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An Application of SMC to continuous validation of heterogeneous systems

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the rigorous design of Systems of Systems (SoS), i.e. systems composed of a series of heterogeneous components whose number evolves with time. Such components coalesce to accomplish functions that they could not achieve alone. Examples of SoS include (among many others) almost any application of the Internet of things such as smart cities or airport management systems.

Dynamical evolution of SoS makes it impossible to design an appropriate solution beforehand. Consequently, existing approaches build on an iterative process that takes its evolution into account. A key challenge in this process is the ability to reason and analyze a given view of the SoS, i.e. verifying a series of goals on a fixed number of SoS constituents, and use the results to eventually predict its evolution.

To address this challenge, we propose a methodology and a tool-chain supporting continuous validation of SoS behavior against formal requirements, based on a scalable formal verification technique known as Statistical Model Checking (SMC). SMC quantifies how close the current view is from achieving a given mission. We integrate SMC with existing industrial practice, by addressing both methodological and technological issues. Our contribution is summarized as follows: (1) a methodology for continuous and scalable validation of SoS formal requirements; (2) a natural-language based formal specification language able to express complex SoS requirements; (3) adoption of widely used industry standards for simulation and heterogeneous systems integration (FMI and UPDM); (4) development of a robust SMC tool-chain integrated with system design tools used in practice. We illustrate the application of our SMC tool-chain and the obtained results on a case study.

Keywords

Systems of systems, statistical model checking, FMI, tool chain, simulation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Context and challenges.

A System of Systems (SoS) is a large-scale, geographically distributed set of independently managed, heterogeneous Constituent Systems (CS). Those entities are collaborating as a whole to accomplish functions/goals that could not be achieved otherwise by any of them, if considered alone [26]. Those goals can either be global to the system, or local to some of its constituents. Constituent Systems are loosely coupled and pursue their own objectives, while collaborating for achieving SoS-level objectives. An SoS adapts itself to its environment through (1) an evolution of the functions provided by its Constituent Systems and (2) an evolution of its architecture. A typical example of an SoS is the Air Traffic Management System of an airport, which coordinates incoming and outgoing aircraft as well as ground-based vehicles and controllers. Such an SoS may evolve in order to accommodate a larger number of passengers, difficult climatic conditions or a modification in the laws regarding security.

Misbehaviors of the functions provided by an SoS can be dangerous and costly. Therefore, it is important to identify a set of analysis and tools to verify that the SoS implementation meets functional and non functional requirements and correctly adapts to changes of the environment during any phase of the design and operation life-cycle. The manager of a SoS should be able to run these analysis in order to take decisions regarding the evolution of the SoS. The main characteristics of an SoS have been long debated since [26]. Nevertheless, one of the key characteristics of an SoS is dynamical evolution, that is, the fact that Constituent Systems may evolve, leave, fail, or be replaced.

In fact, dynamical evolution of SoS makes it impossible to design an appropriate solution beforehand. Consequently, the design flow of a SoS is reiterated multiple times during the operation of the SoS, in order to adapt to its evolutions. As a summary, SoS rigorous design methodologies thus introduce two major challenges. The first one is to check whether a given view of the system (i.e. a fixed number of components) is able to achieve a mission. The second challenge is to exploit the solution to the first challenge in an engineering methodology that permits dynamical evolution.
of the system in case new missions are proposed, in case the environment has changed, or in case the current view cannot achieve the mission. This design approach has been followed by the DANSE project which developed a new SoS design and operation methodology [15].

Contributions.

This paper focuses on Challenge one described above, that is to reason on a given view of the system. A cornerstone to solve the challenge is to develop a usable language for expressing formal requirements independent from the number and identity of CSs and thus from the architectural choices.

In this paper, we propose Goal Contract Requirement Language (GCSL). This is a very expressive pattern-based language to specify requirements on an SoS and its CSs. The language uses an extension of OCL to express constraints independent of the view such as: “the total fire area (over a set of districts) is smaller than 1 percent of the total area of the districts.” By combining those constraints with temporal patterns, we express timing requirements on the behaviors of the view. For instance, the GCSL formula “always [SoS.itsDistricts.fireArea→sum()]<0.01→SoS.itsDistricts.area→sum()” checks that the above constraint is verified at any point of the simulation. A first version of GCSL was introduced in [27]. In this paper we propose additional patterns for expressing properties about the amount of time during which a given predicate remains satisfied. We show that GCSL is powerful enough to capture most of SoS goals and emergent behaviors proposed by our industry partners. The reader shall observe that the language can methodologically be extended to capture more requirements on demand.

The second main difficulty is to detect emergent behaviors and verify the absence of undesired ones. This requires a suitable verification technique. A first solution would be to use formal techniques such as model checking. Unfortunately, both the complexity and the heterogeneous nature of the constituent systems prevent this solution. To solve this problem, we rely on Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [37]. SMC works by monitoring executions of the system, and then use an algorithm from the statistics in order to assess the overall correctness. Contrarily to classical Validation techniques, SMC quantifies how close the view is from achieving a given mission. This information shall later be exploited in the reconfiguration process.

