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► **To cite this version:**

Xavier Vilajosana, Kris Pister, Thomas Watteyne. Minimal IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) Configuration. Internet Engineering Task Force RFC series, 2017, RFC8180. hal-01531205

HAL Id: hal-01531205

<https://inria.hal.science/hal-01531205>

Submitted on 1 Jun 2017

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Request for Comments: 8180
BCP: 210
Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721

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May 2017

Minimal IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) Configuration

Abstract

This document describes a minimal mode of operation for an IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) network. This minimal mode of operation specifies the baseline set of protocols that need to be supported and the recommended configurations and modes of operation sufficient to enable a 6TiSCH functional network. 6TiSCH provides IPv6 connectivity over a Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mesh composed of IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH links. This minimal mode uses a collection of protocols with the respective configurations, including the IPv6 Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) framework, enabling interoperable IPv6 connectivity over IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH. This minimal configuration provides the necessary bandwidth for network and security bootstrapping and defines the proper link between the IETF protocols that interface to IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH. This minimal mode of operation should be implemented by all 6TiSCH-compliant devices.

Status of This Memo

This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on BCPs is available in [Section 2 of RFC 7841](#).

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8180>.

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1. Introduction

A 6TiSCH network provides IPv6 connectivity [RFC2460] over a Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mesh [RFC7554] composed of IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH links [IEEE.802.15.4]. IPv6 connectivity is obtained by the use of the 6LoWPAN framework ([RFC4944], [RFC6282], [RFC8025],[RFC8138], and [RFC6775]), RPL [RFC6550], and the RPL Objective Function 0 (OF0) [RFC6552].

This specification defines operational parameters and procedures for a minimal mode of operation to build a 6TiSCH network. Any 6TiSCH-compliant device should implement this mode of operation. This operational parameter configuration provides the necessary bandwidth for nodes to bootstrap the network. The bootstrap process includes initial network configuration and security bootstrapping. In this specification, the 802.15.4 TSCH mode, the 6LoWPAN framework, RPL [RFC6550], and the RPL Objective Function 0 (OF0) [RFC6552] are used unmodified. Parameters and particular operations of TSCH are specified to guarantee interoperability between nodes in a 6TiSCH network.

In a 6TiSCH network, nodes follow a communication schedule as per 802.15.4 TSCH. Nodes learn the communication schedule upon joining the network. When following this specification, the learned schedule is the same for all nodes and does not change over time. Future specifications may define mechanisms for dynamically managing the communication schedule. Dynamic scheduling solutions are out of scope of this document.

IPv6 addressing and compression are achieved by the 6LoWPAN framework. The framework includes [RFC4944], [RFC6282], [RFC8025], the 6LoWPAN Routing Header dispatch [RFC8138] for addressing and header compression, and [RFC6775] for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) and address resolution.

More advanced work is expected in the future to complement the minimal configuration with dynamic operations that can adapt the schedule to the needs of the traffic at run time.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

This document uses terminology from [[TERMS-6TiSCH](#)]. The following concepts are used in this document:

802.15.4: We use "802.15.4" as a short version of "IEEE Std 802.15.4" in this document.

SFD: Start of Frame Delimiter

RX: Reception

TX: Transmission

IE: Information Element

EB: Enhanced Beacon

ASN: Absolute Slot Number

Join Metric: Field in the TSCH Synchronization IE representing the topological distance between the node sending the EB and the PAN coordinator.

PAN: Personal Area Network

MLME: MAC Layer Management Entity

4. IEEE Std 802.15.4 Settings

An implementation compliant with this specification MUST implement IEEE Std 802.15.4 [[IEEE.802.15.4](#)] in Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode.

The remainder of this section details the RECOMMENDED TSCH settings, which are summarized in Figure 1. Any of the properties marked in the EB column are announced in the EBs the nodes send [[IEEE.802.15.4](#)] and learned by those joining the network. Changing their value means changing the contents of the EB.

In case of discrepancy between the values in this specification and IEEE Std 802.15.4 [[IEEE.802.15.4](#)], the IEEE standard has precedence.

