, 13], we use the following terminology: when a process invokes \( \text{br\_broadcast()} \),
we say that it “br-broadcasts a message”, and when it executes \text{br\_deliver}(), we say that it “br-delivers a message”. BR-broadcast is defined by the following properties:

- BR-Validity. If a correct process \text{br\_deliver} a message \(m\) from a correct process \(p_i\), then \(p_i\) \text{br\_broadcast} \(m\).
- BR-Integrity. A correct process \text{br\_deliver} at most one message \(m\) from a process \(p_i\).
- BR-Termination-1. If a correct process \text{br\_broadcast} a message \(m\), it \text{br\_deliver} it.
- BR-Termination-2. If a correct process \text{br\_deliver} a message \(m\) from \(p_i\) (possibly faulty) then all correct processes eventually \text{br\_deliver} \(m\) from \(p_i\).

On the safety side, BR-validity relates the outputs (messages \text{br\_delivered}) to the inputs (messages \text{br\_broadcast}), while BR-integrity states that there is no duplication.

On the liveness side, BR-Termination-2 gives its name to reliable broadcast: be the sender correct or not, every message \text{br\_delivered} by a correct process is \text{br\_delivered} by all correct processes. Coupled together, the two termination properties further imply that a message \text{br\_broadcast} by a correct process is \text{br\_delivered} by all correct processes. It follows from these properties that all correct processes \text{br\_deliver} the same set of messages, and this set contains at least all the messages \text{br\_broadcast} by correct processes.

As indicated in the introduction, there are signature-free distributed algorithms, which build BR-broadcast on top of asynchronous message-passing systems in which processes may be Byzantine [3, 8].

**Terminology**

When studying the BR-broadcast abstraction, a message \(m\) \text{br\_broadcast} by a process is called an application message. Differently, a message generated by the algorithm implementing the abstraction is called a protocol message. Similarly in the rest of this paper when studying other broadcast abstractions, messages handled by that abstraction are referred to as application messages, and messages generated by the algorithm implementing the abstraction (possibly through a lower-level abstraction) are referred to as protocol messages.

### 2.3 Multi-shot Byzantine reliable broadcast

As already stated, BR-broadcast is a one-shot communication abstraction. But BR-broadcast allows several processes to invoke the operation \text{br\_broadcast}(), each giving rise to distinct BR-broadcast instances. Two BR-broadcast instances can be easily distinguished by associating with each of them the identity of the process that created it.

It follows that a multi-shot BR-broadcast abstraction, which we call MBR-broadcast, can be very easily obtained by adding a sequence number \(sn\) to each BR-broadcast instance. A MBR-broadcast instance is then identified by a pair \((i, sn)\), but only \(sn\) needs to be provided in an invocation, namely \(p_i\) must invoke \text{br\_broadcast}(sn, m), where \(sn\) is the local integer variable (initialized to 0) used by \(p_i\) to generate its sequence numbers. Conversely, when a message is MBR-delivered by a process \(p_i\), the information provided to the upper layer is a triple \((j, sn, m)\) and we say that \(p_i\) mbr-delivered the message \(m\) from \(p_j\) with sequence number \(sn\).

The BR-Validity and BR-Integrity properties for this new multi-shot abstraction become:

- MBR-Validity. If a correct process \text{mbr\_deliver} a message \(m\) from a correct process \(p_i\) with sequence number \(sn\), then \(p_i\) \text{mbr\_broadcast} \(m\) with sequence number \(sn\).
- MBR-Integrity. Given a sequence number \(sn\), a correct process \text{mbr\_deliver} at most one message \(m\) associated with \(sn\) from a process \(p_i\).
The other properties MBR-Termination-1 and MBR-Termination-2 remain the same as for BR-broadcast. Multi-shot extensions of the single-shot signature-free BR-broadcast algorithms introduced in [3, 8] are presented in Appendix A.

3 Byzantine Set-Constrained Delivery Broadcast

3.1 Definition

Set-Constrained Delivery broadcast (SCD-broadcast) was introduced in [9], in the context of asynchronous systems prone to process crashes (in which it can be built if and only if \( t < n/2 \)). We consider here its extension to Byzantine process failures, denoted BSCD-broadcast. This communication abstraction provides two operations, \( \text{bscd\_broadcast}(\cdot) \) and \( \text{bscd\_deliver}(\cdot) \). (We say that a process bscd-broadcasts messages and bscd-delivers messages.) The operation \( \text{bscd\_broadcast}(m) \) allows the invoking process to broadcast an application message, while the operation \( \text{bscd\_deliver}(\cdot) \) returns a non-empty set of messages to the invoking process. BSCD-broadcast is defined by the following properties.

- **BSCD-Validity.** If a correct process bscd-delivers a set of messages containing a message \( m \) from a process \( p_i \), if \( p_i \) is correct, it bscd-broadcasts \( m \).
- **BSCD-Integrity.** A message is bscd-delivered at most once by each correct process.
- **BSCD-Order.** Let \( p_i \) be a correct process that first bscd-delivers a set of messages \( ms_i \) and later bscd-delivers a set of messages \( ms'_i \). For any pair of messages \( m \in ms_i \) and \( m' \in ms'_i \), no correct process bscd-delivers first a set containing \( m' \) and later bscd-delivers a set containing \( m \).
- **BSCD-Termination-1.** If a correct process bscd-broadcasts a message \( m \), it bscd-delivers a message set containing \( m \).
- **BSCD-Termination-2.** If a correct process bscd-delivers a message set containing \( m \), every correct process bscd-delivers a message set containing \( m \).

As a simple example, let \( m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, m_5, m_6, m_7 \) and \( m_8 \) be messages that have been bscd-broadcast by different processes. The following message set bscd-deliveries by \( p_1, p_2 \) and \( p_3 \) respect the definition of BSCD-broadcast:

- at \( p_1 \): \{\( m_1, m_2 \), \( m_3, m_4, m_5 \), \( m_6 \), \( m_7, m_8 \)\}.
- at \( p_2 \): \{\( m_1 \), \( m_3, m_2 \), \( m_6, m_4, m_5 \), \( m_7 \), \( m_8 \)\}.
- at \( p_3 \): \{\( m_3, m_1, m_2 \), \( m_6, m_4, m_5 \), \( m_7 \), \( m_8 \)\}.

Differently, due to the deliveries of the message sets including \( m_2 \) and \( m_3 \), the following message set deliveries by \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) do not satisfy the BSCD-Order property.

- at \( p_1 \): \{\( m_1, m_2 \), \( m_3, m_4, m_5 \), \( m_6, m_4, m_5 \), \( m_7 \), \( m_8 \)\}.
- at \( p_2 \): \{\( m_1, m_3 \), \( m_2 \)\}.

3.2 A simple sub-protocol to ease presentation: BFIFO Broadcast

In order to simplify the presentation of our BSCD-broadcast algorithm, we first introduce a straightforward multi-shot first-in-first-out Byzantine broadcast primitive (BFIFO-broadcast), that is implemented on top of MBR-broadcast (Section 2.3) by Algorithm 1. Basing our algorithm on this abstraction allows us to assume that all correct processes agree on the order of relevant messages for any possible sender, even a Byzantine one. While ordering messages from each possible sender is an important first step, the crucial property of introducing order between messages of different processes is achieved later, in Algorithm 2.
BFIFO-broadcast is defined by the four MBR-broadcast properties (renamed BFIFO-Validity, BFIFO-Integrity, BFIFO-Termination-1, and BFIFO-Termination-2), to which we add a FIFO delivery guarantee, defined as follows:

- **BFIFO-Order.** If a correct process \( p_i \) bfifo-delivers two messages \( m \) and \( m' \) from the same process \( p_k \) in the order first \( m \) and then \( m' \), no correct process bfifo-delivers \( m' \) before \( m \) (BFIFO-Order-1). Moreover, if \( p_k \) is correct, it bfifo-broadcasts \( m \) before \( m' \) (BFIFO-Order-2).

In practice, each invocation of bfifo_broadcast() by a process \( p_i \) is identified by the pair \( \langle i, sn \rangle \), where \( sn \) is the corresponding sequence number. The bfifo-delivery order at correct processes corresponds to the order of increasing sequence numbers.

**Algorithm 1** BFIFO-broadcast on top of MBR-broadcast (code for \( p_i \))

```plaintext
init \( sn_i \leftarrow 0 \); fifo_del \leftarrow [0, \ldots, 0].

operation bfifo_broadcast\((m)\) at \( p_i \) is
(1) \( sn_i \leftarrow sn_i + 1 \);
(2) \( br_broadcast\((sn_i, m)\). \)

when \( \langle j, sn, m \rangle \) is \( br\_delivered \) at \( p_i \) do
(3) \( \text{wait} (\text{sn} = \text{fifo}_{\_del}[j] + 1); \)
(4) \( \text{bfifo\_deliver} \langle j, sn, m \rangle; \)
(5) \( \text{fifo}_{\_del}[j] \leftarrow \text{fifo}_{\_del}[j] + 1. \)
```

The proof that Algorithm 1 implements BFIFO-broadcast is provided in Appendix B.1.