The objective of the paper is not to improve existing statistical algorithms, but rather to expand the SMC verifier Plasma [9] which proposes several algorithms such as Monte Carlo or hypothesis testing. In order to implement an SMC algorithm for SoS, one has to propose a simulation approach for heterogeneous components as well as a monitoring approach for GCSL requirements. While a GCSL monitor is easily obtained by translating GCSL to Bounded Temporal Logic (BLTL) as in [6], simulating SoS requires that one defines a formal representation for SoS constituents. In this work, we exploit the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) [33] standard as a unified representation for heterogeneous systems. In recent years, the development of DESYRE, a new simulator, provided us joint simulation for FMI/FMU. One of the main contributions of the paper is a full integrated tool-chain between the statistical model checker Plasma [9], FMI/FMU, and DESYRE. This tool-chain is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one that offers a full SMC-based approach for the verification of complex heterogeneous systems.

The third main difficulty of our work is to make sure that the technology will be accepted by practitioners, both in terms of usability and in terms of seamless integration with existing industrial practice and tools. Our first contribution provides a solution for expressing requirements. However, we need a language to specify the system itself. In this paper, we propose to support wide-spread industry standards for SoS. This is done by exploiting UPDM [34] for SoS architecture design and the FMI standard for constituent systems. We build on Rhapsody which is a tool used to describe UPDM views, that we enrich with probability distributions. The latter capture uncertainty on the environment so that the verification accounts for predictions on environment’s evolution. We then integrate the Constituent Systems behavioral models with the UPDM architecture through the FMI standard. By exploiting our SMC tool chain, we thus provide the full integration of our SMC-based tool for FMI/FMU within Rhapsody.

Our approach has been illustrated on a firefighting SoS, at the scale of a city. The constituent systems are the districts of the city, the cars, the firemen, the fire stations and the central command center. We show how our tools are used to model the architecture and the constituents systems of the SoS. The architecture indicates how the Constituent Systems cooperate to provide an emergent behavior, namely the extinction of the fires. Using our tool chain, we evaluate the probability of this emergent behavior.

Structure of the paper.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a summary of the Statistical Model Checking approach adopted in our tool-chain. Following this, in Section 3 we introduce the GCSL formal language for specifying formal requirements on SoS and CSs behavior. Finally, in Section 4 the SMC tool-chain and its integration with existing industrial tools for System design. This tool-chain is demonstrated on an industrial case study in Section 5, where we show its application to a Fire Emergency Response system designed in DANSE [2], modeling a complex SoS that manages fire emergencies in a large city.

2. BACKGROUND ON STATISTICAL MODEL CHECKING

Analyzing Systems of Systems requires a careful choice of the verification technique to use. A first solution would be to use model checking. However, this formal approach often requires an input written in a dedicated language, which conflicts with industry acceptance. Even if a complete model were made in a suitable language, analysis would not be feasible because of the very large size of SoSs and its heterogeneous nature. Therefore, we rely on Statistical Model Checking (SMC), which is a trade off between testing and model checking. SMC works by simulating the system and verifying properties on the simulations. An algorithm from the statistic area exploits those results to estimate the probability for the system to satisfy a given requirement.

The quantitative results provided by SMC is richer than a Boolean one. Indeed, if the system does not satisfy the requirement, a Boolean tool returns “not satisfied” without any evaluation of the probability of a correct behavior.

In order to apply SMC, one has to assume that the be-
behavior of the system is governed by a stochastic semantic, that is the choice of the next state in an execution depends on a probability distribution. This hypothesis shall not be seen as a drawback. Indeed, most of SoS do make stochastic assumptions on their external environment or on their hardware. In case no distribution is known, one relies on the uniform distribution which has the maximal entropy.

In the rest of this section, we first present the BLTL logic used to express properties on system’s executions. Then, we present some statistical algorithms used by the SMC engine.

2.1 BLTL Linear Temporal Logic

In this paper, we focus on requirements of SoS that can be verified on bounded executions. This assumption is used to guarantee that the SMC algorithm will terminate. The bounded hypothesis shall not be viewed as a problem. Indeed, like it is the case in the testing world, it is sufficient to consider that the system has a finite live time.

Definition 1. Given a set of variables $V$ and their domain $D$, a state $s$ is a valuation of the variables, that is $s \in D^V$. A trace $\tau$ is a sequence of states and timestamps $(\sigma_0, t_0), \ldots, (\sigma_i, t_i)$, where $\forall i \; t_i \in \mathbb{R}^+ \land t_i < t_{i+1}$.

We present here BLTL, a variant of LTL [30] where each temporal operator is bounded. Properties of SoS will be expressed in GCSL, that instantiates to BLTL (see Section 3).

The core of BLTL is defined by the following grammar, where the time subscript $t$ is interpreted as an offset from the time instant where the sub-formula is evaluated:

$\varphi := \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid p \in AP \mid \varphi_1 \land \varphi_2 \mid \neg \varphi_1 \mid \varphi_1 U_{\leq} \varphi_2 \mid \exists_{\leq} \varphi$

$AP$ is a set of atomic predicates defined in Section 3.2. In our case, an atomic predicate depends on the past states.

