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Information-Flow Preservation in Compiler Optimisations

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Abstract—Correct compilers perform program transformations preserving input/output behaviours of programs. Though mandatory, correctness is not sufficient to prevent program optimisations from introducing information-flow leaks that would make the target program more vulnerable to side-channel attacks than the source program. To tackle this problem, we propose a notion of Information-Flow Preserving (IFP) program transformation which ensures that a target program is no more vulnerable to passive side-channel attacks than a source program. To protect against a wide range of attacks, we model an attacker who is granted arbitrary memory accesses for a pre-defined set of observation points. We propose a compositional proof principle for proving that a transformation is IFP. Using this principle, we show how a translation validation technique can be used to automatically verify and even close information-flow leaks introduced by standard compiler passes such as dead-code elimination and register allocation. The technique has been experimentally validated on the CompCert C compiler.

Index Terms—Secure compilation; Side-Channel; Information-Flow Preservation

I. INTRODUCTION

When it comes to security, compilers can not be trusted. They may perform aggressive optimisations which may exploit undefined behaviours [29] or they may have subtle bugs and generate invalid code [30]. Compilers may turn secure constant-time source programs [2] into target programs vulnerable to timing attacks [16]. Compilers may also increase the lifetime of sensitive data in memory and therefore make the target program more vulnerable to attackers with physical access. The pitfalls of so-called safe erasure in the presence of compiler optimisations is recognised by the CERT at CMU [1] and protections have recently been proposed e.g., [27], [31].

The overall consequence of this unfortunate state-of-affairs is that for highly-critical code, manual inspection of the generated code is standard industrial practice. Furthermore, even if the proposed counter-measures are effective in practice, they do not come with a formal security guarantee.

Much progress has been made in the formal verification of compiler correctness, providing a semantic guarantee that the behaviour of the compiled program is compliant with the behaviour of the source code. Prominent examples are the CompCert C compiler [20], verified using the Coq proof assistant [22], CAKEML [18], an ML compiler verified using HOL4 [1] or seL4 [26], a verified microkernel whose compilation was proven correct through translation validation [23]. Compiler correctness is often desired but non sufficient to preserve non-functional properties which are essential for the security of the compiled code [13].

In this paper, we propose an end-to-end security property to ensure that a target program does not leak more information than a source language. We build on the previous work of Besson et al. [7] but enrich their model to a more realistic setting where an attacker may observe intermediate program states and a strengthened security model preventing the duplication of potentially sensitive data. We consider an attacker model in which an attacker is granted physical memory access at specific observation points, and is parametrised by the amount of information he is allowed to read. In our setting, a program transformation is secure if an attacker at the target language does not have an advantage with respect to an attacker at the source language. This is formalised using the standard information-flow notion of Attacker Knowledge [5].

The technical contributions of the paper can be summarised as follows:

• A formal definition of Information-Flow Preserving (IFP) transformation based on the notion of Partial Attacker knowledge.
• A simulation-based proof principle for proving that a program transformation is IFP.
• A translation validation algorithm which can be instrumented to automatically close information-flow leaks in case the transformation is not IFP.
• An implementation and experiments with an IFP register allocation pass within the CompCert compiler.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II explains the rationale for our attacker model. Examples of security issues of compiler transformations with respect to this attacker model are presented in Section III. Section IV defines formally our notion of Information-Flow Preservation. In Section V we introduce a necessary condition for IFP; this condition takes the form of a simulation-based principle. We use this principle in Section VI to design a translation validation approach for the Register Allocation pass of CompCert and present our experimental results in Section VII. We compare with related work in Section IX and Section X.
II. ATTACKER MODEL

Our overall goal is to prevent information leaks from being introduced by the compilation process. Compiled code should be no more vulnerable to passive side-channel attacks than the source code. Such side channels correspond to an attacker who is granted physical memory access at specific observation points, and who is parametrised by the amount of information he is allowed to read. At the semantic level, side-channels can be modelled using a leakage function exposing a partial view of the program state to the attacker.

The typical example is the timing channel which can be modelled by leaking the program counter and the memory accesses. Another example is the power channel that can be modelled by the so-called Hamming Weight model where what is leaked is the Hamming Weight of the program state i.e., the number of information bits that are set to 1.

In our model, in order to protect against an arbitrary side-channel, we quantify over a hierarchy of attackers who have access to the programs code and where is the number of bits of information that the attacker is allowed to extract from the program memory during the program execution. Thus, we do not fix one leakage function but rather consider protecting against a hierarchy of leakage functions.

This attacker model is sufficient to formally capture the leakage of information. However, it does not take into account the practical difficulty of a physical attack i.e. how hard it is to extract bits of information when the memory is indirectly observed through a noisy side-channel. For instance, an attacker would in practice have an advantage if sensitive data is duplicated multiple times across the memory. We address this problem by forbidding duplication of data. This, in turn, leads to the formal requirement that for a given information leakage, there is an injection between the target attacker observations and the source attacker observations.

Our attacker model and our notion of Information-Flow Preserving transformation are formally presented in Section. First, we present a few typical program transformations and explain informally whether they are Information-Flow Preserving or not.

III. INFORMATION FLOW PRESERVATION BY EXAMPLES

In Figure 1, we present a list of simple programs using the syntax of an imperative language where a • indicates program points where the program memory is leaked to the attacker. In terms of input/output semantics, the program are indistinguishable: they all return 0. As a result, they could all be compiled from the original canonical program that sets the variable x to 0 and returns 0. The program leaks its initial memory (A1) and final memory (A2) to the attacker. In Figure 1, we mark the programs that are IFP with a ✓ and those which are not with a ✗. In the following, we write v for the observation of the value of the variable v at the leakage point •. Consider Program g obtained by removing the assignment to the variable x from Program f. From a compiler point of view, this is a correct transformation because the value of x does not contribute to the result. However, removing such a dead store introduces an information-flow leak and should therefore be ruled out. Intuitively, the principle for a transformation to be safe is that any observation of a value made with the target program must have a corresponding observation in the source code. In particular, the observation 2 2 in g needs to be matched by an observation of 2 2 in f. As the observation 2 2 in g has no counterpart in f for any 2, the transformation is rejected. Note that it is of utmost importance for the source and target observations to be synchronised i.e. a target observation at • needs to be matched by a source observation at the same observation point •. Otherwise, Program g would be wrongly deemed secure under the fallacious argument that the observation of 2 2 in g leaks the same information as 2 2 in f. The synchrony of observations is our solution to make it impossible to remove or delay the erasure of some information.

Program h overwrites x with a different constant. As constants carry no information, the observation 2 2 in f and h leak the same (empty) amount of information and therefore the transformation is information-preserving.