### 3.3 An algorithm for BSCD-broadcast on top of BFIFO-broadcast

Algorithm 2 implements BSCD-broadcast on top of BFIFO-broadcast, with the assumption \( t < n/4 \). This assumption is required in our proof of correctness (see proof of Lemma 17). An open question remains as to whether \( t < n/4 \) is a tight bound for BSCD-broadcast.

This algorithm is used in Section 4 to build a Byzantine-tolerant snapshot object.

**Overall intuition and challenges**

At its core, Algorithm 2 must prevent any potential disruption caused by Byzantine processes, as these cannot be assumed to respect any given behaviour. This need for containment of unpredictable behaviour leads to a design that departs fundamentally from the crash-tolerant SCD-broadcast algorithm proposed in [9].

Whereas the crash-tolerant version SCD-broadcast was able to inject order into the system by enforcing a waiting period between successive broadcasts from the same source, this strategy no longer works in a Byzantine setting. This is because nothing prevents Byzantine processes from issuing overlapping broadcasts, in order to confuse correct processes and foil the protocol. This apparently subtle limitation renders the protocol considerably more complex, as correct processes must now cooperate to enforce an order on the broadcasts initiated by a possibly Byzantine source, while pruning inconsistent control information produced by Byzantine processes.

More concretely, Algorithm 2 exploits an echo mechanism (the `ready` messages `bfifo-broadcast` at lines 5 and 23, illustrated in Figure 1) to construct temporal barriers that witness a message’s distribution among participants. The construction of these barriers is however constrained by preventing correct processes from contributing to the barrier of a `bscd-broadcast` from a source \( p_i \), if an earlier `bscd-broadcast` by the same \( p_i \) (earlier in the
sense of the bfifo-broadcast) has not yet been bscd-delivered. This sequencing introduces some order into the set of bscd-broadcast messages unfolding concurrently, and eventually ensures that received bscd-broadcasts can be locally bundled together and delivered as sets respecting the BSCD-broadcast specification by correct processes.

A note on sequence numbers and message identity

Application messages, each corresponding to an invocation of bscd_broadcast(), are identified by a pair \((j, snj)\) made of a process identity \(j\) and a sequence number \(snj\). To simplify the presentation of the algorithm, and without loss of generality, the sequence numbers given to bscd-broadcast application messages correspond to the sequence number of an underlying bfifo-broadcast message noted init\((m)\) in the algorithm. However the BSCD-broadcast algorithm also bifo-broadcasts protocol messages of other types (namely, ready messages), therefore many sequence numbers of bifo-broadcast messages do not correspond to a bscd-

Algorithm 2 BSCD-broadcast on top of BFIFO-broadcast \((t < n/4\), code for \(p_i\))

init pending \(\leftarrow [\emptyset, \ldots, \emptyset]\); for each \(j \in [1, \ldots, n]\), \(snj \geq 1\)

\(\text{do data}_i[j, snj] \leftarrow \perp\); witness\(_i[j, snj] \leftarrow [-\infty, \ldots, +\infty]\)

done for.

operation bscd_broadcast\((m)\) at \(p_i\) is

(1) \(\text{bfifo广播 init}(m)\).

when \((j, snj, \text{init}(m))\) is \(\text{bfifo广播 delivered at } p_i\)

(2) \% snj is the sequence number carried by \(\text{init}(m)\); namely: \(\text{fifo_del}[j] = snj\) (cf. Alg. 1)

(3) \(\text{data}_i[j, snj] \leftarrow m\); \% we then have \(\text{id}(m) = (j, snj)\)

(4) \(\text{pending}_i[j] \leftarrow \text{pending}_i[j] \cup \{snj\}\);

(5) \(\text{if } snj = \min(\text{pending}_i[j]) \text{ then } \text{bfifo广播 ready}\((j, snj)\) \text{ end if};\)

(6) \(\text{try deliver}()\).

when \((k, snk, \text{ready}((j, snj)))\) is \(\text{bfifo广播 delivered at } p_i\)

(7) \% snk is the sequence number carried by \(\text{ready}(j, snj)\); namely: \(\text{fifo_del}[k] = snk\)

(8) \(\text{if } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] = +\infty \text{ then } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \leftarrow \text{snk end if;}\)

(9) \(\text{if } snj > \text{fifo_del}_i[j] \land \{(k') \text{ such that } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k'] < +\infty\} \geq t + 1\)

(10) \(\text{then pending}_i[j] \leftarrow \text{pending}_i[j] \cup \{snj\} \text{ end if;}\)

(11) \(\text{try deliver}()\).

internal operation \(\text{try deliver}()\) is

(12) \(\text{candidates} \leftarrow \{(j, snj)\} \text{ such that } (snj \in \text{pending}_i[j]) \land \{|k| \text{ such that } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] < +\infty\} \geq t + 1\} \);\n
(13) \(\text{todel} \leftarrow \{(j, snj) \in \text{candidates} \text{ such that } (\text{data}_i[j, snj] \neq \perp) \land \{|k| \text{ such that } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] < +\infty\} \geq n - t\}\);

(14) \(\text{while } \exists (j, snj) \in \text{todel} : \neg (\forall (j', snj') \in \text{candidates} \setminus \text{todel}, \text{safe}(j, snj), (j', snj'))))\)

(15) \(\text{do todel} \leftarrow \text{todel} \setminus \{(j, snj)\}\)

(16) \text{end while;}

(17) \(\text{if } \text{todel} \neq \emptyset \text{ then}\)

(18) \(\text{ms} \leftarrow \{(j, snj, \text{data}_i[j, snj]) \text{ such that } (j, snj) \in \text{todel}\};\)

(19) \(\text{bscd广播 ms;}\)

(20) \(\text{foreach } (j, snj) \in \text{todel}, \text{in increasing lexicographical order do}\)

(21) \(\text{pending}_i[j] \leftarrow \text{pending}_i[j] \setminus \{snj\};\)

(22) \(\text{if } (\text{pending}_i[j] \neq \emptyset) \land (\text{data}_i[j, \min(\text{pending}_i[j])] \neq \perp)\)

(23) \(\text{then } \text{bfifo广播 ready}\((j, \min(\text{pending}_i[j]))\) \text{ end if;}\)

(24) \(\text{end for}\)

(25) \text{end if.}

internal predicate \(\text{safe}\((j, snj), (j', snj')\)\) is

(26) \(\text{if } j = j' \land snj < snj' \text{ then return (true) end if;}\)

(27) \(\text{if } \{|k| \text{ such that } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] < \text{witness}_i[j', snj'][k]\} > \frac{t}{2} \text{ then return (true) end if;}\)

(28) \text{return (false).}
broadcast message. As a consequence, these application messages do not have strictly sequential numbers.

**Local variables at a process**

Each process $p_i$ manages the following local variables:

- $\text{pending}_{i}[1..n]$ is an array of sets, such that $\text{pending}_{i}[j]$ contains the sequence numbers of the messages known by $p_i$ as bscd-broadcast by $p_j$ and not yet locally bscd-delivered.

- $\text{data}_{i}[1..n, 1..1]$ is a two-dimensional array, whose entries are initially ⊥. $\text{data}_{i}[j, snj]$ stores the content of message $(j, snj)$ (the message from $p_j$ whose sequence number is $snj$).

- $\text{witness}_{i}[1..n, 1..1]$ is another two-dimensional array that records the temporal barriers observed so far by $p_i$. Each entry $\text{witness}_{i}[j, snj]$ stores the barrier for message $(j, snj)$, an array of size $n$ initialized to $[+∞, \cdots, +∞]$. As the algorithm progresses, $\text{witness}_{i}[j, snj][k]$ is updated to contain the logical date $snk$ (a sequence number of $p_k$ at which $p_k$ witnessed message $(j, snj)$ by bfifo-broadcasting the protocol message $\text{READY}((j, snj))$).

- $\text{candidates}_i$ and $\text{todel}_i$ are sets containing the identities of message which are potential candidates to belong to the next message set bscd-delivered by $p_i$; $\text{todel}_i$ is a refined subset of $\text{candidates}_i$.

**Behavior of a process $p_i$**

A process triggers the bscd-broadcast of a message $m$ by simply bfifo-broadcasting the protocol message $\text{INIT}(m)$ (line 1, illustrated in Fig. 1).

When a process $p_i$ bfifo-delivers a message $\text{INIT}(m)$ from a process $p_j$, this protocol message has been allocated a sequence number called $snj$ (line 2) by the underlying BFIFO broadcast algorithm (Section 3.2), and consequently $(j, snj)$ becomes the identity of the application message $m$. $m$ is first stored in $\text{data}_{i}[j, snj]$ (line 3), and its sequence number $snj$ is then added to $\text{pending}_{i}[j]$ (line 4), to record that $p_i$ knows that $p_j$ used an INIT message to trigger a bscd-broadcast for the message with sequence number $snj$, and that $p_i$ must bscd-deliver this message. Finally, if $snj$ is the smallest sequence number in $\text{pending}_{i}[j]$, $p_i$ knows that all earlier messages from $p_j$ have been bscd-delivered, and that $(j, snj)$ is the next message it will bscd-deliver from $p_j$. It informs of it the other processes by bfifo-broadcasting the protocol message $\text{READY}((j, snj))$ (line 5, illustrated in Fig. 1) in order to witness the message $(j, snj)$. This READY message will contribute to the time barrier needed to order $(j, snj)$ with respect to other concurrent bscd-broadcast messages (more on this below). $p_i$ then invokes $\text{try\_deliver}()$ (line 6) to see if it can bscd-deliver a set of messages.

