Formal verification of protocols based on short authenticated strings (extended version)
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Abstract—Modern security protocols may involve humans in order to compare or copy short strings between different devices. Multi-factor authentication protocols, such as Google 2-factor or 3D-secure are typical examples of such protocols. However, such short strings may be subject to brute force attacks. In this paper we propose a symbolic model which includes attacker capabilities for both guessing short strings, and producing collisions when short strings result from an application of weak hash functions. We propose a new decision procedure for analysing (a bounded number of sessions of) protocols that rely on short strings. The procedure has been integrated in the AKISS tool and tested on protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard.

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern security protocols often include the human as a participant on his own, i.e., separately from the device he may own and use. Such security protocols are sometimes called security ceremonies [18]. In this paper we are interested in protocols where a human has to copy, or compare short strings, or verification codes on two devices. This kind of situations occurs rather frequently. In multi-factor authentication protocols, such as 3D-secure [1] or Google 2-factor [21], a short verification code is sent by SMS to the user’s phone who has to copy it to another device (to prove ownership of his phone). Another example is Bluetooth tethering [9], [10] where the human user has to compare codes displayed by two devices to be connected. There has also been a recent standard [23] defining several mechanisms for “manual” data transfer: these protocols use a human to ensure that two devices can exchange some data in an authentic way without sharing any cryptographic keys, nor relying on a PKI. One important aspect is that the user introduces a low bandwidth channel: he is only able to copy (or compare) short strings. The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] suggests that such short strings are 16-20 bits long. As pointed out in [25], [26], traditional methods are not suitable to reason about the security of protocols over non standard channels, and the purpose of this paper is to pursue the effort towards formalizing protocols that rely on low bandwidth channels.

As an illustrative example, we may consider the simplified commitment scheme [26] which is also described below. This protocol relies on the existence of two empirical channels.

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According to [26], an empirical channel is a low bandwidth channel that is

- asynchronous: the attacker may delay the delivery,
- authentic: the attacker may not inject messages, and
- public: the channel does not guarantee confidentiality.

Such a channel is typically implemented by an out-of-band channel to a human who copies the data. Message transmission on an empirical channel is denoted by $\rightarrow_e$.

1. $A \rightarrow B$ : $\text{info}_A, \text{hash}(\text{info}_A, n_A, r_A)$
2. $B \rightarrow_e A$ : $\text{ack}$
3. $A \rightarrow B$ : $n_A$
4. $A \rightarrow_e B$ : $r_A$

The goal of this protocol is to ensure that $B$ will receive the information $\text{info}_A$ as sent to him by $A$. Here $r_A$ is a short random value, whereas $n_A$ is a long random nonce. We will now explain the need of the acknowledgment (sent in message 2) and the nonce $n_A$ (included in the hash and sent in message 3). If we remove the nonce $n_A$ we obtain a weaker protocol. Indeed, once the attacker has obtained the modified message 1, i.e. $\text{info}_A, \text{hash}(\text{info}_A, r_A)$, he can compute the value of the short random $r_A$ by brute force. Once $r_A$ is known, the attacker can send an alternative information $\text{info}_I$ of his choice to $B$ by modifying the first message to $\text{info}_I, \text{hash}(\text{info}_I, r_A)$. If we remove message 2 a similar attack is possible as the attacker can just intercept messages 1 and 3 and perform a similar brute force attack.

The above example illustrates that short strings, that are subject to brute force, or guessing attacks are extremely tricky. One of the most successful approaches for analyzing security protocols is the symbolic approach for automated security protocol analysis, based on the seminal ideas of Dolev and Yao [17]. Indeed, there exist today mature tools for analysing security protocols [7], [28], [4], [19], which have been used to successfully analyse real world protocols such as, e.g., authentication standards [5]. With the exception of a few tools (which we discuss in our related work section below), existing analysis tools do however not take into account adversary capabilities for reasoning about weak secrets. Therefore, we devise in this paper a symbolic protocol verification technique that allows to take such guesses into account.

Our contributions. In this paper we extend the AKISS verification tool [11] and the underlying theory to take into account protocols that manipulate short secrets that are subject
to brute force attacks. AKISS allows automated analysis of security protocols when restricted to a bounded number of sessions. Cryptographic primitives may be defined through arbitrary convergent equational theories that have the finite variant property. This class of theories includes standard cryptographic primitives such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, hash functions, ... as well as less commonly supported primitives such as blind signatures and zero knowledge proofs. As we will see the framework is actually flexible enough to model weak hash functions, i.e., hash functions whose output is short enough to be copied by a human. Termination is guaranteed for theories that are subterm convergent, but the tool may terminate in practice on protocols relying on other theories [11]. Protocols in AKISS are written in a process calculus that is similar to the applied pi calculus [2]. Our first contribution is an extension of the semantics to allow an attacker to learn a weak secret during the execution: the fact that a secret may be guessed is expressed by a test that succeeds if the attacker is given the secret to be guessed, but fails if the secret is replaced by a fresh name. We note that our definitions are stated for arbitrary equational theories. Our modeling is reminiscent of the treatment of guessing attacks in password based protocols [14] (see the related work below). Next, building on the theory underlying AKISS, we design a novel verification procedure to verify authentication properties expressed as reachability properties for our new semantics. Unlike the original theory underlying AKISS we also allow disequality tests (else branches) when verifying reachability properties.

The procedure has been implemented in the AKISS tool and used to analyze several protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23]. In addition to weak secrets, we also considered weak hash functions, i.e., hash functions whose output is short and that are subject to collisions. We encode the attacker’s capability to find collisions through an equational theory in a way that is similar to [12]. Our case studies also required us to consider different kind of channels, depending on whether out-of-band channels are supposed to be synchronous or asynchronous, public or confidential and authentic or not. We propose an encoding for each of these different kinds of channels.

Related work. The works closest to ours are the ones by Roscoe et al. [26] and Delaune and Jacquemard [15]. In [26], they propose the use of the process algebra CSP and the model-checker FDR to analyze protocols relying on weak secrets. Their tool is however restricted to messages of finite length and particular equational theories, i.e., they analyze a finite state system and do not allow for user specified equational theories. In [15], they propose a decision procedure for solving a similar problem than the one studied here. However, they rely on a simpler setting, e.g. no disequality tests, only a fixed set of primitives preventing them to model weak hash functions. More importantly, they do not provide any tool support, and their procedure is actually far from being implementable. In [12], Chothia et al. use the ProVerif tool [8] to analyze commitment protocols. Their work inspired our encoding of weak hash functions, for which collisions may be found, through an equational theory. However, they do not offer support for short random secrets that may be guessed and learned by the adversary during a protocol execution.

Our definition of whether a secret is guessable is similar to the definition of dictionary attacks in password-based protocols [14], which can be encoded in terms of static equivalence and verified using tools able to check equivalence properties, such as [8], [11]. A similar definition was also proposed by Lowe [24] in the CSP process algebra. However, when verifying dictionary attacks we are only interested in knowing whether the password may be learned or not. In the protocols studied in this paper, the short secrets are often revealed anyway (see message 4 in the example above). Therefore, deciding whether a weak name is guessable is not a relevant question in the protocols studied here, and existing approaches cannot be used. Here, we need to dynamically add knowledge of the secret to the attacker knowledge. This is technically more challenging as we may need to consider different secrets that may be needed to be guessed in a same execution for a successful attack. Multiple short secrets naturally arise as soon as several sessions are considered. In particular, using symbolic techniques (that do not explicitly represent the infinite number of all possible executions), it is not sufficient to check separately whether secrets are guessable, as one may need to guess one secret to be able to guess a second one.

There has also been interesting work on modeling human behavior in protocols [6]. We do not consider this aspect, which is orthogonal, in our work.

All files related to the tool implementation and case studies are available at [3].

Outline. In Section II, we recall some basic definitions for modelling messages. Then, in Section III, we explain how the attacker may extract information from the messages exchanged in the course of a protocol execution. We introduce our formalism for modelling protocols in Section IV. We restrict ourselves to a minimalistic core calculus which is sufficient to develop our main result. Later on (see Section VII), we will introduce a richer calculus and explain how this richer model is translated into the former. In Section V, we provide an abstract representation of processes expressed in our core calculus as Horn clauses. Next, we present our saturation procedure based on Horn clause resolution in Section VI. We present our algorithm, as well as its integration in AKISS in Section VII. Lastly, in Section VIII, we report the results we obtained when analysing two protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard.

II. Preliminaries

A. Term algebra

As usual in symbolic models we represent messages as terms. We consider three infinite and disjoint sets of names: \( N_{prv} \) is the set of private names, which are used to represent nonces or keys generated by honest participants, \( N_{pub} \) is the
set of public names, which are used to represent identifiers available both to the attacker and to honest participants, as well as attacker nonces, and $N_{\text{guess}}$ is the set of guessable names, which are used to represent data with low entropy such as passwords or PIN numbers. Let $N = N_{\text{prv}} \cup N_{\text{pub}} \cup N_{\text{guess}}$. We consider two infinite and disjoint sets of variables, denoted $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{W}$. Variables in $\mathcal{X} = \{x, y, \ldots\}$ typically refer to unknown parts of messages expected by participants while variables in $\mathcal{W} = \{w_1, w_2, \ldots\}$ are used to store messages known by the attacker.

We consider a signature $\Sigma$, i.e. a finite set of function symbols together with their arity. As usual, a function symbol $\sigma$ to a term $t$ is a function from variables to terms, that is lifted to a term $\sigma(w)$ by $\vars(w)$, where $\vars(w)$ is the set of variables occurring in $w$, i.e., we have that

$$\vars(w) = \{x \mid \sigma(x) \neq x\}.$$ We denote the identity substitution, whose domain is the empty set, by $\emptyset$. The positions of a term are defined as usual.

We associate an equational theory $E$ to the signature $\Sigma$. The equational theory is defined by a set of equations of the form $u = v$ where $u, v \in \mathcal{T}(\Sigma, \mathcal{X})$, and induces an equivalence relation over terms: $u = v$ is the smallest congruence relation on $\mathcal{T}(\Sigma, \mathcal{X})$, and the identity substitution $\sigma = \emptyset$ is a complete set of unifiers, and gives a way to compute it effectively [20].

**Example 1:** Let $\Sigma = \{\cdot, \cdot\}/2, \text{proj}_1/1, \text{proj}_2/1, \text{hash}/1\}$, and consider the equational theory $E_{\text{hash}}$ defined by adding the following equations:

$$\text{proj}_1(\langle x, y \rangle) = x$$

and

$$\text{proj}_2(\langle x, y \rangle) = y.$$ The function symbol $\cdot$ models pairs, whereas projection functions are denoted $\text{proj}_1$ and $\text{proj}_2$. We use the unary symbol hash to model a standard cryptographic hash function.

Let $m_A = (\langle \text{info}_A, \text{hash}(\langle \text{info}_A, r_A \rangle) \rangle)$ with $\text{info}_A \in N_{\text{pub}}$ and $r_A \in N_{\text{guess}}$. We have that:

$$\text{hash}(\langle \text{proj}_1(m_A), r_A \rangle) = E_{\text{hash}} \text{proj}_2(m_A).$$

We may also consider equations to model e.g. symmetric and asymmetric encryption. We will see in Section VIII how these equations can be used to model short hashes.

**B. Finite variant property**

A rewrite system $R$ is a set of rewrite rules of the form $\ell \rightarrow r$ where $\ell, r \in \mathcal{T}(\Sigma, \mathcal{X})$, and $\vars(r) \subseteq \vars(\ell)$. A term $t$ can be rewritten to $u$, denoted $t \rightarrow_R u$, if there exists a position $p$ in $t$, a rule $\ell \rightarrow r$, and a substitution $\sigma$ such that:

- $t|_p = \ell\sigma$, i.e. the term at position $p$ in $t$ is equal to $\ell\sigma$;
- and
- $u = t[r\sigma]_p$, i.e. $u$ is the term obtained by replacing $t|_p$ with $r\sigma$ in $t$.

The relation $\rightarrow^*_R$ denotes the transitive and reflexive closure of $\rightarrow_R$. A rewrite system $R$ is convergent if it is:

- confluent: for any $t, t_1, t_2$ such that $t \rightarrow_R t_1$ and $t \rightarrow_R t_2$ there exists $u$ such that $t_1 \rightarrow_R u$ and $t_2 \rightarrow_R u$; and
- terminating: it does not admit any infinite sequence $t_0 \rightarrow_R t_1 \rightarrow_R t_2 \rightarrow_R \ldots$

We denote by $t \downarrow_R$ (or simply $t_\downarrow$) the normal form of a term $t$. In the following we only consider equational theories $E$ that can be represented by a rewrite system $R$ which is convergent, i.e., we have that $u = E v \iff u \downarrow_R = v \downarrow_R$.

**Example 2:** Continuing Example 1, we consider the rewrite system $R_{\text{hash}}$ given below:

$$\text{proj}_1(\langle x, y \rangle) \rightarrow x$$

and

$$\text{proj}_2(\langle x, y \rangle) \rightarrow y.$$ Actually, we have that $R_{\text{hash}}$ is convergent and it represents the equational theory $E_{\text{hash}}$ defined in Example 1.

Given a convergent rewrite system $R$, we now define the notion of complete set of variants, which was first introduced in [13].

**Definition 1:** Consider a rewrite system $R$ that is convergent, and a set of terms $T$. A set of substitutions $\vars_R(T)$ is called a complete set of variants for the set of terms $T$, if for any substitution $\omega$ there exist $\vars \in \vars_R(T)$, and a substitution $\tau$ such that $\omega \downarrow \tau = \vars \downarrow \tau$ for any $\tau \in \vars(T)$, and $(\vars \downarrow \tau)$ is a complete set of unifiers, and gives a way to compute it effectively [20].

The set of variants of $t$ represents a pre-computation such that the normal form of any instance of $t$ is equal to an instance of $t \downarrow \vars$ for some $\vars$ in the set of variants, without the need to apply further rewrite steps. A rewrite system has the finite variant property if for any sequence of terms a finite, complete set of variants exists and is effectively computable. For the sake of readability, we will often write $\vars_R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ instead of $\vars_R(\{t_1, \ldots, t_n\})$.

**Example 3:** Continuing our running example, let $T_3 = \{\text{proj}_{i}(y)\}$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, let $\vars_1$ be the identity substitution and $\vars_2 = \{y \mapsto \langle y_1, y_2 \rangle\}$. The set $\{\vars_1, \vars_2\}$ is a complete set of variants for $T_3$ (resp $T_2$). Indeed, for any substitution $\omega$, either we have that $\text{proj}_i(\langle y_\omega \rangle)$ is in normal form, and therefore $\vars_1$ (together with $\tau = \omega \downarrow \vars_1$) will satisfy the requirements. Otherwise, we have that $y_\omega \downarrow \vars_1$ is actually a pair $\langle m_1, m_2 \rangle$, and we conclude choosing the substitution $\vars_2$ (together with $\tau = \{y_1 \mapsto m_1, y_2 \mapsto m_2\}$).

This finite variant property is satisfied by many equational theories interesting for modelling cryptographic protocols, e.g. symmetric and asymmetric encryption, signatures, blind signatures, zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover, this property implies the existence of a complete set of unifiers, and gives us a way to compute it effectively [20].

