

On subspace trails cryptanalysis Daniel Coggia

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On subspace trails cryptanalysis

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Outline

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] The AES The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher

Case of the AES Towards a more general lemma Example on another SPN: Midori

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] The AES

The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher

The AES

NIST standard since 2001, SPN on 10 rounds, 128-bit blocks [DR02].

$$x = \begin{pmatrix} x_0 & x_4 & x_8 & x_{12} \\ x_1 & x_5 & x_9 & x_{13} \\ x_2 & x_6 & x_{10} & x_{14} \\ x_3 & x_7 & x_{11} & x_{15} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{16} \qquad \text{S-box} \begin{cases} \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \to \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \\ x_i \to y_i \end{cases}$$
$$SR(y) = \begin{pmatrix} y_0 & y_4 & y_8 & y_{12} \\ y_5 & y_9 & y_{13} & y_1 \\ y_{10} & y_{14} & y_2 & y_6 \\ y_{15} & y_3 & y_7 & y_{11} \end{pmatrix} \qquad \text{ShiftRows } SR$$
$$MC(z) = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \times z \qquad \text{MixColumns } MC$$

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] The AES

The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher

What is a distinguisher ?

Let C_k be a cipher with key k,



Distinguisher \rightarrow attack (on more rounds).

Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom at Eurocrypt 2017 [GRR17] $\rightarrow C = 5$ AES rounds.

Some definitions...

$$\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_{2^{8}} \qquad \begin{pmatrix} x_{0} & x_{4} & x_{8} & x_{12} \\ x_{1} & x_{5} & x_{9} & x_{13} \\ x_{2} & x_{6} & x_{10} & x_{14} \\ x_{3} & x_{7} & x_{11} & x_{15} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{M}_{4}(\mathbb{K}) \qquad x_{i} \in \mathbb{K}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x}_0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \mathbf{x}_1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \mathbf{x}_2 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \mathbf{x}_3 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{C}_0 \qquad \qquad \begin{array}{c} \text{Columns} \\ \mathcal{C}_i = \text{vect}_{\mathbb{K}}(e_{0,i}, e_{1,i}, e_{2,i}, e_{3,i}) \end{array}$$

 $\begin{pmatrix} 0 & x_0 & 0 & y_0 \\ 0 & x_1 & 0 & y_1 \\ 0 & x_2 & 0 & y_2 \\ 0 & x_3 & 0 & y_3 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{C}_{\{1,3\}} \qquad \begin{array}{c} I \subseteq \llbracket 0, 3 \rrbracket : \\ \mathcal{C}_I = \bigoplus_{i \in I} \mathcal{C}_i. \end{array}$

$$\begin{pmatrix} x_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x_{1} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & x_{2} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & x_{3} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{D}_{0}, \qquad \begin{array}{l} \text{Diagonals:} \\ \mathcal{D}_{i} = SR^{-1}(\mathcal{C}_{i}) \\ \\ \begin{pmatrix} x_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & x_{1} \\ 0 & 0 & x_{2} & 0 \\ 0 & x_{3} & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{ID}_{0}, \qquad \begin{array}{l} \text{Anti-diagonals:} \\ \mathcal{ID}_{i} = SR(\mathcal{C}_{i}) \\ \\ \mathcal{ID}_{i} = SR(\mathcal{C}_{i}) \\ \\ \\ x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot x_{2} & 2 \cdot x_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot x_{2} & x_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & x_{2} & x_{3} \\ \end{array} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{M}_{0}. \qquad \begin{array}{l} \text{Mixed:} \\ \mathcal{M}_{i} = MC(\mathcal{ID}_{i}) \\ \\ \end{array}$$

$$\mathcal{D}_{I} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{D}_{I} \xrightarrow{SR} \mathcal{C}_{I} \xrightarrow{MC} \mathcal{C}_{I} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{C}_{I} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{D}_{I} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{M}} \mathcal{D}_{I} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{M}} \mathcal{M}_{I}$$

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

The AES is a key-alternating blockcipher



Subspace trails

Definition ([LTW18]) We have $U \stackrel{\mathcal{F}}{\Rightarrow} V$ if $\forall a \in \mathbb{K}^N, \exists b \in \mathbb{K}^N : \mathcal{F}(U+a) \subseteq V+b$.