When a process $p_i$ bfifo-delivers a witness message $\text{READY}((j, snj))$ from $p_k$ regarding a message $(j, snj)$, $p_i$ uses the sequence number of the READY message (called $snk$, line 7) to update $\text{witness}_{i}[j, snj]$, the time barrier of the message $(j, snj)$. Concretely, if
witness\([j, snj]\)[k] = +\infty, p_i learns that p_k has witnessed the message identified by \(j, snj\) from p_j, and p_i records the time point at which this happened by updating \(\text{witness}_{i}[j, snj][k]\) to \(\text{snj}\) (line 8). Then, if \(p_i\) has not yet bfifo-delivered the message \(j, snj\) (first predicate of line 9) and at least \(t + 1\) processes (i.e., at least one correct process) have witnessed this message (by bfifo-broadcasting a \(\text{READY}(j, snj)\) message, second predicate of line 9), it knows that \(p_j\) bscd-broadcast a message identified by \(j, snj\) and it adds \(snj\) to \(\text{pending}[j]\) (line 10). This early update of \(\text{pending}[j]\) (i.e. before \(p_i\) receives the corresponding \(\text{INIT}\) message from \(p_j\)) ensures \(j, snj\) will be taken into account in the tests performed by \(\text{try\_deliver()}\) at lines 12-16 to decide which application messages can be safely bscd-delivered (we return to these tests just below). Finally, after these various updates, \(p_i\) invokes \(\text{try\_deliver()}\) (line 11) to attempt to bscd-deliver a set of messages.

**Internal operation \(\text{try\_deliver()}\) and predicate \(\text{safe()}\)**

In this operation, \(p_i\) first computes the set \(\text{candidates}_i\) that contains the message identities \((j, snj)\) that have been received but not yet delivered \((snj \in \text{pending}[j])\), and that have been witnessed by at least one correct process (first and second predicate of line 12). Then, to obtain the reduced set \(\text{todel}_i\) (line 13) of messages that can actually be delivered, \(p_i\) first purges from \(\text{candidates}_i\) the message identities whose payload has not been received yet or that have been witnessed by less than \((n - t)\) processes (a process \(p_i\) witnesses an application message \(m\) by bfifo-broadcasting \(\text{READY}(j, snj)\)) at line 5 or 23, whose reception entails the update of \(\text{witness}_{i}[j, snj]\) by \(p_i\) at line 8, see above).

Once this first purge is complete, \(p_i\) then removes from \(\text{todel}_i\) (line 15) all the message identities \((j, snj)\) (line 14) that make it “unsafe” with respect to messages in \(\text{candidates}_i \setminus \text{todel}_i\) (the messages that have been “confirmed”, but cannot be delivered yet, line 14), where \(\text{unsafe}\) is defined as the negation of the predicate \(\text{safe()}\) defined at lines 26-28. Thus a process will only bscd-deliver a set of messages \(\text{todel}_i\) whose messages are all \(\text{safe}\) to bscd-deliver before those remaining in \(\text{candidates}_i \setminus \text{todel}_i\). More precisely a message \(m\) identified by \((j, snj)\) is considered \(\text{safe}\) by \(p_i\) to bscd-deliver before a message \(m'\) identified by \((j', snj')\) if (i) both have been bscd-broadcast by the same process with \(snj < snj'\) (line 26) or (ii) \(p_i\) knows that a majority of processes witnessed \(m\) before \(m'\) (line 27). Thus a process may learn that it is safe to deliver \(m\) before \(m\) once it has received enough \(\text{READY}\) messages for \(m\) before \(\text{READY}\) messages from \(m'\) by the same senders. Note that this \(\text{safe}\) relationship is not transitive, and can lead to complex entanglements. For instance, Figure 2 shows the time barriers of three messages, i.e., the times at which correct processes and possibly a subset of Byzantine processes have first bfifo-broadcast \(\text{READY}(m_{A,B,C})\) messages. In this example, a process may learn that \(m_A\) is safe to bscd-deliver before \(m_B\), and that \(m_B\) is safe to bscd-deliver before \(m_C\), but never that \(m_A\) is safe to bscd-deliver before \(m_C\). Thus correct processes must bscd-deliver \(m_A, m_B\) and \(m_C\) in the same set.

Finally, if \(\text{todel}_i\) is not empty (line 17), \(p_i\) computes from this set of message identities the triplets \((j, snj, data_i[j, snj])\) (line 18), which define the set of messages \(ms\) that it can bscd-deliver (line 19). Then, according to the messages it has just bscd-delivered, \(p_i\) updates the sets \(\text{pending}_i[j]\) (lines 20-21). Moreover, if such a set remains non-empty, and \(p_i\) bfifo-delivered the protocol message \(\text{INIT}(m)\) associated with \(\min(\text{pending}_i[j])\) (line 22), \(p_i\) bfifo-broadcasts the protocol message \(\text{READY}(j, \min(\text{pending}_i[j]))\) to inform the other processes that this is the identity of the next message it intends to bscd-deliver from \(p_j\) (line 24).

**Theorem 1.** Algorithm 2 respects the properties of BSCD-Validity, BSCD-Integrity, BSCD-Ordering, BSCD-Termination-1, and BSCD-Termination-2.
3.4 Proof of Correctness

We start by several intermediate definitions and results before the final proof of Theorem 1. The most important results are shown in Theorem 18 (BSCD-Order) and Theorem 22 (BSCD-Termination).

- **Definition 2.** We say a correct process \( p_i \) bscd-delivers a message \( m \) from \( p_j \) with sequence number \( sn_j \) if it bscd-delivers a message set \( ms \) that contains the tuple \( \langle j, sn_j, m \rangle \).

- **Theorem 3.** If a correct process \( p_i \) bscd-delivers a message \( m \) from a correct process \( p_j \), then \( p_j \) bscd-broadcast \( m \).

**Proof.** If a correct process \( p_i \) bscd-delivers a set containing a message \( m \) from \( p_j \), then \( m \) has been put in \( data_{ij}[j, sn_j] \) for some \( sn_j \), meaning \( p_i \) bfifo-delivered \( \text{init}(m) \) from \( p_j \). By BFIFO-Validity, if \( p_j \) is correct then it bfifo-broadcast \( \text{init}(m) \), meaning it bscd-broadcast \( m \).

- **Definition 4.** We say a message identity \( \langle j, sn_j \rangle \) is valid if all correct processes bfifo-deliver a message \( \text{init}(m) \) from \( p_j \) at sequence number \( sn_j \). Otherwise the message identity \( \langle j, sn_j \rangle \) is invalid.

- **Remark 5.** If \( m \) is a message bscd-broadcast or bscd-delivered by a correct process, then we note \( \text{id}(m) = \langle j, sn_j \rangle \) its identity which is by definition a valid identity. We will note \( \text{sender}(m) = j \) and \( \text{su}(m) = sn_j \).

- **Lemma 6.** If at some point \( sn_j \in \text{pending}_i[j] \) for a correct process \( p_i \), then \( \langle j, sn_j \rangle \) is a valid message identity, i.e. all correct processes will bfifo-deliver a message \( \text{init}(m) \) from \( p_j \) with sequence number \( sn_j \).

**Proof.** If \( sn_j \) is added to \( \text{pending}_i[j] \) at line 4 then \( p_i \) bfifo-delivered a message \( \text{init}(m) \) from \( p_j \) at \( sn_j \), so by BFIFO-Termination so will all other correct processes.

If \( sn_j \) is added to \( \text{pending}_i[j] \) at line 10 then \( p_i \) bfifo-delivered \( \text{ready}(\langle j, sn_j \rangle) \) from at least \( t + 1 \) processes, one of which at least is correct. Thus there is a correct process that bfifo-broadcast \( \text{ready}(\langle j, sn_j \rangle) \), meaning it bfifo-delivered \( \text{init}(m) \) from \( p_j \) at \( sn_j \), so by BFIFO-Termination, all other correct processes also will.

- **Theorem 7.** No correct process bscd-delivers several (identical or different) messages for a given message identity \( \langle j, sn_j \rangle \).

**Proof.** A message that is bscd-delivered by a correct process \( p_i \) has a unique identity \( \langle j, sn_j \rangle \) guaranteed by the bfifo-broadcast of the corresponding \( \text{init}(m) \) message at \( p_j \). At a correct process \( p_i \), BFIFO-Integrity guarantees that \( \text{init}(m) \) will be delivered only once with sequence number \( sn_j \) from \( p_j \). \( sn_j \) will be added in \( \text{pending}_i[j] \) at that time or before but cannot be added again later, and will be removed from \( \text{pending}_i[j] \) only after \( \text{init}(m) \) has been bfifo-delivered, therefore \( sn_j \) can only be removed from \( \text{pending}_i[j] \) once meaning that \( m \) can be bscd-delivered only once.