Property	Recommended Setting	EB*
Slotframe Size	Tunable. Trades off bandwidth against energy.	X
Number of scheduled cells** (active)	1 Timeslot 0x0000 Channel Offset 0x0000 Link Options = (TX Link = 1, RX Link = 1, Shared Link = 1, Timekeeping = 1)	X
Number of unscheduled cells (off)	All remaining cells in the slotframe.	X
Max Number MAC retransmissions	3 (4 transmission attempts)	
Timeslot template	IEEE Std 802.15.4 default (macTimeslotTemplateId=0)	X
Enhanced Beacon Period (EB_PERIOD)	Tunable. Trades off join time against energy.	
Number used frequencies (2.4 GHz O-QPSK PHY)	IEEE Std 802.15.4 default (16)	X
Channel Hopping sequence (2.4 GHz O-QPSK PHY)	IEEE Std 802.15.4 default (macHoppingSequenceID = 0)	X

* An "X" in this column means this property's value is announced in the EB; hence, a new node learns it when joining.

** This cell LinkType is set to ADVERTISING.


Figure 1: Recommended IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH Settings

4.1. TSCH Schedule

This minimal mode of operation uses a single slotframe. The TSCH slotframe is composed of a tunable number of timeslots. The slotframe size (i.e., the number of timeslots it contains) trades off bandwidth for energy consumption. The slotframe size needs to be tuned; the way of tuning it is out of scope of this specification. The slotframe size is announced in the EB. The RECOMMENDED value for the slotframe handle (macSlotframeHandle) is 0x00. An implementation MAY choose to use a different slotframe handle, for example, to add other slotframes with higher priority. The use of other slotframes is out of the scope of this document.

There is only a single scheduled cell in the slotframe. This cell MAY be scheduled at any slotOffset/channelOffset within the slotframe. The location of that cell in the schedule is announced in the EB. The LinkType of the scheduled cell is ADVERTISING to allow EBs to be sent on it.

Figure 2 shows an example of a slotframe of length 101 timeslots, resulting in a radio duty cycle below 0.99%.



EB: Enhanced Beacon

Tx: Transmit

Rx: Receive

S: Shared

OFF: Unscheduled by this specification

Figure 2: Example Slotframe of Length 101 Timeslots

A node MAY use the scheduled cell to transmit/receive all types of link-layer frames. EBs are sent to the link-layer broadcast address and are not acknowledged. Data frames are sent unicast and are acknowledged by the receiving neighbor.

All remaining cells in the slotframe are unscheduled. Dynamic scheduling solutions may be defined in the future that schedule those cells. One example is the 6top Protocol (6P) [PROTO-6P]. Dynamic scheduling solutions are out of scope of this document.

The default values of the TSCH timeslot template (defined in Section 8.4.2.2.3 of [IEEE.802.15.4]) and channel hopping sequence (defined in Section 6.2.10 of [IEEE.802.15.4]) SHOULD be used. A node MAY use different values by properly announcing them in its EB.

4.2. Cell Options

In the scheduled cell, a node transmits if there is a packet to transmit and listens otherwise (both "TX" and "RX" bits are set). When a node transmits, requesting a link-layer acknowledgment per [IEEE.802.15.4], and does not receive the requested acknowledgement, it uses a back-off mechanism to resolve possible collisions ("Shared" bit is set). A node joining the network maintains time synchronization to its initial time-source neighbor using that cell ("Timekeeping" bit is set).

This translates into a Link Option for this cell:

```
b0 = TX Link = 1 (set)
b1 = RX Link = 1 (set)
b2 = Shared Link = 1 (set)
b3 = Timekeeping = 1 (set)
b4 = Priority = 0 (clear)
b5-b7 = Reserved = 0 (clear)
```

4.3. Retransmissions

Per Figure 1, the RECOMMENDED maximum number of link-layer retransmissions is 3. This means that, for packets requiring an acknowledgment, if none are received after a total of 4 attempts, the transmission is considered failed and the link layer MUST notify the upper layer. Packets not requiring an acknowledgment (including EBs) are not retransmitted.

4.4. Timeslot Timing

Per Figure 1, the RECOMMENDED timeslot template is the default one (macTimeslotTemplateId=0) defined in [IEEE.802.15.4].

4.5. Frame Contents

[IEEE.802.15.4] defines the format of frames. Through a set of flags, [IEEE.802.15.4] allows for several fields to be present (or not), to have different lengths, and to have different values. This specification details the RECOMMENDED contents of 802.15.4 frames, while strictly complying with [IEEE.802.15.4].