The temporal modalities $F$ (the “eventually”) and $G$ (the “always”) can be derived from the “until” $U$ as $F \varphi = true U_{\leq} \varphi$ and $G \varphi = \neg F_{\geq} \neg \varphi$, respectively. The semantics of BLTL is defined with respect to finite traces $\tau$. We denote by $\tau, i \models \varphi$ the fact that a trace $\tau = (\sigma_0, t_0), \ldots, (\sigma_i, t_i)$ satisfies the BLTL formula $\varphi$ at point $i$ of execution. The meaning of $\tau, i \models \varphi$ is defined recursively:

$\tau, i \models \text{true}$ and $\tau, i \models \neg \varphi$;

$\tau, i \models p$ if and only if $p(\tau, i)$ (cf. Subsection 3.2);

$\tau, i \models \varphi_1 \land \varphi_2$ if and only if $\tau, i \models \varphi_1$ and $\tau, i \models \varphi_2$;

$\tau, i \models \neg \varphi$ if and only if $\tau, i \not\models \varphi$;

$\tau, i \models U_{\leq} \varphi_2$ if and only if there exists an integer $j \geq i$ such that (i) $t_j \leq t_i + t$, (ii) $\tau, j \models \varphi_2$, and (iii) $\varphi_k \models \varphi_1$, for each $i \leq k < j$;

$\tau, i \models \exists_{\leq} \varphi$ if and only if $\exists \alpha \; 0 \models \varphi$ where $k = \min \{j > i \mid t_j > t_i + t\}$ and $\varphi_k = ((\zeta'_0, t'_0), \ldots, (\zeta'_k, t'_{k-1}))$ with $t_i = s_{i+k}$ and $t'_i = t_{i+k}$.

Typically, a monitor, such as in [17], is used to decide whether a given trace satisfies a given property.

2.2 Statistical Model Checking

Given a stochastic system $M$ and a property $\varphi$, SMC is a simulation-based analysis technique [37, 32] that answers two questions: (1) Qualitative $i$: whether the probability $p$ for $M$ to satisfy $\varphi$ is greater or equal to a certain threshold $\vartheta$ or not; (2) Quantitative $i$: what is the probability $p$ for $M$ to satisfy $\varphi$. In both cases, producing a trace $\tau$ and checking whether it satisfies $\varphi$ is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable $B_i$ of parameter $p$. Such a variable is 0 ($\tau \not\models \varphi$) or 1 ($\tau \models \varphi$), with $Pr[B_i = 1] = p$ and $Pr[B_i = 0] = 1 - p$. We want to evaluate $p$.

Qualitative Approach.

The main approaches [36, 32] proposed to answer the qualitative question are based on Hypothesis Testing. In order to determine whether $p \geq \vartheta$, we follow a test-based approach, which does not guarantee a correct result but controls the probability of an error. We consider two hypotheses: $H : p \geq \vartheta$ and $K : p < \vartheta$. The test is parameterized by two bounds, $\alpha$ and $\beta$. The probability of accepting $K$ (resp. $H$) when $H$ (resp. $K$) holds is bounded by $\alpha$ (resp. $\beta$). Such algorithms sequentially execute simulations until either $H$ or $K$ can be returned with a confidence $\alpha$ or $\beta$, which is dynamically detected. Other sequential hypothesis testing approaches exists, which are based on Bayesian approach [22].

Quantitative Approach.

In [18, 23] Peyromet et al. propose an estimation procedure to compute the probability $p$ for $M$ to satisfy $\varphi$. Given a precision $\epsilon$, Peyromet’s procedure, which we call $PESIM$, computes an estimate $p'$ of $p$ with confidence $1 - \delta$, for which we have: $Pr(|p' - p| \leq \epsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$. This procedure is based on the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [19], which provides the minimum number of simulations required to ensure the desired confidence level.

The quantitative approach is used when there is no known approximation of the probability to evaluate, i.e. to obtain a first approximation. This method is useful when the goal of the analysis is to have a idea on how well the model behaves. On the contrary, the qualitative approach determines whether the probability is above a given threshold, with a high confidence and in a minimal number of simulations.

3. TIMED OCL CONSTRAINTS FOR SOS REQUIREMENTS

The challenge in promoting the use of formal specification languages in an industrial setting is essentially to provide a good balance between expressiveness and usability. In this section we present the requirements language, called GCSL (Goal and Contract Requirement Language). The full GCSL language specification, as well as the details of translation of the GCSL patterns into BLTL, can be retrieved in [3]. In this section we focus on providing a brief recap of the language and illustrate why it is appropriate to define SoS and CSs requirements. We also discuss an explicit contribution of this paper to GCSL.

3.1 A Survey of GCSL

A GCSL contract is a pair of Assume/Guarantee assertions denoting requirements on SoS and CSs inputs and outputs, respectively. Contracts allow us to decompose requirements and perform local or global verification on need. Assertions are built upon GCSL natural-language patterns, some of which are shown in Figure 1. GCSL patterns are inspired by and extend the Contract Specification Language (CSL) patterns [1], developed in the SPEEDS European project. These natural-language based requirements have their formal semantics defined by translation into corresponding BLTL formulas, enabling the application of SMC. To simplify the specification of properties of complex systems.
and architectures, GCSL integrates the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [35], a formal language used to describe static properties of UML models. OCL is an important means to improve the expressiveness and usability of GCSL patterns. Using OCL we can describe properties about types of CS in the SoS architecture, while being independent of their actual number of instances and, thus, defining requirements that are adaptable to the natural evolution of the SoS, without the need of rewriting them.