 $\mathcal{D}_{0} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\rightrightarrows} \mathcal{C}_{0}$ $\forall a, \forall x,$



The distinguisher Theorem ([GRR17]) Let $a \in \mathcal{M}_4(\mathbb{K}), i \in [0,3], J \subseteq [0,3]$. We define $n = \#\{ \{p^0, p^1\} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{D}_i + a) \mid \mathcal{R}^5(p^0) + \mathcal{R}^5(p^1) \in \mathcal{M}_J \}.$

Then $n \equiv 0 \mod 8$.



The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

Proof for the distinguisher

Case of the AES

Towards a more general lemma Example on another SPN: Midori

A key lemma

Lemma ([GRR17])
Let
$$a \in \mathcal{M}_4(\mathbb{K}), \ I \subset [0,3], \ J \subseteq [0,3].$$
 We define
 $n = \#\{ \{p^0, p^1\} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + a) \mid \mathcal{R}(p^0) + \mathcal{R}(p^1) \in \mathcal{D}_J \}.$

Then $n \equiv 0 \mod 8$.

$$\underbrace{\begin{array}{c}2\\ \mathcal{D}_{I} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{C}_{I} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{M}_{I} \stackrel{\mathcal{L}_{\text{Lemma}}}{\xrightarrow{\mathcal{L}}} \underbrace{\begin{array}{c}2\\ \mathcal{D}_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{C}_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{M}_{J}\end{array}}_{\mathcal{D}_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{C}_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{M}_{J}$$

Proof

In the original paper [GRR17]:

First case. First, we consider the case in which three variables are eas

$$(SR\colon\operatorname{SBos}(p^2)\oplus SR\colon\operatorname{SBos}(p^2))_{:,0}= \begin{vmatrix} \operatorname{SBos}(2\cdot x\oplus a_{0,k})\oplus\operatorname{SBos}(2\cdot x'\oplus z)\\ 0\\ 0 \end{vmatrix}$$

must be different from zero, that is all the output lytes are different from p

that is w.l.o.g. we assume for example that z = z' and w = w', while $x \neq z'$:

 $\frac{1}{1^{2} \operatorname{Note that}} \otimes \operatorname{Hos}(2 \cdot x \oplus a_{n,n}) \oplus \otimes \operatorname{Hos}(2 \cdot x' \oplus a_{n,n}) = 0$ if and only if x = x', we

$$\dot{p}^2 = a \odot \begin{bmatrix} 2 \cdot x' & y & 0 & 0 \\ x' & y & 0 & 0 \\ x' & 3 \cdot y & 0 & 0 \\ x' & 3 \cdot y & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
, $\dot{p}^2 = a \odot \begin{bmatrix} 2 \cdot x & y' & 0 & 0 \\ x & y' & 0 & 0 \\ x & 3 \cdot y' & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$

belong to the same coset of D_1 after one round. To neces this fact, it is suffici $R(p^2) = R(p^2) = R(p^2) = R(p^2).$

 $(R(p^2) \oplus R(p^2))_{kk} = 2 \cdot (S \operatorname{-lim}(2 \cdot x \oplus a_{kk}) \oplus S \operatorname{-lim}(2 \cdot x' \oplus a_{kk})) \oplus$

 $\oplus 3 \cdot (S \cdot \operatorname{Box}(y \oplus a_{1,1}) \oplus S \cdot \operatorname{Box}(y' \oplus a_{1,1})),$ $(R(p^2) \oplus R(p^2))_{1,0} = S \operatorname{Rox}(2 \cdot x \oplus a_{0,0}) \oplus S \operatorname{Rox}(2 \cdot x' \oplus a_{0,0}) \oplus$

$$R(p^2) \oplus R(p^2)(\omega) = S \operatorname{Bar}(2 \cdot x \oplus m_2) \oplus S \operatorname{Bar}(2 \cdot x' \oplus m_2) \oplus$$

 $\oplus S \operatorname{Bar}(p \oplus a_{1,1}) \oplus S \operatorname{Bar}(p' \oplus a_{1,2}).$

$$(R(p^2) \oplus R(p^2))_{2,0} = 2 \cdot (S \operatorname{Bins}(2 \cdot x \oplus a_{0,0}) \oplus S \operatorname{Bins}(2 \cdot x' \oplus a_{0,0})) \oplus (S \operatorname{Bins}(2 \cdot x' \oplus a_{0,0})) \oplus ($$