- **Lemma 8.** If at any correct processes \( p_i \) at any time of its execution, and for any \( p_j, sn_j, p_k \) we have \( \text{witness}_i[j, sn_j][k] = \infty \) then \( sn_k = \text{the sequence number of the first } \text{ready}(\langle j, sn_j \rangle) \text{ message bf-delivered by } p_i \text{ from } p_k \), which is the same at every correct process, even if \( p_k \) is Byzantine.
Proof. If \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \) is set to other than \( \infty \) it is when \( p_k \) bfifo-delivers \( \text{READY}(j, snj) \) from \( p_k \). If \( p_l \) bfifo-delivers \( \text{READY}(j, snj) \) from \( p_k \) several times, the first time will lead to the execution of \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \leftarrow snk \) and the second one won’t because we now have \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \neq \infty \) (line 8). Correct processes all bfifo-deliver the same messages from \( p_k \) in the same order and with the same sequence numbers, therefore they will eventually all update their \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \) variable to the same value.

\[ \text{ Convention 9. } \text{ Since only the first } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ bfifo-delivered by a correct process } p_k \text{ from } p_k \text{ can lead to a change in } \text{witness}_i[j, p][k], \text{ we will say that } p_k \text{ "received" } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ from } p_k \text{ to refer only to the first such READY bfifo-delivered. This is important if the sender of the READY, } p_k, \text{ is Byzantine since in that case it may bfifo-broadcast several times the same READY message. We will say that } p_k \text{ received } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ before } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k \text{ if } p_k \text{ bfifo-delivered for the first time } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ from } p_k \text{ before bfifo-delivering for the first time } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k \text{. We will also say that a correct process receives } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ before } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k \text{ if it bfifo-delivers at least once } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ from } p_k \text{ and never bfifo-delivers } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k. \]

\[ \text{ Remark 10. } \text{ If a correct process receives } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ before } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from a process } p_k, \text{ then the same happens for all other correct processes: if } p_l \text{ only bfifo-delivers one or more } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ from } p_k \text{ and no } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k \text{ then all other correct processes will also bfifo-deliver it or them and they will not bfifo-deliver a READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k. \text{ If } p_l \text{ both bfifo-delivers one or more } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ from } p_k \text{ and one or more } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k, \text{ other correct processes will also bfifo-deliver them, in the same order and with the same sequence numbers.} \]

\[ \text{ Lemma 11. } \text{ If at any correct process } p_i, \text{ for any } p_j, snj, p_j', snj', p_k, \text{ we have } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] < \text{witness}_i[j', snj'][k] \text{ at any time of its execution, then that will always be the case at } p_i \text{ afterwards.} \]

Proof. If \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] < \text{witness}_i[j', snj'][k] \) then \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \) was set to a non-infinite value which is the sequence number with which \( p_i \) bfifo-delivers the first \( \text{READY}(j, snj) \) from \( p_k \). The content of \( \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] \) will never be changed afterwards, and if \( \text{witness}_i[j', snj'][k] \) is changed afterwards it will be set to the sequence number with which \( p_i \) bfifo-delivers the first \( \text{READY}(j', snj') \) from \( p_k \) which is necessarily larger than the sequence number of the first \( \text{READY}(j, snj) \).

We now construct a relation \( \rightarrow \) on messages to capture the fact that a message \( m \) can be safely bscd-delivered before a message \( m' \); if \( m \rightarrow m' \), no correct process delivers \( m' \) before \( m \). The relation \( \rightarrow \) relies on the time barriers of \( m \) and \( m' \) arising from the witness messages \( \text{READY} \). We construct \( \rightarrow \) incrementally, starting with a simpler preliminary relation \( \sim_k \).

\[ \text{ Definition 12. } \text{ If correct processes receive } \text{READY}(j, snj) \text{ before } \text{READY}(j', snj') \text{ from } p_k, \text{ we write: } (j, snj) \sim_k (j', snj'). \]

\[ \text{ Remark 13. } \text{ If } p_i \text{ is a correct process, } \text{witness}_i[j, snj][k] < \text{witness}_i[j', snj'][k] \text{ can be interpreted as: } "p_i \text{ knows that } (j, snj) \sim_k (j', snj')" \text{ and implies } (j, snj) \sim_k (j', snj'). \]

\[ \text{ Definition 14. } \text{ Let us note } m \rightarrow m' \text{ if (i) there is a majority } P \text{ of processes such that } \forall p_k \in P, m \sim_k m', \text{ or if (ii) } m \text{ and } m' \text{ are sent by the same process and } sn(m) < sn(m'). \text{ Formally: } m \rightarrow m' \Leftrightarrow (\text{sender}(m) = \text{sender}(m') \land sn(m) < sn(m')) \lor (|\{k : m \sim_k m'\}| > \frac{m}{2}). \]

\[ \text{ Lemma 15. } m \rightarrow m' \text{ and } m' \rightarrow m \text{ are exclusive: } \forall m, m', \neg(m \rightarrow m' \land m' \rightarrow m). \]
Proof. If \( \text{sender}(m) = \text{sender}(m') \), then suppose w.l.o.g. that \( \text{sn}(m) < \text{sn}(m') \). We directly have \( m \rightarrow m' \) following from the definition. Moreover, if correct processes bfifo-broadcast \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m')) \), they will do it after they have already bfifo-broadcast \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m)) \), thus \( \{|k : m' <_k m\}| \leq t \), thus we have \( \neg(m' \rightarrow m) \).

If \( m \) and \( m' \) are not from the same sender and \( m \rightarrow m' \) and \( m \rightarrow m' \) then we have \( \{|k : m <_k m'\}| > \frac{n}{2} \) and \( \{|k : m' <_k m\}| > \frac{n}{2} \). There is a process in the intersection of these two majorities for which we have a contradiction.

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Remark 16.} \rightarrow \text{is not a partial order as it is not transitive.} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Lemma 17.} \text{A correct process } p_i \text{ bfifo-delivers } \text{ms}_i \text{ containing a message } m \text{ and later bscd-delivers a set } \text{ms}'_i \text{ containing a message } m'. \text{ No correct process } p_j \text{ bfifo-delivers first a set } \text{ms}'_j \text{ containing } m' \text{ and later a message set } \text{ms}_j \text{ containing } m. \]

Proof. By Lemma 17, such a situation would imply \( m \rightarrow m' \) and \( m' \rightarrow m \), which we have shown are exclusive (Lemma 15).

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Definition 19.} \text{We say that a correct process } p_i \text{ knows that } m \rightarrow m' \text{ if either } \{|k : \text{witness},[\text{id}(m)][k] < \text{witness},[\text{id}(m')][k]\}| > \frac{n}{2} \text{ or } \text{sender}(m) = \text{sender}(m') \land \text{sn}(m) < \text{sn}(m'). \]

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Remark 20.} \text{If a correct process } p_i \text{ knows that } m \rightarrow m' \text{ then } m \rightarrow m'. \]

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Remark 21.} \text{In the while loop of } \text{try_deliver}(), \text{a correct process removes a message } m \text{ from } \text{todo}_i \text{ when there is a message } m' \text{ in } \text{candidates}_i \backslash \text{todo}_i \text{ for which it does not know that } m \rightarrow m'. \text{ For a correct process to bscd-deliver a set of messages } \text{ms}, \text{it must know that } m \rightarrow m' \text{ for all } m \in \text{ms} \text{ and } m' \in \text{candidates}_i \backslash \text{ms}. \]

\[ \Rightarrow \text{Theorem 22.} \text{If a correct process } p_i \text{ bfifo-delivers } \text{INIT}(m) \text{ from } p_j, \text{it eventually bscd-delivers } m \text{ from } p_j. \]

Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there is a correct process that bfifo-delivers an \( \text{INIT}(m) \) but never bscd-delivers \( m \). Let \( M \) be the set of these \textit{unterminated} messages, i.e. the set of messages \( m \) for which correct processes bfifo-deliver \( \text{INIT}(m) \) but there is at least one correct process that does not bscd-deliver \( m \).

Let \( M_{p_i} = \{ m \in M : \text{sender}(m) = p_i \} \), the set of unterminated messages bscd-broadcast by \( p_i \), and \( S = \{ i : M_{p_i} \neq \varnothing \} \), the set of processes who bscd-broadcast at least one unterminated message. For \( i \in S \), let \( m_i \) be the message in \( M_{p_i} \) with the lowest sequence
number, and let \( M_0 = \{ m_i, i \in S \} \). We use \( M_0 \) as a boundary to define four sets of messages that will lead us to a contradiction. Let \( M_{-1} = \{ m : \text{sender}(m) \in S \land \text{sn}(m) < \text{sn}(m_i) \} \) the set of all messages by processes of \( S \) that all correct processes bscd-deliver.