To show the expressiveness of GCSL, consider the following simple example (based on Pattern 12 from Fig. 1):

\[
\text{SoS.its(CriticalComponent)} \rightarrow \text{forAll(cc) whenever} \\
\quad (\text{cc.its(TempSensor)} \rightarrow \text{exists(ts | ts.temp > cc.threshold)}) \text{ occurs,} \\
\quad (\text{cc.connected(CoolingFan)} \rightarrow \text{exists(f | f.on)}) \\
\quad \text{occurs within [1 min, 5 min])}
\]

This architecture-abstract requirement says that if any CS of type CriticalComponent has one of its TempSensor measuring at time \(t\) a temperature that is higher than the threshold set by the specific CriticalComponent (the threshold may be different for distinct components) then one of the CoolingFan connected to that component should be switched on within the \([t-1\text{ min},t+5\text{ min}]\) time frame. This property does not depend on a concrete architecture or on the number of the mentioned CSs. It can be used as a requirement for any SoS that integrates the mentioned CSs types.

The idea of mixing OCL and temporal logic originates from the need of specifying static and dynamic properties of object-based systems. In [14, 39] OCL has been extended with CTL and (finite) LTL, respectively, without support for real-time properties. The work in [16] is more similar to ours and it is based on ClockedLTL, a real-time extension of LTL. ClockedLTL is slightly more expressive than BLTL, because it allows unbounded temporal operators, whereas BLTL is decidable on a finite trace.

Patterns provide a convenient way to represent frequently occurring and well-identified schemes, while avoiding errors due to the complexity of the underlying logic. The methodology developed during the DANSE project prescribes to have a library of patterns [3] that captures the most relevant temporal constraints for the considered domain. In the rest of this section we are going to discuss a number of these pre-defined patterns. The expressiveness of BLTL, jointly with OCL, makes the patterns library easy extensible to cover future, domain-specific needs.

Figure 1 shows some of the behavioural patterns of GCSL (all the patterns can be found in [3]). Patterns 2 and 3 are typical safety properties, where \(\Psi\) denotes an argument where an OCL property can be used to describe a state of the SoS. The translation of pattern 2 into BLTL states that the atomic property \(\Psi\) should be true at every real-time instant following discharging condition. Second, on the occurrence of \(\Psi\) the pattern requires a shift to time \(a\) (as close as possible, depending on the actual states produced by simulation) which is indicated by the next operator \(X_{\leq a}\). From that point onwards, we can check for the occurrence of the condition \(\Psi\) in the remaining interval using \(F_{\leq b-a}\).

### 3.2 Contribution to GCSL

Before illustrating the new patterns, we enrich the set of atomic predicates of BLTL with adequate timing operators.

#### On extending BLTL

Usually atomic predicates describe properties of system states, e.g. by comparing a variable with a constant. We propose here an extension where atomic predicates also depend on the past (i.e. from states before the current one). In particular, we are interested in measuring in time during which a given atomic predicate has been true. The syntax for our predicates is as follows:

\[
AP ::= \text{true} | \text{false} \mid AP \lor AP \mid Nexp \cdot AP
\]

\[
Nexp ::= \#Time \mid \text{Id} \mid \text{Constant} \mid \text{dur}(AP) \mid \text{occ}(AP, a, b) \mid \text{Nexp} \pm \text{Nexp}
\]

Here, \(\circ\) contains the usual boolean connectors, \(+\) the usual arithmetic operators, and \(\text{occ}\) the usual comparison operators. Given a trace \(\tau = (\sigma_0, t_0), \cdots, (\sigma_k, t_k)\) and a step \(i\), our predicates are interpreted as follows:

\[
[[true][\tau, i] = \text{true and } [[false][\tau, i] = \text{false;}}
\]

\[
[[\#Time][\tau, i] = i; \text{is the simulation time at step } i;}
\]

\[
[[\text{Id}][\tau, i] = \sigma_i(\text{id}) \text{ is the value of var } \text{id} \text{ at step } i;}
\]

Operators and comparisons have their usual semantics:

\[
[[\text{dur}(p)][\tau, i] = 0, \quad \text{if } i = 1,
\]

\[
[[\text{dur}(p)][\tau, i] = \text{dur}(p)(\tau, i-1), \quad \text{if } i > 1 \land \neg[[p][\tau, i-1],
\]

\[
[[\text{dur}(p)][\tau, i] = \text{dur}(p)(\tau, i-1) + t_i - t_{i-1}, \quad \text{otherwise.}
\]

The \(\text{dur}\) function computes the amount of time during which the predicate \(p\) has been true since the beginning of the trace. The \#Time notation returns the simulation time at the current point. The \text{occ} function computes the number of steps in which a predicate holds within the given time bound. For instance, \(\text{occ}_{\leq t}([\text{dur}(UP)] > 0.9 \cdot \#Time)\) is true if for every step between 0 and \(t\), the amount of time during which \(UP\) holds is at least 90% of the elapsed time.

#### On monitoring extended BLTL

In order to support the new \#Time and \text{dur} constructs, we extend the atomic predicates available in BLTL. Concerning the \#Time variable, we first recall that each state in a trace contains a timestamp, according to Definition 1. In-
deed, this value is necessary for verifying patterns involving time bounds. At a given state, each predicate is evaluated by replacing \#Time by the timestamp of that state. The predicate dur(\phi) is evaluated by accumulating the amount of time during which the predicate \phi evaluates to true, according to its semantics defined above.

**On GCSL extension.**

We are now ready to present our new contribution to GCSL, that is patterns 13 and 14. Those patterns are suitable for expressing safety and reliability constraints, such as the availability of a SoS. As shown in Figure 1, the BLTL translation of these patterns relies on the novel OCL-expr. Pattern 13 checks that, at each simulation point during [a,b], the amount of time during which \Psi has been seen to be true so-far is at least \epsilon\% of the currently elapsed simulation time. We use the operator dur to accumulate the overall time during which \Psi is true, and we compare the accumulated value with the required portion of the current simulation time, extracted with the operator \#Time, at each simulation point. Pattern 14 checks that, at time [b], the amount of time during which \Psi has been seen to be true is at least the required portion of b.