Program i overwrites x with the variable y. Because 2 2 is already leaked, this does not introduce any additional information-flow leak. However, it does lead to duplication of information which we may want to forbid. In the example, the duplication may make it easier to get to the information of 2 2 in i (it is also present in 2 2) than in f (where it is only present in 2 2). To track duplication, our security definition can be adjusted to mandate the existence of a bijection between target and source observations. In the present case, constructing the bijection is impossible because there are two target observations i.e. 2 2 and 2 2 in i, leaking the value of y while there is a single source one i.e. 2 2 in f.

Program j (resp. Program k) leaks the initial value of x through the variable a using a direct (resp. indirect) flow. In either case, the observation 2 2 has no counterpart in f and the transformation is rejected. Our Information-Flow preserving definition is semantic in nature and immune to syntactic differences.
\[
\begin{align*}
    f &: \bullet_1 \ a = x \land y; \ x = 0; \ \bullet_2 \ \text{return} \ a; \\
    g &: \bullet_1 \ a = x \land y; \ \bullet_2 \ \text{return} \ a;
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 2. Safe Erasure of One-Time Pad

A. The “Full Information Flow” Paradox

We work with a parameterised attacker model where the attacker makes partial observations. Partial observations are essential, because they capture partial information flows that would go unnoticed if we only had an omniscient attacker observing the whole memory. In the context of dynamic information flow policies, Askarov and Chong [3] have already observed that a program could be secure against a powerful attacker but insecure for a weaker attacker. To see this, consider the program \( f \) and the transformed program \( g \) in Figure 2.

Using a cryptographic analogy, Program \( f \) is encoding the plain-text \( y \) using the one-time pad key \( x \) and erases the key \( x \). Program \( g \) performs the same encryption without erasing the key. If the attacker observes \( x \bullet_2 \) in Program \( g \), he obviously learns the key \( x \). Perhaps surprisingly, the key \( x \) can also be learnt for Program \( f \) by an attacker observing both the plain-text \( y \bullet_2 \) and the cipher-text \( a \bullet_2 \). The attacker obtains \( x \) by solving the equation \( a \bullet_2 = x \oplus y \bullet_2 \), whose unique solution is \( x = a \bullet_2 \oplus y \bullet_2 \). Thus, no additional information flow is introduced and the transformation is (erroneously) deemed secure.

To rule out this insecure transformation, we stipulate that both attackers need to observe the same amount of information i.e., the same number \( n \) of bits. If both attackers observe a single bit, the observation \( a \bullet_2 \) in \( g \) cannot be simulated in \( f \) and therefore we conclude that the transformation is, as expected, not information-flow preserving.

IV. INFORMATION-FLOW PRESERVATION

A. Execution model

Without loss of generality, we assume that the program state is only made of a bit-addressable memory:

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{Mem} &= \text{Address} \rightarrow \text{Bit} \\
    \text{Bit} &= \{0, 1\}
\end{align*}
\]

A structured program state \( s \) can always be mapped to a memory \( m \in \text{Mem} \) at the cost of some encoding. For instance, a language using program variables would represent them by reserving certain memory addresses.

The semantics of a program \( p \) is given by a one-step deterministic transition relation \( \cdot \rightarrow_{e} \subseteq \text{Mem} \times \text{Mem} \) where \( e \in E = \{e, o\} \) is either \( e \), denoting a silent transition, or \( o \) indicating that the end state of the transition is leaked to the attacker. From an initial memory \( m_{0} \), a run of a program \( p \) is given by a sequence of memories \( m_{0} \cdot m_{1} \cdot \cdots \cdot m_{n} \) such that for every \( i < n \) we have \( m_{i} \rightarrow_{e_{i}} m_{i+1} \). Given such a run, the view of the attacker is given by the sub-trace of leaked memories i.e. those memories resulting from a transition tagged \( o \). Formally, we define the transition relation of the attacker as a sequence of silent transitions followed by a transition leaking its final memory:

\[
\begin{align*}
    m \rightarrow_{e} m' &\quad m' \rightarrow_{o} m'' \\
    m &\sim m''
\end{align*}
\]

As a result, from an initial memory \( m_{0} \), the trace of memories \( t = m_{1} \cdots m_{n} \) that is leaked to the attacker is such that for every \( i < n \) we have \( m_{i} \sim m_{i+1} \). In the following, we write \((p, c) \Downarrow t \) for a trace of the attacker obtained by running the program \( p \) from an initial memory \( c \).

B. Partial Attacker Knowledge

We next define precisely the information leaked through a (partial) trace of attacker observations, using the notion of Attacker Knowledge. Following [5], the Attacker Knowledge from a trace \( t \) of program \( p \) is defined by

\[
\mathcal{K}_{t}(p) = \{ c \in \text{Mem} \mid (p, c) \Downarrow t \}
\]

i.e., the attacker knowledge corresponds to the initial memories that may lead to (and hence are indistinguishable by) the observation of the trace \( t \). We generalise the notion of Attacker Knowledge to partial observations of \( n \) bits of the trace \( t \). A partial observation \( o \) is a trace of partial memories, i.e., a trace of partial maps from addresses to bits:

\[
(Address \leftarrow Bit)^n
\]

Partial memories \( m, m' \in Address \rightarrow Bit \) are ordered so that \( m \subseteq m' \) if \( m \) and \( m' \) agree on all the addresses where \( m \) is defined. Formally, this is the standard (point-wise) ordering of partial functions:

\[
m \subseteq m' \iff \forall x \in \text{dom}(m) \cdot |m(x)| = |m'(x)|.
\]

Two partial traces are ordered if they have the same length and the memories (at the same position) are ordered using \( \subseteq \). Formally:

\[
\mathcal{K}_{t}(p) = \{ o \in (Address \leftarrow Bit)^n \mid (p, o) \Downarrow t \wedge |o| = n \}
\]

We can then define the notion of partial observation formally as follows.

**Definition 1** (Partial Observation). The set of partial observations of \( n \) bits of a trace \( t \) is defined by

\[
\mathcal{O}_{n}(t) = \{ o : (Address \leftarrow Bit)^* \mid o \subseteq t \wedge |o| = n \}
\]

**Definition 2** generalises the standard notion of Attacker Knowledge to partial observations.

**Definition 2.** For a program \( p \) and a trace \( t \), the Partial Attacker Knowledge for a partial observation \( o \in \mathcal{O}_{n}(t) \) is given by

\[
\mathcal{K}_{n}(p, o) = \bigcup_{o \subseteq u} \mathcal{K}_{u}(p).
\]
In Definition 2, we quantify over all the complete traces \( u \in Mem^* \) that are compatible with the partial observation \( o \) i.e., \( \{ o \mid o \subseteq u \} \). The Partial Attacker Knowledge is therefore defined as the union of the Attacker Knowledge for all the complete traces that are indistinguishable from the point of view of \( o \).

