# On subspace trails cryptanalysis 

Daniel Coggia

## To cite this version:

Daniel Coggia. On subspace trails cryptanalysis. JC2 2018 - Journées Codage et Cryptographie, Oct 2018, Aussois, France. hal-01960306

HAL Id: hal-01960306
https://inria.hal.science/hal-01960306
Submitted on 19 Dec 2018

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

# On subspace trails cryptanalysis 

Daniel Coggia<br>Inria Paris, Project Team SECRET

October 8, 2018

## Outline

The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]
The AES
The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher
Case of the AES
Towards a more general lemma
Example on another SPN: Midori

Conclusion

# The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] 

The AES
The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher

Conclusion

## The AES

NIST standard since 2001, SPN on 10 rounds, 128-bit blocks [DR02].

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
x=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
x_{0} & x_{4} & x_{8} & x_{12} \\
x_{1} & x_{5} & x_{9} & x_{13} \\
x_{2} & x_{6} & x_{10} & x_{14} \\
x_{3} & x_{7} & x_{11} & x_{15}
\end{array}\right) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{8}}^{16} \\
S R(y)=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\mathbb{F}_{2^{8}} & \rightarrow & \mathbb{F}_{2^{8}} \\
x_{i} & \mapsto & y_{i}
\end{array}\right. \\
\left.\begin{array}{ccccc}
y_{0} & y_{4} & y_{8} & y_{12} \\
y_{5} & y_{9} & y_{13} & y_{1} \\
y_{10} & y_{14} & y_{2} & y_{6} \\
y_{15} & y_{3} & y_{7} & y_{11}
\end{array}\right) & \text { S-box } \\
M C(z)=\left(\begin{array}{llll}
2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
3 & 1 & 1 & 2
\end{array}\right) \times z & \text { ShiftRows } S R \\
\text { MixColumns } M C
\end{array}
$$

# The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17] 

The AES
The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

## Proof for the distinguisher

## What is a distinguisher?

Let $C_{k}$ be a cipher with key $k$,


Distinguisher $\rightarrow$ attack (on more rounds).
Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom at Eurocrypt 2017 [GRR17] $\rightarrow C=5$ AES rounds.

## Some definitions...

$$
\begin{gathered}
\mathbb{K}=\mathbb{F}_{2^{8}}\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
x_{0} & x_{4} & x_{8} & x_{12} \\
x_{1} & x_{5} & x_{9} & x_{13} \\
x_{2} & x_{6} & x_{10} & x_{14} \\
x_{3} & x_{7} & x_{11} & x_{15}
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{M}_{4}(\mathbb{K}) \quad x_{i} \in \mathbb{K} \\
\left(\begin{array}{llll}
x_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
x_{1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
x_{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
x_{3} & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{C}_{0} \\
\begin{array}{lll} 
& \begin{array}{l}
\mathcal{C}_{i}=\operatorname{vect}_{\mathbb{K}}\left(e_{0, i}, e_{1, i}, e_{2, i}, e_{3, i}\right)
\end{array} \\
\left(\begin{array}{llll}
0 & x_{0} & 0 & y_{0} \\
0 & x_{1} & 0 & y_{1} \\
0 & x_{2} & 0 & y_{2} \\
0 & x_{3} & 0 & y_{3}
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{C}_{\{1,3\}} & \begin{array}{l}
I \subseteq \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket: \\
\mathcal{C}_{I}=\bigoplus_{i \in I} \mathcal{C}_{i} .
\end{array}
\end{array}
\end{gathered}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\begin{array}{cccc}
x_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & x_{1} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & x_{2} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & x_{3}
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{D}_{0}, \\
& \left(\begin{array}{cccc}
x_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & x_{1} \\
0 & 0 & x_{2} & 0 \\
0 & x_{3} & 0 & 0
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{I} \mathcal{D}_{0}, \\
& \text { Diagonals: } \\
& \mathcal{D}_{i}=S R^{-1}\left(\mathcal{C}_{i}\right) \\
& \text { Anti-diagonals: } \\
& \mathcal{I D}_{i}=\operatorname{SR}\left(\mathcal{C}_{i}\right) \\
& \left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & x_{2} & 3 \cdot x_{3} \\
x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot x_{2} & 2 \cdot x_{3} \\
x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot x_{2} & x_{3} \\
3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & x_{2} & x_{3}
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{M}_{0} . \quad \begin{array}{l}
\text { Mixed: } \\
\mathcal{M}_{i}=M C\left(\mathcal{I D}_{i}\right)
\end{array} \\
& \mathcal{D}_{1} \overbrace{\xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{D}_{1} \xrightarrow{S R} \mathcal{C}_{1} \xrightarrow{M C}}^{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{C}_{1} \overbrace{\xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{C}_{1} \xrightarrow{S R} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{D}_{1} \xrightarrow{M C}}^{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{M}_{1}
\end{aligned}
$$