Figure 2 shows a (simplified) portion of the grammar defining the OCL integration within the GCSL atomic properties (indicated by OCL-prop). Properties are constructed using usual boolean operators (\land) and basic arithmetic comparisons (\geq \leq) between expressions. Attributes of Constituent Systems can occur in properties or expressions and can be accessed by using their Fully Qualified Name (FQN), such as SoS.Sensor03.isOn.

OCL propositions can describe properties about sets of Constituent Systems that are unknown at requirements-definition time. These sets are left undetermined because (1) the requirements may apply to several variant architectures of the same SoS and (2) the SoS architecture may evolve during the SoS life-cycle. Indeed in [26] one of the five SoS-specific properties of a complex system is that the number and type of systems participating to a SoS may change over time. Ideally, the specifications of the system should remain independent of the number and type of CSs, which is exactly what OCL provides as a feature within GCSL. In order to support properties that are parametrized by the SoS architecture, GCSL provides the quantifiers forAll and exists that allow us to instantiate properties over finite collections (OCL-coll) of Constituent Systems (the var ranges over these collections and occurs in the OCL-prop which is the scope of the quantifier). A corner case of quantification is provided by the set operators empty and notEmpty that simply return a truth value after testing the emptiness of the collection. Standard OCL allows to concatenate object names (here indicated as csName) by the "."-containment relation, until reaching an attribute. In GCSL we add (1) another (weak) containment operator (its) that allows to navigate the systems hierarchy in terms of CSs types and (2) an operator (connected) that allows to navigate the neighborhood of a CS, again in terms of types.

Quantifiers occur also in expressions (OCL-expr) and allow to aggregate the values of (equally-typed) attributes. E.g. the simple expression (SoS.its(Sensor).temp \rightarrow \text{sum}())/(SoS.its(Sensor) \rightarrow \text{size}()) can be used to compute the average temperature in a SoS independently of the number of CS of type Sensor.

Since BLTL does not interpret the OCL syntax (except for FQN), the translation from GCSL to BLTL is done once the architecture is fully known and fixed. OCL operators can be nested and their elimination is performed by induction over the structure of the formula in an outside-in fashion. Conceptually, this can be done by repeated application of three steps: (1) resolution of the outermost OCL collections (that is, replacing a collection with a finite set of FQN), which eliminates its and connected operators, (2) elimination of the universal (existential) quantifiers, replaced by the corresponding conjunctions (disjunctions) of the instantiated scopes, (3) elimination of the remaining operators by replacement with corresponding Boolean or arithmetic expressions, and (4) recursion on new outermost OCL collections. Termination of this procedure is trivially proved. In practice, this procedure is reiterated each time the SMC analysis is called in order to capture every architecture change.

### 4. SMC TOOL-CHAIN

This Section describes the tool-chain we have set-up to address the challenges listed in the introduction. The tool-chain has been adopted by the industry partners of the DANSE Project project, that are CARMEQ, IBM, EADS, and Thalès. The core of our SMC tool-chain is composed of three main tools: IBM Rhapsody is the tool implementing the UPDM language, DESYRE is the tool providing the joint simulation engine for SMC and PLASMA [9] is the tool providing the SMC analysis engine. A SoS model consists of a model of the architecture and a model of each Constituent System. Our choice is to use UPDM to describe the architecture, that is the interception between the instances of Constituent Systems. In order to encompass heterogeneity of the CSs model, our only requirement is that they comply with the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) [33]. Additional modeling and simulation tools like for example Modelica, JModelica, Dymola, Rhapsody and...
Simulink/StateFlow or any tool exporting models to FMI 1.0 can be seamlessly integrated with this core tool-chain thanks to our choice to adopt that standard. The remaining of this Section describes our core SMC tool-chain.

### 4.1 Describing SoS Architecture in IBM Rhapsody

UPDM, or Unified Profile for DoDAF\(^1\) and MoDAF\(^2\) [34], is a modeling language based on UML 2 standardized by the Object Management Group (OMG) in 2012. Profiles, such as UPDM, extend the UML meta-model in order to model specific systems. A profile basically includes additional modeling elements that are frequently used in that domain. IBM Rational Rhapsody [20] is a model-based system engineering environment implementing industry-standard languages such as UML, SysML and UPDM.

The SoS architecture is specified in Rhapsody by using UPDM, extended with a new profile enabling pseudo-random number generation according to uniform, normal or custom probability distributions. More precisely, this profile provides additional functions for constituent systems to which it is applied. These additional functions can be used inside constituent systems model whenever a random value is needed, for instance to model a sensor input, the waiting time before the occurrence of an event, or to make global hypotheses on the environment for future predictions.

Rhapsody provides a Java API for integration with external tools. We developed a Java Exporter Plug-in to translate informations from the UPDM SoS architecture model to a format intelligible by DESYRE, the joint simulation engine.