**Definition 2:** Consider a convergent rewrite system $R$. Let $\Gamma = \{u_1 = v_1, \ldots, u_k = v_k\}$ be a set of equations. A set of substitutions $\Sigma$ is called a complete set of $R$-unifiers for $\Gamma$ if:

1) each $\vars \in \Sigma$ is such that $u_i \vars_\downarrow = v_i \vars_\downarrow$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$;
2) for each $\theta$ such that $u_i\theta_\downarrow = v_i\theta_\downarrow$ for any $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$, there exists $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and a substitution $\tau$ such that $x\theta_\downarrow = x\sigma\tau_\downarrow$ for any $x \in \text{vars}(\Gamma)$.

We denote $\text{csup}_R(\Gamma)$ such a set.

When $R = \emptyset$, it is well-known that for any

$$\Gamma = \{u_1 = v_1, \ldots, u_k = v_k\}$$

which admits a solution (i.e. there exists $\sigma$ such that for any $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, we have that $u_i\sigma = v_i\sigma$), such a complete set can be chosen with cardinality one. This element is actually unique up to some renaming and we denote it $\text{mgu}(\Gamma)$ or $\text{mgu}(u, v)$ when $\Gamma = \{u = v\}$.

In the following, we consider equational theories $E$ that can be represented by a convergent rewrite system $R$ that has the finite variant property.

III. Capabilities of the Attacker

At a particular point in time, after some interaction with a protocol, an attacker may know a sequence of messages $t_1, \ldots, t_\ell \in T(\Sigma, N)$. Such a sequence is organised into a frame

$$\varphi = \{w_1 \mapsto t_1, \ldots, w_\ell \mapsto t_\ell\}$$

that is a substitution with domain $\text{dom}(\varphi) = \{w_1, \ldots, w_\ell\}$, and size $|\varphi| = \ell$.

Definition 3: Let $\varphi$ be a frame, and $t \in T(\Sigma, N)$. We say that $t$ is strongly deducible from $\varphi$ (using $R$), written $\varphi \vdash_R t$, when $R\varphi_\downarrow = t_\downarrow$ for some $R \in T(\Sigma, N_{\text{pub}} \uplus \text{dom}(\varphi))$.

Similarly, we say that $t$ is weakly deducible from $\varphi$ (using $R$), written $\varphi \vdash^+_R t$, when $R\varphi_\downarrow = t_\downarrow$ for some $R \in T(\Sigma, N_{\text{pub}} \uplus N_{\text{guess}} \uplus \text{dom}(\varphi))$.

Intuitively, an attacker is able to deduce new messages by applying function symbols in $\Sigma$ to public names (those in $N_{\text{pub}}$) and terms he already knows (those in $\varphi$). The term $R$ is called a recipe. Assuming that the attacker has access to names in $N_{\text{guess}}$, this gives him more power, and allows him to (weakly) deduce more terms.

Definition 4: Let $\varphi$ be a frame, and $g \in N_{\text{guess}}$. We say that $g$ is guessable from $\varphi$ when there exist $R_1, R_2 \in T(\Sigma, N_{\text{pub}} \uplus N_{\text{guess}} \uplus \text{dom}(\varphi))$ such that:

- $R_1\varphi =_{E} R_2\varphi$, and
- $R_1\varphi \neq_{E} R_2\varphi$ where $R_i = R_i\{g \mapsto g'\}$ for some fresh name $g'$ ($i \in \{1, 2\}$).

The idea underlying this definition is the following. The frame $\varphi$ represents the information known by the attacker. To see if the attacker is able to infer the value of a guessable data, we check whether the attacker can distinguish a situation in which he has access to all the correct guesses from one where we provide him with a wrong value (here $g'$ instead of $g$) for the weak data that he targeted. To distinguish the situation the attacker must apply a test (here $R_1$ and $R_2$) that holds when faced with the right value of the guess, but fails otherwise.

Example 4: Let $\varphi = \{w_1 \mapsto \langle \text{info}_A, \text{hash}(\langle \text{info}_A, r_A\rangle)\rangle\}$ with $r_A \in N_{\text{guess}}$. The name $r_A$ is guessable from $\varphi$. Indeed, considering the recipes $R_1 = \text{proj}_2(w_1)$ and $R_2 = \text{hash}(\langle \text{proj}_1(w_1), r_A\rangle)$, we have that:

- $R_1\varphi =_{E_{\text{hash}}} \text{hash}(\langle \text{info}_A, r_A\rangle) =_{E_{\text{hash}}} R_2\varphi$, whereas
- $(R_1\{r_A \mapsto r'_A\})\varphi \neq_{E_{\text{hash}}} R_2\{r_A \mapsto r'_A\}\varphi$.

However, we may note that $r_A$ is not guessable from $\varphi' = \{w_1 \mapsto \langle \text{info}_A, \text{hash}(\langle \text{info}_A, n_A, r_A\rangle)\rangle\}$ assuming that $n_A \in N_{\text{go}}$. Intuitively, without knowing $n_A$, there is no way for the attacker to check whether he has correctly guessed the value $r_A$.

This way of modelling guessable names allows one to take into account the fact that weak names are deducible by the attacker as soon as he has a way to verify that the guess he has performed is correct. This reflects the deduction capabilities of the attacker in a more accurate way than what happens in usual attacker models. However, this modellings comes with some limitations since it does not take into account the fact that a sufficiently large set of guessable names is as secure as a (strong) name. Indeed, in our setting, assuming that $r_1, \ldots, r_k$ are names from $N_{\text{guess}}$, it is possible to guess all these names from the message $\text{hash}((r_1, \{r_2, \ldots, r_k\}))$, independently of $k$.

IV. Our Cryptographic Process Calculus

We assume that cryptographic protocols are modelled using a simple process calculus which has some similarities with the applied pi calculus [2]. Following [11], we only consider a minimalistic core calculus, additionally extended with disequality tests and guess actions.

A. Syntax

Let $Ch$ be a set of public channel names. A protocol is modelled by a finite set of processes generated by the following grammar:

$$P, Q ::= 0 \quad \text{null process}$$

$$\text{in}(c, x).P \quad \text{input}$$

$$\text{out}(c, t).P \quad \text{output}$$

$$[s = t].P \quad \text{positive test}$$

$$[s \neq t].P \quad \text{negative test}$$

$$\text{guess}(g).P \quad \text{guess}$$

where $x \in X, s, t \in T(\Sigma, N \uplus X), c \in Ch$, and $g \in N_{\text{guess}}$.

As usual, a receive action $\text{in}(c, x)$ acts as a binding construct for the variable $x$. We assume the usual definitions of free and bound variables for processes. We also assume that each variable is bound at most once. A process is ground if it does not contain any free variables. For the sake of conciseness, we sometimes omit the null process at the end of a process.

We may note that our calculus does not include operators for parallel composition, and we do not consider private channels. Given that we only consider a bounded number of sessions (i.e. a process calculus without replication) and that we aim at verifying a reachability based property, parallel composition, but also private channels, can be added as syntactic sugar to
denote the set of all interleavings. To ease the presentation, we also introduce a special action $\text{guess}(g)$ in order to indicate at which step guessing on $g$ has to be done. At the price of a (potentially exponential) blow-up on the number of processes needed to model a given protocol, we may indeed assume that this kind of actions is given explicitly.

**Example 5:** As a running example, we consider the following process where $c \in Ch$, $ack \in N_{pub}$, $r_A \in N_{guess}$, and $x, y \in X$:

$$
P_{weak} = \text{out}(c, m_A) . \text{guess}(r_A) . \text{in}(c, y) . \text{out}(c, r_A) . [\text{hash}((\text{proj}_1(y), r_A))] = \text{proj}_2(y). \text{proj}_1(y) \neq \text{info}_A \cdot 0$$

where $m_A = (\text{info}_A, \text{hash}((\text{info}_A, r_A)))$.

Intuitively, this process models one possible interleaving (among many others) of the different actions of one session of the weak version of the protocol described in Section I. In order to keep this example simple, we discard the action $\text{out}(c, \text{ack})$ (output of a public name), and we have arbitrarily chosen to perform a guess action on $r_A$ at the second step. Moreover, the purpose of the final test $\text{proj}_1(y) \neq \text{info}_A$ is to see whether $B$ can accept a message different from the expected one, i.e. $\text{info}_A$. Intuitively, an execution of this process until the end will correspond to an attack on the protocol. Of course, in order to perform a security analysis, given a protocol (as the one described in Section I), we have to explain how such interleavings are computed. This is briefly explained in Section VII-C where a richer calculus (with some convenient additional operators) is introduced. Moreover, the way out-of-band channels are encoded is explained in Section VIII-B. However, the theoretical development explained in Sections V, VI, and VII, only rely on the syntax formally introduced in this section.

We may be interested to study a similar interleaving of actions for the strong version of the protocol (the one with $n_A \in N_{pub}$). This gives us:

$$
P_{strong} = \text{out}(c, m_A) . \text{guess}(r_A) . \text{in}(c, y) . \text{out}(c, n_A) . \text{out}(c, r_A) . [\text{hash}((\text{proj}_1(y), \{n_A, r_A\})]) = \text{proj}_2(y). \text{proj}_1(y) \neq \text{info}_A \cdot 0$$

**B. Semantics**

We can now define the semantics of our process calculus by means of a labelled transition relation on configurations. A configuration is a pair $(P, \varphi)$ where $P$ is a ground process, and $\varphi$ is a frame used to record the messages that the participants have sent previously, and that are known by the attacker.

The relation $\xrightarrow{l}$ where $l$ is either an input, an output, a test, or a guess is defined as follows:

$$
\text{RECV} (\text{in}(c, x). P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{in}(c)} (P \{x \leftarrow t\}, \varphi) \quad \text{if } \varphi \vdash t
$$

$$
\text{SEND} (\text{out}(c, t). P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c)} (P, \varphi \cup \{w_{|t|+1} \leftarrow t\})
$$

$$
\text{TEST} (\{s = t\}. P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{test}^=} (P, \varphi) \quad \text{if } s \downarrow = t
$$

$$
\text{TEST} (\{s \neq t\}. P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{test}^\neq} (P, \varphi) \quad \text{if } s \downarrow \neq t
$$

$$
\text{GUESS} (\text{guess}(g). P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{guess}(g)} (P, \varphi \cup \{w_{|g|+1} \leftarrow g\}) \quad \text{if } g \text{ is guessable from } \varphi
$$

The label $\text{in}(c, t)$ represents the input of a message $t$ sent by the attacker over the channel $c$. The label $\text{out}(c)$ indicates a message sent over channel $c$, and transition rule $\text{SEND}$ records the message sent in the frame. The rule $\text{TEST}^=$, respectively $\text{TEST}^\neq$, checks equality, respectively difference, of $s$ and $t$ in the equational theory and is labelled by $\text{test}^=$, respectively $\text{test}^\neq$. The label $\text{guess}(g)$ represents the fact that the value $g$ has been guessed, and this is only possible when $g \in N_{guess}$ is indeed guessable. In such a case, $g$ is added into the frame.

**Example 6:** Considering the process $P_{weak}$ given in Example 5, we have that

$$
(P_{weak}, \emptyset) \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c)} (P_{weak}, \emptyset) \xrightarrow{\text{guess}(r_A)} (P_{weak}, \emptyset) \xrightarrow{\text{out}(c), \text{test}^=} (P_{weak}, \emptyset) \xrightarrow{\text{test}^\neq} (P_{weak}, \emptyset)
$$

where $\text{info}_1 \in N_{pub}$. This execution corresponds to the attack described in the introduction. The fact that $\text{guess}(r_A)$ can be fired is a direct consequence of the fact that $r_A$ is guessable from $\varphi$ (see Example 4). Note that this action would not be possible starting from $(P_{strong}, \emptyset)$. This comes from the fact that $r_A$ is not guessable from $\varphi'$ (see Example 4).

In the rest of the paper, for our technical development, we also consider an alternative semantics $\xrightarrow{\downarrow}$ is defined as $\xrightarrow{l}$, except that rules $\text{TEST}^\neq$ and $\text{GUESS}$ are replaced by the two following ones:

$$
\text{GUESS} (\text{guess}(g). P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{guess}(g)} (P, \varphi \cup \{w_{|g|+1} \leftarrow g\})
$$

$$
\text{TEST} (\{s \neq t\}. P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{\text{test}^\neq} (P, \varphi)
$$

i.e., this alternative semantics does neither check whether a name is indeed guessable, nor differences of terms.

The goal of this paper is to analyse confidentiality and authentication properties of protocols that rely on weak secrets. These properties can be directly encoded as reachability properties in a process. We therefore study the **Guess Reachability Problem** defined as follows.

**Guess Reachability Problem**

- **Input:** A ground process $P$
- **Output:** Do there exist $t_1, \ldots, t_n$, and a frame $\varphi$ such that $(P, \emptyset) \xrightarrow{t_1, \ldots, t_n} (\emptyset, \varphi)$?
We emphasise that the execution is defined w.r.t. $\rightarrow$ and not $\rightarrow^*$. A difficulty is to ensure that $g$ is guessable when a guess($g$) action is fired and that disequalities hold when they occur. In case such a complete execution exists, we say that the process $P$ is guess reachable.

In case, the ground process under study only contains one guess action at the end, this problem is similar to the problem of deciding whether a protocol is resistant against guessing attack. Here, the difficulty is to develop a procedure allowing us to consider several guesses. Note also that, contrary to the case of password-based protocols, guessing a data is not a goal in itself, and does not necessarily lead to an attack on a protocol. In many protocols, participants first commit to weak data and reveal it later in the execution.

V. MODELLING USING HORN CLAUSES

As the original procedure described in [11] and implemented in the AKISS tool, our decision procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a process in first-order Horn clauses. We give the details of this modelling in this section.

A. Predicates

We define the set of symbolic runs, denoted $u, v, w, \ldots$, as the set of finite sequences of symbolic labels:

$$u, v, w := \epsilon | l, w$$

where $l$ is of the form $\text{in}(c, t), \text{out}(c), \text{test}^=$, $\text{test}^\neq$, or $\text{guess}(g)$ with $t \in T(\Sigma, N \cup X), c \in Ch$, and $g \in N_{\text{guess}}$.

The empty sequence is denoted by $\epsilon$. Intuitively, a symbolic run stands for a set of possible runs of the protocol. We denote $u \subseteq v$ when $u$ is a prefix of $v$.

We assume a set $Y$ of recipe variables disjoint from $X$, and we use capital letters $X, Y, Z$ to range over $Y$. We assume that such variables may only be substituted by terms in $T(\Sigma, N_{\text{pub}} \cup N_{\text{guess}} \cup V(\cup Ya))$.

We consider five kinds of predicates over which we construct the atomic formulas of our logic. Below, $w$ denotes a symbolic run, $R, R'$ are terms in $T(\Sigma, N_{\text{pub}} \cup N_{\text{guess}} \cup V(\cup Ya))$, and $t$ is a term in $T(\Sigma, N \cup X)$. Informally, these predicates have the following meaning (see Figure 1 for the formal semantics).