## The AES is a key-alternating blockcipher



## Subspace trails

## Definition ([LTW18])

We have $U \stackrel{\mathcal{F}}{\rightrightarrows} V$ if $\forall a \in \mathbb{K}^{N}, \exists b \in \mathbb{K}^{N}: \mathcal{F}(U+a) \subseteq V+b$.

$\mathcal{D}_{0} \stackrel{\mathcal{R}}{\rightrightarrows} \mathcal{C}_{0}$
$\forall a, \forall x$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\begin{array}{cccc}
x_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & x_{1} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & x_{2} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & x_{3}
\end{array}\right) \xrightarrow{+a}\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
x_{0}+a_{0} & * & * & * \\
* & x_{1}+a_{1} & * & * \\
* & * & x_{2}+a_{2} & * \\
* & * & * & x_{3}+a_{3}
\end{array}\right) \\
& \xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}}\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
y_{0} & * & * & * \\
* & y_{1} & * & * \\
* & * & y_{2} & * \\
* & * & * & y_{3}
\end{array}\right) \xrightarrow{S R}\left(\begin{array}{llll}
y_{0} & * & * & * \\
y_{1} & * & * & * \\
y_{2} & * & * & * \\
y_{3} & * & * & *
\end{array}\right) \\
& \xrightarrow{M C}\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\vdots & * & * & * \\
\vdots & * & * & * \\
M C(y) & * & * & * \\
\vdots & * & * & *
\end{array}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

The distinguisher
Theorem ([GRR17])
Let $a \in \mathcal{M}_{4}(\mathbb{K}), i \in \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket, J \subseteq \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket$. We define

$$
n=\#\left\{\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{D}_{i}+a\right) \mid \mathcal{R}^{5}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}^{5}\left(p^{1}\right) \in \mathcal{M}_{j}\right\} .
$$

Then $n \equiv 0 \bmod 8$.


## The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

Proof for the distinguisher
Case of the AES
Towards a more general lemma
Example on another SPN: Midori

## A key lemma

Lemma ([GRR17])
Let $a \in \mathcal{M}_{4}(\mathbb{K}), I \subset \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket, J \subseteq \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket$. We define

$$
n=\#\left\{\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{1}+a\right) \mid \mathcal{R}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}\left(p^{1}\right) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}\right\} .
$$

Then $n \equiv 0 \bmod 8$.


## Proof

## In the original paper [GRR17]:










 come


 vith an the cout of $\mathcal{M}_{2}$. Thit mingian that the rumber of olliemine must b

$\qquad$






## Our contribution starts here

- Search for the underlying property ;
- write a better proof for it to come out;
- generalize?


## Step 1: equivalence relation between pairs

In $\mathcal{M}_{0}$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left\{\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\
x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\
x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\
3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3}
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot y_{0} & y_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\
y_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\
y_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\
3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3}
\end{array}\right)\right\} \\
\sim
\end{gathered}
$$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left\{\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\
x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\
x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\
3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3}
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot y_{0} & y_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\
y_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\
y_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\
3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3}
\end{array}\right)\right\} \\
\sim
\end{gathered}
$$

## Definition

Let $\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\}$ a pair of states from $\mathcal{M}_{I}+a$. The information set $K$ of the pair $\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\}$ is $\left\{k \in \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket \mid \exists i \in I: x_{i, k} \neq y_{i, k}\right\}$.
It is $K=\{0,1\}$ in the example.