### C. Information-Flow Preserving Transformation

We shall use Partial Attacker Knowledge to define precisely what we mean by a secure transformation of a source program into a target. Intuitively, a source program \( p \) is at least as vulnerable as a target program \( p' \) if any partial observation \( o' \) of a (target) trace of \( p' \) can always be matched by a partial observation \( o \) (of a source) trace of \( p \) such that the source observation \( o \) leaks more information than the target observation \( o' \).

The notion of *matching observation* is formalised by a function mapping partial observations from \( Obs(t', n) \) to \( Obs(t, n) \). To forbid transformations that increase the lifetime of an information leak, we also enforce that the observations at the target and source level are performed in lock-step i.e., at each instant, both attackers observe the same amount of information.

**Definition 3.** The set of lock-step observation mappings \( \Omega \) is defined by

\[
\Omega(t', t, n) = \{ \omega : Obs(t', n) \to Obs(t, n) \mid \forall o', \sup(o') = \sup(\omega(o')) \}
\]

where the support of an observation is defined by

\[
\sup(\epsilon) = \epsilon \quad \sup(m \cdot o) = |dom(m)| \cdot \sup(o)
\]

Using lock-step mappings, we are ready to define the security refinement of a source program \( p \) by a target program \( p' \).

**Definition 4.** A target program \( p' \) is at least as secure as \( p \) for an attacker observing \( n \) bits (written \( p \leq_n p' \)) iff

\[
\forall c, t, t', (p, c) \not\equiv t \land (p', c) \not\equiv t' \Rightarrow \exists \omega \in \Omega(t, t', n), \forall o', K_n(t, \omega(o')) \subseteq K_n(t, o')
\]

Because it quantifies over every partial observations and requires a lock-step mapping, Definition 4 ensures that if a target observation is matched by a source observation, so is every prefix observation.

In order to rule out the duplication of information, we can further restrict the function \( \omega \) to be injective, by adding the constraint

\[
\Omega_1(t', t, n) = Obs(t', n) \to Obs(t, n)
\]

where \( \to \) denotes the set of bijective functions.

In case of duplication of information, several target observations with the same Partial Attacker Knowledge would need to be mapped to the same source level observation. The fact that \( \omega \) is injective rules out this possibility. In the following, we take the constraint on matching functions to be either \( \Omega \) or \( \Omega \cup \Omega_1 \) and discuss when the constraint \( \Omega_1 \) is a too strong requirement.

A transformation \( T \) is IFP if \( T(p) \) is at least as secure as \( p \) for attackers with any level of observational power.

**Definition 5.** A transformation \( T : Prog \to Prog \) is IFP iff

\[
\forall p, \bigwedge_{n \in \mathbb{N}} (p \leq_n T(p))
\]

### V. A sufficient condition for IFP and its Proof Principle

The definition of an IFP transformation does not suggest an immediate composition proof principle, and proving directly that a program transformation abides to Definition 5 would be a daunting task. To prove that a transformation is IFP, we present a simulation-based proof technique, ensuring that a source memory can be simulated by a target memory.

#### A. Partition and Simulation Relation

In order to facilitate concrete proofs, we partition the memories leaked to the attacker. In program terms, a typical partitioning would assign to the same partition index \( i \) all the memory leaked by a given syntactic observation point \( \bullet_i \). To each partition index \( i \), we attach a simulation function \( \alpha_i : Address \to Address + Bit \). Given a source memory \( m \) and a target memory \( m' \) mapped to the same partition index \( i \), the mapping \( \alpha_i \) explains how \( m \) can be effectively simulated by \( m' \). This is done by showing how any bit in \( m' \) is either a constant (thus without any information) or a bit that is stored in \( m \) possibly at another address as indicated by \( \alpha_i \).

**Example 1.** Consider the Programs \( f \) and \( h \) of Figure 7

For this simple case, each observation point \( \bullet_i \) (both in the source and target program) would be mapped to the partition index \( i \in \{1, 2\} \). For the initial observation point \( \bullet_1 \), both memories are the same and therefore we would have \( \alpha_1 \) would be the identity function \( \lambda \alpha.a.a \). For \( \bullet_2 \), the memories are the same except for the address \( x \) which carry the constant 1 in Program \( h \). Therefore, we would have \( \alpha_2 = \lambda x.a.1 \) if \( a = x \) then 1 else \( a \).

As we show in Theorem 1, these are sufficient conditions to ensure that \( m' \) contains at most the same amount of information as \( m \).

The source (resp. target) partition is characterised by a function \( sid \) (resp. \( tid \) : Memory \( \to \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Therefore, in the following, we write \( m.sid \) (resp. \( m'.tid \)) for the source index (resp. target index) of a memory \( m \) (resp. \( m' \)).

**Definition 6.** Let \( \alpha_i : Address \to Address + Bit \) be a simulation function indexed by \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). A source memory \( m \) is simulated by a target memory \( m' \) (written \( m \sim m' \)) iff we have \( m.sid = m'.sid \)

\[
\forall a'.m'(a') = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_i(a') & \text{if } a'(a') \in Bit \\
\alpha_i(a') & \text{if } a(a') \in Address
\end{cases}
\]

Lifted to traces we get,

\[
\epsilon \sim _\alpha \epsilon \quad m \sim _\alpha m' \quad t \sim _\alpha t'
\]
In order to avoid duplication of information and enforce the constraint \(\Omega_1\), the function \(\alpha_i\) needs to be further constrained to forbid mapping distinct target addresses to the same source address i.e., \(\forall a_1, a_2, a_1(\alpha_1) = a_2(\alpha_2) \Rightarrow a_1 = a_2\).

Using the previous definitions, our necessary conditions for IFP can be stated using Theorem 1.

**Theorem 1.** Consider two programs \(p\) and \(p'\), and an indexed simulation function \(\alpha_i : \text{Address} \rightarrow \text{Address} + \text{Bit}\). If
\[
\forall c, t, t', s \left( (p, c) \downarrow t \land (p', c) \downarrow t' \right) \Rightarrow t \sim_\alpha t',
\]
then \(\forall n, p \sim_n p'\), i.e., the transformation is IFP.