- **reachability predicate**: $r_{w}$ holds when the run $w$ is executable in the alternative semantics $\rightarrow$, i.e., ignoring constraints on guesses and differences;
- **attacker knowledge predicate**: $k_{\text{w}}^\nu(R, t)$ holds if whenever the run $w$ is executable (w.r.t. $\rightarrow$), the message $t$ can be constructed by the attacker using the recipe $R$ that does not contain names in $N_{\text{guess}}$;
- **attacker extended knowledge predicate**: $k_{\text{w}}^\nu(R, t)$ holds if whenever the run $w$ is executable (w.r.t. $\rightarrow$), the message $t$ can be constructed by the attacker using the recipe $R$ that may contain names in $N_{\text{guess}}$;
- **identity predicate**: $i_{w}(R, R')$ holds if whenever the run $w$ is executable (w.r.t. $\rightarrow$), $R$ and $R'$ (that may contains names in $N_{\text{guess}}$) are recipes for the same term; and
- **reachable identity predicate**: $i_{\text{ran}}(R, R')$ is a short form for the conjunction of $i_{w}(R_{1}, R'_{1}), \ldots, i_{w}(R_{n}, R'_{n})$, and $r_{\text{ran}}$, where $R = (R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n})$, and $R' = (R'_{1}, \ldots, R'_{n})$.

A (ground) atomic formula is interpreted over a pair consisting of a process $P$ and a frame $\varphi$, and we write $(P, \varphi) = f$ when the atomic formula $f$ holds for $(P, \varphi)$ or simply $P = f$ when $\varphi$ is the empty frame. We consider first-order formulas built over the above atomic formulas and the usual connectives (conjunction, disjunction, negation, implication, existential and universal quantification). The semantics is defined as expected, but the domain of quantified variables depends on their type: variables in $X$ may be mapped to any term in $T(\Sigma, N)$, while recipe variables in $Y$ are mapped to recipes.

Example 7: Let $P_{\text{weak}}$ be the process defined in Example 5, and consider the following run:

$$w_{0} = \text{out}(c), \text{guess}(r_{A}), \text{in}(c, m_{1}), \text{out}(c), \text{test}^=, \text{test}^{\neq}$$

with $m_{1} = (\text{info}_{1}, \text{hash}(\text{info}_{1}, r_{A}))$. We have $P_{\text{weak}} \models r_{w_{0}}$, and this is a direct consequence of the execution trace given in Example 6. We have that $P_{\text{weak}} \models i_{\text{out}}(c)(R_{1}, R_{2})$ where $R_{1} = \text{proj}_{2}(w_{1})$ and $R_{2} = \text{hash}((\text{proj}_{1}(w_{1}), r_{A}))$. Indeed, the only frame reachable from $P_{\text{weak}}$ through the run $\text{out}(c)$ is $\varphi$ as defined in Example 4. Let $t = \text{hash}(\text{info}_{A}, r_{A})$, we have that $\varphi \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow R_{1}$ and $\varphi \vdash R_{2} \rightarrow t$.

Let $P_{\text{strong}}$ as given in Example 5, and $w'_{0}$ be as follows:

$$\text{out}(c), \text{guess}(r_{A}), \text{in}(c, m'_{1}), \text{out}(c), \text{test}^=, \text{test}^{\neq}$$

with $m'_{1} = (\text{info}_{1}, \text{hash}((\text{info}_{1}, (n_{1}, r_{A})))$. We have also that $P_{\text{strong}} \models r_{w_{0}}$, since such a trace is indeed executable w.r.t. the weak semantics $\rightarrow$.

B. Seed statements

We now identify a subset of the formulas, which we call statements. Statements will take the form of Horn clauses, and we shall be mainly concerned with them.

Definition 5: A statement is a Horn clause of the form

$$H \iff k_{\nu}^s(X_{1}, t_{1}), \ldots, k_{\nu}^s(X_{n}, t_{n})$$

where:

- $H \in \{r_{w_{0}}, k_{\nu}^s(R, t), k_{\nu}^\nu(R, t), i_{w_{0}}(R, R'), i_{\text{ran}}(\vec{R}, \vec{R'})\}$;
- $u_{0}, u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}$ are symbolic runs such that $u_{i} \subseteq u_{0}$ for any $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$;
- $t, t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n} \in T(\Sigma, N \cup X)$;
- $R, R'$ as well as elements of $\vec{R}$ (resp. $\vec{R'}$) are in $T(\Sigma, N_{\text{pub}} \cup N_{\text{guess}} \cup V(\cup Ya))$;
- and $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}$ are distinct variables from $Y$. Lastly, we have that $\text{vars}(t) \subseteq \text{vars}(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n})$ when $H = k_{\nu}^s(R, t)$ with $s \in \{-, +\}$.

In the definition above, we implicitly assume that all variables are universally quantified, i.e. all statements are ground.
As mentioned above, our decision procedure is based on an abstract modelling of a process in first-order Horn clauses. In this section, given a ground process \( P \) we will give a set of statements \( \text{seed}(P) \) which will serve as a starting point for the modelling. We shall also establish that the set of statements \( \text{seed}(P) \) is a sound and (partially) complete abstraction of the ground process \( P \). In order to formally define \( \text{seed}(P) \), we start by fixing some conventions.

Let \( P = a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \) be a ground process. We assume w.l.o.g. the following naming conventions:

1) if \( a_i \) is a receive action then \( a_i = \text{in}(c_i, x_i) \).
2) if \( a_i \) is a send action then \( a_i = \text{out}(c_i, t_i) \).
3) if \( a_i \) is a guess action then \( a_i = \text{guess}(g_i) \).
4) if \( a_i \) is a positive test action then \( a_i = [s_i = t_i] \).
5) if \( a_i \) is a negative test action then \( a_i = [s_i \neq t_i] \).

Moreover, we assume that \( x_i \neq x_j \) for any \( i \neq j \). For each \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), we define the symbolic label \( \ell_i \) as follows:

\[
\ell_i = \begin{cases} 
\text{in}(c_i, x_i) & \text{if } a_i = \text{in}(c_i, x_i) \\
\text{out}(c_i, t_i) & \text{if } a_i = \text{out}(c_i, t_i) \\
\text{guess}(g_i) & \text{if } a_i = \text{guess}(g_i) \\
\text{test}^+ & \text{if } a_i = [s_i = t_i] \\
\text{test}^- & \text{if } a_i = [s_i \neq t_i] 
\end{cases}
\]

For each \( 0 \leq m \leq n \), let \( R(m) \) (resp. \( S(m) \), \( G(m) \), \( T^−(m) \), and \( T^+(m) \)) be the set of indices of the receive (resp. send, guess, positive and negative test) actions amongst \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m \). Moreover, we denote by \( |Γ| \) the number of elements in such a set \( Γ \). Formally,

- \( R(m) = \{ i \mid 1 \leq i \leq m \text{ and } a_i = \text{in}(c_i, x_i) \} \);
- \( S(m) = \{ i \mid 1 \leq i \leq m \text{ and } a_i = \text{out}(c_i, t_i) \} \);
- \( G(m) = \{ i \mid 1 \leq i \leq m \text{ and } a_i = \text{guess}(g_i) \} \);
- \( T−(m) = \{ i \mid 1 \leq i \leq m \text{ and } a_i = [s_i = t_i] \} \);
- \( T+(m) = \{ i \mid 1 \leq i \leq m \text{ and } a_i = [s_i \neq t_i] \} \).

Given a set of public names \( N^0_{\text{pub}} \subseteq N_{\text{pub}} \), and a set of guessable names \( N^0_{\text{guess}} \subseteq N_{\text{guess}} \), the set of seed statements associated to \( P, N^0_{\text{pub}} \), and \( N^0_{\text{guess}} \) denoted \( \text{seed}(P, N^0_{\text{pub}}, N^0_{\text{guess}}) \), is defined to be the set of statements given in Figure 2. Intuitively, the first three kinds of seed statements allows one to express that as soon as suitable messages are deducible by the attacker to fill the receive actions occurring before step \( m \), the process is indeed (weakly) executable until step \( m \). Moreover, in case its \( m^\# \) action is either a send action or a guess action, the corresponding term (or guess) will become (strongly) deducible by the attacker.
If $\mathcal{N}^\text{pub}$, $\mathcal{N}^\text{guess}$, then we write seed($P$) as a shortcut for seed($P$, $\mathcal{N}^\text{pub}$, $\mathcal{N}^\text{guess}$). This set is is said to be the set of seed statements associated to $P$.

**Example 3**: Continuing our running example, among others, we have the following statements in seed($P_{\text{weak}}$):

\begin{align*}
f_1 & \triangleright k^-(w_1, m_A) \\
f_2 & \triangleright k^+(r_A, w_2, r_A) \\
f_3 & \triangleright r_w \triangleq k^+(\text{guess}(r_A), (y_1, r_A)) \triangleright k^+(X, x)
\end{align*}

2) if $\varphi \vdash P t$ with $\ast \in \{-, +\}$ then $k^\ast_{t_1 \downarrow \ldots \downarrow t_m \downarrow}(R(t) \downarrow) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P)).$

We will show that the completeness of seed($P$) can be built upon to achieve full abstraction, i.e., including also identities of the process $P$ and a procedure for checking guess reachability.

**VI. Saturation**

**A. Saturation procedure**

In this section we will describe the saturation procedure. It manipulates a set of statements called a knowledge base.

**Definition 7**: Given a statement $f = (H \leftarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n)$,

- $f$ is said to be solved if for all $1 \leq i \leq n$, we have that $B_i = k^+_{u_i}(X_i, x_i)$ for some $\ast_i \in \{-, +\}$, $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$, and $X_i \in \mathcal{X}'$.
- $f$ is said to be well-formed if whenever it is solved and $H = k^+_{u_i}(R, t)$ for some $\ast_i \in \{-, +\}$, we have that $t \notin \mathcal{X}'$.

A set of well-formed statements is called a knowledge base. If $K$ is a knowledge base, $K_{\text{sat}} \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}})$. The set of reachable fixed points starting from the initial set $K_{\text{init}}$ is denoted $\text{sat}(K_{\text{init}})$.

**a) Generating new statements**: Given a knowledge base $K$, new statements are generated by applying the rules in Figure 3. Each rule generates a new statement $h$. Roughly, the rule RESOLUTION applies the standard rule of resolution from first-order logic between an unsolved statement $f$ and a solved deduction statement $g$. We do not require $\ast' = \ast$ but only $\ast' \leq \ast$ which is formally defined as follows:

\[ \ast' \leq \ast \text{ if, and only if, } \begin{cases} \text{either } \ast' = \ast, \\
\text{or } (\ast', \ast) = (-, +) \end{cases} \]

This condition reflects the intuition that any term that is strongly deducible, is also weakly deducible. The rule EQUATION allows us to derive new identities on recipes that may be imposed by the execution of the protocol. The rule TEST allows us to derive a sequence of identities (at most one per guess action) that necessarily hold in an execution of the protocol. Once the statement $h$ is generated, we update the knowledge base $K$ with $h$ as explained below.

**b) Update**: We will now define the update operator $\uplus$ which adds statements generated by the rules of Figure 3 to the knowledge base.

**Definition 8**: Let $K$ be a knowledge base, and $f = H \leftarrow B$ a statement. The update of $K$ by $f$, denoted $K \uplus f$, is $K \cup \{f\}$ when $f$ is either not a solved deduction statement, or a well-formed and solved deduction statement. Otherwise, we have that $f = k^+_{u_i}(R, x) \leftarrow B$ with $k^+_{u_i}(X, x) \in B$ for some $\ast'$, $u'$,
Similarly, we are able to derive and then, after several resolution steps, we are able to derive a knowledge base. Moreover, given a knowledge base, we may apply the TEST by performing several resolution steps starting from which leads to the statement: Intuitively, this statement means that the symbolic run \( w \) is indeed executable and leads to a test \( \text{proj}_2(w_1) = \text{hash}((\text{info}_A, r_A)) \) that holds in the resulting frame (provided the attacker knows a public value that will be used to instantiate \( y_1 \)).

**B. Soundness and completeness**

We extend \( \mathcal{H}(K) \) to establish that any \( K_{\text{sat}} \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(P)) \) is a complete abstraction of \( P \).

**Definition 10:** Let \( K \) be a set of statements. We define \( \mathcal{H}_e(K) \) to be the smallest set of ground facts containing \( \mathcal{H}(K) \) and that is closed under the rules of Figure 4.

We have that the set of solved statements produced by the saturation procedure is a sound and complete abstraction of the ground process \( P \) (w.r.t. \( \rightarrow \)). More formally, we have the following result.

**Theorem 2:** Let \( K \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(P)) \) for some ground process \( P \). We have that:

- **Soundness:** \( P \models f \) for any \( f \in K \cup \mathcal{H}_e(K) \);
- **Completeness:** If \( \langle P, \emptyset, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n \rangle \vdash (Q, \varphi) \) then
  1. \( \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{sat}}) \);
  2. if \( \varphi \vdash_{H} t \) then \( k_{\text{out}}^{+}(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{sat}}) \);
  3. if \( \varphi \vdash_{H} t \) and \( \varphi \vdash_{H} t' \) then \( k_{\text{out}}^{+}(R, t') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{sat}}) \).

**VII. OUR PROCEDURE**

In this section, we first discuss the effectiveness and termination of the saturation procedure. Then, we describe our algorithm to solve the Guess Reachability Problem as stated at the end of Section IV. We finally discuss the integration of our algorithm in the verification tool AKISS.

**A. Effectiveness of the saturation procedure**

In this section, we will discuss some issues on how to effectively compute a saturated knowledge base and also discuss termination of the saturation procedure.
A first issue comes from the fact that $K_{\text{init}}(P)$ is infinite. Indeed, the set $\text{seed}(P)$ for a ground process $P$ is infinite because $\mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}$ and $\mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}$ contain an infinite set of names. We follow [11] to overcome this difficulty. Intuitively, we do only need to consider names occurring in $P$ for its saturation; clauses representing names not occurring in $P$ do not influence the saturation of the remaining clauses. Formally, we have the following result.

**Lemma 2:** Let $P$ be a ground process, $\mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}(P) \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}$ (resp. $\mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}(P) \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}$) be the finite set of public names (resp. guessable names) occurring in $P$, and $K^0 \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P), \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}(P), \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}(P)))$. We have that $K \subseteq K^0 \cup S$ for some $K \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(P))$ and a set $S$ containing statements of the form:

- $k^n_{\text{e}}(n, n) \iff$ for any $n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}$;
- $k^n_{\text{e}}(g, g) \iff$ for any $g \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}$;
- $i^n_{\text{e}}(n, n) \iff$ for any $n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \cup \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}$;
- $r^n_{\text{e}}((R_1, \ldots, R_k), (R_1', \ldots, R_k')) \iff B$ where $(R_i, R_i') = (n, n)$ for some $1 \leq i_0 \leq k$, and $n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \cup \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}$.

The saturation procedure may itself not terminate even if the initial knowledge base is finite. As shown in [11] in a simple setting, we conjecture that our saturation procedure terminates for the class of subterm convergent equational theories. More importantly, we have implemented our procedure and tested it on several examples considering various equational theories that are not subterm convergent, and our tool did terminate on all practical examples we have tested.

**B. Description and correctness of the algorithm**

Our procedure is described in Figure 5. Let $P$ be a ground process and $K^0 \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P), \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}(P), \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}(P)))$ where $\mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}(P)$ (resp. $\mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}(P)$) is the set containing all public names (resp. guessable names) occurring in $P$. In our procedure, $P$ is represented by the set $K^0_{\text{solved}}$ of solved statements of $K^0$.