After some time, correct processes all bscd-deliver the messages of \( M_{-1} \), thus all correct processes will bfifo-broadcast \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m_i)) \) for all \( i \in S \) after some time. Let \( A \) be the set of messages witnessed (with a ready message) by at least one correct process before one of the unterminated messages in the “boundary” \( M_0 \). More formally \( A \) is defined by: \( m' \in A \iff \) a correct process bfifo-broadcasts \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m')) \) before bfifo-broadcasting \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m_i)) \) for some \( i \in S \). Because a process may only receive a finite number of messages in a finite amount of time, the set \( A \) is finite. For all \( m \notin A \) and \( i \in S \) we have \( m_i \rightarrow m \).

Let \( A_S = \{ m \in A : \text{sender}(m) \in S \} \) and \( A_{-S} = \{ m \in A : \text{sender}(m) \notin S \} \). Let \( M_1 = A_S \setminus (M_{-1} \cup M_0) \). We have that \( A = A_S \cup M_{-1} \cup M_0 \cup M_1 \). We have two cases:

- Case 1: no correct process ever bscd-delivers a message of \( M_0 \). In that case, no correct process will ever bfifo-broadcast a \( \text{READY} \) for a message of \( M_1 \), thus the messages of \( M_1 \) will never be considered in the \( \text{candidates} \) set of correct processes.

Let \( p_i \) be a correct process. After a certain time \( p_i \) will have bscd-delivered all messages of \( A_{-S} \) and of \( M_{-1} \) and will have bfifo-delivered its last \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m)) \) for a message \( m \in M_0 \), thus it will execute \( \text{try\_deliver()} \) either strictly after all that happens or when bscd-delivering for the last time messages of \( A_{-S} \cup M_{-1} \) and after having bfifo-delivered its last \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m)) \) for a message \( m \in M_0 \). At that point \( \text{candidates} \) will contain only messages of \( M_0 \) and messages not in \( A \), and possibly some messages of \( A_{-S} \cup M_{-1} \) which will be in \( \text{todel} \) at the end of the while loop. Since \( p_i \) never bscd-delivers messages of \( M_0 \), at some point in the while loop it will remove a message \( m \in M_0 \).

Let \( m \) be the first message of \( M_0 \) \( p_i \) removes from \( \text{todel} \), it is removed because there is an \( m' \in \text{candidates} \setminus M_0 \) that violates the exit condition of the loop. We have \( m' \notin M_0 \) because \( m \) is the first message of \( M_0 \) that \( p_i \) removes from \( \text{todel} \) and initially there is no message of \( M_0 \) in \( \text{candidates} \setminus \text{todel} \), \( m' \notin A_{-S} \cup M_{-1} \) because all messages of \( A_{-S} \cup M_{-1} \) remaining at this step are in \( \text{todel} \) at the end of the loop, and \( m' \notin M_1 \) because no message of \( M_1 \) is in \( \text{candidates} \), thus \( m' \notin A \). Since \( m \in M_0 \) and \( m' \notin A \) we have \( m \rightarrow m' \) and since \( p_i \) has bfifo-delivered all messages \( \text{READY}(\text{id}(m)) \) then it knows that \( m \rightarrow m' \), meaning that \( \text{safe}(\text{id}(m), \text{id}(m')) = \text{true} \). Therefore \( p_i \) cannot remove \( m \) from \( \text{todel} \) because of \( m' \). We have a contradiction.

- Case 2: there is a correct process \( p_i \) that bscd-delivers a message \( m \in M_0 \). In that case, \( p_i \) delivered a certain message set ms that contains \( m \). Let us note \( U \) the set of all messages.
Let \( p_i \) be a correct process that does not bscd-deliver \( m \). After a certain time, it will receive its last \( \text{ready} \) for a message of \( U \) (in particular, it will have bfifo-delivered \( \text{ready}(\text{id}(m)) \) from all correct processes), at which time it executes \( \text{try\_deliver}() \) and removes at least one message of \( U \) from \( \text{todel}_i \). Moreover no messages of \( U \) are in \( \text{candidates}\backslash \text{todel}_i \) at the beginning of the loop since \( p_i \) was able to bscd-deliver all messages of \( U \) and all \( \text{ready} \) messages for messages of \( U \) have been bfifo-delivered by \( p_j \). Let \( m_0 \) be the first message of \( U \) that \( p_j \) removes from \( \text{todel}_i \). The message \( m_0 \) is removed because of some message \( m_1 \not\in U \) that violated the condition. Since \( p_i \) bscd-delivered \( m_0 \) before bscd-delivering \( m_1 \) we have \( m_0 \rightarrow m_1 \). Since \( p_j \) has already bfifo-delivered its last messages \( \text{ready}(\text{id}(m_0)) \) then it knows that \( m_0 \rightarrow m_1 \), meaning that \( \text{safe}(\text{id}(m), \text{id}(m')) = \text{true} \). Therefore \( p_j \) cannot remove \( m \) from \( \text{todel}_i \) because of \( m' \). We have a contradiction. □

Final proof of Theorem 1

Proof. BSCD-Validity, BSCD-Integrity and BSCD-Ordering are shown respectively in Theorem 3, Theorem 7 and Theorem 18. BSCD-Termination-1: if a correct process bscd-broadcasts a message \( m \), then it will bf-broadcast \( \text{init}(m) \). By BFIFO-Termination it will thus bf-deliver \( \text{init}(m) \), thus by Theorem 22 it will bscd-deliver \( m \). BSCD-Termination-2: If a correct process bscd-delivers \( m \) then it has previously bf-delivered \( \text{init}(m) \). By BFIFO-Termination all correct processes bf-deliver \( \text{init}(m) \). By Theorem 22, all correct processes will bscd-deliver \( m \). □

4 BSCD-broadcast in action: a Byzantine-tolerant snapshot object

The snapshot object was introduced in [1, 2]. A snapshot object can be seen as an array \( \text{REG}[1..n] \) of single-writer/multi-reader atomic registers which provides processes with two operations, denoted \( \text{write}(v) \) and \( \text{snapshot()} \). The invocation of \( \text{write}(v) \) by a process \( p_i \) assigns atomically \( v \) to \( \text{REG}[i] \). The invocation of \( \text{snapshot()} \) returns the value of \( \text{REG}[1..n] \) as if it was executed instantaneously. Hence, in any execution of a snapshot object, its operations \( \text{write}(v) \) and \( \text{snapshot()} \) are linearizable [7]. As mentioned in the introduction, the snapshot object has recently been shown to be instrumental in the design of cryptocurrency systems [5].

Byzantine Snapshot object on top of BSCD-broadcast

Let us recall that nothing can prevent Byzantine processes from writing fake values in their register of the snapshot object. The important property is that the registers associated with correct processes cannot be corrupted by Byzantine processes.

Our algorithm is similar in structure to the multi-writer/multi-reader snapshot object built on SCD-broadcast that was introduced in [9] in the context of process crash failures. However a multi-writer snapshot object is intrinsically unsuited to a system with Byzantine processes as such processes would then be able to prevent all effective communication between correct ones by overwriting correct processes’ values as soon as they are written, which is why we focus on a single-writer/multi-reader snapshot object instead. As a consequence, the analysis of our algorithm shares little in common with that of [9].
Local data structures at a process \( p_i \)

Let \( REG \) be the snapshot object. At a process \( p_i \), it uses three local data structures:
- \( done_i \) is a Boolean variable.
- \( reg_i[1..n] \) is the value of \( REG[1..n] \) as currently known by \( p_i \).
- \( wsn_i[1..n] \) is such that \( wsn_i[j] \) is the sequence number of the last write by \( p_j \) in \( REG[j] \), as known by \( p_i \). Such a sequence number is systematically associated (at line 18 of Algorithm 2) with each invocation of \( \text{bscd\_broadcast\ write(\_)} \) (line 3 of Algorithm 3).

Algorithm 3 Construction of a snapshot object on top of BSCD-broadcast (code for \( p_i \))

```plaintext
init \( reg_i \leftarrow [\bot, \ldots, \bot] ; wsn_i \leftarrow [0, \ldots, 0] \).

operation \( \text{snapshot(\_)} \) is
(1) \( done_i \leftarrow \text{false}; \text{bscd\_broadcast\ sync(\_)}; \text{wait}(done_i) \);
(2) return(\( reg_i[1..n] \)).

operation \( \text{write(\_)} \) is
(3) \( done_i \leftarrow \text{false}; \text{bscd\_broadcast\ write(\_)}; \text{wait}(done_i) \).

when the message set \{ \( \langle j_1, sn_1, \text{write}(v_1) \rangle, \ldots, \langle j_r, sn_r, \text{write}(v_r) \rangle \) \}
(4) for each message \( \langle j, snj, \text{write}(v) \rangle \) \in \text{bscd-delivered message set do}
(5) if \( wsn_i[j] < snj \) then \( reg_i[j] \leftarrow v; wsn_i[j] \leftarrow snj \) end if
(6) end for;
(7) if \( \exists \ell : j_\ell = i \) then \( done_i \leftarrow \text{true} \) end if.
```

Operation \( \text{snapshot(\_)} \)

When a process invokes \( \text{snapshot(\_)} \), it simply invokes \( \text{bscd\_broadcast\ sync(\_)} \), where \( \text{sync} \) is
a synchronization tag, and (with the help of the Boolean \( done_i \), lines 1 and 7) waits until
this message has been locally processed. Then, \( p_i \) returns the value of the local array \( reg_i \).
The aim of the message \( \text{sync} \) is to stop the progress of \( p_i \) so that, once unblocked, it will
have a consistent value of \( REG \) it can return (“consistent” refers here to the atomicity of the
snapshot object).