Proof: Suppose \(t \sim_\alpha t'\). We need to prove, for any \(n\),
\[
\exists \omega \forall \omega' \omega' : \text{Obst}(m_i, k) \rightarrow \text{Obst}(m_i, k)\)
\[
\text{Bit}(\omega'') \subseteq \text{Bit}(\omega')\]

Let \(t' = m_1' \cdots m_n'\) and \(t = m_1 \cdots m_n\). Remember that \(\omega\) has type \(\omega_1 : \text{Obst}(m_i, k) \rightarrow \text{Obst}(m_i, k)\) which given a partial observation \(\omega'\) of the target memory \(m_i\) reconstructs an observation \(\omega_i(\omega')\) of the source memory \(m_i\). As \(m_i \sim_\alpha m_i'\), this can be done as follows. Suppose that \(\omega_i(\omega') \neq \perp\) for some address \(a'\). If \(\alpha_i(a') \in \text{Address}\), we can obtain the same observation from memory \(m_i\) and \(\omega_i(\omega')(a') = m_i(\alpha(a'))\). Otherwise, if \(\alpha_i(a') \in \text{Bit}\), the observation does not provide any information and therefore it suffices to pick an arbitrary fresh address \(a\), and have \(\omega_i(\omega')(a) = m_i(a)\).

From this construction, for any partial observation \(\omega' \in \text{Obst}(t', n)\) we can derive a partial observation of the source execution \(\omega(\omega')\) which contains at least as much information as in \(\omega'\). It follows that the target attacker knowledge obtained from an observation \(\omega'\) is always bigger than the source attacker knowledge of the observation \(\omega(\omega')\) and therefore the property holds.

Theorem 1 does not provide a complete characterisation of IFP transformations. It captures transformations where information is perhaps moved around but is otherwise unmodified. To illustrate the limitation, consider the following contrived example
\[
x := y \rightarrow x' := \sim y
\]
where the bit values of \(y\) are flipped bitwise. The variables \(x\) and \(x'\) contain the exact same information i.e., the value of \(y\). Yet, the transformation of values cannot be modelled by a simulation function \(\alpha\). We show that standard optimisations including register allocation and dead store elimination are in the scope of Theorem 1.

**B. Simulation-Based Principle**

The pre-condition of Theorem 1 can be proved using a lock-step backward simulation principle over the attacker semantics.

**Definition 7 (Backward Simulation).** A simulation function \(\alpha_i : \text{Address} \rightarrow \text{Address} + \text{Bit}\) is a backward simulation if:

1) From the initial memory \(c\), the first source memory \(m\) and target memory \(m'\) leaked to the attacker are in relation \(m \sim_\alpha m'\).

2) Given memories \(m_1 \sim_\alpha m_1'\), for every attacker step of the target program \(m_1' \sim_\alpha m_2'\) there exists a memory \(m_2\) in the source program such that \(m_1 \sim_\alpha m_2\) and \(m_2 \sim_\alpha m_2'\).

**Theorem 2.** Suppose two programs \(p\) and \(p'\) and a simulation function \(\alpha\). If there is a backward simulation (according to Definition 7) for \(\alpha\), then the pre-condition of Theorem 1 holds i.e.,
\[
\forall c, t, t', s \left( (p, c) \downarrow t \land (p', c) \downarrow t' \right) \Rightarrow t \sim_\alpha t'.
\]

Proof: The proof is by induction over the length of the trace \(t'\) and follows using Condition 1 of Definition 7 for the base case and Condition 2 of Definition 7 for the inductive case.

**VI. TRANSLATION VALIDATION FOR REGISTER ALLOCATION**

Translation validation [23] is a verification technique which consists in validating a posteriori (and automatically) that a program \(p'\) is obtained by a valid transformation of a program \(p\). We adopt this principle and design a specialised algorithm to validate a posteriori whether programs obtained through the Register Allocation (RA) pass of the verified COMP CERT C compiler [19] satisfy our IFP property. This is done by explicitly constructing a backward simulation using the sufficient condition of Section V. An interesting feature of our algorithm is that certain failures can be interpreted as potential information leak and that these leaks can be closed automatically by inserting erasing instructions.

**A. Register Allocation in a Nutshell**

Before RA, programs make use of an unbounded number of pseudo-registers. The role of RA is to exploit the constraint that the physical machine has only finitely many registers and therefore allocate each pseudo-register to a machine register. RA is also responsible for implementing calling-conventions i.e. passing arguments in the right register and restoring callee-saved registers. What makes RA a complex optimisation task is that this resource allocation task may be impossible due to a shortage of registers. In that case, a register may be spilled in the function stack frame i.e. its content copied, for later reuse. After the last use of a spilled register, a conventional RA algorithm has no reason to explicitly erase the stack location. This breaks our IFP property because i) the value is duplicated (it is stored in both a register and a stack location); ii) this introduces an information leak if the stack location is not erased after the last use of the register. This is illustrated by Example 2.

**Example 2.** Consider the simple function `cipher` of Figure 3 and the function `cipher'` obtained by a typical RA pass for an hypothetical target architecture with only two registers \(r1\) and \(r2\). The code has been arranged to highlight the relation
between a source instruction and the corresponding sequence of target instructions. For instance, the source instruction of Line 6 is compiled into the sequence of target instructions of Lines 4-6. The Function cipher’ contains additional spilling/loading instructions inserted by RA Lines 4, 5 and 7. In Function cipher the secret value in key is overwritten Line 8, hence an attacker at • cannot observe its value. However in Function cipher’, the value of key in stored in register r2 and copied in variable key’ (see Line 4). As the variable key’ is never erased, an attacker at • can observe its value. Hence this transformation is not IFP and will be rejected by our validation algorithm.

B. Register Allocation in CompCert

1) Register Allocation Languages: In CompCert, the RA pass compiles a source in the Register Transfer Language (RTL) into a target in the Location Transfer Language (LTL). RTL and LTL are both fairly classic control-flow graph program representations where nodes are labelled with three-address code instructions.

Instructions representative of RTL are given below.

\( I \ni i \; ::= \; \text{nop}(\text{s}) \quad \mid \quad \text{op}(\text{op}, \text{args}, \text{dest}, \text{s}) \quad \mid \quad \text{load}(\text{addr}, \text{args}, \text{dest}, \text{s}) \quad \mid \quad \text{store}(\text{addr}, \text{args}, \text{src}, \text{s}) \quad \mid \quad \text{cond}(\text{cond}, \text{args}, \text{strue}, \text{sfalse}) \quad \mid \quad \text{call}(\text{sig}, \text{fid}, \text{args}, \text{dest}, \text{s}) \quad \mid \quad \text{return}(\text{arg}) \)

Each instruction \( i \in I \), attached to a node \( n \in N \), specifies its immediate successor \( s \) which is the node of the instruction to execute next. The nop instruction does nothing. The op instruction computes the value of the variable dest using the values stored in the vector of pseudo-registers \( \text{args} \). The load instruction moves the value at the address computed by \( \text{addr} \) with the addressing mode \( \text{addr} \) to the destination dest. Similarly store move the value from src to the address computed by \( \text{addr} \) and addr. The call instruction calls the function fid with signature sig with parameters args; the result of the call is stored in dest. The instruction cond models a conditional and has two successors. Depending on the value of arg, the instruction to execute next is either strue of sfalse. Finally, return exits the current function and return the value of arg.