The test GUESS-REACHABILITY($P$) checks whether there exists a reachable identity $\eta_{i_1, \ldots, i_n}(\bar{R}, \bar{R}')$ $\iff B$ in $K^0_{\text{solved}}$ that corresponds to a real execution after replacement of the remaining variables with fresh constants. For guess actions, we simply check whether the recipes $R_j \omega$ and $R_j' \omega$ are witnesses of the fact that the $j^{th}$ guess action contains indeed a guessable name. If all these tests succeed then $P$ is indeed guess reachable. Otherwise, in case no such a reachable identity exists, then process $P$ is not guess reachable.

**Theorem 3:** Let $P$ be a ground process, $\mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}(P) \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}$ (resp. $\mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}(P) \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}$) be the finite set of public names (resp. guessable names) occurring in $P$. Let $K^0 \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P), \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}(P), \mathcal{N}_{\text{guess}}(P)))$.

We have that $P$ is guess reachable if, and only if GUESS-REACHABILITY($P$, $K^0_{\text{solved}}$) holds.

The soundness part of this theorem is an easy consequence of our algorithm. Completeness is more involved. It is based on Theorem 2 but some works remains to be done to ensure that disequality tests will be satisfied. More importantly, we have to ensure that enough reachable identity predicates will be generated and tested. This is needed to ensure that when a weak name is guessable, then our algorithm will find a test witnessing this fact. Intuitively, our procedure will only generate small tests and our completeness results shows that this is indeed sufficient when we are looking for an attack. Note that, we have to consider all the tests (one per guess) together, and this may require to perform instantiations that will not be needed when considering only one guess. Intuitively, this comes from the fact that the attacker may need to output messages that are quite complex to ensure that all the guessable data will become guessable when needed (on the same trace).

**C. Integration in AKISS**

We have implemented all of the before described theory in the AKISS tool. To ease the specification of the protocols, the AKISS tool supports additional operators in the process calculus for parallel composition ($P || Q$), sequential composition ($P :: Q$) [11], and we also allow the use of (statically defined) private channels. All these constructions are syntactic sugar and can be translated to sets of (linear) processes eventually at the cost of an exponential blow-up.

While the original version of AKISS only allowed the verification of equivalence properties we added support for reachability properties (specified by the means of events). Similarly we allow to define authentication properties as (non-injective) correspondence properties. These correspondence properties are specified by annotating the protocols with begin and end events and are internally translated into simple reachability properties. Note that such a translation requires the use of disequality tests.

The tool also automatically annotates the protocol with the necessary guess actions, i.e., the protocol specifier is
Guess-Reachability \((P, K^0_{\text{solved}})\)

Let \(n\) be the number of actions occurring in \(P\).

For all \(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m (R, R') = K^*_{\text{pub}}(X_1, x_1), \ldots, K^*_{\text{pub}}(X_m, x_m) \in K^0_{\text{solved}}\)

Let \(c_1, \ldots, c_k\) be fresh names in \(\mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}\) such that \(\sigma: \text{vars}(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n) \cup \{x_1, \ldots, x_m\} \rightarrow \{c_1, \ldots, c_k\}\) is a bijection.

Let \(\omega = \{X_i \rightarrow x_i \sigma \mid 1 \leq i \leq m\}\).

Check whether \((P, \emptyset) = (P_0, \emptyset_0) \overset{\ell_1\sigma}{\rightarrow} \ldots (P_{n-1}, \emptyset_{n-1}) \overset{\ell_n\sigma}{\rightarrow} (P_n, \emptyset_n) = (\emptyset, \emptyset)\) using the recipes \(R_{j\omega}\) and \(R_{j'\omega}\) as a witness for guessing the guessable name in the \(j\)th guess action. If this execution is valid, return Yes.

Return No.

Fig. 5. Test for checking guess reachability

not required to include these actions. Intuitively, these guess actions have to be inserted at all possible steps. To limit the number of interleavings we implement a few straightforward optimisations: guess actions are only inserted before inputs when an output occurred since the last guess of the given weak name; when generating the interleavings we always favour outputs as they increase the attacker’s knowledge which is a sound optimisation when verifying reachability properties.

VIII. Case studies

In this section we demonstrate that our tool can be effectively used to analyse protocols based on weak secrets. Weak secrets may either be low-entropy secrets (the guessable names introduced in Section II) or the result of applying a function that produces a short output, e.g., truncating the output of a hash function. The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] suggests that “short” corresponds to 16-20 bits. We will first describe how we can model such weak hash functions. Weak secrets are often used in protocols relying on (a low capacity) out-of-band channel. We therefore also explain how out-of-band channels can be handled in our formalism.

A. Weak functions

Sometimes short verification codes need to be transmitted. One way for generating these codes is to use weak hash functions whose output is short enough to be, e.g., copied or compared by a human. However, when the output of the function is short, an attacker may efficiently find collisions. As AKISS supports user specified equational theories, we encode this property in the equational theory. While, strong cryptographic hash functions are modelled as free symbols, the property that collisions may be found by the attacker on a keyed hash function is reflected using equations:

\[
\text{sh}(k', \text{bf}(k', \text{sh}(k, m))) = \text{sh}(k, m)
\]

\[
\text{sh}(\text{bf}(m', \text{sh}(k, m)), m') = \text{sh}(k, m)
\]

The first equation models that given a short hash \(\text{sh}(k, m)\) and an arbitrary key \(k'\), the attacker may find by brute force a message \(m' = \text{bf}(k', \text{sh}(k, m))\) such that \(\text{sh}(k, m) = \text{sh}(k', m')\).

The second equation allows to fix the message \(m'\) and find a key \(k' = \text{bf}(m', \text{sh}(k, m))\) such that \(\text{sh}(m, k) = \text{sh}(m', k')\). A similar modelling was also used by Chothia et al. in [12] for verifying commitment protocols in ProVerif.

The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] distinguishes two types of short hash functions, which they call check value functions and message digests. While both generate short hashes, they differ on the keys they take as input: check value functions take as second argument a weak key and message digests a strong key. Our model does reflect these two types of hash functions, simply depending on whether the second argument is a weak name or not. The requested security property for short hash functions is that an attacker may not find two messages \(m, m'\) such that \(\text{sh}(m, k) = \text{sh}(m', k)\) for a non-negligible fraction of the key space. This property is indeed reflected by our modelling as the equation \(\text{sh}(m, x) = \text{sh}(m', x)\) does not hold for arbitrary keys, unless \(m = m'\).

B. Out-of-band channels

When out-of-band channels are used in protocols we may consider different kinds of channels, depending on whether the communication is supposed to be confidential, authentic, and synchronous. To model these different kind of channels, we allow the use of private channels, similar to the applied pi calculus. However, we only allow static channel names, i.e., channel names are not transmitted dynamically during the protocol execution. In that case, private channels are merely syntactic sugar for generating the appropriate traces.

We consider the following types of channels:

- Public channels: they offer no guarantee and correspond to normal output actions in our calculus.
- Private channels: communications are confidential, authentic, and synchronous; this corresponds to a usual communication using a private channel.
- Asynchronous, private channels: such communications offer confidentiality and authentication, but may be delayed by the attacker; asynchrony is encoded as usual by performing the output in parallel, i.e., if \(c_{\text{ap}}\) is an asynchronous private channel, we replace \(\text{out}(c_{\text{ap}}, u).P\) with \(P | \text{out}(c_{\text{ap}}, u).0\) where \(c_{\text{ap}}\) is a private channel.
- Asynchronous, authentic, but non-confidential (or simply authentic) channels can be encoded similarly; if \(c_{\text{aa}}\) is an asynchronous authentic channel, we replace \(\text{out}(c_{\text{aa}}, u).P\) with \(\text{out}(c_{\text{pub}}, u).P | \text{out}(c_{\text{priv}}, u).0\) where \(c_{\text{pub}}\) is a public channel and \(c_{\text{priv}}\) is a private channel.

Which channel is the most appropriate depends on the context and the nature of the out-of-band channel.
C. Protocols with manual data transfer

The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] presents several protocols for transferring authenticated data among two devices. The mechanisms differ in the assumptions on the input/output capabilities of the devices, the used of hash functions and the actions a user has to perform.

Devices may have a standard or simple input or output interface. While standard interfaces allow to enter/display alphanumeric strings, a simple interface generally only consists in a button or a light to confirm or infirm success. Hash functions may be short hash functions, cryptographic hash functions or MACs. Humans may need to either compare or copy short strings. Some protocols also require the human to generate a short random string.

To illustrate our work, we will detail below mechanisms 2 and 4 of [23].

a) Manual authentication mechanism 2: The protocol assumes two devices that have both a standard output interface and a simple input interface. The protocol uses a check-value function, i.e., a short hash function which uses a weak key. The protocol assumes that both devices are in proximity of a human who is able to compare short strings displayed on both device’s output interface.

The protocol is described in Figure 6. Initially, data $d_A$ and $d_B$ are provided to devices $A$, respectively $B$. The goal of the protocol is to check whether the devices agree on the data. We assume that the data can be chosen freely by the attacker. Once they have received their data the devices signal to the user that they are ready. When both devices are ready, the user informs device $A$ that it may start, e.g., by pressing the button of the simple input interface. Device $A$ generates a fresh, weak key $k$ and transmits it (on an insecure channel) to device $B$. Both devices display the key $k$ and the short hash of their data with $k$ on their output interface. The user compares the output of both devices and enters either accept or reject depending on whether the displayed codes coincide or not.

The protocol is easily encoded in the process calculus serving as the input language of AKISS. The process modelling the authentication mechanism is entirely displayed in Figure 7 where $k$ is a weak name, and channels $ah_1$, $ah_2$, $ha_1$, $ha_2$, $bh_1$, $bh_2$, and $hb$ are private channels used for encoding authentic channels as explained in Section VIII-B. We briefly explain below the process $B$ given in Figure 7. Initially, $d_B$ is provided to device $B$. Therefore, $B$ initially waits for an input, and answers by outputting the constant ready on an authentic (but non-confidential) channel. To model these channel properties we rely on the encoding explained in Section VIII-B. Then, device $B$ is waiting for another message on a classical (i.e. insecure) channel. $B$ answers to this message by sending the key it just received as well as the short hash it has computed. Both are sent on another authentic channel (encoded in a similar way than before). Once this is done, it simply waits for an answer from the user (this is modelled through a communication on the private channel $hb$).

In case, the received value is the public constant ok (which indicated that the user has accepted this transaction) device $B$ will end this session normally (modelled through the event end). If the event end is reached authentication should hold. The two other processes $A$ and $H$ are modelled in a rather similar way. The operator :: that occurs in process $H$ is used to model the two synchronisations that appear from the user's point of view. Indeed, the user is supposed to receive the ready message coming from both devices before he proceeds. Similarly, the user is supposed to wait for the short strings of both devices and compare them before he accepts/rejects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>scenario</th>
<th># traces</th>
<th>time</th>
<th>status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one session</td>
<td>Auth. A</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>&lt; 8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth. B</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>&lt; 8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without start</td>
<td>Auth. A</td>
<td>360/592</td>
<td>&lt; 8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth. B</td>
<td>337/736</td>
<td>&lt; 8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without start + h strong</td>
<td>Auth. A</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>&lt; 4s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth. B</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>&lt; 5s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two sessions</td>
<td>Auth. A</td>
<td>48852</td>
<td>59m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth. B</td>
<td>10794</td>
<td>8m30s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We verify the correspondance property that states that whenever Device $B$ finishes the protocol with data $d$ then Device $A$ must have started the protocol with the same data before, by annotating the processes with begin and end events.

Our tool easily verifies that this property indeed holds. We can also show that if the synchronisation message ‘start’ is removed we find an attack as expected: indeed the attacker may learn $k$ and forge a value $d' = bf(k', sh(k, m))$ to be sent to $A$ in the begin of the protocol. Note that the attacker can not chose an arbitrary value for $d'$ as both $k$ and the short hash are compared by the human. We have also verified that, although this scenario is unrealistic, this attack is not possible...
if we use a strong hash function instead of the short hash. Finally we also checked that the protocol is still secure in the case of two sequential sessions. Given that the protocol uses a human as an intermediate we think that parallel sessions are not a meaningful scenario.

Most of those verifications have been performed in a few seconds on a standard laptop. Actually, only the last experiments (the ones reported on the last line of each table) have been done on a 20 core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2687W v3 @ 3.10GHz. We also indicate the number of traces (due to all the possible interleaving of the actions) that have been considered by the tool in order to conclude. Note that in case an attack has been found, the tool stops the exploration before considering all these traces, and this is also indicated in the table.

The fact that the performances degrade when considering an additional session is not surprising and is clearly correlated with the number of traces that have to be considered to carry out the analysis. This is the usual and well-known state-space explosion problem inherent of the concurrent nature of the systems we analyse. As briefly explained in Section VII-C, we have implemented a few straightforward optimisations to mitigate this issue, but more needs to be done in this direction.

b) Manual authentication mechanism 4: This mechanism is described in Figure 8. It assumes a simple input interface and standard output interface for device $A$ and a simple input and standard output interface for device $B$.

The protocol relies on a standard hash function and supposes a user who can copy a short random string from device $A$ to device $B$. As in the previous protocol we assume that data $d_A$ and $d_B$ are given to the devices and that the aim is to ensure agreement on these data. Device $A$ generates a strong nonce $k$, a weak nonce $r$ and sends $\text{hash}(d_A, k, r)$ to $B$ over an insecure network. Both devices then notify the user that they are ready and the user informs $A$ that it may start. $A$ displays $r$ to the user who copies $r$ into $B$. Moreover, $A$ sends $k$ to $B$ over the insecure network. Device $B$ recompute the hash and compares it to the previously received value. If both values are identical it outputs accept and reject otherwise. The user enters the displayed result into device $A$.

We may note that, despite the high number of traces, answers are relatively fast. We consider here an empty equational theory, and therefore the saturation process is faster than for mechanism 2.

**IX. Conclusion**

In this paper we presented a novel symbolic model for reasoning about protocols that use short authentication strings, possibly generated as the result of a weak hash function. We propose a new procedure for verifying protocols in this model and have implemented the procedure in the AKISS tool. The new capabilities of the tool are illustrated by analysing...
several protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard for authentication mechanisms for manual data transfer.

As future work we plan to perform additional case studies, as well as checking injective correspondence properties. Another possible generalisation is to adapt our framework to verify equivalence properties. The resulting framework might be used for analysing vote anonymity in protocols relying on short vote codes, such as in Pretty Good Democracy [27] or Du-Vote [22].

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma 1: Given a ground process $P$, $N_{\text{pub}}^0 \subseteq N_{\text{pub}}$, and $N_{\text{guess}} \subseteq N_{\text{guess}}$, the set $K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P, N_{\text{pub}}^0, N_{\text{guess}}))$ is a knowledge base. Moreover, given a knowledge base $K$, any set of statements obtained through the saturation procedure is also a knowledge base.

Proof. We first show that, given a knowledge base $K$ and a statement $f = (H \leftarrow B)$, $K \cup f$ is a knowledge base. If $f$ is well-formed then $K \cup f = K \cup f$. If $f$ is not well-formed then $f = k^*_s(R, x) \leftarrow B$ with $k^*_u(X, x) \in B$ for some $s^*$, $u^*$, and $X$. In that case we have that $K \cup f = K \cup u^*(R, X) \leftarrow B$. Since $K \cup f$ is well-formed (by definition) we conclude.