Operation \( \text{write(\_)} \)

The code of this operation is similar in structure to the synchronization of operation \( \text{snapshot(\_)} \),
however instead of reading the registers and returning their values, the process sends a value
to be written but does not return anything. When a process invokes \( \text{write(\_)} \), it simply
invokes \( \text{bscd\_broadcast\ write(\_)} \), where \( \text{write} \) is an operation tag, and, with the help of
the Boolean \( done_i \), waits until this message has been locally processed (lines 3 and 7, this
synchronization pattern is sometimes called “read your writes”).

Processing of a set of messages

This procedure consists in two steps:
- Process \( p_i \) first considers the messages \( \text{write(\_)} \) that appear in the message set \( ms \) it is
bscd-delivering. Each element of \( ms \) is actually a triplet \( \langle j, snj, v \rangle \), such that \( \langle j, snj \rangle \) is
the identity of the value \( v \), namely the \( snj \)-th value written by \( p_j \) in \( REG[j] \). \( p_i \) writes \( v \)
into \( reg_i[j] \), if this value has not been overwritten by a more recent value (lines 4-6).
- After the previous updates, \( p_i \) sets the Boolean \( done_i \) to the value \( \text{true} \) if the message
set contains a message it bscd-broadcast (line 7).
Theorem 23. Algorithm 3 builds a linearizable snapshot object in an n-process asynchronous message-passing system where up to \( t < n/4 \) processes may commit Byzantine failures.

The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix B.2.

5 Conclusion

This paper addressed the design of a Set-Constrained Delivery broadcast abstraction in the context of \( n \)-process asynchronous message-passing systems where up to \( t \) processes may commit Byzantine failures. A first primitive, BFIFO-broadcast, ensures that, for any sender, all correct processes deliver its messages in the same order (which is their sending order if the sender is correct). BSCD-broadcast, which is built over BFIFO-broadcast, ensures that correct processes deliver sets of messages such that, if a correct process \( p \) delivers a set of messages containing a message \( m \) and later delivers a set of messages containing a message \( m' \), no correct process delivers first a set of messages containing \( m' \) and later a set of messages containing \( m \). As an illustration of BSCD-broadcast, it has been shown how it facilitates the construction of a Byzantine-tolerant read/write snapshot object.

References

A. Two Multi-shot Signature-free BR-broadcast Algorithms

In order to make the paper as self-contained as possible, this section presents multi-shot extensions of the one-shot signature-free BR-broadcast algorithms introduced by G. Bracha [3] and D. Imbs and M. Raynal [8]. The presentation follows pages 64-71 of [13], where the reader can also find proofs of these algorithms. In the text of these two extensions, \( sn \) denotes the sequence number of the corresponding BR-broadcast instance, hence a process invokes \( \text{br\_broadcast}(sn,m) \).

A.1 Underlying Basic Communication System

In both algorithms described below, the processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that a message that has been sent is eventually received by its destination process, i.e., there is no bound on message transfer delays. “Reliable” means that the network does not loose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that there is a bi-directional communication channel between each pair of processes. As a consequence, a process can identify the sender of each message it receives and no Byzantine process can impersonate another process. In practice, this means that Byzantine processes cannot control the underlying communication layer.

A process \( p_i \) sends a message to a process \( p_j \) by invoking the primitive “\text{send } \text{tag}(m) \text{ to } p_j \”, where \( \text{tag} \) is the type of the message and \( m \) its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process receives a message by executing the primitive “\text{receive}()”. The macro-operation “\text{broadcast } \text{tag}(m)” is a shortcut for “\texttt{for } j \in \{1,\cdots,n\} \text{ do } \text{send } \text{tag}(m) \text{ to } p_j \text{ end for}”.

A.2 Multi-shot Version of Bracha’s BR-broadcast Algorithm

Algorithm 4 is a multi-shot version of Bracha’s BR-broadcast algorithm. This algorithm assumes \( t < n/3 \). When, on its client side, a process \( p_i \) invokes \( \text{br\_broadcast}(sn,m) \), it invokes the macro-operation \( \text{broadcast}(\text{tag}(m)) \) with the protocol message \( \text{init}(sn,m) \) (line 1).

On its server side a process \( p_i \) may receive three different types of protocol messages: \text{init}(), \text{echo}(), and \text{ready}(). A message \text{init} carries an application message, while the messages \text{echo}() and \text{ready}() carry a process identity and an application message\(^1\).

- When \( p_i \) receives \( \text{init}(sn,m) \) for the first time from a process \( p_j \) (line 2), it broadcasts the protocol message \( \text{echo}((j,sn),m) \) (line 3). If this message is not the first message \( \text{init}(sn,-) \) from \( p_j \), \( p_i \) discards it (in this case, \( p_j \) is Byzantine).
- When \( p_i \) receives the protocol \( \text{echo}((j,sn),m) \) from any process, it broadcasts the protocol message \( \text{ready}((j,sn),m) \) (line 5) if it received \( \text{echo}((j,sn),m) \) from enough different processes (where “enough” means here more than \( n+1 \)), and \( \text{ready}((j,sn),m) \) has not yet been broadcast (line 4). This message exchanges ensure that no two correct processes will br-deliver different message from \( p_j \) with the sequence number \( sn \), but it is still possible that a correct process br-delivers \( m \) from \( p_j \) while another correct process does not br-deliver a message from \( p_j \). The role of the message \( \text{ready}((j,sn),m) \) is to prevent a correct process from blocking on the br-delivery of \( m \).

\(^1\) The fact that the \( \text{echo}() \) and \( \text{ready}() \) messages carry a process identity makes redundant the use of an identity in the pair \( (-,sn) \) that appear in the messages that are br-broadcast (see the paragraph “Invocation pattern” at the end of Section 2.3).
Algorithm 5 is a multi-shot version of Imbs-Raynal’s BR-broadcast algorithm. This algorithm assumes \( t < n/5 \). The code of \( \text{br广播}(sn, m) \) is the same as in the previous algorithm.

On its server side a process \( p_i \) may receive two different types of protocol messages: \textsc{init()} and \textsc{witness()}. The processing of \textsc{init}(sn, m) is similar to the one of Algorithm 4. Process \( p_i \) simply broadcasts the message \textsc{witness}((j, sn), m) if it is the first time it received from \( p_j \) a message \textsc{init}(sn, −) (line 3). Then, when it receives a message \textsc{witness}((j, sn), m) \( p_i \) does the following.

- If it received the same message \textsc{witness}((j, sn), m) from “enough” processes (where “enough” means here \( n - 2t \)), and it has not yet broadcast this message (line 4), it does it
Algorithm 5 Multi-shot version of Imbs-Raynal’s BR-broadcast algorithm \((t < n/5, \text{ code for } p_i)\)

```
operation \text{br\_broadcast}(sn, m) is
(1) \text{broadcast \text{INT}(sn, m)}. 
when \text{INT}(sn, m) \text{ is received from } p_j do
(2) discard the message if it is not the first message \text{INT}(sn, -) received from \(p_j\);
(3) \text{broadcast \text{WITNESS}((i, sn), m)}. 
when \text{WITNESS}((j, sn), m) \text{ is received from any process do}
(4) if \text{WITNESS}((j, sn), m) \text{ received from at least } (n - 2t) \text{ different processes} 
\land \text{WITNESS}((i, sn), m) \text{ not yet broadcast}
(5) then \text{broadcast \text{WITNESS}((j, sn), m)}
(6) end if;
(7) if \text{WITNESS}((j, sn), m) \text{ received from at least } (n - t) \text{ different processes} 
\land \text{(j, sn, m) not yet \text{br\_delivered}}
(8) then \text{br\_deliver (j, sn, m)}
(9) end if.
```

(line 5).

- If it received \text{WITNESS}((j, sn), m) from “more” processes (where “more” means here \(n - t\)), and it has not yet \text{br\_delivered} the pair \((sn, m)\) from \(p_j\) (line 7), it \text{br\_delivers} it ((line 8).

Let us notice that, as \(t < n/5\), we have \(n - 2t > 3t\), which means that, in this case, \text{WITNESS}(j, m) was broadcast by at least \(n - 3t \geq 2t + 1\) correct processes. Then, if it received \text{WITNESS}(j, m) from more different processes, where “more” means” \((n - t)\), \(p_i\) locally \text{br\_delivers} \(m\) from \(p_j\).

