

One critic for two actors

Nicolas P. Rougier

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ONE CRITIC FOR TWO ACTORS

NICOLAS ROUGIER, INRIA ROBOTICS & NEUROSCIENCES, BORDEAUX, 2016

STARRING CEREBRAL CORTEX, BASAL GANGLIA & THALAMUS SPECIAL GUEST HEBBIAN LEARNING, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING & COVERT LEARNING IN COOPERATION WITH THOMAS BORAUD, DAISUKE KASE, CAMILLE PIRON & MEROPI TOPALIDOU HTTP://WWW.LABRI.FR/PERSO/NROUGIER/ PLAYING NOVEMBER 17TH, 2016


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(1) the reasonable sort, whereby we accede to rational arguments (2) the sort that is triggered by external circumstances, such as overhearing a rumor; (3) the sort that is prompted by our submission to something within ourselves, such as a habit formed by past actions; (4) the sort that results from a sudden change of mood such as might be caused by a feeling of grief; and (5) the rare sort that is a consequence of our own voluntary choice, which will be identified as the "will to believe."

William James, 1890




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William James, 1890

The transition from reflex action to volitional is not abrupt and sharp. Familiar instances of individual acquisition of motor coordination are furnished by the cases in which short, simple movements, whether reflex or not, are by practice under volition **combined into new sequences and become in time habitual** in the sense that though able to be directed they no longer require concentration of attention upon them for their execution.


Charles Sherrington, 1906



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Brain is optional

- Decision-making without a brain: how an amoeboid organism solves the two-armed bandit (2016) Chris R. Reid, Hannelore MacDonald, Richard P. Mann, James A. R. Marshall, Tanya Latty, Simon Garnier
- Habituation in non-neural organisms: Evidence from slime moulds (2016) Romain P. Boisseau, David Vogel & Audrey Dussutour
- A two-neuron system for adaptive goal-directed decision-making in Lymnaea (2016) Crossley M., Staras K., Kemenes G.
- Functional organization and adaptability of a decision-making network in Aplysia (2012) Nargeot R., Simmers J.
- Neuronal microcircuits for decision making in C. Elegans (2012) Faumont S., Lindsay T.H., Lockery, S. R.
- Decision-making in soccer game: a developmental perspective (2005) Rulence-Pâquesa P., Frucharta E., Drub V., Mullet E.

Rougier & Hutt, 2012


A dual particle system (degenerated neural field) whose initial state governs final state.

 $dx/dt = \alpha(1 - x) + (x - y)(1 - x), x > 0$ $dy/dt = \alpha(1 - y) + (y - x)(1 - y), y > 0$

Noise (i.e. initial position) induces symmetry breaking and final decision.



The executive decision maker Brazil, Terry Gilliam, 1985



The habit factor




The habit factor

A tentative definition

Yin and Knowlton (2006), Graybiel (2008), Seger and Spiering (2011)

- Elicited by a particular context or stimulus
 → stimulus-response as opposed to action-outcome
- Acquired via experience
 → require extensive training or repetition
- Performed automatically

 → the mere presence of the stimulus induces the response
- Resistant to outcome devaluation
 → disengagement from the goal
- Performed unconsciously
 → without "thinking" about it



A simple question

Action-outcome then stimulus-response?

Action-outcome comes first until being transformed into stimulus-response

Action-outcome versus stimulus-response?

Both processes are present and compete for expression

Action-outcome with stimulus-response?

Final decision is a mix of both processes

Action-outcome and stimulus-response?

Processes cooperate and influence each other, always

Main structures

Cortex (CTX)

- Posterior
- Motor / Premotor
- Prefrontal

Thalamus (THL) Amygdala (AMY) Striatum (STR)

- · Caudate
- Putamen
- Nucleus Accumbens


Subthalamic Nucleus (STN)

Globus Pallidus

- Internal (GPi)
- External (GPe)

Subtantia Nigra

- · pars Compacta (SNc)
- pars Reticulata (SNr)




Functional pathways


Direct pathway (go pathway) CTX → STR → GPi/SNr → THL → CTX

Indirect pathway (no go pathway) $CTX \rightarrow STR \rightarrow GPe \rightarrow GPi/SNr \rightarrow THL \rightarrow CTX$ $\rightarrow STN \rightarrow THL \rightarrow CTX$


Hyperdirect pathway (stop pathway) $CTX \rightarrow STN \rightarrow GPi/SNr \rightarrow THL \rightarrow CTX$




Segregated loops



Dopamine as RPE




Sutton & Barto, 1998



Schulz et al., 1997


Daw et al. (2005)

"A broad range of neural and behavioral data suggests that the brain contains multiple systems for behavioral choice, including one associated with prefrontal cortex and another with dorsolateral striatum. However, such a surfeit of control raises an additional choice problem: how to arbitrate between the systems when they disagree. Here, we consider dual-action choice systems from a normative perspective, using the computational theory of reinforcement learning. We identify a key trade-off pitting computational simplicity against the flexible and statistically efficient use of experience. The trade-off is realized in a competition between the dorsolateral striatal and prefrontal systems..."