Given that $K_{\text{init}}(S) = (\{((\emptyset \cup f_1) \cup \ldots) \cup f_n\}$ and that $\emptyset$ is a knowledge base, $K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P, N_{\text{pub}}^0, N_{\text{guess}}))$ is a knowledge base. Finally, as saturation only adds statements through the update operator $\cup$ we conclude.

B. Soundness and completeness of the seed statements

Lemma 3: Let $P$ be a ground process. We have that $P \models f$ for any statement $f \in \text{seed}(P)$.

Proof. We suppose the naming conventions for $P$ as in the definition of the set of seed statements. We prove that $P \models f$ for each statement $f \in \text{seed}(P)$. We proceed by case analysis on the seven kinds of seed statements.

Case 1. Let $m$ be such that $0 \leq m \leq n$, $\sigma \in \text{vars}_P(\{s_k = t_k : k \in \{m\}\})$, and $\tau \in \text{vars}_P(\{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m, \sigma\})$. Let $f$ be the following statement:

$$f = (k_1(\sigma \tau_1), \ldots, j_m(\sigma \tau_m)) \leftarrow (X_j, x_j(\sigma \tau_j)) \in R(m)$$

Let $\omega$ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for $f$. Assume that $P \models f$. Hence we have that $P \models f$. We have to show that $P \models f$. In

[24] S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and L. Robin. Formal verification of protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard for authentication mechanisms for manual data transfer. The resulting framework might be used for analysing vote anonymity in protocols relying on short vote codes, such as in Pretty Good Democracy [27] or Du-Vote [22].
Let $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p,\sigma_p})\omega$ for all $0 \leq p \leq m$.

We proceed by induction on $p$. When $p = 0$ we have that $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p,\sigma_p})\omega$ and therefore we trivially have that $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p,\sigma_p})\omega$. When $p > 0$, we assume that $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p-1,\sigma_{p-1}})\omega$, and we show that $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p,\sigma_p})\omega$ by case analysis on $a_p$. Before we do the case analysis, let us first fix some notations. Let $P_1 = P$ and $\varphi_1 = \emptyset$. As $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p-1,\sigma_{p-1}})\omega$ we have that $\ell_{t_1,\sigma_1} \bowrightarrow (P_1, \varphi_1)$ for all $1 \leq i < p$, where $P_i = (a_i, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(i-1)}$ and where $\varphi_{i+1}$ extends $\varphi_i$ (for all $1 \leq i < p$). We can now do the case analysis.

1) if $a_p = \text{out}(c_p, t_p)$, then $\ell_p = \text{out}(c_p)$. Let $P_{p+1} = (a_p, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(p)}$ and $\varphi_{p+1} = \varphi_p \cup \{w_{|\varphi_p|} \mapsto t_p\sigma_p\omega\}$. We have that $(P_p, \varphi_p) \equiv (P_{p+1}, \varphi_{p+1})$ which is what we wanted to prove.

2) if $a_p = \text{guess}(g_p)$ then $\ell_p = \text{guess}(g_p)$. Let $P_{p+1} = (a_p, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(p)}$ and $\varphi_{p+1} = \varphi_p \cup \{w_{|\varphi_p|} \mapsto g_p\}$. We have that $(P_p, \varphi_p) \equiv (P_{p+1}, \varphi_{p+1})$ which is what we wanted to prove.

3) if $a_p = \text{in}(c_p, x_p) \land \ell_p = \text{in}(c_p, x_p\sigma_p\omega)$ and $p \in R(p)$. Let $P_{p+1} = (a_p, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(p)}$ and $\varphi_{p+1} = \varphi_p$. As $p \in R(p)$, we have that $P \models k_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, t_{p-1,\sigma_{p-1}}(X_p, x_p\sigma_p\omega)$ (this is an antecedent of $f$). Therefore, we have that $\varphi \vdash x_\omega \rightarrow x_p\sigma_p\omega \rightarrow \ell_p$.

We obtain by the definition of $\rightarrow$ that $(P_p, \varphi_p) \equiv (P_{p+1}, \varphi_{p+1})$ which is what we wanted to prove.

4) if $a_p = [s_p = t_p]$, then $\ell_p = \text{test}^\circ$. Let $P_{p+1} = (a_p, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(p)}$ and $\varphi_{p+1} = \varphi_p$. As $s \in \text{csu}_R$ we have that $s_p\sigma_p\omega = t_p\sigma_p\omega$, and therefore $s_p\sigma_p\omega \rightarrow \ell_p\sigma_p\omega$. We have that $(P_p, \varphi_p) \equiv (P_{p+1}, \varphi_{p+1})$ which is what we wanted to prove.

5) if $a_p = [s_p \neq t_p]$, then $\ell_p = \text{test}^\circ$. Let $P_{p+1} = (a_p, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(p)}$ and $\varphi_{p+1} = \varphi_p$. We have that $(P_p, \varphi_p) \equiv (P_{p+1}, \varphi_{p+1})$ which is what we wanted to prove.

We have shown that $P \models (r_{t_1,\sigma_1}, \ldots, r_{p,\sigma_p})\omega$.

Case 2. Let $m \in S(n)$, $s \in \text{csu}_R(\{s_k = t_k\}_{k \in T = (m)})$, $s \in \text{variants}(\ell_1, \sigma_1, \ldots, \ell_m, \omega)$, and $f$ a statement as follows:

$$k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_m,\sigma_m}(w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)|, t_m\sigma_m) \quad \iff \quad (k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_{p-1,\sigma_p}}(X_p, x_p\sigma_p\omega))_{j \in R(m)}.$$

We show that $P \models f$. Let $\omega$ be a substitution grounding for $f$. We assume that:

$$P \models k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_{p-1,\sigma_p}}(X_p, x_p\sigma_p\omega) \text{ for all } j \in R(m).$$

We show $P \models (k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_{p-1,\sigma_p}}(w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)|, t_m\sigma_m))\omega$.

Let $\omega(y)$ be the term sent or guessed at the $y$th send or guess action, i.e. $o(y) = t_j$ when $j = \min\{x \mid |S(x)| + |G(x)| = y\}$ belongs to $S(n)$, or $o(y) = g_j$ otherwise (i.e. when $j \in G(n)$).

Let $P_1 = (a_i, \ldots, a_n)\{x_j \mapsto x_j\sigma_j\omega\}_{j \in R(i-1)}$ and $\varphi_i = \bigcup_{1 \leq j \leq |S(i)| + |G(i)|} \{w_j \mapsto o(j)\sigma_j\omega\}$ for $1 \leq i \leq m + 1$.

If

$$(P_1, \varphi_1) \ell_{t_1,\sigma_1} \rightarrow (P_2, \varphi_2) \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow (P_{m+1}, \varphi_{m+1})$$

then

$$\varphi_{m+1}(w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)|) = o(m)\sigma_m\omega \rightarrow t_m\sigma_m\omega \downarrow$$

and hence $\varphi \vdash w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)| \rightarrow t_m\sigma_m\omega \downarrow$.

Therefore,

$$\varphi \vdash w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)| \rightarrow (t_m\sigma_m)\downarrow$$

which implies that

$$P \models (k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_{m,\sigma_m}}(w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)|, t_m\sigma_m)\omega).$$

Case 3. Let $m \in G(n)$, $s \in \text{csu}_R(\{s_k = t_k\}_{k \in T = (m)})$. Let $f$ be a statement of the form:

$$k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_m,\sigma_m}(w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)|, g_m) \quad \iff \quad \{k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_m,\sigma_m}(X_j, x_j\sigma_j\omega)\}_{j \in R(m)}.$$

We show that $P \models f$. Let $\omega$ be a substitution grounding for $f$. We assume that:

$$P \models k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_{m-1,\sigma_{m-1}}}(X_j, x_j\sigma_j\omega) \text{ for all } j \in R(m).$$

We show $P \models (k_{t_1,\sigma_1, \ldots, t_{m-1,\sigma_{m-1}}}(w_{|S(m)|} + |G(m)|, t_m\sigma_m))\omega$.

This derivation is not possible we directly conclude. We have that

$$\varphi_{m+1} \vdash y_{j\sigma_j\omega} \rightarrow t_j\sigma_j\omega \downarrow \text{ for all } 1 \leq j \leq k.$$
and hence $P \models k^*_\ell \ldots \ell_m(f(Y_1, \ldots, Y_k), f(y_1, \ldots, y_k)\tau_\downarrow)\omega$.

**Proposition 1:** Let $P$ be a ground process and $K$ be a set of statements such that for all $f \in K$ we have that $P \models f$. We have that $P \models f$ for all $f \in \mathcal{H}(K)$.

**Proof.** Let $f \in \mathcal{H}(K)$, and $\pi$ a proof tree witnessing this fact. We proceed by structural induction on $\pi$.

**Base case.** In such a case, the proof tree $\pi$ is obtained by applying the rule $\text{CONSEQ}$ with $n = 0$. We have that $f' = (H \leftrightarrow) \in K$ and $f = f'\sigma$ where $\sigma$ is a substitution grounding for $f'$. As $f' \in K$, by hypothesis, $P \models f'$. Hence, as all variables in $f'$ are universally quantified, $P \models f'\sigma$.

**Inductive step.** We proceed by case distinction on the last rule of $\pi$.

- **CONSEQ:** We have that $f' = (H \leftrightarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n) \in K$, $\sigma$ is a substitution grounding for $f'$ such that $H = \sigma$ and $B_i\sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. As $H = B_1, \ldots, B_n \in K$ we have by hypothesis that $P \models (H \leftrightarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n)$ and hence $P \models (H \leftrightarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n)\sigma$. By induction hypothesis we also have that $P \models B_i\sigma$. Hence, we conclude that $P \models H\sigma$.

- **EXTEND:** In such a case, we have that $f = k^*_\omega(R, t)$, and we know that $k^*_\omega(R, t) \in H(K)$. By induction hypothesis $P \models k^*_\omega(R, t)$. It follows from the semantics of $k^*$ that $P \models k^*_\omega(R, t)$.

- **WEAKENING:** In such a case, we have that $f = k^*_\omega(R, t)$, and we know that $k^*_\omega(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(K)$. By induction hypothesis $P \models k^*_\omega(R, t)$. It follows from the semantics of $k^+$ and $k^-$ that $P \models k^*_\omega(R, t)$.

**Lemma 4:** Let $P$ be a ground process. If $(P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{l_1 \ldots l_m} (Q, \varphi)$ then

1. $r_{l_1 \ldots l_m} \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$;
2. If $\varphi \vdash^*_R t$ with $* \in \{\ldots, +\}$ then $k_{l_1 \ldots l_m}^*(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$.

**Proof.** We assume the same naming conventions for $P$ and labels $\ell_i$, as in Section V-B on p. 7. As $(P, \varphi) \xrightarrow{l_1 \ldots l_m} (Q, \varphi)$, there exists $\omega$ such that $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)\omega = (l_1, \ldots, l_m)\omega$ and $s_k\omega \rightarrow_R t_k\omega$ for all $k \in T^\perp(n)$. We proceed by induction on $m$.

To show the first item, observe that there exists $\sigma \in \text{csu}_R(\{s_k = t_k\}_{k \in T^\perp(n)})$ such that:

1. $\text{dom}(\sigma) \subseteq X$;
2. $s_k\sigma =_R t_k\sigma$ for all $k \in T^\perp(n)$;
3. $\omega[X] =_R (\sigma\pi)[X]$ for some substitution $\pi$.

where $X = \text{vars}(s_k, t_k)_{k \in T^\perp(n)}$. It follows that $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)\omega_\downarrow = (l_1, \ldots, l_m)\sigma\pi_\downarrow$. By definition of $\text{vars}_R(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)$, there exists $\tau \in \text{vars}_R(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)$ such that $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)\sigma\pi_\downarrow = (l_1, \ldots, l_m)\sigma\tau_\downarrow\tau'$ for some substitution $\tau'$. By definition of $\text{seed}(P)$, we have that $f \in \text{seed}(P)$ where

$f = r_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow \ldots \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow} \leftrightarrow \{k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow \ldots \ell_j \sigma_\downarrow}(X_j, x_j\sigma\tau_\downarrow)_{j \in R(m)}\}$

Let $\tau''$ be the substitution that extends $\tau'$ by $\{X_j \mapsto R_j\}_{j \in R(m)}$ where $R_j$ are recipes for $x_j\omega$. We have by induction hypothesis that each antecedent of $f\tau''$ is in $\mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$.

Therefore

$r_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow \tau'' \ldots \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow} = r_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow \tau' \ldots \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow} \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$

We know prove the second item. We assume that the statement holds for any index less than $m$ and we prove it for $m$.

By induction on $R$ we show that: if $\varphi \vdash^*_R t_k\omega$ then $k_{l_1 \ldots l_m}^*(R, t_k\omega) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$ with $* \in \{\ldots, +\}$.

1) If $R = c$ is a public name, as the statement $f = (k^*_c(c, c) = \omega) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$ by definition, we have that $k^*_c(c, c) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$ and $k^*_c(l_1 \ldots l_m, c, c) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$ by the EXTEND rule. By application of the WEAKENING rule $k^*_c(l_1 \ldots l_m, c, c) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$.

2) If $R = w_k$, let $n$ be the smallest index such that $|S(n)| + |G(n)| = k$, we distinguish two cases:

a) $a_n = \text{out}(c, t_n)$ for some channel $c$. We choose $\sigma \in \text{csu}_R(\{w_k = t_k\}_{k \in T^\perp(n)})$ such that $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)\omega = (l_1, \ldots, l_m)\sigma\pi_\downarrow$ for some substitution $\pi$. Let $\tau$ be a variants $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m, t_n)\sigma$ and $\tau' = (\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m, t_n)\sigma\tau_\downarrow$. By definition of $\text{seed}(P)$, we have that $h \in \text{seed}(P)$ where

$h = k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow}(w_k, t_n\sigma_\downarrow) \leftrightarrow \{k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_j \sigma_\downarrow}(X_j, x_j\sigma\tau_\downarrow)\}_{j \in R(n)}$

For $j \in R(n)$ we let $R_j$ be a recipe of $x_j\sigma\tau_\downarrow = c$ $x_j\omega$ in the smallest possible prefix of $\varphi$. Let $\tau'' = \tau' \cup \{X_j \mapsto R_j\}_{j \in R(n)}$. We have that the antecedents of $h\tau''$ are in $\mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore

$k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow \tau'' \ldots \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow}(w_k, t_n\sigma_\downarrow)\tau'' = k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow \tau' \ldots \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow}(w_k, t_n\sigma_\downarrow)\tau' = k_{\ell_1 \omega_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_m\omega_\downarrow}(w_k, t_n\sigma_\downarrow) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$

Since $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)\omega_\downarrow$ is a prefix (not necessarily strict) of $(\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m)\omega$, eventually applying the EXTEND rule, we have that $k_{\ell_1 \omega_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_m\omega_\downarrow}(w_k, t_n\omega_\downarrow) = k_{\ell_1 \omega_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_m\omega_\downarrow}(R_j, R_j\phi_\downarrow) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$.