As we can easily see, this algorithm requires two communication steps and \(n^2 - 1\) protocol messages. This better efficiency with respect to Bracha’s algorithm is obtained at the price of a weaker \(t\)-resilience, namely \(t < n/5\).

B Proofs of Algorithms

This appendix contains the complete proofs for the theorems that were not proved in the paper.

B.1 BFIFO-broadcast on top of MBR-broadcast

BFIFO-Validity follows directly from MBR-Validity. BFIFO-Integrity (resp. BFIFO-Termination) follows directly from MBR-Integrity (resp. MBR-Termination), the delivery condition (line 3), and the increase of \(\text{fifo\_del}_i[j]\) (line 5). The formalization of these proofs are left to the reader. The next (easy) theorem concerns the BFIFO-Order property.

▶ Theorem 24. Algorithm 1 satisfies the BFIFO-Order property.

Proof. Suppose a correct process \(p_i\) \text{bfifo\_delivers} first a message \(m\), then a message \(m'\), both from the same sender \(p_j\). These messages were \text{br\_delivered} to \(p_i\) with some sequence numbers, \(sn\) and \(sn'\). As \(p_i\) \text{bfifo\_delivers} message from any process in the order defined by their sequence numbers, we have \(sn < sn'\). It follows then from BFIFO-Termination-2 that all correct processes \text{br\_deliver} \(m\) and \(m'\) with sequence numbers \(sn\) and \(sn'\), respectively. It follows that any correct process \text{bfifo\_delivers} \(m\) before \(m'\).

If the sender \(p_j\) of \(m\) and \(m'\) is correct, it associated the sequence number \(sn\) with \(m\) and the sequence number \(sn' > sn\) with \(m'\). It follows that \(p_j\) \text{bfifo\_broadcast} \(m\) before \(m'\). ◀
The computability and messages/time complexities of this algorithm are the ones of the underlying Byzantine reliable broadcast algorithm.

B.2 BSCD-broadcast in action: a Byzantine-tolerant snapshot object

We start by several intermediate definitions and results before the final proof of Theorem 23.

► Lemma 25. If a correct process invokes an operation, it returns from its invocation.

Proof. Let \( p_i \) be a correct process that invokes a read or write operation. By the BSCD-Termination-1 property of BSCD-broadcast, it eventually receives a message set containing the message \( \langle i, s_{ni}, x \rangle \) which it sent at line 1 or 3 of Algorithm 3. As all the statements associated with the bscd-delivery of a message set terminate, it follows that the synchronization boolean \( done_i \) is eventually set to true. Consequently, \( p_i \) returns from the invocation of its operation. ◄

► Definition 26. A sequence number array sna is an array \( sna = [sna[1], \ldots, sna[n]] \) of \( n \) sequence numbers, one per process.

► Remark 27. In Algorithm 3, \( wsn_i \) is a sequence number array that is used to keep track of \( p_i \)'s vision of the operations performed so far.

► Definition 28. Let \( \leq_{sna} \) be the product order defined on sequence number arrays as:

\[
sna_1 \leq_{sna} sna_2 \iff \forall k \in 1..n, sna_1[k] \leq sna_2[k].
\]

Let \( <_{sna} \) be the relation defined as:

\[
sna_1 <_{sna} sna_2 \iff (sna_1 \leq_{sna} sna_2) \land (sna_1 \neq sna_2).
\]

► Definition 29. If \( p_i \) is a correct process, let \( WSN_i \) be the set of the array values taken by \( wsn_i \) at line 7 during an execution, after the processing of message sets by process \( p_i \). Let \( WSN = \bigcup_{p_i \text{ correct}} WSN_i \).

► Lemma 30. The order \( <_{sna} \) is total and well founded on \( WSN \).

Proof. Let us first observe that, for any correct process \( p_i \), all values in \( WSN_i \) are totally ordered: this comes from \( wsn_i \), whose entries can only increase (line 5). Hence, let \( sna_1 \) be an array value of \( WSN_i \) and \( sna_2 \) be an array value of \( WSN_j \) with \( i \neq j \) and where both \( p_i \) and \( p_j \) are correct processes.

Let us assume, by contradiction, that \( \neg(sna_1 \leq_{sna} sna_2) \) and \( \neg(sna_2 \leq_{sna} sna_1) \). Thus there is a \( k \) such that \( sna_1[k] > sna_2[k] \) and a \( k' \) such that \( sna_1[k'] < sna_2[k'] \). According to lines 4 and 5, there is a message \( \langle k, sna_1[k], \text{WRITE}(v) \rangle \) that has been received by \( p_i \) when \( wsn_i = sna_1 \) and not by \( p_j \) when \( wsn_j = sna_2 \). Similarly, there is a message \( \langle k', sna_2[k'], \text{WRITE}(v') \rangle \) that has been received by \( p_j \) when \( wsn_j = sna_2 \) and not by \( p_i \) when \( wsn_i = sna_1 \). This situation directly contradicts the BSCD-Order property, from which we conclude that either \( sna_1 \leq_{sna} sna_2 \) or \( sna_2 \leq_{sna} sna_1 \). Therefore \( <_{sna} \) is a total order.

Since all elements of \( WSN \) are vectors of elements of \( \mathbb{N} \), they all have a finite number of strictly smaller elements, therefore \( <_{sna} \) is well founded on \( WSN \). ◄

► Definition 31. Let \( C \) be the set of triples \( \langle i, s_{ni}, x \rangle \) bscd-broadcast by correct processes when invoking an operation (line 1 or 3), where \( i \) and \( s_{ni} \) is the control information provided by the BSCD-broadcast abstraction and \( x \) is the value sent, either \( \text{SYNC()} \) or \( \text{WRITE}(v) \).
Since each operation invoked by a correct process corresponds to the BSCD-broadcast of a unique message, we will identify the corresponding message triple with the invoked operation.

For any \(\langle i, \text{sni}, x \rangle, \langle j, \text{snj}, y \rangle \in C\), we write \(\langle i, \text{sni}, x \rangle < \langle j, \text{snj}, y \rangle\) if \(p_i\) returned from its operation that bscd-broadcast \(\langle i, \text{sni}, x \rangle\) before \(p_j\) started its operation that bscd-broadcast \(\langle j, \text{snj}, y \rangle\).

\begin{definition}
Let \(W\) be the set of triples \(\langle i, \text{sni}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle\) bscd-delivered by correct processes. This set may contain write operations by Byzantine processes.
\end{definition}

\begin{definition}
Let \(O = W \cup C\) be the set of read (or \text{SYNC}) and write operations invoked by correct processes and of write operations received by correct processes from Byzantine processes.
\end{definition}

\begin{remark}
As a direct consequence of BSCD-broadcast properties, the set \(O\) contains at most one triplet of the form \(\langle i, \text{sni}, \_ \rangle\) for given \(i\) and \(\text{sni}\).
\end{remark}

\begin{lemma}
\(\langle i, \text{sni}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle < \langle i, \text{sni}, \text{WRITE}(v')\rangle \implies \text{sni} < \text{sni}'\).
\end{lemma}

\begin{proof}
\(\langle\_\rangle\) only applies to operations by correct processes, therefore \(p_i\) is a correct process. If a correct process terminates \text{WRITE}(v) before starting \text{WRITE}(v')\), then it bscd-broadcast \text{WRITE}(v) before \text{WRITE}(v'), therefore \text{sni} < \text{sni}'.
\end{proof}

\begin{definition}
If \(\text{sna}\) is a sequence number array, let \(W(\text{sna}) = \{\langle i, \text{sni}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle \in W : \text{sni} \leq \text{sna}[i]\}\) be the set of write operations included in the time barrier defined by \(\text{sna}\).
\end{definition}

\begin{definition}
If \(\tau\) is a time at which a correct process \(p_i\) executes line 7, then:
\begin{itemize}
\item let \(\text{wsn}_i(\tau)\) be the value of \(\text{wsn}_i\) when \(p_i\) executes line 7 at time \(\tau\);
\item let \(U_i(\tau)\) be the union of all the message sets bscd-delivered by \(p_i\) until \(\tau\).
\end{itemize}
\end{definition}

\begin{lemma}
\(U_i(\tau) \cap W = W(\text{wsn}_i(\tau))\). As a consequence:
\begin{align*}
U_i(\tau) \cap W \subseteq U_j(\tau') \cap W & \iff \text{wsn}_i(\tau) \leq_{\text{sna}} \text{wsn}_j(\tau'), \\
U_i(\tau) \cap W \not\subseteq U_j(\tau') \cap W & \iff \text{wsn}_i(\tau) <_{\text{sna}} \text{wsn}_j(\tau') .
\end{align*}
\end{lemma}

\begin{proof}
Let \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle\) be a message of \(W\). If \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle \in U_i(\tau)\), then when \(p_i\) executes line 7 at time \(\tau\), it has already bscd-delivered and processed \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle\), therefore \(\text{wsn}_i(\tau)[j] \geq \text{snj}\), therefore \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle \in W(\text{wsn}_i(\tau))\). Conversely, if \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle \in W(\text{wsn}_i(\tau))\), then at time \(\tau\) \(p_i\) has already bscd-delivered and processed a message \(\langle j, \text{snj'}, \text{WRITE}(v')\rangle\) with \(\text{snj'} \geq \text{snj}\). Since BSCD-broadcast preserves sequence number ordering, \(p_i\) has already bscd-delivered \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle\), therefore \(\langle j, \text{snj}, \text{WRITE}(v)\rangle \in U_i(\tau)\).