Dezfouli et al. (2013)

"... Model-based reinforcement learning (RL) has been argued to underlie the goal-directed process; however, the way in which it interacts with habits and the structure of the habitual process has remained unclear. According to a flat architecture, the habitual process corresponds to model-free RL, and its interaction with the goal-directed process is coordinated by an external arbitration mechanism. Alternatively, the interaction between these systems has recently been argued to be hierarchical, such that the formation of action sequences underlies habit learning and a goaldirected process selects between goal-directed actions and habitual sequences of actions to reach the goal..."




Ashby et al. (2007)

"... The model assumes 2 neural pathways from sensory association cortex to the premotor area that mediates response selection. A longer and slower path projects to the premotor area via the striatum, globus pallidus, and thalamus. A faster, purely cortical path projects directly to the premotor area. The model assumes that the subcortical path has greater neural plasticity because of a dopamine-mediated learning signal from the substantia nigra. In contrast, the corticalcortical path learns more slowly via (dopamine independent) Hebbian learning..."




Piron et al. (2016)

"... Said differently, we managed to explicitly dissociate reinforcement learning from Hebbian learning and demonstrated covert learning inside the basal ganglia. These results suggest that a behavioral decision results from both the cooperation (acquisition) and competition (expression) of two distinct but entangled memory systems, the goal-directed system and the habit system that may represent the two ends of the same graded phenomenon.




Two-armed bandit

- → Humans
- → Monkeys
- → Rodents
- \rightarrow Birds (Krebs et al. 1978)
- \rightarrow Fish (Thomas et al. 1985)
- → Bees (Keasar et al. 2002)
- \rightarrow Slime mould (Reid et al. 2016)
- \rightarrow Photon (Naruse et al. 2015)






Two-armed bandit



A long series... LEBLOIS ET AL. (2006) MISSING IN ACTION (FEW LINES OF C) GUTHRIE ET AL. (2013) DEAD (GOOO LINES OF DELPHI) TOPALIDOU ET AL. (2015) PIRON ET AL. (2016)(200 LINES OF PYTHON) We redo Science ! TOPALIDOU ET AL. (IN PREP) ESCOBAR ET AL., 2016 NALLAPU ET AL., 2016 CARREIRE ET AL., 2015


RESCIENCE.GITHUB.IO



DANA framework

A unit is a set of arbitrary values that can vary along time under the influence of other units and learning.

- Distributed
 - → no supervisor
- Asynchronous
 - → no central clock
- Numerical
 - → no symbol
- Adaptative
 - → to learn something



We want to make sure that emerging properties are those of the model and not those of the software running the model.

Computational model

Cortex

- Posterior
- Motor / Premotor
- Prefrontal

Thalamus Striatum (STR)


- Caudate
- Putamen
- Nucleus Accumbens

Subthalamic Nucleus (STN) Globus Pallidus

- Internal (GPi)
- External (GPe)

Subtantia Nigra

- pars Compacta (SNc)
- pars Reticulata (SNr)



Computational model

Dopamine + Reinforcement learning

- Cognitive cortex to cognitive striatum
- Motor cortex to motor striatum


Lateral Competition + Hebbian learning


- Cognitive cortex to associative cortex
- Motor cortex to associative cortex

Lesion

- Motor GPi to motor thalamus
- Cognitive GPi to cognitive thalamus








Intact model (GPi On)


Faster decision (before learning)



Lesioned model (GPi Off)


Slower decision (before learning)







Saline / GPi ON

Muscimol / GPi OFF









Saline / GPi ON


Muscimol / GPi OFF

Covert learning




Covert learning





 10 first trials
 D2 (saline)
 10 last trials




Muscimol / GPi OFF


Saline / GPI ON

Covert learning





 10 first trials
 Day 2 (Saline)
 10 last trials



Muscimol / GPi OFF

Saline / GPI ON

Conclusion


Habit acquisition and habit expression


- → These are two different processes even though they're entangled
- → Basal ganglia serves as an implicit supervisor
- → Habit can be expressed outside BG (at least in the primate)

The critic role of the BG

- → Basal ganglia serves as a generic critic, for any "actor"
- → No experimental evidence yet for the role of the cortex
- → Ongoing experiments to measure RL vs HL influence on behavior

Habits are a graded phenomenon





Questions ?

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M. TOPALIDOU

THINKING, PLEASE WAIT

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M. TOPALIDOU

C. PIRON

Questions ?

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M. TOPALIDOU