### 4.2 Performing Joint Simulation in DESYRE

Joint simulation capabilities are provided by DESYRE [27], a simulation framework based on the SystemC standard and its discrete-event simulation kernel. Inputs to DESYRE are the SoS architecture exported from Rhapsody and the Functional Mock-up Units (FMUs) associated to CS types. Joint simulation of several FMUs, that are units complying with the FMI standard, is implemented by a Master Algorithm (MA), with two alternatives. In co-simulation, each FMU embeds its own ODE solver and computes autonomously the evolution of its continuous-time variables. In model exchange, the MA is in charge of computing evolution of continuous-time variable. In general the implementation of a Master Algorithm (MA) is not a trivial task having to guarantee: (1) correctness of the composition according to the model(s) of computation (MoC) of both the host environment and the constituent FMUs, (2) termination of the integration step and (3) determinism of the composition. Challenges related to the implementation of Master Algorithms for model composition, have been extensively addressed in the literature. In [25] the authors define the operational and denotational semantics of the (hierarchical) composition of

\[\text{Algorithm 1 DESYRE FMI MA for DANSE.}\]

Synchronous Reactive (SR), Discrete Event (DE), and Continuous Time (CT) models. Termination and determinacy properties of MA for co-simulation are addressed in [10].

#### 4.2.1 DESYRE Master Algorithm

Within the context of the DANSE project a specific FMI Master Algorithm has been developed in DESYRE to address the unique needs of Systems of Systems simulation and SMC. The main focus is on simulation efficiency due to SoS model complexity and large observation (i.e. simulation) time span (up to several years) and to support large number of runs (tens or hundreds of thousands) as required by SMC analysis. The MA builds on a set of assumptions that are typically satisfied by the CS models used within the DANSE context. The choice of a MA for model exchange rather than co-simulation provides us with full control of the overall integration algorithm. The MA assumes that none of the FMUs contains direct feedback i.e. FMU output does not depend on the value of its inputs at the current simulation time, removing the need for a causality analysis during the fixed point computation at each step.

Lines 1 to 11 in Algorithm 1 represent the initialization phase, while lines 12 to 25 describe the SoS system simulation loop. The algorithm determines the time synchronization instants for the different FMUs composing the SoS model. Time synchronization points represent those time instants in which (1) the different FMUs are executed, (2) the generated outputs are propagated among their interfaces (line 16) and (3) FMU continuous state is updated (line 20). Synchronization points are calculated based on time events,

\[\text{Algorithm 1 DESYRE FMI MA for DANSE.}\]

Synchronous Reactive (SR), Discrete Event (DE), and Continuous Time (CT) models. Termination and determinacy properties of MA for co-simulation are addressed in [10].

#### 4.2.1 DESYRE Master Algorithm

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1Department of Defense Architecture Framework
2Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework
state events and step events notified by the different FMUs [33].

4.3 SMC Analysis in PLASMA

PLASMA is a tool for performing SMC analysis. Contrary to existing tools, PLASMA offers a modular architecture which allows to plug new simulators and new input languages on demand. This architecture has been exploited to verify systems and requirements from various languages/specific domains such as systems biology [13], a train station [11], or an autonomous robot [12].

The core of PLASMA is thus a set of SMC algorithms, which includes those presented in Subsection 2.2 as well as more complex ones [9]. This core is completed by two types of plug-ins, that are controlled by the SMC algorithm. First, the simulator plug-ins which implements an interface between PLASMA and a dedicated simulator to produce traces from a dedicated input language on demand. Second, there is a checker plug-ins that verify whether a finite trace satisfy a property.

In this paper we extended the facilities of PLASMA as follows. First, we built a new plug-in between PLASMA and DESYRE in order to produce traces from FMI-FMU model. Second, we used the BLTL checker plug-in that we enrich with the two new primitives dur and #Time in order to monitor those traces and report the answer to the SMC algorithm. As a last implementation effort, we also implemented a compiler from GCSL to BLTL.

5. A CASE STUDY

This section illustrates the application of our technology to a concept alignment example that was defined for the DANSE Project. This case study has the particularity to embed all the difficulties of the case studies proposed by EADS, THALES, and CARMEQ that, for confidentiality reasons, cannot be described in this paper.

5.1 Modeling

We modeled an emergency response SoS for a city fire scenario in UPDM. The city is partitioned into 10 districts, and we focus on a few fire-fighting constituent systems (CS). We consider the following CSs: the Fire Head Quarter (FireHQ), the Fire Stations, the Fire Fighting Cars and the Fire Men. The behavior of the CSs has been modeled in several FMI-compliant authoring tools. For example, the FireMan has been modeled in OpenModelica (as shown in Figure 3) which is an open-source multi-domain modeling tool based on the Modelica language. Other CSs have been modeled using Rhapsody state-charts. The CSs rely on the new UPDM profile to include probabilistic behavior. For instance, each District models occurrences of fires by randomly choosing the time before the next fire according to a exponential distribution. The time before a fire is reported to the head quarter is also randomly chosen. We remind the reader that the objective of this work is not to learn the probability distribution itself (this has to be done via observations), but rather to show that it is conceptually possible to incorporate such information within the model.

The SoS integrated architecture was built by instantiating the CSs and by specifying how to connect them through an Internal Block Diagram, shown in Figure 4. The SoS architecture is exported to DESYRE using a DANSE-specific exporter plug-in. Each CS behavioral model is exported from the corresponding authoring tool into FMUs, according to the FMI standard. This enables the DESYRE platform to simulate the whole SoS model and to plot some selected variables – see Figure 5 for an illustration.