Due to the definition of p^2 and p^2 , it follows immediately that $(R|p^2) \oplus R|p^2)$

time given p^2 and p^2 as before, is it possible that x, y, x', y' exist a

$$\Re_1 \operatorname{SBac}(p^2) \oplus \operatorname{SR}_2 \operatorname{SBac}(p^2))_{,0} =$$

$$\begin{cases} \operatorname{SBac}(p \oplus a_{1,1}) \oplus \operatorname{SBac}(p) \\ \operatorname{SBac}(p \oplus a_{1,1}) \oplus \operatorname{SBac}(p) \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{cases}$$

After the MigColumns operation (note $R(a^2) \cap R(a^2) = MC(SR)$. S Bog(a²) SRo S-Bax(p²))), since two input bytes¹¹ are different from area, it follows t

Note that 8: Bre(2 $x \oplus m_2$) \oplus S:Bre(2 $x' \oplus m_2$) = 0 if and only if x = x', which are we happen for hypothesis. In the same way, 8: Bra($y \oplus a_{i,j}$) \oplus 8:Bra($y' \oplus a_{i,j}$)

This implies that the two elements if (emerated by (x, w')) and if (emera at least three output leves must be different from zero, or at most one out

with the previous conditions. Moreover, observe that $R(p^1) \oplus R(p^2) \in D_J$ for |J| = 3 if and only if 6 better (one ner column) of $R(p^1) \oplus R(p^2)$ are small to zero. Since these are 6 "fee" variables (i.e. x, y, x', y') and a system of four equations, such a syst-

 $(R(p^2) \oplus R(p^2))_{1,1} = A_0 \cdot (S \operatorname{Box}(R_0 \cdot x \oplus C_0) \oplus S \operatorname{Box}(R_0 \cdot x' \oplus C_0)) \oplus$ \odot A₂ · (S-line(B₂ · z \odot C₂) \odot S-line(B₂ · z' \odot C₂)) \odot $\cap A_i \cdot (S \operatorname{-line}(B_i \cdot w \cap C_i) \cap S \operatorname{-line}(B_i \cdot w' \cap C_i)) =$

 $=A_{n} \cdot (S \cdot Box(B_{n} \cdot x = C_{n}) = S \cdot Box(B_{n} \cdot x' = C_{n})) =$ $\cap A_1 \cdot (S \operatorname{Bas}(B_1 \cdot \psi \cap C_1) \cap S \operatorname{Bas}(B_1 \cdot \psi' \cap C_1)).$

It follows that - under the mercions hypothesis - each nair of elements of and

 $x' \oplus \cdot$ Third case. Thirdly, we consider the case in which only one variable is con-

belong after one round in the same coset of D_J for the same J of p^2 and p^2

	$[S-Box 2-x \oplus a_{0,k})$	S-Box(2 - ar)
$(SR + S \operatorname{Box}(p^2) \oplus SR + S \operatorname{Box}(p^2))_{,\pm} =$	$S \operatorname{Hun}(y \oplus a_{1,1})$ $S \operatorname{Hun}(2 \cdot z \oplus a_{2,2})$	©S-Bos(g' ⊕.4 ⊕S-Bos(2 - z')

After the MixColumns operation, since three input bytes¹² are different for

this case, the idea is to show that the difference $R(x^2) = R(x^2)$ doesn't denome

 $(R(s^2) = R(s^2))$, $\iota = A_s \cdot (S \cdot \operatorname{Res}(B_s \cdot x = C_s) = S \cdot \operatorname{Res}(B_s \cdot x' = C_s)) =$ $= A_1 \cdot (S \operatorname{Box}(R) \cdot u = C)) = S \operatorname{Box}(R) \cdot u = C))(u)$

It follows that - under the previous hypothesis - each pair of elements p¹ and

Note that $S \operatorname{Bos}(2 \circ (\neg u_x)) \otimes S \operatorname{Bos}(2 \circ (\neg u_x)) \otimes S \operatorname{Bos}(y (\neg u_x)) \otimes S \operatorname{Bo$

(x, u, x, u) and (x', u', x', u) for each possible value of u satisfy the condition