Using the WEAKENING rule we also have that $k_{\ell_1 \omega_\downarrow, \ldots, l_m\omega_\downarrow}(R_j, R_j\phi_\downarrow) \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P))$. By definition of $\text{seed}(P)$, we have that $h \in \text{seed}(P)$ where

$h = k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_m\sigma_\downarrow}(w_k, g_n) \leftrightarrow \{k_{\ell_1 \sigma_\downarrow, \ldots, \ell_j \sigma_\downarrow}(X_j, x_j\sigma\tau_\downarrow)\}_{j \in R(n)}$

For $j \in R(n)$ we let $R_j$ be a recipe of $x_j\sigma\tau_\downarrow = \omega$ $x_j\omega$ in the smallest possible prefix of $\varphi$. Let
Lemma 7 for the terms stated and proved in this section. There are three
steps of $\sigma$ and $\tau$.

Let $f$ and $g$ be arbitrary substitutions grounding for $f$ and $g$ in $\mathcal{H}(P)$, respectively.

3) If $R = g$ is a guess name, then we have that $\tau = +$, and as the statement $(f = k^+_1(g, g) \in \mathcal{H}(P))$ by definition, we have that $k^+_1(g, g) \in \mathcal{H}(P)$ and $k^+_1_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_m}(g, g) \in \mathcal{H}(P)$ by the EXTEND rule.

4) If $R = \tau_1 \cdots \tau_k$, let $\tau$ be a variant of $R'(y_1, \ldots, y_k)$ and $\tau''$ such that $R\tau'' = \tau(\tau_1 \cdots \tau_k)\tau'$. By definition of $\mathcal{H}(P)$, we have the following statement $h \in \mathcal{H}(P)$ with $\tau'' = \{ \tau_1 \cdots \tau_k \}$.

Let $\tau'' = \omega \cup \tau'' \cup \{ \tau_1 \cdots \tau_k \}$. We have that all antecedents of $\mathcal{H}(P)$ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, the head of $\mathcal{H}(P)$ is also in $\mathcal{H}(P)$, and this allows us to conclude.

C. Soundness and completeness of the saturation

The soundness part of Theorem 2 is a consequence of the lemmas stated and proved in this section. There are three lemmas to deal with the three saturation rules: Lemma 5 for the RESOLUTION rule, Lemma 6 for the EQUATION rule, and Lemma 7 for the TEST rule. Then, we establish soundness of the update operation (see Lemma 8), and of $\mathcal{H}_e$ (see Lemma 9).

Lemma 5: Let $P$ be a ground process. We consider the statements $f, g$ and $h$ as defined in the RESOLUTION rule. If $P = f$ and $P = g$ then we have that $P = h$.

Proof. We have that:

- $f = \{ (H \Leftrightarrow k^+_1(X, t), B_1, \ldots, B_n) \} \subseteq K$, $k^+_1(X, t) \in \mathcal{H}(P)$,

- $g = \{ k^+_1(R, t') \Leftrightarrow B_{n+1}, \ldots, B_m \} \subseteq K_{\text{solved}}$, and $k^+_1(R, t') \in \mathcal{H}(P)$,

- $h = H \Leftrightarrow B_{1}, \ldots, B_{m} \subseteq \mathcal{H}(P)$

where $\sigma = \text{mgu}(k^+_1(X, t), k^+_1(R, t'))$, $t \not\in \mathcal{X}$, $\sigma = \{ \tau_1 \cdots \tau_k \}$, and $\sigma = \{ \tau_1 \cdots \tau_k \}$.

Let $\tau$ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for $h$ such that $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ and $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$. We have to show that $P = H_{\sigma} \tau$.

We have that $P = g$, and $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ for $n + 1 \leq j \leq m$. Therefore, we deduce that $P = k^+_1(R, t') \subseteq \mathcal{H}(P)$.

By definition of $\sigma$, we have that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$, and we deduce that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$ of the semantics of the predicates $k^-$ and $k^+$. Therefore, we have that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$, $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$

for $i \in \{ 1, \ldots, n \}$, and $P = f$. This allows us to conclude that $P = H_{\sigma} \tau$. $
\Box$

Lemma 6: Let $P$ be a ground process. We consider the statements $f, g$ and $h$ as defined in the EQUATION rule. If $P = f$ and $P = g$ then we have that $P = h$.

Proof. We have that:

- $f = \{ k^+_1(R, t) \Leftrightarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n \} \subseteq K_{\text{solved}}$.

- $g = k^+_1(R, t') \subseteq B_{n+1}, \ldots, B_m \subseteq K_{\text{solved}}$, and $k^+_1(R, t') \in \mathcal{H}(P)$.

- $h = \{ i_{u'}(R, t') \} \subseteq K_{\text{solved}}$, and $i_{u'}(R, t') \in \mathcal{H}(P)$.

Let $\tau$ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for $h$ such that $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ and $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$. We have to show that $P = i_{u'}(R, t') \sigma$.

We have that $P = g$, and $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ for $n + 1 \leq j \leq m$. Therefore, we deduce that $P = k^+_1(R, t') \subseteq \mathcal{H}(P)$.

By definition of $\sigma$, we have that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$, and we deduce that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$ of the semantics of the predicates $k^-$ and $k^+$. Therefore, we have that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$, $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$

for $i \in \{ 1, \ldots, n \}$, and $P = f$. This allows us to conclude that $P = H_{\sigma} \tau$.

Lemma 7: Let $P$ be a ground process. We consider the statements $f, g, f_i, t, f_i$, and $h$ as defined in the TEST rule. If $P = g$, and $P = f_i$ for $i \in \{ 0, \ldots, n \}$ then we have that $P = h$.

Proof. We have that:

- $g = \{ i_{u_{\tau}}(X, t) \Leftrightarrow B, \ldots, n \} \subseteq K_{\text{guess}}$.

- $f_i = \{ i_{u_{\tau}}(R_i, t') \Leftrightarrow B_i \} \subseteq K_{\text{guess}}$, $i \in \{ 1, \ldots, n \}$.

- $h = \{ i_{u_{\tau}}(R, t') \} \subseteq K_{\text{guess}}$, and $i_{u_{\tau}}(R, t') \in \mathcal{H}(P)$.

Where $\sigma = \text{mgu}(\{ u_{\tau} \})$, $\sigma = \{ u_{\tau} \}$, and $\sigma = \{ u_{\tau} \}$.

Let $\tau$ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for $h$ such that $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ and $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$. We have to show that $P = i_{u_{\tau}}(R, t') \sigma$.

We have that $P = g$, and $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$ for $n + 1 \leq j \leq m$. Therefore, we deduce that $P = k^+_1(R, t') \subseteq \mathcal{H}(P)$.

By definition of $\sigma$, we have that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$, and we deduce that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$ of the semantics of the predicates $k^-$ and $k^+$. Therefore, we have that $P = k^+_1(X, t) \sigma$, $P = B_{\sigma} \tau$

for $i \in \{ 1, \ldots, n \}$, and $P = f$. This allows us to conclude that $P = H_{\sigma} \tau$.

\Box

Lemma 8: Let $P$ be a ground process, and $K$ be a knowledge base such that $P = f$ for any $f \in K$. Let $h$ be a statement such that $P = h$. We have that $P = g$ for any $g \in K \cup h$.

Proof. In case $K \cup h$ is $K \cup \{ h \}$ the result trivially holds. Otherwise, we have that
Note that $PKK$ be a statement: $\sigma$ was applied to unifier. As $jw$ such that $P \models h'$. Let $\tau$ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for $h'$ and such that $P \models Br$. In particular, we have that $P \models k^+_{u}(X,x) \tau$, and by definition of a statement, we have that $w' \tau$ is a prefix of $w \tau$. Thus, we have also that $P \models k^+_{u}(X,x) \tau$. Note that $\tau$ is grounding for $h$, and since $P \models h$, we have that $P \models k^+_{u}(X,x) \tau$. Due to the semantics of $k^-$ and $k^+$, we have that $P \models k^+_{u}(X,x) \tau$ and $P \models k^+_{u}(X,x) \tau$. This allows us to conclude that $P \models i_u(X,R) \tau$. □

Lemma 9: Let $P$ be a ground process, and $K$ be a knowledge base such that $P \models f$ for any $f \in K$. We have that $P \models g$ for any $g \in \mathcal{H}_e(K)$.

Proof. We show this result by structural induction on the proof tree witnessing the fact that $H \in \mathcal{H}_e(K)$ relying on Proposition 1 to conclude when the proof tree is reduced to a leaf. □

Given a proof tree $\Pi$, we denote by $|\Pi|$ its size, i.e. its number of nodes.

Lemma 10: Let $K$ be a saturated knowledge base and $f \in K$ be a statement:

$$f = (H \Leftarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n).$$

If $\sigma$ is a substitution grounding for $f$ such that $B_i \sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ then we have that $H \sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$.

Proof. By hypothesis we have that $B_i \sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. Therefore there exist proof trees $\Pi_1, \ldots, \Pi_n$ witnessing these facts. We show the result by induction on $\sum_{i=1}^n |\Pi_i|$.

If $f$ is a solved statement, the conclusion is immediate by the definition of $\mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$. Otherwise, if $f$ is not a solved statement, there exists some $B_j$ ($1 \leq j \leq n$) such that $B_j = k^+_{u'}(X_j,t_j)$ and $t_j \notin X$. As $B_j \sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$, it follows that there exists $g = (k^+_{u'}(X_j,t_j) \Leftarrow B_{n+1}, \ldots, B_m) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ and a substitution $\sigma'$ grounding for $g$ such that $B_{n+1} \sigma', \ldots, B_m \sigma' \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$, $*_{j} \leq *_{j}$, $R_j \sigma' = X_j \sigma$, $t_j \sigma' = t_j \sigma$, $u_t \sigma' = u_t \sigma$ with $u_t$ prefix of $w_j$, and proof trees $\Pi_{n+1}, \ldots, \Pi_m$ witnessing $B_{n+1} \sigma', \ldots, B_m \sigma' \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ such that $\sum_{i=n+1}^m |\Pi_i| < |\Pi_j|$.

As $\omega = \sigma \cup \sigma'$ is a unifier of $H' = k^+_{u'}(R_j,t_j)$ and $k^+_{u'}(X_j,t_j)$, it follows that the two terms are unifiable. Let $\tau = \mathcal{M}(k^+_{u'}(R_j,t_j), k^+_{u'}(X_j,t_j))$ denote their most general unifier. As $K$ is saturated, it follows that the RESOLUTION rule was applied to $f$ and $g$ and therefore the resulting statement

$$h = (H \Leftarrow B_1, \ldots, B_{j-1}, B_{j+1}, \ldots, B_m) \tau$$

must be in $K$. Note that in case $H$ is of the form $k^+_{u}(R,t)$ we know that $t \notin X$ since $f \in K$ and $K$ is a knowledge base.

Therefore, by the update function, statement $h$ is added to the knowledge base.

As $\omega$ is a unifier of $H' = k^+_{u'}(R_j,t_j)$ and $k^+_{u'}(X_j,t_j)$, whereas $\tau$ is the mgu, it follows that there exists $\omega'$ such that $\omega = \tau \omega'$. We have that $\omega'$ is a substitution grounding for $h$, and we have that

- $B_i \tau \omega \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, j-1, j+1, \ldots, m\}$, and
- $\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} |\Pi_i| = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} |\Pi_i| + |\Pi_j| + \sum_{i=j+1}^{n+1} |\Pi_i| > \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} |\Pi_i| + \sum_{i=n+1}^{n+m} |\Pi_i| = \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} |\Pi_i| + \sum_{i=j+1}^{n+m} |\Pi_i|.

Therefore we can apply the induction hypothesis to $h$ and $\omega'$ and conclude. □

Lemma 11: Let $K$ be a saturated knowledge base. If $k^+_{u'}(R,t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ and $k^+_{u'}(R',t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ then $i_{u'}(R,R') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ for some $w$ prefix of $uv$.

Proof. As $k^+_{u'}(R,t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$, we know that there exist

$$f = (k^+_{u'}(S, s) \Leftarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$$

and a substitution $\sigma$ grounding for $f$ such that $B_i \sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$), $*_{\tau} \leq *_{\sigma}$, and $k^+_{u'}(S, s) \tau = k^+_{u'}(R',r) \sigma$ for some $w'$ prefix of $u$.

Similarly, as $k^+_{u'}(R',t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$, we know that there exist

$$g = (k^+_{u'}(S', s') \Leftarrow B'_1, \ldots, B'_m) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$$

and a substitution $\sigma'$ grounding for $g$ such that $B'_i \sigma' \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ ($1 \leq i \leq m$), $*_{\tau} \leq *_{\sigma'}$, and $k^+_{u'}(S', s') \sigma' = k^+_{u'}(R',t) \sigma'$ for some $w'$ prefix of $w$.

We have that $\omega \sigma$ is a prefix of $u$ which implies that $\omega \sigma$ is a prefix of $uv$, and we know that $w \sigma'$ is a prefix of $w$. Let $w = l_1, \ldots, l_p$ and $w' = l'_1, \ldots, l'_q$. Suppose $q \leq p$, the other case being symmetric. We have that $l_1, \ldots, l_q \sigma = l'_1, \ldots, l'_q \sigma'$. We have that $\sigma \cup \sigma'$ is a unifier of $\langle l_1, \ldots, l_q, s \rangle$ and $\langle l'_1, \ldots, l'_q, s' \rangle$. It follows that $\tau = \mathcal{M}(\langle l_1, \ldots, l_q, s \rangle, \langle l'_1, \ldots, l'_q, s' \rangle)$ exists. As $K$ is saturated, it follows that the equational statement

$$h = (i_{l_1, \ldots, l_q}(S, s') \Leftarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n, B'_1, \ldots, B'_m) \tau \in K$$

resulting from applying the EQUATION rule to $f$ and $g$ is in $K$. As $\sigma \cup \sigma'$ is a unifier of $\langle l_1, \ldots, l_q, s \rangle$ and $\langle l'_1, \ldots, l'_q, s' \rangle$, and $\tau$ is the mgu of these two terms, it follows that there exists $\omega$ such that $\sigma \cup \sigma' = \tau \omega$. We have that $\omega$ is grounding for $h$ and that

$$B_1 \tau \omega, \ldots, B_n \tau \omega, B'_1 \tau \omega, \ldots, B'_m \tau \omega \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$$

Therefore, we have by Lemma 10 that

$$i_{l_1, \ldots, l_p}(S, s') \tau \omega = i_{l_1 \sigma, \ldots, l_p \sigma}(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}).$$

As $\langle l_1, \ldots, l_p \rangle \sigma$ is a prefix of $uv$ we conclude. □

Proposition 2: Let $S$ be a set of seed statements and $K \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(S))$. We have that:
\begin{itemize}
\item If \( r_u \in \mathcal{H}(S) \) then \( r_u \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \); and
\item If \( k_u^n(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(S) \) then there exists \( R' \) such that \( k_u^n(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) and \( i_u(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \).
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Proof.} Let \( H_0 = r_u \) or \( H_0 = k_u^n(R, t) \) be such that \( H_0 \in \mathcal{H}(S) \). We will prove this result by induction on the proof tree witnessing the fact that \( H_0 \in \mathcal{H}(S) \). We proceed by case distinction on the last rule applied to derive \( H_0 \).