The simulation is parameterized by its duration, expressed in the time of the model. For our experiments, we choose to simulate 10 000s of execution. Since our model of computation is event based, the computation time needed for running this simulation depends on the number of events occurring during the simulation. Whenever there are few events, such as in the top of Figure 5, the simulation takes a few seconds. In that case, there is no event between two pikes, corresponding to two fires that are very quickly extinguished. Simulations involving more events, such as the one at the bottom of the Figure, require a few dozen of seconds to complete. In that case, fires are not extinguished and the time between two events is kept small to describe the evolution of the fire.

5.2 Expressing Goals of the SoS

Our main objective is to check that the fire area remains small enough. In order to define “small enough” independently of the number of components, we require that the fire is less than a given percentage of the total area.

In our model, each district has two variables of interest, its area and the fire area. Our first formulation states that the fire area is always less than X percent of the total area. The total fire area is
The traces are obtained by running stochastic simulations of the model. The length of a simulation is set to $\delta$.

We define Pattern 1 as follows:

For technical reasons, we define Pattern 2 as the negation of the above property, namely:

As Pattern 1 might be too strong, we propose an alternative formulation. More precisely, we allow the fire area to exceed $X\%$ of the total area, but no more than $10\%$ of the time. For technical reasons, we define Pattern 2 as the negation of the above property, namely:

Pattern 2 is true whenever the fire area is above the threshold for more than $10\%$ of the time, that is when the SoS behaves incorrectly. As we want the probability that the system behaves correctly, we have to compute the probability of the complementary event. This is done by subtracting the probability that Pattern 2 holds from 1.

One of the challenges in SoS design is the detection and analysis of unwanted emergent behaviour. In our case, simulation allowed us to detect an (undesired) emergent behaviour which is depicted in the lower part of Figure 5. Our analysis of this emergent behaviour is the evaluation of the probability of its occurrence. The first step is to define a GSCL pattern that characterizes the absence of the emergent behaviour. One key characteristic of this behaviour is that fires spread over entire districts. We assume that the emergent behaviour does not occur if there is no area where the fire has taken the whole district. This is specified in Pattern 3:

In order to obtain the probability presented in Table 2, we subtract from 1 the probability that Pattern 2 holds. We obtain the probability that the fire is smaller than $X\%$ of the total area for at least $90\%$ of the time (over 10000s). Again, since for each value of $X$ we ran a different set of simulations, it is not clear that the probability that the pattern holds increases when $X$ increases. With this more permissive definition, we see that even small fires have a low probability to stay on for more than $10\%$ of the simulation time. By comparing with Table 1, we can conclude that frequently occurring fires (i.e., very small ones) are quickly extinguished, because the probability of the last two lines are significantly higher in Table 2.

Finally, we evaluate the probability to obtain the unwanted emergent behavior depicted in Figure 5, that is the probability that Pattern 3 holds. The returned result is 0.9622, which means that the probability that the contract holds is between 0.8622 and 1 with a confidence of 99%.

As expected, the probability that the fire remains smaller than $X\%$ of the total area increases when $X$ increases. Indeed, “the fire area remains smaller than $X\%$ of the total area” implies that “the fire area remains smaller than $Y\%$ of the total area” for any $Y \geq X$. However, the probability returned is an approximation, with an error up to 0.1 with a confidence of 99%. Therefore, the fact that the probability decreases from 0.96 to 0.95 when $X$ increases from 0.01 to 0.1 is not significant. Indeed, the difference between the two values is less than the error. On the contrary, the difference between the probabilities obtained for $X = 0.0001$ and $X = 0.001$ are significant since they are more than twice the error. In our model, the total area is about 23 square kilometers. Therefore the two last lines of the table correspond to respectively an area of 23 and 2.3 square meters.

### Table 1: Probability that fire is always smaller than $X\%$ of the total area during 10000 seconds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X$</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Analysis Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.954716981</td>
<td>00:40:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.981132075</td>
<td>00:34:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.966037736</td>
<td>00:42:37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.939622642</td>
<td>00:36:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.973584906</td>
<td>00:42:59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.996222415</td>
<td>00:37:25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to obtain the probability presented in Table 2, we subtract from 1 the probability that Pattern 2 holds. We obtain the probability that the fire is smaller than $X\%$ percent of the total area for at least 90% of the time (over 10000s). Again, since for each value of $X$ we ran a different set of simulations, it is not clear that the probability that the pattern holds increases when $X$ increases. With this more permissive definition, we see that even small fires have a low probability to stay on for more than 10% of the simulation time. By comparing with Table 1, we can conclude that frequently occurring fires (i.e., very small ones) are quickly extinguished, because the probability of the last two lines are significantly higher in Table 2.

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### Table 2: Probability that fire area is smaller than $X\%$ percent of the total area at least 90% of the time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X$</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Analysis Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.984905666</td>
<td>03:34:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.954716981</td>
<td>03:39:54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.966037736</td>
<td>03:01:03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.939622642</td>
<td>03:36:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.603773585</td>
<td>02:28:49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.359943396</td>
<td>02:55:23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In our case, simulation allowed us to detect an (undesired) emergent behaviour which is depicted in the lower part of Figure 5. Our analysis of this emergent behaviour is the evaluation of the probability of its occurrence. The first step is to define a GSCL pattern that characterizes the absence of the emergent behaviour. One key characteristic of this behaviour is that fires spread over entire districts. We assume that the emergent behaviour does not occur if there is no area where the fire has taken the whole district. This is specified in Pattern 3:

$$\text{always } \{ \text{SoS.itsDistricts} \rightarrow \forall \text{All(district) | district.fireArea < district.area } \}$$

### Analysis and Discussions

In this section, we use SMC to compute an estimate of the probability for Pattern 1, 2 and 3 to hold. We use the PESTIM method which is parameterized by an allowed error $\epsilon$, and a confidence $1 - \delta$. We chose an error of 0.1 and a confidence of 0.99% ($\delta = 0.01$), which requires 265 simulations traces. These traces are obtained by running stochastic simulations of the model. The length of a simulation is set to 10000s. We present the analysis results and time for Pattern 1 in Table 1. The analysis result is an estimation of the probability that Pattern 1 holds, based on the 256 traces.