4.5.1. IEEE Std 802.15.4 Header

The Frame Version field MUST be set to 0b10 (Frame Version 2). The Sequence Number field MAY be elided.

The EB Destination Address field MUST be set to 0xFFFF (short broadcast address). The EB Source Address field SHOULD be set as the node's short address if this is supported. Otherwise, the long address MUST be used.

The PAN ID Compression bit SHOULD indicate that the Source PAN ID is "Not Present" and the Destination PAN ID is "Present". The value of the PAN ID Compression bit is specified in Table 7-2 of the IEEE Std 802.15.4-2015 specification and depends on the type of the destination and source link-layer addresses (e.g., short, extended, not present).

Nodes follow the reception and rejection rules as per Section 6.7.2 of [IEEE.802.15.4].

The nonce is formatted according to [IEEE.802.15.4]. In the IEEE Std 802.15.4 specification [IEEE.802.15.4], nonce generation is described in Section 9.3.2.2, and byte ordering is described in Section 9.3.1, Annex B.2, and Annex B.2.2.

4.5.2. Enhanced Beacon Frame

After booting, a TSCH node starts in an unsynchronized, unjoined state. Initial synchronization is achieved by listening for EBs. EBs from multiple networks may be heard. Many mechanisms exist for discrimination between networks, the details of which are out of scope.

The IEEE Std 802.15.4 specification does not define how often EBs are sent, nor their contents [IEEE.802.15.4]. In a minimal TSCH configuration, a node SHOULD send an EB every EB_PERIOD. Tuning EB_PERIOD allows a trade-off between joining time and energy consumption.

EBs should be used to obtain information about local networks and to synchronize ASN and time offset of the specific network that the node decides to join. Once joined to a particular network, a node MAY choose to continue to listen for EBs, to gather more information about other networks, for example. During the joining process, before secure connections to time parents have been created, a node MAY maintain synchronization using EBs. [RFC7554] discusses different time synchronization approaches.

The IEEE Std 802.15.4 specification requires EBs to be sent in order to enable nodes to join the network. The EBs SHOULD carry the Information Elements (IEs) listed below [IEEE.802.15.4].

TSCH Synchronization IE: Contains synchronization information such as ASN and Join Metric. The value of the Join Metric field is discussed in [Section 6.1](#).

TSCH Timeslot IE: Contains the timeslot template identifier. This template is used to specify the internal timing of the timeslot. This specification RECOMMENDS the default timeslot template.

Channel Hopping IE: Contains the channel hopping sequence identifier. This specification RECOMMENDS the default channel hopping sequence.

TSCH Slotframe and Link IE: Enables joining nodes to learn the initial schedule to be used as they join the network. This document RECOMMENDS the use of a single cell.

If a node strictly follows the recommended setting from Figure 1, the EB it sends has the exact same contents as an EB it received when joining, except for the Join Metric field in the TSCH Synchronization IE.

When a node has already joined a network (i.e., it has received an EB) synchronized to the EB sender and configured its schedule following this specification, the node SHOULD ignore subsequent EBs that try to change the configured parameters. This does not preclude listening to EBs from other networks.

4.5.3. Acknowledgment Frame

Per [[IEEE.802.15.4](#)], each acknowledgment contains an ACK/NACK Time Correction IE.

4.6. Link-Layer Security

When securing link-layer frames, link-layer frames MUST be secured by the link-layer security mechanisms defined in IEEE Std 802.15.4 [[IEEE.802.15.4](#)]. Link-layer authentication MUST be applied to the entire frame, including the 802.15.4 header. Link-layer encryption MAY be applied to 802.15.4 Payload IEs and the 802.15.4 payload.

This specification assumes the existence of two cryptographic keys:

Key K1 is used to authenticate EBs. EBs MUST be authenticated only (no encryption); their contents are defined in [Section 4.5.2](#).

Key K2 is used to authenticate and encrypt DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT frames.

These keys can be pre-configured or learned during a key distribution phase. Key distribution mechanisms are defined, for example, in [SEC-6TISCH] and [SEC-JOIN-6TISCH]. Key distribution is out of scope of this document.

The behavior of a Joining Node (JN) is different depending on which key(s) are pre-configured:

If both keys K1 and K2 are pre-configured, the JN does not rely on a key distribution phase to learn K1 or K2.