The LTL language is similar to RTL with the differences that i) so-called locations corresponding to stack slots or machine registers are used in place of the unlimited pseudo-registers called temporaries and; ii) call and return instructions are bounded by the calling conventions of the target architecture. As a result, in the program syntax, \( \text{args} \) and dest are locations made of either machine registers or stack slots used for spilling registers. Compared to temporaries, stack slots are pointers into the current stack frame and special care must be taken to make sure that spilled registers do not overlap. The calling conventions stipulate where function arguments and return must be stored and are represented by a list of locations. For instance, for x86_32, arguments are passed on the stack and the result is stored in eax while for x86_64, arguments are passed in different registers depending of the type of the argument.

2) Translation Validation of RA: CompCert is using an untrusted RA algorithm which output is verified using a specialised translation validation approach [24], ensuring that each target LTL function is a sound compilation of the source RTL function. Observational correctness of the whole program is then achieved by composing the validation of each pair of functions. As our own IFP validator is reusing some key components, we give a brief overview of their algorithm.

The translation validator of CompCert exploits that the RTL and LTL functions have a very similar structure and only differ in that the LTL function introduces move instructions to materialise spills and reloads of stack slots; and data movements between registers.

The untrusted RA algorithm takes as argument a RTL function and returns a LTL function. The LTL function is structured in such a way that it is straightforward to rebuild a mapping from a single RTL instruction to the list of LTL instructions it is compiled into. Because RA is only using a few local transformations, the list of LTL instructions is always made of move instructions i.e. assignments between locations, followed by the actual instruction which is obtained from the original RTL instruction by replacing registers by locations. The only possibilities are presented in the first column of Figure 4. Each possible association of instructions are categorized into block-shape and form whole block-shape functions. Similar to RTL and LTL, block-shape functions are structured as a CFG and each block-shape is parametrised with
the nodes of its successors. Moreover each possible block-
shape contains a list of move instructions from the LTL code,
labelled $mv$ in Figure 4 which are executed before the core
instruction.

COMP CERT translation validation algorithm is composed of
two parts. The first one is a structural check which verifies
that the LTL function respects a certain structure in regard to
the RTL function. This check is carried while by constructing
the block-shape function. For example to construct $BSop$ the
validator needs to find $op$ instructions in both RTL and LTL
and that the operations computed match. Another example
with $BScond$ where the condition and successors must be the
same in both $cond$ instructions. If an unexpected pattern
is found between source and transformed functions then the
structural check and the validation will fail. To complete
the translation validation algorithm, COMP CERT performs
an additional backward data flow analysis to verify that the
two functions effectively compute and use the same values.

C. Modular IFP Validation Algorithm

Our security policy is determined by the location of ob-
servation points $i$ in both the RTL and LTL programs. In
order to get a translation validation algorithm integrated in
the RA compiler pass, it is necessary to be able to process
one function at a time. Our solution is to set observation
points at function boundaries, more precisely at function calls
and returns. From a security point of view, this ensures that
the locations managed by register allocation do not leak
information at function return i.e. the stack frame does not
leak information not present in the pseudo-registers of RTL.

In the following, we detail our IFP validation algorithm.
In Section [4] we have shown that proving IFP preservation
can be done by exhibiting some mapping $\alpha_i : \text{Address} \rightarrow \text{Address} + \text{Bit}$ used to establish a simulation between the
source and the target memories at every observation point
$i$. To get to this point, our IFP validator needs to con-
struct richer objects in order to accommodate for the RTL
and LTL COMP CERT memory model [21] and the fact that,
for intermediate program points, the existence of such a
$\alpha_i$ mapping is a too strong requirement. Hence, the IFP
validator constructs a set of associations between locations
and temporaries $\beta_i \in \mathcal{P}(\text{Loc} \times \text{Temp})$; computes the set
of modified location $\gamma_i \in \mathcal{P}(\text{Loc})$ and performs a constant
analysis $\text{cst}_i : \text{Loc} \rightarrow \text{Value} + \{\top\}$ such that, given a program
point $i$, $(l,t) \in \beta_i$ iff the value of the LTL location $l$ is the
same value as the RTL temporary $t$; $l \in \gamma_i$ iff the location $l$ may
be modified by the current function and $\text{cst}_i(l) = v$ iff
for any execution the location $l$ always contains the value $v$.

The constant analysis $\text{cst}_i$ and the set of modified locations
$\gamma_i$ are computed by solving standard forward data-flow equa-
tions that are solved iteratively using the data-flow framework
of COMP CERT.

1) Inference of Location Mapping $\beta_i$: Compared to the
existing RA validator of COMP CERT, a difference is that we
construct $\beta_i$ using a forward data-flow analysis over the
block-shapes of Figure 4. The reason is that, for compiler
correctness, it is just necessary to ensure that the return LTL
register, say $eax$, is mapped to the return RTL temporary, say
$t$. For IFP, we need a comprehensive mapping for all the RTL
temporaries and LTL locations.

The transfer functions for the possible block shapes gener-
ated by RA can be found in Figure 3. The transfer functions
are using the following notations. We write $(l \rightarrow t)$ for a pair
$(l,t) \in \beta_i$ with the interpretation that the LTL location $l$ is
mapped to the RTL temporary $t$. We extend this notation to
vectors of locations and temporaries and write $(l_1, \ldots, l_n) \rightarrow
(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ for the set $\{(l_1 \rightarrow t_1), \ldots, (l_n \rightarrow t_n)\}$. Because
of copy instructions, in both RTL and LTL, the mapping is not
unique and there may be several pairs with $l$ as first component
and $t$ as the second component. Given a temporary $t$, we write
$_{\rightarrow t}$ for the set of all pairs such that the second element
is $t$. Symmetrically, for a given location, we write $(l \rightarrow _{\rightarrow})$
for the set of all pairs such that the first element is $l$.