---

**Figure 5: Simulation results in DESYRE**

The sum of the fire area in each district, which can be expressed in GCSL by $\text{SoS.itsDistricts.fireArea} \rightarrow \text{sum()}$. We define Pattern 1 as follows:

As Pattern 1 might be too strong, we propose an alternative formulation. More precisely, we allow the fire area to exceed $X\%$ of the total area, but no more than $10\%$ of the time. We obtain the probability that Pattern 2 holds from 1.

As expected, the probability that the fire remains smaller than $X\%$ of the total area increases when $X$ increases. Indeed, “the fire area remains smaller than $X\%$ of the total area” implies that “the fire area remains smaller than $Y\%$ of the total area” for any $Y \geq X$. However, the probability returned is an approximation, with an error up to 0.1 with a confidence of 99%. Therefore, the fact that the probability decreases from 0.96 to 0.95 when $X$ increases from 0.01 to 0.1 is not significant. Indeed, the difference between the two values is less than the error. On the contrary, the difference between the probabilities obtained for $X = 0.0001$ and $X = 0.001$ are significant since they are more than twice the error. In our model, the total area is about 23 square kilometers. Therefore the two last lines of the table correspond to respectively an area of 23 and 2.3 square meters.
which explains why Pattern 1 and Pattern 2 do not occur with a probability of 1. This problem could be resolved by studying the causes of the emergent behavior and evolving the SoS to avoid it, for instance by adding more fire fighting cars.

At this level of analysis, a precision of 0.1 is sufficient to obtain a given general idea about the probability that each of the patterns occur. In general, using SMC requires to find the appropriate trade-off between the required precision and the time available for the analysis and subsequent re-engineering.

Our Patterns are independent on the actual number of components. Indeed, adding constituent systems such as districts or cars, even if they have a new behavior, do not require specifying new patterns. The analysis is still possible on the modified SoS model.

In the framework of the DANSE project, Industrial Partners built models of their SoS under analysis. SMC and other methods provided them a higher confidence in their models [4]. More precisely, one Partner verified Mean Time Between Failures (safety) requirements in an Air Traffic Control case study. Another Partner verified sufficient water availability (robustness to failures) in a water distribution system of national scale.

6. CONCLUSION, FUTURE WORK AND RELATED WORK

This paper proposes a full tool-chain for the rigorous design of Systems of Systems via formal reasoning and Statistical Model Checking.

Recent work promotes simulation techniques as the principal way to perform SoS analysis. In [38] the authors use discrete event specification (DEVS) concepts and tools to support virtual build and test of systems of systems. Their MSA-Me environment enables modeling and simulation (MkS) of SoS by allowing the user to specify constituent systems’ behavior in terms of a so-called Constrained Natural Language. The tool is implemented in Eclipse and employs Xtext, Eclipse Modeling Framework and the Graphical Modeling Project.

Recent work in [31] provides an overview of the underlying theory, methods, and solutions in MkS of systems of systems, to better understand how modeling and simulation can support the Systems of Systems engineering process. However, simulation is an incomplete analysis and it is not possible to assess the likelihood of the simulated behaviors. This is not acceptable from the point of view of SoS analysis, as it does not provide to the designer sufficient confidence of correctness. Other approaches to verification of complex systems are based on exhaustive formal analysis, such as model checking, or simulation-based formal analysis, such as run-time monitoring. Industrial model checking techniques [8] are not adequate to the complexity and dynamicity of SoS. Run-time monitoring does not seem to be adequate to the context of SoS, where failures detection should provide a likelihood estimate of the failure and sufficient time for devising failure-avoidance corrections. In this perspective, a very promising approach to provide sufficient coverage of the SoS behavior while keeping the analysis cost low is based on Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [37]. SMC is a simulation-based formal analysis providing an estimate of the likelihood of requirement satisfaction and a tunable level of confidence in the accuracy of analysis results.

Some frameworks, such as BIP [7] or Reo [5] allow the user to describe architecture of systems using alternative composition operators. Both these frameworks theoretically permit composition of heterogeneous systems, by including existing code into the components. However, they provide no standard such as FMI/FMU allowing to compile a particular component independently of the architecture, which make them unsuitable for an industrial environment. They both include a stochastic extension [29, 28], which is not part of the core framework.

Contracts for reasoning about heterogeneous systems are presented in [24]. However, these contracts are considered at a very abstract level, and thus are not as useful as FMI/FMU from an industrial point of view.

Future Work.

Our objective is to improve our solution by exploiting rare-event techniques [21] that would allow us to detect rare emergent behaviors with a minimal amount of simulations.

Our second future work is to automatize the relationship between the outcome of SMC and the reconfiguration process, in order to automatically find an architecture satisfying sufficiently the GCSL contracts.

7. REFERENCES