If key K1 is pre-configured but not key K2, the JN authenticates EBs using K1 and relies on the key distribution phase to learn K2.

If neither key K1 nor key K2 is pre-configured, the JN accepts EBs as defined in Section 6.3.1.2 of IEEE Std 802.15.4 [IEEE.802.15.4], i.e., they are passed forward even "if the status of the unsecuring process indicated an error". The JN then runs the key distribution phase to learn K1 and K2. During that process, the node that JN is talking to uses the secExempt mechanism (see Section 9.2.4 of [IEEE.802.15.4]) to process frames from JN. Once the key distribution phase is done, the node that has installed secExempts for the JN MUST clear the installed exception rules.

In the event of a network reset, the new network MUST either use new cryptographic keys or ensure that the ASN remains monotonically increasing.

5. RPL Settings

In a multi-hop topology, the RPL routing protocol [RFC6550] MAY be used.

5.1. Objective Function

If RPL is used, nodes MUST implement the RPL Objective Function Zero (OF0) [RFC6552].

5.1.1. Rank Computation

The Rank computation is described in Section 4.1 of [RFC6552]. A node's Rank (see Figure 4 for an example) is computed by the following equations:

$$R(N) = R(P) + \text{rank_increment}$$

$$\text{rank_increment} = (R_f * S_p + S_r) * \text{MinHopRankIncrease}$$

Figure 3 lists the OF0 parameter values that MUST be used if RPL is used.

OF0 Parameters	Value
Rf	1
Sp	$(3 * ETX) - 2$
Sr	0
MinHopRankIncrease	DEFAULT_MIN_HOP_RANK_INCREASE (256)
MINIMUM_STEP_OF_RANK	1
MAXIMUM_STEP_OF_RANK	9
ETX limit to select a parent	3

Figure 3: OF0 Parameters

The `step_of_rank` (Sp) uses the Expected Transmission Count (ETX) [RFC6551].

An implementation MUST follow OF0's normalization guidance as discussed in Sections 1 and 4.1 of [RFC6552]. Sp SHOULD be calculated as $(3 * ETX) - 2$. The minimum value of Sp (MINIMUM_STEP_OF_RANK) indicates a good quality link. The maximum value of Sp (MAXIMUM_STEP_OF_RANK) indicates a poor quality link. The default value of Sp (DEFAULT_STEP_OF_RANK) indicates an average quality link. Candidate parents with ETX greater than 3 SHOULD NOT be selected. This avoids having ETX values on used links that are larger than the maximum allowed transmission attempts.

5.1.2. Rank Computation Example

This section illustrates the use of OF0 (see Figure 4). We have:

$$\text{rank_increment} = ((3 * \text{numTx} / \text{numTxAck}) - 2) * \text{minHopRankIncrease} = 512$$




Figure 4: Rank computation example for a 5-hop network where numTx=100 and numTxAck=75 for all links.

5.2. Mode of Operation

When RPL is used, nodes MUST implement the non-storing mode of operation (see [Section 9.7 of \[RFC6550\]](#)). The storing mode of operation (see [Section 9.8 of \[RFC6550\]](#)) SHOULD be implemented by nodes with enough capabilities. Nodes not implementing RPL MUST join as leaf nodes.

5.3. Trickle Timer

RPL signaling messages such as DODAG Information Objects (DIOs) are sent using the Trickle algorithm (see [Section 8.3.1 of \[RFC6550\]](#) and [Section 4.2 of \[RFC6206\]](#)). For this specification, the Trickle timer MUST be used with the RPL-defined default values (see [Section 8.3.1 of \[RFC6550\]](#)).

5.4. Packet Contents

RPL information and hop-by-hop extension headers MUST follow [\[RFC6553\]](#) and [\[RFC6554\]](#). For cases in which the packets formed at the Low-Power and Lossy Network (LLN) need to cross through intermediate routers, these MUST follow the IP-in-IP encapsulation requirement specified by [\[RFC6282\]](#) and [\[RFC2460\]](#). Routing extension headers such as RPL Packet Information (RPI) [\[RFC6550\]](#) and Source Routing Header (SRH) [\[RFC6554\]](#), and outer IP headers in case of encapsulation, MUST be compressed according to [\[RFC8138\]](#) and [\[RFC8025\]](#).