All block shapes have a sequence of move $mv$ instructions
on the LTL side. A move $l_1 = l_2$ assigns $l_2$ to $l_1$. Given an
initial mapping $B$, the effect of move $l_1 = l_2$ is to remove
the existing mappings for $l_1 ((l_1 \rightarrow _{\rightarrow})$ and map $l_1$ to existing
mappings of $l_2$ in $B$. As a result, we get
\[
\text{transfer}_{l_1 = l_2} = B \setminus (l_1 \rightarrow _{\rightarrow}) \cup \{(l_1 \rightarrow x) | (l_2 \rightarrow x) \in B\}.
\]
For valid code, there should always be an existing mapping
for $l_2$. If not, the analysis continues but $l_2$ and $l_1$ would be
flagged as potential information leaks at the next observation
point. A $BSnop$ only consists in a list of LTL move
instruction and its effect is modelled by iterating the transfer
function for a single move instruction. For $BSop$, we check
after computing the consequence of the moves that the LTL
arguments $\text{args}^L$ are mapped to the RTL arguments $\text{args}^R$. If
this is the case, we have the guarantee that the arguments $\text{args}^L$
and $\text{args}^R$ have the same values and therefore the destinations
$\text{tmp}$ and $\text{loc}$ have the same value. After evaluating the effect
of the moves, the transfer function invalidates the existing
mappings for $\text{tmp}$ and $\text{loc}$ and add the mapping $(\text{loc} \rightarrow \text{tmp})$.
For $BSload$, the transfer function is similar but exploits
the additional invariant that the memory of RTL and LTL
agree for every address $a$ that is neither a LTL location
$a \notin \text{Loc}$ nor a temporary $a \notin \text{Temp}$. For $BSstore$, we
check that the computed addresses $\text{args}^L$ and $\text{args}^R$ compute
the same value in both RTL and LTL. We also check that the
stored value are the same i.e., the current mapping includes
$(\text{loc} \rightarrow \text{tmp})$. Except for the potential move instructions, a
memory store has no effect on the current mapping. Yet, our
verifications ensure that the LTL and RTL memory still agree
for addresses that are neither temporaries nor locations. For
$BScall$, we check that the arguments of the call are the same.
In RTL, the arguments and return value are explicitly passed;
in LTL, the functions $\text{Params}(\text{sig})$ and $\text{Ret}(\text{sig})$ implement the
architecture dependent calling conventions of functions
arguments and return. In RTL, all the temporaries are restored
after a function call. In LTL, the calling conventions state that
both stack locations and a subset of the registers i.e., so callee-
saved registers, are restored after a call. This is modelled
in the transfer function by the function call-save which invalidates mappings to registers which are not callee-saved. For BScall, we simply check that the conditions evaluate to the same value thus ensuring that both program have the same control-flow. For BReturn, we also check that the return values are the same and only update the mapping to model due to move instructions.

In order to get $\beta_i$, we iterate the data-flow equations until a fixpoint using data-flow framework of COMPCERT.

2) Verification of Sufficient Conditions: If the computation of $\beta_i$ succeeds, the next step consists in verifying, for every observation point, IFP verification conditions. For a given observation point $\bullet_i$, we verify that for every LTL location $l \in \gamma_i$ that may be modified by the current function, there exists either a mapping to a RTL register $t$ i.e., $(l \rightarrow t) \in \beta_i$ or the location $l$ is constant $\text{cst}_i(l) = v$ for some $v \neq T$.

**Theorem 3.** Let $p$ be a RTL program and $p'$ be a LTL program. Suppose that we have successfully constructed $\beta_i$, $\gamma_i$ and $\text{cst}_i$ for every program point of $p$. If for every observation point $\bullet_i$, the following condition holds:

$$\forall l \in \gamma_i. (\exists t. (l \rightarrow t) \in \beta_i) \lor (\exists v. \text{cst}_i(l) = v \land v \neq T)$$

Then RA transformation of $p$ to $p'$ is IFP.

Moreover, if every pair $(l_1, l_2)$ of distinct locations is mapped to distinct to distinct temporaries, the transformation prevents data duplication.

In the following section, we give some key insights on how the previous verification conditions are sufficient to ensure the existence of a simulation function $\alpha_i$ and a backward simulation between $p$ and $p'$.

**D. Correctness of the Validation Algorithm**

We suppose an execution of $p$ and $p'$ where memories $m_1$ and $m'_1$ are respectively leaked from observation point $\bullet_1$ and there exists $\alpha_1$ such that $m_1 \sim_{\alpha_1} m'_1$. Similarly we note $\bullet_2$ the observation point leaking $m_2$. It remains to prove that we can construct a backward simulation according to Definition 7.
Hence we need to prove two goals: the existence of \( m_2 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) such that \( m_1 \leadsto m_2 \) and \( m_2 \leadsto_{\alpha_2} m'_{2} \).

1. \( \exists m_2, \ m_1 \leadsto m_2 \): By definition of \( \leadsto \), there is a derivation of length \( n \) such that \( m_1 \rightarrow^{n} m_2 \). We have to show that there is a derivation of length \( n \) such that \( m_1 \rightarrow^{n} m_2 \). Such a proof is also needed by the original \textsc{CompCert} semantics preservation proof of the RA pass [24] and we therefore inherit it for free.

2. \( \exists \alpha_2, \ m_2 \leadsto_{\alpha_2} m'_{2} \): The construction of \( \alpha_2 \) partitions addresses in the following three categories:
   - addresses which are not part of LTL locations;
   - LTL locations that have been modified by the current function;
   - and LTL locations that have not been modified.

First of all for every address that are not locations in the LTL memory model. These memory slots are only accessible with \texttt{load} and \texttt{store} instructions. While building \( \beta_2 \) we check that these memory accesses always agree on the values computed and memory chunk that is addressed. Therefore in \( p \) and \( p' \) these memory chunks remain the same and \( \alpha_2 \) corresponds to the identity function for these addresses.

Then we tackle the instances where addresses are part of LTL locations. \( \gamma_2 \) is the set of locations which may have been modified since the beginning of the function being analysed. We study the case where the location \( l \) was not modified in the function, e.g., \( l \notin \gamma_2 \). We know that when reaching \( \bullet_1 \) the memories \( m_1 \) and \( m'_1 \) were leaked and that \( m_1 \leadsto_{\alpha_1} m'_1 \). Moreover locations and temporaries are local to their functions and observation points are placed before function calls and returns. From these facts we deduce that \( \alpha_1(l) \) still holds at \( \bullet_2 \) and gives us \( \forall(l \notin \gamma_2), \ \alpha_2(l) = \alpha_1(l) \). In the last case where \( l \in \gamma_2 \), we know from our precondition of Theorem 3 that we are able to map \( l \) to either a temporary or a constant. Thus \( \alpha_2 \) is equal to \( \beta_2 \) or \texttt{cst}_{2} \) for every location of \( \gamma_2 \).