The two equivalency relations follow directly from replacing \(U_i(\tau) \cap W\) and \(U_j(\tau') \cap W\) respectively by \(W(\text{wsn}_i(\tau))\) and \(W(\text{wsn}_j(\tau'))\) and applying the definitions.
\end{proof}

\begin{definition}
If \(\text{op} = \langle i, \text{sn}, x \rangle \in O\) then let \(\text{sna}(\text{op})\), \(\text{witness}(\text{op})\) and \(\tau(\text{op})\) be defined as follows:
\begin{itemize}
\item if \(x = \text{SYNC}()\), then by definition of \(O\), \(p_i\) is a correct process. Let:
\begin{itemize}
\item \(\text{sna}(\text{op})\) be the value of \(\text{wsn}_i\) when \(p_i\) returns \(\text{reg}_i[1 \ldots n]\) (line 2),
\item \(\text{witness}(\text{op}) = p_i\),
\item \(\tau(\text{op})\) be the time at which \(p_i\) executes line 7 for the last time before returning at line 2.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{definition}
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- If \( x = \text{write}(v) \) then let:
  - \( \text{sna}(\text{op}) \) be the smallest sequence number array observed by a correct process and that has registered the write operation \( \text{op} \), which exists because \( \leq_{\text{sna}} \) is a well-founded total order on WSN (by Lemma 30):
    \[
    \text{sna}(\text{op}) = \min\{\text{sna} \in \text{WSN} : \text{sna}[i] \geq \text{sna}(\text{op})\},
    \]
  - \( \tau(\text{op}) \) be the smallest time at which a correct process \( p_j \) executed line 7 with \( \text{wsn}_j = \text{sna}(\text{op}) \),
  - \( \text{witness}(\text{op}) = p_j \) be the correct process that executed line 7 with \( \text{wsn}_j = \text{sna}(\text{op}) \) at \( \tau(\text{op}) \).

In both cases, the following relations hold:

\[
\text{sna}(\text{op}) = \text{wsn}_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})),
\]
\[
\text{op} \in U_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})).
\]

And if \( p_i \) is a correct process that invoked \( \text{op} \) at \( \tau_{\text{invoke}}(\text{op}) \) and returned at \( \tau_{\text{return}}(\text{op}) \) then:

\[
\tau_{\text{invoke}}(\text{op}) < \tau(\text{op}) < \tau_{\text{return}}(\text{op}).
\]

**Lemma 40.** Let \( \text{op} \) and \( \text{op}' \) be two distinct operations such that \( \text{op} < \text{op}' \). We have \( \text{sna}(\text{op}) \leq \text{sna}(\text{op}') \). Moreover, if \( \text{op}' \in W \) then \( \text{sna}(\text{op}) < \text{sna}(\text{op}') \).

**Proof.** \( \text{op} \) and \( \text{op}' \) are invoked by correct processes. We have \( \tau(\text{op}) < \tau_{\text{return}}(\text{op}) < \tau_{\text{invoke}}(\text{op}') < \tau(\text{op}') \).

By BSCD-order, we have:

\[
U_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})) \subseteq U_{\text{witness}(\text{op}')}(\tau(\text{op}')) \lor U_{\text{witness}(\text{op}')}(\tau(\text{op}')) \subseteq U_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})).
\]

However \( \text{op}' \) was bscd-broadcast after \( \tau(\text{op}) \) therefore \( \text{witness}(\text{op}) \) cannot have bscd-delivered \( \text{op}' \) at time \( \tau(\text{op}) \). Therefore: \( \text{op}' \in U_{\text{witness}(\text{op}')}(\tau(\text{op}')) \setminus U_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})). \)

Therefore we are in the case: \( U_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})) \subset U_{\text{witness}(\text{op}')}(\tau(\text{op}')) \), from which we deduce:

\[
U_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})) \cap W \subseteq U_{\text{witness}(\text{op}')}(\tau(\text{op}')) \cap W,
\]
\[
\text{wsn}_{\text{witness}(\text{op})}(\tau(\text{op})) \subseteq \text{wsn}_{\text{witness}(\text{op}')}(\tau(\text{op}')),
\]
\[
\text{sna}(\text{op}) \leq \text{sna}(\text{op}').
\]

Moreover, if \( \text{op}' \in W \) then the inclusion and inequalities become strict and we have the desired results.

**Definition 41.** Let \( \text{op}, \text{op}' \in O \) be two distinct operations. We define \( \rightarrow \) as \( \text{op} \rightarrow \text{op}' \) if either one of the following holds:

- (A) \( \text{op} < \text{op}' \),
- (B) \( \text{sna}(\text{op}) < \text{sna}(\text{op}') \),
- (C) \( \text{sna}(\text{op}) = \text{sna}(\text{op}') \) \land \( \text{op} \in W \) \land \( \text{op}' \notin W \).

Let \( \rightarrow^* \) be the reflexive transitive closure of \( \rightarrow \).

**Lemma 42.** \( \rightarrow^* \) is a partial order on \( C \).

**Proof.** \( \rightarrow^* \) is reflexive transitive by construction. Let us prove antisymetry:

Suppose we have \( \text{op} \neq \text{op}' \) such that \( \text{op} \rightarrow^* \text{op}' \) and \( \text{op}' \rightarrow^* \text{op} \). By definition of \( \rightarrow^* \) this means there are \( \text{op}_0, \text{op}_1, \text{op}_2, \ldots, \text{op}_m \) for an \( m > 1 \) such that \( \text{op}_0 = \text{op}_m = \text{op}, \text{op}_k = \text{op}' \) for some \( k \in [1, m - 1] \), and \( \text{op}_i \rightarrow \text{op}_{i+1} \) for all \( i < m \).

By the definition and Lemma 40, we have that \( \forall i < m, \text{sna}(\text{op}_i) \leq \text{sna}(\text{op}_{i+1}) \).
Moreover $\text{sna}(op_i) = \text{sna}(op_m)$, and $\leq$ on sequence number arrays is antisymmetric, thus we have: $\forall i < m, \text{sna}(op_i) = \text{sna}(op_0)$, which eliminates case (B) for all $i$.

We have two cases:

- If for any $i < m$, $op_i \not\in W$, then we are necessarily in case (A): $op_i \prec op_{i+1}$. Since $\text{sna}(op_i) = \text{sna}(op_{i+1})$, by the contrapositive of Lemma 40, we have $op_{i+1} \not\in W$.

By applying this same reasoning recursively, we have that $\forall i < m, op_i \prec op_{i+1}$. As $\prec$ is included in the total order of time, it is a partial order, therefore antisymmetric. We have a contradiction.

- Otherwise, $\forall i < m, op_i \in W$, which eliminates case (C). By the contrapositive of Lemma 40, since $\text{sna}(op_i) = \text{sna}(op_{i+1})$, we have $\forall i, op_i \not\in op_{i+1}$. All three cases for $op_i \rightarrow op_{i+1}$ are impossible, we have a contradiction.

In both cases we have shown a contradiction, therefore $\rightarrow^*$ is antisymmetric.

Final proof of Theorem 23

Proof. Let $\rightarrow_{op}$ be a topological sort of $\rightarrow^*$. $\rightarrow_{op}$ is a total order that extends $\rightarrow^*$. $\rightarrow_{op}$ includes the process order $\prec$ therefore it is real-time compliant.

Let us consider a snapshot operation $op = (i, sni,\text{SYNC}())$ by a correct process $p_i$, and let us show that the value read by $p_i$ in each register is the last value written to that register before $op$ according to $\rightarrow_{op}$.

Let us consider a register $k$ and let $snk = \text{sna}(op)[k]$. According to line 3, the value returned by $op$ for register $k$ is a value $v$ such that $op_k = (k, snk,\text{WRITE}(v))$ is the last write operation on $k$ known by $p_i$ when the snapshot operation returns. By definition of $\text{sna}(op)$ we have $\text{sna}(op_k) \leq \text{sna}(op)$, moreover $op_k$ is a write and $op$ is a read, therefore $op_k \rightarrow_{op} op$. Moreover, for any different write operation $op'_k = (k, snk',\text{WRITE}(v'))$ on register $k$, we have $snk' \neq snk$. If $snk' < snk$ then $op'_k \rightarrow_{op} op_k$. Otherwise $snk' > snk$, in which case $\text{sna}(op'_k) > \text{sna}(op)$, therefore $op \rightarrow_{op} op'_k$. In both cases, $v$ is the last value written on register $k$ before the snapshot operation $op$ according to $\rightarrow_{op}$.

We have thus shown that Algorithm 3 builds a linearizable single-writer multi-reader Byzantine tolerant snapshot object.