6. Network Formation and Lifetime

6.1. Value of the Join Metric Field

The Join Metric of the TSCH Synchronization IE in the EB MUST be calculated based on the routing metric of the node, normalized to a value between 0 and 255. A lower value of the Join Metric indicates the node sending the EB is topologically "closer" to the root of the network. A lower value of the Join Metric hence indicates higher preference for a joining node to synchronize to that neighbor.

In case the network uses RPL, the Join Metric of any node (including the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) root) MUST be set to $\text{DAGRank}(\text{rank}) - 1$. According to [Section 5.1.1](#), $\text{DAGRank}(\text{rank}(0)) = 1$. $\text{DAGRank}(\text{rank}(0)) - 1 = 0$ is compliant with 802.15.4's requirement of having the root use Join Metric = 0.

In case the network does not use RPL, the Join Metric value MUST follow the rules specified by [\[IEEE.802.15.4\]](#).

6.2. Time-Source Neighbor Selection

When a node joins a network, it may hear EBs sent by different nodes already in the network. The decision of which neighbor to synchronize to (e.g., which neighbor becomes the node's initial time-source neighbor) is implementation specific. For example, after having received the first EB, a node MAY listen for at most `MAX_EB_DELAY` seconds until it has received EBs from `NUM_NEIGHBOURS_TO_WAIT` distinct neighbors. Recommended values for `MAX_EB_DELAY` and `NUM_NEIGHBOURS_TO_WAIT` are defined in Figure 5. When receiving EBs from distinct neighbors, the node MAY use the Join Metric field in each EB to select the initial time-source neighbor, as described in [Section 6.3.6](#) of IEEE Std 802.15.4 [[IEEE.802.15.4](#)].

At any time, a node MUST maintain synchronization to at least one time-source neighbor. A node's time-source neighbor MUST be chosen among the neighbors in its RPL routing parent set when RPL is used. In the case a node cannot maintain connectivity to at least one time-source neighbor, the node loses synchronization and needs to join the network again.

6.3. When to Start Sending EBs

When a RPL node joins the network, it MUST NOT send EBs before having acquired a RPL Rank to avoid inconsistencies in the time synchronization structure. This applies to other routing protocols with their corresponding routing metrics. As soon as a node acquires routing information (e.g., a RPL Rank, see [Section 5.1.1](#)), it SHOULD start sending EBs.

6.4. Hysteresis

Per [[RFC6552](#)] and [[RFC6719](#)], the specification RECOMMENDS the use of a boundary value (`PARENT_SWITCH_THRESHOLD`) to avoid constant changes of the parent when ranks are compared. When evaluating a parent that belongs to a smaller path cost than the current minimum path, the candidate node is selected as the new parent only if the difference between the new path and the current path is greater than the defined `PARENT_SWITCH_THRESHOLD`. Otherwise, the node MAY continue to use the current preferred parent. Per [[RFC6719](#)], the `PARENT_SWITCH_THRESHOLD` SHOULD be set to 192 when the ETX metric is used (in the form $128 * \text{ETX}$); the recommendation for this document is to use `PARENT_SWITCH_THRESHOLD` equal to 640 if the metric being used is $((3 * \text{ETX}) - 2) * \text{minHopRankIncrease}$ or a proportional value. This deals with hysteresis both for routing parent and time-source neighbor selection.

7. Implementation Recommendations

7.1. Neighbor Table

The exact format of the neighbor table is implementation specific. The RECOMMENDED per-neighbor information is (taken from the [openwsn] implementation):

identifier: Identifier(s) of the neighbor (e.g., EUI-64).

numTx: Number of link-layer transmission attempts to that neighbor.

numTxAck: Number of transmitted link-layer frames that have been link-layer acknowledged by that neighbor.

numRx: Number of link-layer frames received from that neighbor.

timestamp: When the last frame was received from that neighbor. This can be based on the ASN counter or any other time base. It can be used to trigger a keep-alive message.

routing metric: The RPL Rank of that neighbor, for example.

time-source neighbor: A flag indicating whether this neighbor is a time-source neighbor.

7.2. Queues and Priorities

The IEEE Std 802.15.4 specification [IEEE.802.15.4] does not define the use of queues to handle upper-layer data (either application or control data from upper layers). The following rules are RECOMMENDED:

A node is configured to keep in the queues a configurable number of upper-layer packets per link (default NUM_UPPERLAYER_PACKETS) for a configurable time that should cover the join process (default MAX_JOIN_TIME).