Lastly we need to prove that \( \alpha_2 \) is injective. For addresses which are not locations, \( \alpha_2 \) is the identity function which is injective. For addresses not in \( \gamma_2 \) this is given by the fact that by induction \( \alpha_1 \) is also injective. For the other addresses we have the hypothesis that every location maps to distinct temporaries which proves that \( \alpha_2 \) is injective.

E. Validating Dead Store Elimination (DSE)

DSE is an optimisation which replaces an assignment to RTL temporary \( tmp \) by \texttt{nop} when the compiler is able to show that the value of \( tmp \) will not be used by the rest of the computation. When such instructions have the security purpose of erasing sensitive values from memory, DSE is introducing information-flow leaks. A particularity of \textsc{CompCert} is that dead store elimination is not a separate pass but is performed during RA. The rationale is that a liveness analysis is needed to both detect \texttt{dead store} and construct the interference graph of RA algorithms. Therefore the validator of \textsc{CompCert} is capable of validating both RA and DSE. Similarly, we also adapt our IFP validator to handle DSE. For most cases, DSE will not be IFP. To cope with this situation, we refer to Section VII-F where we show how to patch the program on the fly to close potential information leaks. A typical case where removing a store is not IFP occurs when it happens right before an observation point.

The only transformation that may occur in DSE is to replace an assignment by a \texttt{nop}. To deal with this situation, our validator considers the additional block shapes and transfer functions of Figure 5. Those blocks are \texttt{BSopdead} and \texttt{BSloaddead} where the corresponding core instructions in LTL has become a \texttt{nop}. In both cases, after evaluating the move instructions, the transfer functions remove the mappings for the target RTL temporary \( tmp \).

With these extensions our IFP validator is now able to check the \textsc{CompCert} transformation composed of register allocation and DSE.

F. Patching algorithm

An interesting property of our IFP validator is that we can recover from certain validation failures; track down the origin of the information leak and apply a patch to a function \( f' \) to automatically close the information leak. When this is the case, it is possible to run existing optimisations unmodified, and during a post-treatment, detect and remove potential information leaks. Suppose that, for a given observation point \( \bullet_i \), the verification conditions needed by Theorem 3 do not hold. Typically, there is a location \( l \) that is neither a constant (\( \texttt{cst}_{i} = \texttt{T} \)) nor has a mapping to some RTL temporary (\( \beta_{i}(l) = \emptyset \)). In this situation either the validator is not precise enough or \( l \) is responsible for an information leak. To close the potential leak detected by the IFP validator, our patching algorithm inserts an erasure instruction and sets the location to the constant 0 just before the observation point \( \bullet_i \). After the addition of those erasure instructions, we have the guarantee that the transformed program is IFP. Moreover, those erasure instructions cannot compromise the correctness of the transformation. The rationale is that an erasure instruction for location \( l \) is necessarily a \texttt{dead} store. To see this, consider by contradiction that \( l \) is live. In that case, to establish semantics preservation, the original \textsc{CompCert} validator needs to establish a mapping for location \( l \) and a RTL temporary \( t \). As our forward validator always computes more mappings than the original backward validator of \textsc{CompCert}, it would establish the same mapping. This contradicts our assumption.

As a result, we have the guarantee that inserting erasure instructions, according to the rules above, is a sound algorithm to make \textsc{CompCert} RA a semantic preserving IFP transformation.

VII. EXPERIMENTS

The translation validation algorithm of Section VI has been integrated as part of the register allocation pass of \textsc{CompCert} [19]. We run our IFP validator; close any potential information leak using the patching algorithm of Section VII-F. Afterwards, we run the existing validator of \textsc{CompCert}, thus, ensuring the semantics correctness of our security transformation.
In our model, the attacker can only observe the memory at so-called observation points. As explain in Section VI observation points are set at function boundaries; the attacker may observe memory just before call and return instructions. With this policy, our IFP validator enforces that register allocation does not introduce information leaks due, for instance, to stack allocated variables (or spilled registers) not being properly erased at function return; an acknowledged security issue [14], [27], [31].

A. Results and analysis

The experiments have been conducted on a quad-core Intel i7-6600U at 2.60GHz with 16GB of RAM running Fedora 27. We have tested our IFP validator on 24 programs which are all part of the CompCert test suite. For every program, our validator detected potential information leaks introduced by CompCert RA. All the information leaks have been successfully closed by our patching algorithm and all the resulting programs have passed the CompCert validator.

The impact of the security transformation on the size of the programs and their efficiency are summarised in Figure 6. The first bar represents the runtime overhead of our secured RA compared to the original RA of CompCert. The benchmarks have a running time ranging from 1 to 10 seconds and are sorted by increasing overhead that is obtained by averaging 50 runs. The second (grey) bar is the overhead on the size of the program incurred by the insertion of erasure instructions. The third (dark) bar represents the overhead in the number of executed instruction.

As shown in Figure 6, the increase in program size can be large and is above 20% for most of the benchmarks. Yet, this increase is not always reflected in the execution overhead because even when many erasure instructions are inserted, they may be rarely executed. Actually, for most functions, the increase of the number of executed instructions is negligible and for more than half of the programs the execution overhead is within a range of ±5%. We believe that speed ups are a lucky side-effect, probably due to an improved behaviour of the cache of instructions. Yet, there 4 benchmarks for which the execution overhead is above 10%. For chomp, the overhead peaks at 51% but is not quite correlated with the increase in executed instructions which is less than 15%. Another extreme phenomenon is the speedup of 17% of lists for which there is no obvious explanation and require further investigations. Anyway, these results are encouraging and show that an improved security can often be obtained without sacrificing too much efficiency.

For a few benchmarks, the number of inserted instructions can be quite large. For instance, for programs like almabench or fftsp we notice a 40% increase in program size. A reason for this phenomenon is that our IFP validator needs to be quite conservative about the behaviour of function calls relying exclusively on guarantees given by calling conventions. This is illustrated by Example 3 where a potentially spurious instruction needs to be inserted to protect against a potential information leak.

Example 3. Consider the code snippet of Figure 7. According to standard x86 calling conventions, it is typically compiled as the LTL program of Figure 7. After the call of g, we only have the guarantee that the registers are either overwritten or carry the same value as before. Therefore, our validator makes the conservative assumption that edi (that is not callee-saved) was
not modified by \( g \), may leak the initial value of the variable \( x \) and therefore needs to be explicitly erased, thus adding a potential spurious erasure instruction \( edi := 0 \).

As programs like \texttt{almabench} or \texttt{ffisq} are using a significant number of distinct registers, the patching algorithm introduces for each of them an erasing instruction for each call site.