Fourth case. Fourthly, we consider the case in which all the variables

for a total of eight different pairs. As before, in order to prove this fact it sufficient to show that $B(n') = B(n') = B(n') \cap B(n')$. Moreover, as before it with all the coset of ,Mo. This implies that the number of collisions must b-

 $[S \operatorname{Box}(2 \cdot x \odot x_{a,b}) \odot S \operatorname{Box}(2 \cdot x' \odot x)]$ $(SBi \otimes Bas(p^1) \otimes SBi \otimes Bas(p^2))_{:,0} = \left| \begin{array}{c} SBis(p \otimes a_{1,1}) \otimes Seassary \otimes a_{2,2} \\ SBis(2 \cdot z \otimes a_{2,2}) \otimes SBis(2 \cdot z \otimes a_{2,2}) \end{array} \right|$ S-Busing (1 eas) in S-Boging' (1 ea

ser of variables.

⁶ Note that S Bas(2 $u \in ac_0) \otimes S Bas(2 u' \in ac_0) = S Bas(y \in ac_1) \otimes S Bas(y' \in ac_0) \otimes S Bas(u' \otimes ac_0) \otimes S Bas(u' \otimes ac_0) = S Bas(u' \otimes ac_0) \otimes S Bas(u' \otimes ac_0) = 0.0$

Our contribution starts here

- Search for the underlying property ;
- write a better proof for it to come out;
- ► generalize ?

Step 1: equivalence relation between pairs

In \mathcal{M}_0 ,

 $\left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\ x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot y_{0} & y_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\ y_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \end{pmatrix} \right\}$ $\left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot x_{0} & y_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\ x_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot y_{0} & x_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\ y_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ 3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \end{pmatrix} \right\}$

$$\left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\ x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot y_{0} & y_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\ y_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \end{pmatrix} \right\}$$

$$\left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot x_{0} & y_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\ x_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot y_{0} & x_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\ y_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ 3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \end{pmatrix} \right\}$$

Definition

Let $\{p^0, p^1\}$ a pair of states from $\mathcal{M}_I + a$. The information set K of the pair $\{p^0, p^1\}$ is $\{k \in [0,3]] \mid \exists i \in I : x_{i,k} \neq y_{i,k}\}$. It is $K = \{0,1\}$ in the example. Proof for the distinguisher Case of the AES

$$\left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\ x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot y_{0} & y_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\ y_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \end{pmatrix} \right\}$$

$$\sim \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot x_{0} & y_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\ x_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\ x_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ 3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot y_{0} & x_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\ y_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\ 3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \end{pmatrix} \right\}$$

Definition

Let $P=\{p^0,p^1\},\ Q=\{q^0,q^1\}\in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I+a).$ We have $P\sim Q$ if:

- K is the information set of $P \Rightarrow K$ is the information set of Q.
- ► $\forall k \in K, \exists b \in \{0,1\} : \forall i \in I, q_{i,k}^0 = p_{i,k}^b \text{ et } q_{i,k}^1 = p_{i,k}^{1-b}.$

~ is an equivalence relation on $\mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + a)$.

Lemma The function

$$\begin{array}{rcl} f: & \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I+a) & \longrightarrow & \mathcal{M}_4(\mathbb{K}) \\ & & \{p^0,p^1\} & \longmapsto & \mathcal{R}(p^0)+\mathcal{R}(p^1) \end{array}$$

is constant on the equivalence classes of \sim .

Proposition

Let \mathfrak{C} be an equivalence class K. Then

$$\#\mathfrak{C} = 2^{|K| - 1 + 8|I|(4 - |K|)} \equiv 0 \mod 8.$$

Lemma If $n = \#\{ \{p^0, p^1\} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + a) \mid \mathcal{R}(p^0) + \mathcal{R}(p^1) \in \mathcal{D}_J \},$ then $n \equiv 0 \mod 8$.

Proof.

$$n = \#f^{-1}(\mathcal{D}_J)$$

$$= \sum_{\mathfrak{C} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + \mathfrak{a}) / \sim} \#(f^{-1}(\mathcal{D}_J) \cap \mathfrak{C})$$

$$= \sum_{\mathfrak{C} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + \mathfrak{a}) / \sim} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D}_J} \#\mathfrak{C}$$

$$\equiv 0 \mod 8$$

21/ 30

What about the branch number ?