\textbf{Case} \textit{Conseq.} There is a statement
\[ f = \left( H = B_1, \ldots, B_n \right) \in S \]
and a substitution \( \sigma \) grounding for \( f \) such that \( H_0 = H\sigma \) and \( B_i\sigma \in \mathcal{H}(S) \). W.l.o.g. assume that \( B_i = k_w^*(X_i, s_i) \). By the induction hypothesis, we have that there exist \( R_1^i, \ldots, R_n^i \) such that:
\begin{itemize}
\item \( k_w^*(R_i^i, s_i\sigma) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \); and
\item \( i_w\sigma(X_i, s_i^\sigma) \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \).
\end{itemize}

Let \( \sigma' \) be the substitution defined to be \( \sigma \) except that it maps \( X_i \) to \( R_i^i \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq n \). We will show that \( H_0' \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \). As \( K \) was updated by \( f \), there are two different cases:

1. If \( f \in K \), we conclude by Lemma 10.
2. Otherwise, we have that \( f = k_w^*(S, x) \Leftrightarrow B \) with \( k_w^*(X, x) \in B \), and in such a case we have that \( h = (i_w(S, X) = B) \) in \( K_{\text{solved}} \). Moreover, by definition of a (seed) statement, we have that \( \ast \geq \ast' \). Let \( R' = X\sigma' \). Since \( B = B_1, \ldots, B_n \) and \( B_i\sigma' \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), we have that \( i_w\sigma'(X_i, X_i\sigma') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \). We also have that \( k_w^*(X_i, s_i\sigma') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \), and thanks to the EXTEND rule, we deduce that
\[ k_w^*(X\sigma', s\sigma') = k_w^*(X\sigma', s\sigma') = k_w^*(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \]

Note that, in case \( \ast \neq \ast' \), since we know that \( \ast \geq \ast' \), we deduce that \( \ast = \ast' \) and \( \ast' = \ast' = \ast' \), and therefore we conclude that \( k_w^*(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) relying on the \textit{WEAKENING} rule. Since \( i_w\sigma(X_i, s_i^\sigma) \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), we have also thanks to the EXT rule that \( i_w\sigma(X_i\sigma, R_i^i) \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), and thus \( i_w\sigma(S\sigma, X\sigma') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \). Note that \( u\sigma' = u\sigma \), and therefore thanks to the \textit{TRANS} rule, we have that:
\[ i_w\sigma(S\sigma, X\sigma') = i_w(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \]

\textbf{Case} \textit{EXTEND}. In such a case, we have that \( H_0 = k_w^n(R, t) \) and \( k_w^n(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(S) \) for some prefix \( u \) of \( w \), in which case by the induction hypothesis we know that there exists \( R' \) such that \( k_w^n(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) and \( i_u(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \). We conclude that \( k_w^n(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) and \( i_u(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \) by applying the rules \textit{EXTEND} and \textit{EXT}.

\textbf{Case} \textit{WEAKENING}. In such a case, we have that \( H_0 = k_w^n(R, t) \) and \( k_w^n(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(S) \). By induction hypothesis, we have that there exists \( R' \) such that \( k_w^n(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) and \( i_u(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \). We conclude that \( k_w^n(R', t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) by applying the \textit{WEAKENING} rule. \qedhere

We are now able to establish the completeness part of Theorem 2.

\textbf{Proposition 3:} Let \( P \) be a ground process and let \( K \) be a knowledge base such that \( K \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(P)) \). If \( (P, 0) \xrightarrow{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} (Q, \varphi) \) then we have that:
\begin{enumerate}
\item \( r_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \);
\item if \( \varphi \models_R^T t \) then \( k_w^+(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \);
\item if \( \varphi \models_R^T t \) and \( \varphi \models_R^T t' \), then \( i_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n}(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \).
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{Proof.} We prove each item separately.
\begin{enumerate}
\item Thanks to Theorem 1, we have that \( r_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} \in \mathcal{H}(\text{seed}(P)) \). Therefore, thanks to Proposition 2, we know that \( r_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) \( \subseteq \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \). This allows us to conclude.
\item Thanks to Theorem 2, we have that \( k_w^+(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) and \( i_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n}(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \).
\end{enumerate}

This allows us to conclude that \( k_w^+(R, t) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}}) \) and \( i_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n}(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}_e(K_{\text{solved}}) \).

\textbf{D. Soudness and completeness of the algorithm}

\textbf{Lemma 2:} Let \( P \) be a ground process, \( \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}^P \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \) (resp. \( \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}}^P \subseteq \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}} \)) be the finite set of public names (resp. guessable names) occurring in \( P \), and \( K^0 \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P, \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}^P, \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}}^P))) \). We have that \( K \subseteq K^0 \cup S \) for some \( K \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(P)) \) and a set \( S \) containing statements of the form:
\begin{itemize}
\item \( k_w^n(n, n) \Leftrightarrow \) for any \( n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \);
\item \( k_w^n(g, g) \Leftrightarrow \) for any \( g \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}} \);
\item \( i_w(n, n) \Leftrightarrow \) for any \( n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \cup \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}} \);
\item \( i_u(R_1, \ldots, R_k) \Leftrightarrow B \) where \( (R_0, R'_0) = (n, n) \) for some \( 1 \leq i_0 \leq k \), and \( n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \cup \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}} \).
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Proof.} First observe that any name \( n \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}} \cup \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}}^P \) (respectively \( g \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}} \cup \mathcal{N}_{\text{gus}}^P \)) does not appear in the seed, except
in the statement $k_\gamma(n, n) \iff (\text{respectively } k_\gamma^p(g, g) \iff)$. Therefore, the statement $k_\gamma(n, n) \iff (\text{respectively } k_\gamma^p(g, g) \iff)$ is never used in the Resolution rule of the satisfaction, and any knowledge statement in $\text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P, N_g, N_{\text{guess}})))$ is also in $\text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P, N_g, N_{\text{guess}}))) \subseteq S$. Similarly, as $n$ and $g$ only unify with itself (or with a variable, but this case is forbidden by well-formedness of statements) they only trigger the equation rule to produce statements $i(n, n) \iff$ and $i(g, g) \iff$. However, any statement of this type is also included in $S$. Finally, if statements $i(n, n) \iff$ or $i(g, g) \iff$ are used to trigger the Test rule, we obtain a resulting statement already included in $S$.

□

Given a frame $\phi$ and $g \in N_{\text{guess}}$ such that $g$ is guessable from $\phi$. We write $\phi \models M, N g$ to point out the recipes $M$ and $N$ that witness this fact.

**Lemma 12**: Let $P$ be a ground process and $(P', \varphi)$ be such that $(P, \emptyset) \rightarrow_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} (P', \varphi)$ and $g \in N_{\text{guess}}$ such that $g$ is guessable from $\varphi$. Let $K = \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(P))$. We have that $i_w(M, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ for some recipes $M$, $N$, and some $w \subseteq \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n$, and $\varphi \models M, N g$.

Proof. Since $g$ is guessable from $\phi$, we know that there exists $M$ and $N$ such that $\phi \models M, N g$. Therefore, we have that

1) $(M = N) \phi$; and
2) $(M \{g \rightarrow g'\} \neq N\{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$ for some new name $g'$.

Thus, we have that $\phi \vdash^+_t M$ and $\phi \vdash^+_t N$ for some term $t$, and thanks to the completeness part of Theorem 2, we have that $i_w(M, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ where $w = \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n$. We will show that it implies that $i_{w'}(M', N') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$, for some $w'$, $M'$, and $N'$ such that $w' \subseteq w$ and $\phi \models M', N' g$.

We proceed by induction on the proof tree witnessing the fact that $i_w(M, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$.

Base cases: Note that the reflexivity case is excluded since we know that $\phi \models M, M g$. Thus, it only remains the trivial case where $i_w(M, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$.

Inductive cases: We proceed by case analysis on the last rule applied to derive the proof tree.

**SYM**

\[
i_w(M, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})
\]

Since $\phi \models M, N g$ we have that $\phi \models N, M g$ and, applying our induction hypothesis, on the proof tree for $i_w(N, M)$, we conclude.

**TRAN**

\[
i_w(M, M_1), i_w(M_1, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})
\]

Thanks to the soundness part of Theorem 2, we have that $P \models i_w(M, M_1)$ and $P \models i_w(M_1, N)$. Hence, if $(P, \emptyset) \rightarrow_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} (P', \varphi)$, we have that $(M = M_1) \phi$ and $(M_1 = N) \phi$. Now, assume that $(M \{g \rightarrow g'\} = M_1 \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$ and $(M_1 \{g \rightarrow g'\} = N \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$. This would imply that $(M \{g \rightarrow g'\} = N \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$, and lead to a contradiction. Hence, we have that either $(M \{g \rightarrow g'\} \neq M_1 \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$ or $(M_1 \{g \rightarrow g'\} \neq N \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$, which implies that either $\phi \models M, N g$ or $\phi \models M_1, N g$. Therefore, we can apply our induction hypothesis on the proof tree allowing one to derive $i_w(M, M_1)$ or $i_w(M_1, N)$, and conclude.

\[
i_w(M, N) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})
\]

We conclude by applying our induction hypothesis on the proof tree allowing one to derive $i_w(M, N)$, and transitivity of the relation $\subseteq$.

**CONG**

\[
i_w(M_1, N_1) \ldots i_w(M_k, N_k) \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})
\]

Let $M = f(M_1, \ldots, M_k)$ and $N = f(N_1, \ldots, N_k)$. We have from the soundness part of Theorem 2 that $(M = N) \phi$, and $((M_1 = N_1) \phi, \ldots, (M_k = N_k) \phi)$. In order to conclude relying on our induction hypothesis, we have to show that there exists $j$ such that $(M_j \{g \rightarrow g'\} \neq N_j \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$. By contradiction, assume that for all such $j$ that $1 \leq j \leq k$, we have that $(M_j \{g \rightarrow g'\} = N_j \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$. Therefore, we have that $(M \{g \rightarrow g'\} = N \{g \rightarrow g'\}) \phi$, which leads to a contradiction.

Hence we have shown that there exist $M'$, $N'$, and $w' \subseteq w$ such that $i_w(M', N') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ and $\varphi \models M', N' g$.

□

**Lemma 13**: Let $K$ be a saturated knowledge base such that:

- $\tau_u \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ with $\#\text{guess}(u) = n$; and
- $i_u(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ with $u_i \subseteq u$ and $\#\text{guess}(u_i) < i$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$.

We have $\tau_u(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ where $(\overrightarrow{R}, \overrightarrow{R'}) = ((\overrightarrow{R_1}, \ldots, \overrightarrow{R_n}), (\overrightarrow{R'_{i_1}}, \ldots, \overrightarrow{R'_{i_n}}))$.

Proof. As $\tau_u \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$, by Definition of $\mathcal{H}$, there exists a solved statement $g = (\tau_u \models B) \in K_{\text{solved}}$ and a substitution $\sigma$ grounding for $g$ such that $\forall b \in B, b\sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ and such that $u = uv\sigma$. As $i_u(R_1, R_1'), \ldots, i_u(R_k, R_k') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ there exist, by definition of $\mathcal{H}$, solved statements $f_1 = (i_u(T_1, T_1')) \models B_1, \ldots, f_k = (i_u(T_k, T_k')) \models B_k$ and substitutions $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_k$ respectively grounding for $f_1, \ldots, f_k$ such that $\forall b \models B_i\tau_i, b \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ and $u_i = w_i\tau_i, R_i = T_i\tau_i$ and $R'_i = T'_i\tau_i$, for all $i, 1 \leq i \leq k$.

Since $w_i\tau_i = u_i$ and $u_i \subseteq u$, $1 \leq i \leq k$, there exists a mgu $\omega$ such that $\omega = \text{mgu}(u, w_1, \ldots, w_k)$. Let $\sigma$ be defined such that $(\sigma \cup \tau_1 \cup \ldots \cup \tau_k) = \omega\tau$.

As the knowledge base is saturated the Test saturation rule must have fired for $f_1, \ldots, f_k$ and $g$. Therefore $K$ must have been updated with $h$ where

$h = (\tau_u(T, T')) \models B, B_1, \ldots, B_k \omega$

But as $h$ is not a deduction fact, the update must have simply added $h$ to $K$ and therefore $h \in K$.

We have that $\forall b \in B, b\omega\tau = b\sigma \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ and that $\forall b \in B_i, 1 \leq i \leq k, b\omega\tau = b\tau_i \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$ for
all $1 \leq i \leq k$. Applying Lemma 10 to the statement $h$ and the substitution $\pi$, we obtain that $r_{i_0, \pi}(T_{\omega_1}T_{\omega_2}) = r_{i_0}(R, R') \in \mathcal{H}(K_{\text{solved}})$.

Lemma 14: Let $P$ be a ground process, and $\{c_1, \ldots, c_r\}$ names that do not occur in $P$. Let $\varphi_0$ be the empty ifme. If

$$(P_0, \varphi_0) \xrightarrow{\ell_1} (P_1, \varphi_1) \xrightarrow{\ell_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{\ell_n} (P_n, \varphi_n)$$

and

$$(P_0, \varphi_0) \xrightarrow{\ell'_1} (P'_1, \varphi'_1) \xrightarrow{\ell'_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{\ell'_{n'}} (P'_{n'}, \varphi'_{n'})$$

such that $\ell_1 \downarrow, \ldots, \ell_n \downarrow = (\ell'_1 \downarrow, \ldots, \ell'_{n'} \downarrow)$ for some substitution $\pi$ that replaces constants $\{c_1, \ldots, c_r\}$ by messages, then we have that $P'_{n'} = P_n \pi \downarrow$ and $\varphi'_{n'} = \varphi \pi \downarrow$.

Proof. We show this result by induction on the length of the derivation. Note that, when $n = 0$, the result trivially holds. Therefore, we assume that $P'_{n-1} = P_n \pi \downarrow$ and $\varphi'_{n-1} = \varphi \pi \downarrow$, and we show that $P'_n = P_n \pi \downarrow$ and $\varphi'_{n} = \varphi \pi \downarrow$. By hypothesis, we know that $(P_{n-1}, \varphi_{n-1}) \xrightarrow{\ell_n} (P_n, \varphi_n)$, $(P'_{n-1}, \varphi'_{n-1}) \xrightarrow{\ell'_{n}} (P'_n, \varphi'_{n})$, and $\ell_n \downarrow = (\ell'_{n} \downarrow) \pi \downarrow$. We proceed by case distinction depending on the action $\ell_n$.

Case $\ell_n = \text{out}(c)$ for some $c$. In such a case, we have that $P_{n-1} = \text{out}(c, t)$.U and $P'_{n-1} = \text{out}(c, t').U'$ for some $t, t', U$, and $U'$ such that $t' \downarrow = t \downarrow$ and $U' \downarrow = U \downarrow$. We have that:

- $(P_n, \varphi_n) = (U, \varphi_{n-1} \cup \{\{u \mid \text{dom}(\phi_{n-1} + 1) \to t \})$.
- $(P'_n, \varphi'_n) = (U', \varphi'_{n-1} \cup \{\{u \mid \text{dom}(\phi'_{n-1} + 1) \to t \})$.

It is easy to see that $P'_n \downarrow = P_n \pi \downarrow$ and $\varphi'_{n} = \varphi \pi \downarrow$.