Frames generated by the 802.15.4 layer (including EBs) are queued with a priority higher than frames coming from higher layers.

A frame type BEACON is queued with higher priority than frame types DATA.

7.3. Recommended Settings

Figure 5 lists RECOMMENDED values for the settings discussed in this specification.

Parameter	RECOMMENDED Value
MAX_EB_DELAY	180
NUM_NEIGHBOURS_TO_WAIT	2
PARENT_SWITCH_THRESHOLD	640
NUM_UPPERLAYER_PACKETS	1
MAX_JOIN_TIME	300

Figure 5: Recommended Settings

8. Security Considerations

This document is concerned only with link-layer security.

By their nature, many Internet of Things (IoT) networks have nodes in physically vulnerable locations. We should assume that nodes will be physically compromised, their memories examined, and their keys extracted. Fixed secrets will not remain secret. This impacts the node-joining process. Provisioning a network with a fixed link key K2 is not secure. For most applications, this implies that there will be a joining phase during which some level of authorization will be allowed for nodes that have not been authenticated. Details are out of scope, but the link layer must provide some flexibility here.

If an attacker has obtained K1, it can generate fake EBs to attack a whole network by sending authenticated EBs. The attacker can cause the joining node to initiate the joining process to the attacker. In the case that the joining process includes authentication and distribution of a K2, then the joining process will fail and the JN will notice the attack. If K2 is also compromised, the JN will not notice the attack and the network will be compromised.

Even if an attacker does not know the value of K1 and K2 ([Section 4.6](#)), it can still generate fake EB frames authenticated with an arbitrary key. Here we discuss the impact these fake EBs can have, depending on what key(s) are pre-provisioned.

If both K1 and K2 are pre-provisioned; a joining node can distinguish legitimate from fake EBs and join the legitimate network. The fake EBs have no impact.

The same holds if K1 is pre-provisioned but not K2.

If neither K1 nor K2 is pre-provisioned, a joining node may mistake a fake EB for a legitimate one and initiate a joining process to the attacker. That joining process will fail, as the joining node will not be able to authenticate the attacker during the security handshake. This will force the joining node to start over listening for an EB. So while the joining node never joins the attacker, this costs the joining node time and energy and is a vector of attack.

Choosing what key(s) to pre-provision needs to balance the different discussions above.

Once the joining process is over, the node that has joined can authenticate EBs (it knows K1). This means it can process their contents and use EBs for synchronization.

ASN provides a nonce for security operations in a slot. Any re-use of ASN with a given key exposes information about encrypted packet contents and risks replay attacks. Replay attacks are prevented because, when the network resets, either the new network uses new cryptographic key(s) or ensures that the ASN increases monotonically ([Section 4.6](#)).

Maintaining accurate time synchronization is critical for network operation. Accepting timing information from unsecured sources MUST be avoided during normal network operation, as described in [Section 4.5.2](#). During joining, a node may be susceptible to timing attacks before key K1 and K2 are learned. During network operation, a node MAY maintain statistics on time updates from neighbors and monitor for anomalies.

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks at the Media Access Control (MAC) layer in an LLN are easy to achieve simply by Radio Frequency (RF) jamming. This is the base case against which more sophisticated DoS attacks should be judged. For example, sending fake EBs announcing a very low Join Metric may cause a node to waste time and energy trying to join a fake network even when legitimate EBs are being heard. Proper join security will prevent the node from joining the false flag, but by then the time and energy will have been wasted. However, the energy cost to the attacker would be lower and the

energy cost to the joining node would be higher if the attacker simply sent loud short packets in the middle of any valid EB that it hears.

ACK reception probability is less than 100% due to changing channel conditions and unintentional or intentional jamming. This will cause the sending node to retransmit the same packet until it is acknowledged or a retransmission limit is reached. Upper-layer protocols should take this into account, possibly using a sequence number to match retransmissions.