In [GRR17], the proof needs maximal branch number. But...

Proposition ([GRR16]) Let $I, J \subseteq [0,3]$ and b be the differential branch number of MC. Then

$$|I| + |J| < \mathbf{b} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \mathcal{D}_I \cap \mathcal{M}_J = \{\mathbf{0}\}$$

If $\{p^0, p^1\} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + a)$ has information set K,

$$p^0+p^1\in \mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{K}}$$
 and then $\mathcal{R}(p^0)+\mathcal{R}(p^1)\in \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{K}}.$

 $\mathsf{If}\; |\mathcal{K}| < \underline{\textit{b}} - |J|, \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{K}} \cap \mathcal{D}_J = \{0\} \; \mathsf{and} \; \mathcal{R}(p^0) + \mathcal{R}(p^1) \not\in \mathcal{D}_J.$

Lemma If $n = \#\{ \{p^0, p^1\} \in \mathcal{P}^2(\mathcal{M}_I + a) \mid \mathcal{R}(p^0) + \mathcal{R}(p^1) \in \mathcal{D}_J \},$ then $n \equiv 0 \mod 8$.

Proof.

$$n = \sum_{\mathfrak{C} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}(\mathcal{M}_{I}+a) / \sim} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}} \# \mathfrak{C}$$
$$= \sum_{h=0}^{4} \sum_{\mathfrak{C} : |K(\mathfrak{C})|=h} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}} \# \mathfrak{C}$$
$$= \sum_{h=b-|J|}^{4} \sum_{\mathfrak{C} : |K(\mathfrak{C})|=h} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}} \# \mathfrak{C}$$

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

Proof for the distinguisher

Case of the AES Towards a more general lemma Example on another SPN: Midori

Definition

Let $V \subseteq \mathbb{K}^N$ be a \mathbb{K} -subspace. We say V is compatible with S if it has a basis g such that its matrix in basis f is of the form:





3 2 1 \mathcal{M}_0 is compatible with \mathcal{S}_{AES} . Likewise, $\mathcal{M}_0 \cap \mathcal{C}_{0,1}$ is compatible with \mathcal{S}_{AES} .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 2 \cdot \mathbf{x}_0 & \mathbf{x}_1 & 0 & 0 \\ \mathbf{x}_0 & \mathbf{x}_1 & 0 & 0 \\ \mathbf{x}_0 & 3 \cdot \mathbf{x}_1 & 0 & 0 \\ 3 \cdot \mathbf{x}_0 & 2 \cdot \mathbf{x}_1 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{M}_0 \cap \mathcal{C}_{0,1}.$$

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

Proof for the distinguisher

Case of the AES Towards a more general lemma Example on another SPN: Midori

Midori

Midori, presented at Asiacrypt 2015 [BBI+15]. Goal: low energy consumption.

- $\mathcal{R} : \mathbb{F}_2^{128} \to \mathbb{F}_2^{128}$ • S-box: $\mathbb{F}_{2^8} \to \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ • $\mathcal{L} :$
 - ShuffleCell SC (more complex ShiftRows)
 - MixColumns MC

$$M_{MC} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\overbrace{\mathcal{D}'_{I} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{C}_{I} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{M}'_{I}}^{2} \stackrel{\text{Genaralized Lemma}}{\longrightarrow} \overbrace{\mathcal{D}'_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{C}_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{M}'_{J}}^{2}$$

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] The AES The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher

Case of the AES Towards a more general lemma Example on another SPN: Midori

What now ?

- The generalization can be useful (the distinguisher can be easily transposed) but cannot give better results!
- ▶ Working on subspace trails [LTW18].

$$\underbrace{\begin{array}{c}2\\\mathcal{D}_{I}^{\prime} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\rightrightarrows} \mathcal{C}_{I} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\rightrightarrows} \mathcal{M}_{I}^{\prime} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} \mathcal{G}enaralized \ Lemma}{\begin{array}{c} \mathcal{G}enaralized \ Lemma} \end{array}}_{\mathcal{P} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\longrightarrow} \mathcal{D}_{J}^{\prime} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\rightrightarrows} \mathcal{C}_{J} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\rightrightarrows} \mathcal{M}_{J}^{\prime}$$

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