$$
\left\{\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\
x_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\
x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\
3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3}
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot y_{0} & y_{1} & z_{2} & 3 \cdot z_{3} \\
y_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot z_{2} & 2 \cdot z_{3} \\
y_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot z_{2} & z_{3} \\
3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & z_{2} & z_{3}
\end{array}\right)\right\}
$$

$$
\left\{\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot x_{0} & y_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\
x_{0} & y_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\
x_{0} & 3 \cdot y_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\
3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot y_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3}
\end{array}\right),\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot y_{0} & x_{1} & w_{2} & 3 \cdot w_{3} \\
y_{0} & x_{1} & 3 \cdot w_{2} & 2 \cdot w_{3} \\
y_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 2 \cdot w_{2} & w_{3} \\
3 \cdot y_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3}
\end{array}\right)\right\}
$$

## Definition

Let $P=\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\}, Q=\left\{q^{0}, q^{1}\right\} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{l}+a\right)$. We have $P \sim Q$ if:

- $K$ is the information set of $P \Rightarrow K$ is the information set of $Q$.
- $\forall k \in K, \exists b \in\{0,1\}: \forall i \in I, q_{i, k}^{0}=p_{i, k}^{b}$ et $q_{i, k}^{1}=p_{i, k}^{1-b}$.
$\sim$ is an equivalence relation on $\mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{I}+a\right)$.

Lemma
The function

$$
\begin{aligned}
f: \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{1}+a\right) & \longrightarrow \mathcal{M}_{4}(\mathbb{K}) \\
\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\} & \longmapsto \mathcal{R}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}\left(p^{1}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

is constant on the equivalence classes of $\sim$.

## Proposition

Let $\mathfrak{C}$ be an equivalence class $K$. Then

$$
\# \mathfrak{C}=2^{|K|-1+8|I|(4-|K|)} \equiv 0 \quad \bmod 8
$$

Lemma
If

$$
n=\#\left\{\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{I}+a\right) \mid \mathcal{R}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}\left(p^{1}\right) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}\right\}
$$

then $n \equiv 0 \bmod 8$.
Proof.

$$
\begin{aligned}
n & =\# f^{-1}\left(\mathcal{D}_{J}\right) \\
& =\sum_{\mathfrak{C} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{l}+a\right) / \sim} \#\left(f^{-1}\left(\mathcal{D}_{J}\right) \cap \mathfrak{C}\right) \\
& =\sum_{\mathfrak{C} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{l}+a\right) / \sim} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}} \# \mathfrak{C} \\
& \equiv 0 \bmod 8
\end{aligned}
$$

## What about the branch number?

In [GRR17], the proof needs maximal branch number. But...

Proposition ([GRR16])
Let $I, J \subseteq \llbracket 0,3 \rrbracket$ and $b$ be the differential branch number of MC. Then

$$
|I|+|J|<b \quad \Rightarrow \quad \mathcal{D}_{I} \cap \mathcal{M}_{J}=\{0\}
$$

If $\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{l}+a\right)$ has information set $K$,

$$
p^{0}+p^{1} \in \mathcal{C}_{K} \text { and then } \mathcal{R}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}\left(p^{1}\right) \in \mathcal{M}_{K} .
$$

If $|K|<b-|J|, \mathcal{M}_{K} \cap \mathcal{D}_{J}=\{0\}$ and $\mathcal{R}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}\left(p^{1}\right) \notin \mathcal{D}_{J}$.