Case $\ell_n = \text{in}(c, t)$ for some $c$ and some $t$. In such a case, we have that $P_{n-1} = \text{in}(c, x).U$ and $P'_{n-1} = \text{in}(c, x).U'$ for some $x, U$, and $U'$ such that $t' \downarrow = t \downarrow$. Let $\ell'_{n} = \text{in}(c, t')$.

By hypothesis, we know that $\{t \downarrow = (t \downarrow) \pi \downarrow$. We have that:

- $(P_n, \varphi_n) = (U \{x \to t \downarrow \}, \varphi_{n-1} \downarrow$).
- $(P'_n, \varphi'_n) = (U' \{x \to t' \downarrow \}, \varphi'_{n-1} \downarrow$).

Therefore, we have that:

- $\varphi \pi \downarrow = \varphi_{n-1} \downarrow = \varphi'_{n-1} \downarrow$.
- $P_n \pi \downarrow = (\{U \pi \downarrow \mid \{x \to (t \downarrow) \pi \downarrow \} \downarrow = P'_n \pi \downarrow$.

Case $\ell_n = \text{test}^-$ or $\text{test}^+$. In such a case, we easily conclude relying on our induction hypothesis.

Case $\ell_n = \text{guess}(g)$ for some $g$. Again, we easily conclude relying on our induction hypothesis.

Lemma 15: Let $P$ be a ground process and let $K$ be a saturated knowledge base associated to $P$. For any statement $f \in K$, we have that:

1) If $f = (k^*_i \ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t)$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$.
2) If $f = (\ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ then there exists $w_j \in t_1, \ldots, t_m$ with $k' < k$ such that $x \in \text{vars}(t_j)$.
3) If $f = (\ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ then there exists $w_j \in t_1, \ldots, t_m$ with $k' < k$ such that $x \in \text{vars}(t_j)$.

Proof. The seed states satisfy these properties, and they are preserved by update and saturation.

Lemma 16: Let $P$ be a ground process and $K$ be a saturated knowledge base associated to $P$. For any statement $f \in K$, we have that:

- If $f = (k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t)$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$.
- If $f = (\ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$.
- If $f = (\ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$.

Proof. The seed states satisfy this property and this property is preserved by update and saturation.

Lemma 17: Let $P$ be a ground process and let $K$ be a saturated knowledge base associated to $P$. For any statement $f \in K$, we have that:

1) If $f = (k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t)$.
2) If $f = (\ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$.
3) If $f = (\ell_i, t_i) \Leftrightarrow \{k^*_{i,m}(X_i, t_i)\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ and $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ then $x \in \text{vars}(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$.

Proof. The seed states satisfy these properties. These properties are preserved by saturation.

We may note that the update operator may introduce a recipe variable in the head of the resulting identical statement. However, this happens only when a statement of the form $f = k^*_{i,r}(R, x) \Leftrightarrow B$ with $k^*_{i,r}(X, x) \in B$ has been generated either though the saturation procedure or is initially present in the set of seed statements. In both cases, we have that $R \notin \mathcal{Y}$.

Therefore, considering the resulting statement which is of the form $i_u(R, X) \Leftrightarrow B$ it remains to show that the property is satisfied for $X$. The property is trivially satisfied when $* = +$. Therefore, we consider the case where $* = -$. In such a case, we have that $* = +$, and thanks to the additional property defined in item 1, we know that $X$ is a strict subterm of $R$. This allows us to conclude.

Theorem 4: Let $P$ be a ground process, and $K \in \text{sat}(K_{\text{init}}(\text{seed}(P)))$. If $P$ is guess reachable then $\text{GUESS-REACHABILITY}(P, K_{\text{solved}})$ holds.
Proof. If $P$ is guess reachable then there exists an execution witnessing this fact:

$$(P, \emptyset) \overset{\ell_1}{\rightarrow} (P_1, \varphi_1) \ldots \overset{\ell_n}{\rightarrow} (P_n, \varphi_n) = (\emptyset, \varphi).$$

Let $k$ be the number of guesses in this execution trace, and $p_1, \ldots, p_k$ be the indices where these guess actions occur in this trace. Relying on the completeness part of Theorem 2 we have that

$$r_{i_1, \ldots, i_n} \in H_e(K_{\text{solved}})$$

By definition of $H_e$, we have that it contains no reachability statements in addition to those in $H$. Therefore $r_{i_1, \ldots, i_n} \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$. Thanks to Lemma 12, we have that:

$$i_{i_1, \ldots, i_n} (R_{p_1}, R'_{p_1})_i \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$$

for some $R_{p_1}, R'_{p_1}$ such that $\varphi_{p_1-1} \vdash R_{p_1}, R'_{p_1}, g_i$ with $p_i < p_1$, and where $g_i \in N_{\text{guess}}$ is the guess occurring in the $p_i$th action of the execution trace. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 13, in order to deduce that

$$\overrightarrow{f} = r_{i_1, \ldots, i_n} (\overrightarrow{R}, \overrightarrow{R'}) \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$$

where $\overrightarrow{R} = (R_{p_1}, \ldots, R_{p_k})$, and $\overrightarrow{R'} = (R'_{p_1}, \ldots, R'_{p_k})$. By definition of $H$, we know that there exists a statement $f$ in $K_{\text{solved}}$:

$$f = r_{i_1, \ldots, i_n} (\overrightarrow{S}, \overrightarrow{S'}) \leftarrow k_{w_1}^1(X_1, x_1), \ldots, k_{w_n}^m(X_m, x_m)$$

and a substitution $\sigma$ such that $\ell_i, \tau = i_1, \ldots, i_n$ with $1 \leq i \leq n$, $\overrightarrow{S} \sigma = \overrightarrow{R}$, and $\overrightarrow{S'} \sigma = \overrightarrow{R'}$; and $k_{w_i}^j(X_j, x_j) \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$ with $1 \leq j \leq m$.

We call $\alpha = (\overrightarrow{R}, F, f, \tau)$ a witness and define its size $sz(\alpha) = (s, s')$ where $s, s'$ are integers such that:

- $s = \sum_{i=1}^{k} |R_i| | g_i \text{ does occur in } R_i \} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \{ |R'_i| \mid g_i \text{ does occur in } R'_i \};$ and
- $s' = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \{ |R_i| \mid g_i \text{ does not occur in } R_i \} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \{ |R'_i| \mid g_i \text{ does not occur in } R'_i \}.$

Observe that $s + s' = \sum_{i=1}^{k} (|R_i| + |R'_i|)$. Moreover, for each test $R_i, R'_i$, we may note that either $R_i$ or $R'_i$ contributes to the measure $s$. We suppose without loss of generality that we choose the witness $\alpha = (\overrightarrow{R}, F, f, \tau)$ whose size is minimal in the lexicographic order.

Let $\sigma_1 : \{x_1, \ldots, x_m\} \rightarrow \{c_1, \ldots, c_r\}$ be a bijection. Let $\sigma_2$ be a substitution such that $\text{dom}(\sigma_2) = \{X_1, \ldots, X_m\}$, and $\sigma_2(X_j) = x_j \sigma_3$. According to Lemma 15 and Lemma 16, $\sigma_1 \circ \sigma_2$ is a grounding substitution for $f$. We obtain that:

$$r_{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n} (\overrightarrow{S} \sigma_2, \overrightarrow{S'} \sigma_2) \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$$

By Theorem 2 (soundness), it follows that:

$$(P, \emptyset) \overset{\ell_1}{\rightarrow} (P'_1, \varphi'_1) \ldots \overset{\ell_n}{\rightarrow} (P'_n, \varphi'_n) = (0, \varphi')$$

Let $\tau = \tau_1 \uplus \tau_2$ where $\tau_1$ (resp. $\tau_2$) has the same domain as $\sigma_1$ (resp. $\sigma_2$). Let $\pi_1$ be the substitution such that $\text{dom}(\pi_1) = \{c_1, \ldots, c_r\}$, and $\pi_1(c_j) = \tau_1(\sigma_1^{-1}(c_j))$. Therefore, we have the two following derivations:

1) $$(P, \emptyset) \overset{\ell_1}{\rightarrow} (P'_1, \varphi'_1) \ldots \overset{\ell_n}{\rightarrow} (P'_n, \varphi'_n) = (0, \varphi')$$

2) $$(P, \emptyset) \overset{\ell_1}{\rightarrow} (P_1, \varphi_1) \ldots \overset{\ell_n}{\rightarrow} (P_n, \varphi_n) = (0, \varphi').$$

As $i_1 \downarrow \ell_1 \tau_1 = \ell_1 \sigma_1 \pi_1$ we can apply Lemma 14, and obtain that $P_i = P_i \pi_1$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, and $\varphi = \varphi \pi_1$.

It remains to establish the validity of execution 1 w.r.t. $\rightarrow$, i.e.

$$(P, \emptyset) \overset{\ell_1}{\rightarrow} (P'_1, \varphi'_1) \ldots \overset{\ell_n}{\rightarrow} (P'_n, \varphi'_n) = (0, \varphi').$$

For this we need to show that the side conditions corresponding to negative tests actions and guess actions are satisfied.

Regarding negative test actions, assume that the 4th action in the ground process $P$ is a negative test of the form $a_i = [s_i \neq t_i]$ that is instantiated in $[s_i \neq t_i]$ in the derivation 2 and in $[s_i \neq t_i]$ in the derivation 1. Moreover, we have seen that $P_i = P_i \pi_1$, therefore we have that $s_i = s_i \pi_1$ and $t_i = t_i \pi_1$. Assume by contradiction that $s_i \neq t_i \pi_1$ for some $i$. Therefore, we have that $s_i \neq t_i \pi_1 = t_i \theta \pi_1$, and thus $s_i = t_i \theta$. Since, derivation 2 is a valid execution w.r.t. $\rightarrow$, we know that $s_i \theta \neq t_i \theta$. Hence, we obtain a contradiction.

Regarding guess actions, we need to show to show that:

$$(S_1 \sigma_2 \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) \varphi \downarrow \neq (S_1' \sigma_2 \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) \varphi \downarrow \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq k.$$ 

Let $i_0 \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$. We first establish the following claim.

Claim. Let $k_{j1}^{i1}(X_{j1}, x_{j1})$ and $k_{j2}^{i2}(X_{j2}, x_{j2})$ be two hypotheses of $f$ such that $x_{j1} = x_{j2}$, and $|w_{j1}|, |w_{j2}| < p_{i0}$. Moreover, in case $*j_1 = +$ (resp. $*j_2 = -$), we assume that $X_{j1}$ (resp. $X_{j2}$) occurs in $S_{i_0}$, or $S'_{i_0}$. In such a case, we have that:

$$(X_{j1} \tau \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) = X_{j2} \tau \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) \varphi$$

Proof of the claim. In case $*j_1 \neq *j_2$, we know that $g_i$ does not occur neither in $X_{j1} \tau$ nor in $X_{j2} \tau$, and therefore we easily conclude that:

$$(X_{j1} \tau \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) = X_{j2} \tau \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) \varphi$$

In case $+ \in \{*j_1, *j_2\}$, we know in addition that $X_{j1}$ or $X_{j2}$ occurs in $S_{i_0}$ or in $S'_{i_0}$. Assume by contradiction that:

$$(X_{j1} \tau \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) \neq X_{j2} \tau \{ g_i \rightarrow g'_i \}) \varphi$$

Thanks to Lemma 11, since $k_{j1}^{i1}(X_{j1}, x_{j1})$ and $k_{j2}^{i2}(X_{j2}, x_{j2})$ are both in $H(K_{\text{solved}})$, we have that $i_{w_1}(X_{j1} \tau, X_{j2} \tau) \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$ for some $w \not\subseteq w_{j1}$ with $i = 1$ or $i = 2$. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 13 again considering the same elements as those introduced at the beginning of the proof of our Theorem but replacing $i_{w_1}(R_{p_0}, R'_{p_0}) \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$ with $i_{w_1}(X_{j1} \tau, X_{j2} \tau) \in H(K_{\text{solved}})$. Then, by definition of
$\mathcal{H}$, we will obtain the existence of another statement $f'$ that witnesses guess reachability. As $+ \in \{*_{j_1}, *_{j_2}\}$, by Lemma 17 the size of the new witness is smaller than the size of our previous witness. Hence, we contradict the minimality of the previously chosen witness which concludes the proof of the claim.

From now on, we suppose w.l.o.g. that for $f$, we have that:
- if $|w_i| < p_{i_0}$ then $i < j$;
- if $|w_i| > p_{i_0}$, $*_{j} = -$, and $*_{j} = +$ then $i < j$;
- if $|w_i| < |w_j| < p_{i_0}$, $*_{j} = -$, and $*_{j} = -$ then $i < j$;
- if $|w_i| > w_j$ then $*_{j} = -$.

In other words, we assume that the hypotheses of $f$ are ordered by putting together the hypotheses $k^-$ with increasing world (until reaching world of size $p_{i_0}$), and then the hypotheses $k^+$ that contribute to the test $S_{i_0}$.

Let $\tau_{2,i_0}$ be the substitution such that $\tau_{2,i_0}(X_i) = \tau_2(X_{\text{least}(i)})$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$ where $\text{least}(j) = \min\{i \mid x_i = x_j\}$. In other words, we change some recipes. However, thanks to our previous claim, we preserve some equalities between messages. Therefore, relying on Lemma 16, we have that:

- $(S_{i_0}\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g'_{i_0})) = (S_{i_0}\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))$, and hence $(R_{i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g_{i_0}) = (S_{i_0}\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))$;
- $(S_{i_0}'\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0})) = (S_{i_0}'\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))$, and hence $(R_{i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g_{i_0}) = (S_{i_0}'\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))$.

Now, we assume, by contradiction, that:

$$(S_{i_0}\sigma_2(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))' = (S_{i_0}'\sigma_2(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))'$$

Let $\pi_{1,i_0}$ be $\pi_1$ restricted to the constants that occur in $\ell_1 \sigma_2, \ldots, \ell_{p_{i_0}} \sigma_2$ and that are those that may occur in $\phi' \{w_1, \ldots, w_{o(i_0)}\}$ where $o(i_0)$ is the number of outputs occurring before the action guess$(g_{i_0})$ in the trace under study. Applying $\pi_{1,i_0}$ on both sides of the equality, we deduce that

$$(S_{i_0}\sigma_2(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))' \pi_{1,i_0} = (S_{i_0}'\sigma_2(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))' \pi_{1,i_0}.$$  

We have that:

- $\sigma_2 = \sigma_2' \cup \sigma_2''$,
- $\tau_{2,i_0} = \tau_{2,i_0}' \cup \tau_{2,i_0}''$.

We need to establish $\text{dom}(\tau_{2,i_0})$, so we have:

$$(S_{i_0}\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}) \phi) = (S_{i_0}'\tau_{2,i_0}(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}) \phi)$$

We now consider a substitution $\pi$ that maps constants that do not occur in $\ell_1 \sigma_2, \ldots, \ell_{p_{i_0}} \sigma_2$ but that occur in either $S_{i_0} \sigma_2$ or $S_{i_0}' \sigma_2$ to messages such that $\pi(\sigma_2(X)) = (X \tau_{2,i_0}'(g_{i_0} \mapsto g''_{i_0}))$. Note that $\pi$ is defined since in case $\sigma_2(X) = \sigma_2''(Y)$ and variables $X$ and $Y$ occur either in $S_{i_0}$ or in $S_{i_0}'$, we have that $X \tau_{2,i_0} = Y \tau_{2,i_0}$.