The 6TiSCH layer SHOULD keep track of anomalous events and report them to a higher authority. For example, EBs reporting low Join Metrics for networks that cannot be joined, as described above, may be a sign of attack. Additionally, in normal network operation, message integrity check failures on packets with a valid Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) will occur at a rate on the order of once per million packets. Any significant deviation from this rate may be a sign of a network attack. Along the same lines, time updates in ACKs or EBs that are inconsistent with the MAC-layer's sense of time and its own plausible time-error drift rate may also be a result of network attack.

9. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA actions.

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Appendix A. Examples

This section contains several example packets. Each example contains (1) a schematic header diagram, (2) the corresponding bytestream, and (3) a description of each of the IEs that form the packet. Packet formats are specific for the [IEEE.802.15.4] revision and may vary in future releases of the IEEE standard. In case of differences between the packet content presented in this section and [IEEE.802.15.4], the latter has precedence.

The MAC header fields are described in a specific order. All field formats in this example are depicted in the order in which they are transmitted, from left to right, where the leftmost bit is transmitted first. Bits within each field are numbered from 0 (leftmost and least significant) to $k - 1$ (rightmost and most significant), where the length of the field is k bits. Fields that are longer than a single octet are sent to the PHY in the order from the octet containing the lowest numbered bits to the octet containing the highest numbered bits (little endian).

A.1. Example: EB with Default Timeslot Template

```

          1                2                3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len1 = 0 |Element ID=0x7e|0|   Len2 = 26   |GrpId=1|1|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len3 = 6   |Sub ID = 0x1a|0|           ASN
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
                ASN | Join Metric |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len4 = 0x01 |Sub ID = 0x1c|0| TT ID = 0x00 | Len5 = 0x01
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| ID=0x9 |1| CH ID = 0x00 | Len6 = 0x0A |Sub ID = 0x1b|0|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| #SF = 0x01 | SF ID = 0x00 | SF LEN = 0x65 (101 slots) |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| #Links = 0x01 | SLOT OFFSET = 0x0000 | CHANNEL
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OFF = 0x0000 |Link OPT = 0x0F|           NO MAC PAYLOAD
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Bytestream:

```

00 3F 1A 88 06 1A ASN#0 ASN#1 ASN#2 ASN#3 ASN#4 JP 01 1C 00
01 C8 00 0A 1B 01 00 65 00 01 00 00 00 00 0F

```


Description of the IEs:

```
#Header IE Header
  Len1 = Header IE Length (0)
  Element ID = 0x7e - termination IE indicating Payload IE
    coming next
  Type 0

#Payload IE Header (MLME)
  Len2 = Payload IE Len (26 bytes)
  Group ID = 1 MLME (Nested)
  Type = 1

#MLME-SubIE TSCH Synchronization
  Len3 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload (6 bytes)
  Sub-ID = 0x1a (MLME-SubIE TSCH Synchronization)
  Type = Short (0)
  ASN = Absolute Sequence Number (5 bytes)
  Join Metric = 1 byte

#MLME-SubIE TSCH Timeslot
  Len4 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload (1 byte)
  Sub-ID = 0x1c (MLME-SubIE Timeslot)
  Type = Short (0)
  Timeslot template ID = 0x00 (default)

#MLME-SubIE Channel Hopping
  Len5 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload (1 byte)
  Sub-ID = 0x09 (MLME-SubIE Channel Hopping)
  Type = Long (1)
  Hopping Sequence ID = 0x00 (default)

#MLME-SubIE TSCH Slotframe and Link
  Len6 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload (10 bytes)
  Sub-ID = 0x1b (MLME-SubIE TSCH Slotframe and Link)
  Type = Short (0)
  Number of slotframes = 0x01
  Slotframe handle = 0x00
  Slotframe size = 101 slots (0x65)
  Number of Links (Cells) = 0x01
  Timeslot = 0x0000 (2B)
  Channel Offset = 0x0000 (2B)
  Link Options = 0x0F
  (TX Link = 1, RX Link = 1, Shared Link = 1,
  Timekeeping = 1 )
```

A.2. Example: EB with Custom Timeslot Template

Using a custom timeslot template in EBs: setting timeslot length to 15 ms.