Lemma
If

$$
n=\#\left\{\left\{p^{0}, p^{1}\right\} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{l}+a\right) \mid \mathcal{R}\left(p^{0}\right)+\mathcal{R}\left(p^{1}\right) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}\right\},
$$

then $n \equiv 0 \bmod 8$.
Proof.

$$
\begin{aligned}
n & =\sum_{\mathfrak{C} \in \mathcal{P}^{2}\left(\mathcal{M}_{l}+a\right) / \sim} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D} J} \# \mathfrak{C} \\
& =\sum_{h=0}^{4} \sum_{\mathfrak{C}:|K(\mathfrak{C})|=h} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D} J} \# \mathfrak{C} \\
& =\sum_{h=b-|J|}^{4} \sum_{\mathfrak{C}:|K(\mathfrak{C})|=h} 1_{\tilde{f}(\mathfrak{C}) \in \mathcal{D}_{J}} \# \mathfrak{C}
\end{aligned}
$$

## The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

Proof for the distinguisher

## Case of the AES

Towards a more general lemma
Example on another SPN: Midori

## Definition

Let $V \subseteq \mathbb{K}^{N}$ be a $\mathbb{K}$-subspace. We say $V$ is compatible with $\mathcal{S}$ if it has a basis $g$ such that its matrix in basis $f$ is of the form:
$\left(\begin{array}{ccccccccc}* & \cdots & * & & & & & & \\ \vdots & \lambda_{0, \ell, i} & \vdots & & 0 & & & 0 & \\ * & \cdots & * & & & & & & \\ & & & * & \cdots & * & & & \\ & 0 & & \vdots & \lambda_{k, \ell, i} & \vdots & & 0 & \\ & & & * & \cdots & * & & & \\ & & & & & & * & \cdots & * \\ & 0 & & & 0 & & \vdots & \lambda_{h-1, \ell, i} & \vdots \\ & & & & & & * & \cdots & * \\ & \uparrow & & & 0 & & & 0 & \\ & & & & \\ & g_{0, i} & & & g_{k, i} & & & g_{h-1, i} & \end{array}\right)$
$\mathcal{M}_{0}$ is compatible with $\mathcal{S}_{\text {AES }}$.
Likewise, $\mathcal{M}_{0} \cap \mathcal{C}_{0,1}$ is compatible with $\mathcal{S}_{A E S}$.

$$
\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
2 \cdot x_{0} & x_{1} & 0 & 0 \\
x_{0} & x_{1} & 0 & 0 \\
x_{0} & 3 \cdot x_{1} & 0 & 0 \\
3 \cdot x_{0} & 2 \cdot x_{1} & 0 & 0
\end{array}\right) \in \mathcal{M}_{0} \cap \mathcal{C}_{0,1} .
$$

## The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

Proof for the distinguisher
Case of the AES
Towards a more general lemma
Example on another SPN: Midori

## Midori

Midori, presented at Asiacrypt 2015 [ $\left.\mathrm{BBI}^{+} 15\right]$. Goal: low energy consumption.

- $\mathcal{R}: \mathbb{F}_{2}^{128} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2}^{128}$
- S-box: $\mathbb{F}_{2^{8}} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^{8}}$
- $\mathcal{L}$ :
- ShuffleCell SC (more complex ShiftRows)
- MixColumns MC

$$
M_{M C}=\left(\begin{array}{llll}
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{array}\right)
$$



## The AES and the distinguisher of [GRR17]

The AES
The distinguisher of Grassi, Rechberger and Rønjom

Proof for the distinguisher
Case of the AES
Towards a more general lemma
Example on another SPN: Midori

Conclusion

## What now?

- The generalization can be useful (the distinguisher can be easily transposed) but cannot give better results!
- Working on subspace trails [LTW18].


围 S．Banik，A．Bogdanov，T．Isobe，K．Shibutani，H．Hiwatari，and
T．Akishita．
Midori：A block cipher for low energy．
In ASIACRYPT 2015 （2），pages 411 －436， 2015.
囦 J．Daemen and V．Rijmen．
The Design of Rijndael：AES－The Advanced Encryption Standard．
Springer， 2002.
L．Grassi，C．Rechberger，and S．Rønjom．
Subspace trail cryptanalysis and its applications to AES．
IACR Trans．Symmetric Cryptol．，2016（2）：192－225， 2016.
L．Grassi，C．Rechberger，and S．Rønjom．
A new structural－differential property of 5－round AES．
In EUROCRYPT 2017，Part II，volume 10211 of LNCS，pages 289－317．Springer， 2017.
围 G．Leander，C．Tezcan，and F．Wiemer．
Searching for subspace trails and truncated differentials．

## Conclusion

IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol., 2018(1):74-100, 2018.