**B. Discussion**

The validator is also verifying whether register allocation satisfies the absence of data duplication. This property is unfortunately currently violated and cannot be easily fixed because of constraints imposed by existing calling conventions. More precisely, calling conventions stipulate that arguments are copied into specific registers. Moreover, as arguments are not callee-saved, erasing the original register would be unsound and, therefore, this duplication is inevitable. At the price of breaking compatibility with existing code, a solution would be to adapt the calling-conventions so that arguments are callee-saved. Other sources of duplication are between a register and a spilled stack slot. In this case, either the register or the stack slot is dead and could be erased. The patching algorithm would have to be enhanced with a liveness analysis in order to perform this reasoning and erase the dead location.

Reducing the number of erasure instructions would require to give the validator additional information about the registers that are either preserved or erased by function calls. For functions in the same compilation unit, this could be done using standard static analyses computing unmodified registers or constant registers. Library calls are more problematic. A possibility would be to require extended calling conventions stipulating which registers are preserved (beyond callee-saved) or erased. However, if the client code is optimised for these extended calling conventions, it would only be secure if linked against this specific version of the library.

**VIII. Securing Other Compiler Passes**

In their paper, D’Silva et al. [14] mention that compiler passes such as Code Motion or Inlining, because they modify the lifetime of variables, may introduce information leaks. In the following, we explain how these transformations fit with our IFP property.

**A. Inlining**

In our experiments, observation points are attached to function calls. As inlining consists in replacing a function call by a function body, if has the effect of removing an observation point. As observations need to be synchronised, inlining breaks this property and therefore is simply not an IFP transformation. As this may seem overly restrictive, a first solution to accommodate some inlining would be to weaken the security policy and attach observation points only to security critical functions. As a result, those critical functions would not be inlined but other functions could be freely inlined without modifying observation points. In this restricted scenario, inlining would be an IFP transformation. Another tempting approach would be to detach the observation point from the function call. Yet, this raises the issue of code motion that we discuss below.

**B. Code motion**

The risk of code motion is that code, and therefore information, could move around observation points and thus modify the security policy. Consider for instance, the code of Figure 8 where observation points are detached from function calls and the code is subject to code motion. In this example, both erasure instructions and observation points have been delayed and moved at the end of the program. The result is that the transformation is formally IFP but defeats the intention of the security policy. It follows that an IFP-aware compiler needs to limit code motion within the bounds of observation points.

**IX. Related Work**

The correctness-security gap was pinpointed by D’Silva et al. [14]. In that work, dead-store elimination is identified as a program transformation that can cause security issues. Deng and Namjoshi [11]–[13] introduce an information flow notion of leaky triple and ensure that an adaptation of the standard DSE transformation [13] and SSA transform [12] preserves this notion of information flow. Leaky triples do not capture the amount of information that is leaked. As a consequence, they ensure that a non-interferent program is transformed into another non-interferent program but a leaky program may be transformed into a more leaky program without violating their property. Because our IFP property is based on the notion of partial attacker knowledge, it will rule out this possibility and ensure that the transformed program is no more leaky.

Chong and Myers [9] propose semantics foundations for defining erasure policies. A main insight behind that work is that erasure can be seen as the dual of declassification [25]. Later on, Chong and Myers [10], but also Hunt and Sands [15], propose type-systems for verifying erasure policies of the source code. Askarov et al. [4] enforce the erasure policies in the presence of so-called write-once locations which cannot be overwritten. The key insight is to store encrypted data in write-once locations and simulate erasure by the erasure of the cryptographic key. In our work, we do not consider erasure policies but ensure that program transformations do not introduce information leaks. We believe that our IFP definition has the potential to preserve such rich erasure policies. A difficulty is to specify the observation points relevant to the source property and make sure that they are preserved across compiler passes. An attacker observing all the intermediate memory states would probably suffice but may preclude too many transformations.
Yang et al. [31] provides a list of techniques used by developers to prevent compilers from removing security-sensitive dead-store instructions. They present a secure dead-store elimination transformation that has been implemented for LLVM. This transformation verifies our IFP property. Simon, Chisnall and Anderson [23] investigate how compilers may break the security of cryptographic code because it is impossible to control side-effects of compiler optimizations. They propose compiler support for constant-time selection and for the secure erasure of secrets, which improves the security of the generated code.

Besson et al. [7] pursue a goal similar to ours, i.e., preserving information flow under program optimisations. The attacker in [7] is weaker because the attacker can only observe memory at the end of the execution. By basing our attacker model on traces of observations, we obtain a model that is more realistic and closer to the intuitive notion of an attacker that probes memory at specific moments during execution. From a formal point of view, the move to a trace-based model is necessary to analyse the security of intra-procedural optimisations. In addition, we show how it is possible to combine identification and patching of leaky transformations with a solution to the problem of identifying leaks due to the duplication of data. Finally, contrary to [7], we have experimentally validated our technique by analysing and enforcing information preservation properties of passes of a realistic compiler, the CompCert C compiler.

Barthe et al. [6] propose a general framework for reasoning about the preservation of information leakage. Their approach is based on an instrumented semantics which explicitly leaks information to the attacker and which is used for deriving reasoning principles based on so-called 2-simulations. Our attacker model is stronger. As the attacker may perform arbitrary observations of memory, we quantify over the set of all leakage functions. Moreover, our reasoning principle is simpler and is sufficient to validate most transformations. Yet, it also has limitations and 2-simulations are more flexible when some leaked information of the source is gradually leaked in the target program.

**X. Conclusion**

We present a notion of Information-Flow Preservation ensuring that an attacker observing \( n \) bits of information during the run of a target program does not get an advantage over an attacker observing the same amount of bits of the source program. This is a strong property which is not tailored to a specific model of leakage but ensures that a compiler does not introduce any kind of information-flow leaks. We show that it is possible to adapt classic aggressive optimisations to this setting by inserting automatically erasing instructions before observation points. This approach has the advantage that the existing compiler code can be reused mostly unchanged. Our information-flow preservation property may prevent the spatial duplication of information using an injection between the observations of the target and source attackers. As future work, we will investigate how to characterise in the same framework both spatial and temporal duplication of data, thus modelling the lifetime of data as temporal duplication. The notion of injection is unfit for this purpose and would need to be generalised to allow up-to \( k \) duplications of the same data during the program execution. We also intend to push our security property to its limit and model an attacker observing memory at any time. Though the opportunities for optimisations will most probably be greatly reduced, we are nonetheless confident that programs can still be compiled in a reasonable manner under this stringent requirement, at the cost of some budget for temporal duplication of data.

**References**