```

          1                2                3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len1 =  0 |Element ID=0x7e|0|      Len2 = 53          |GrpId=1|1|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len3 =  6   |Sub ID = 0x1a|0|              ASN
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
              ASN                      |Join Metric  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len4 = 25   |Sub ID = 0x1c|0| TT ID = 0x01 | macTsCCAOffset
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
= 2700        | macTsCCA = 128                | macTsTxOffset
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
= 3180        | macTsRxOffset = 1680          | macTsRxAckDelay
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
= 1200        | macTsTxAckDelay = 1500        | macTsRxWait
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
= 3300        | macTsAckWait = 600            | macTsRxTx
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
= 192         | macTsMaxAck  = 2400           | macTsMaxTx
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
= 4256        | macTsTimeslotLength = 15000   | Len5 = 0x01
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|ID=0x9 |1| CH ID = 0x00 | Len6 = 0x0A | ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Bytestream:

```

00 3F 1A 88 06 1A ASN#0 ASN#1 ASN#2 ASN#3 ASN#4 JP 19 1C 01 8C 0A 80
00 6C 0C 90 06 B0 04 DC 05 E4 0C 58 02 C0 00 60 09 A0 10 98 3A 01 C8
00 0A ...

```

Description of the IEs:

```

#Header IE Header
  Len1 = Header IE Length (none)
  Element ID = 0x7e - termination IE indicating Payload IE
                  coming next
  Type 0

```

```

#Payload IE Header (MLME)
  Len2 = Payload IE Len (53 bytes)
  Group ID = 1 MLME (Nested)
  Type = 1

#MLME-SubIE TSCH Synchronization
  Len3 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload (6 bytes)
  Sub-ID = 0x1a (MLME-SubIE TSCH Synchronization)
  Type = Short (0)
  ASN = Absolute Sequence Number (5 bytes)
  Join Metric = 1 byte

#MLME-SubIE TSCH Timeslot
  Len4 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload (25 bytes)
  Sub-ID = 0x1c (MLME-SubIE Timeslot)
  Type = Short (0)
  Timeslot template ID = 0x01 (non-default)

```

The 15 ms timeslot announced:

IEEE 802.15.4 TSCH parameter	Value (us)
macTsCCAOffset	2700
macTsCCA	128
macTsTxOffset	3180
macTsRxOffset	1680
macTsRxAckDelay	1200
macTsTxAckDelay	1500
macTsRxWait	3300
macTsAckWait	600
macTsRxTx	192
macTsMaxAck	2400
macTsMaxTx	4256
macTsTimeslotLength	15000

#MLME-SubIE Channel Hopping

Len5 = Length in bytes of the sub-IE payload. (1 byte)

Sub-ID = 0x09 (MLME-SubIE Channel Hopping)

Type = Long (1)

Hopping Sequence ID = 0x00 (default)

A.3. Example: Link-layer Acknowledgment

Enhanced Acknowledgment packets carry the Time Correction IE (Header IE).

```

          1                2                3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Len1 =  2 |Element ID=0x1e|0|                Time Sync Info                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Bytestream:

```
02 0F TS#0 TS#1
```

Description of the IEs:

#Header IE Header

Len1 = Header IE Length (2 bytes)

Element ID = 0x1e - ACK/NACK Time Correction IE

Type 0

A.4. Example: Auxiliary Security Header

802.15.4 Auxiliary Security Header with the Security Level set to ENC-MIC-32.

```

          1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|L = 5|M=1|1|1|0|Key Index = IDX|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Bytestream:

```
6D IDX#0
```

Security Auxiliary Header fields in the example:

#Security Control (1 byte)

L = Security Level ENC-MIC-32 (5)

M = Key Identifier Mode (0x01)

Frame Counter Suppression = 1 (omitting Frame Counter field)
ASN in Nonce = 1 (construct Nonce from 5 byte ASN)
Reserved = 0

#Key Identifier (1 byte)

Key Index = IDX (deployment-specific KeyIndex parameter that identifies the cryptographic key)

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the guidance and input from Rene Struik, Pat Kinney, Michael Richardson, Tero Kivinen, Nicola Accettura, Malisa Vucinic, and Jonathan Simon. Thanks to Charles Perkins, Brian E. Carpenter, Ralph Droms, Warren Kumari, Mirja Kuehlewind, Ben Campbell, Benoit Claise, and Suresh Krishnan for the exhaustive and detailed reviews. Thanks to Simon Duquennoy, Guillaume Gaillard, Tengfei Chang, and Jonathan Munoz for the detailed review of the examples section. Thanks to 6TiSCH co-chair Pascal Thubert for his guidance and advice.

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