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Chaotic Chebyshev polynomials based remote user authentication scheme in client-server environment

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Abstract. Perfect forward secrecy is considered as the most important standard to evaluate a strong authentication scheme. There are many results researched to achieve this property without using hard problems. Recently, the result of Chang et al has some advances such as, the correctness of schemes mutual authentication and session key agreement demonstrated in BAN-logic or the overheads reduction of system implementation. However, in this paper, we prove that their scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation attacks and session key leakage. To overcome those limitations and be practical, we use different notion to propose time efficient scheme conducted in experiment. Our proposed method can be applied for remote user authentication in various scenarios, including systems with user authentication using mobile or wearable devices.

Keywords: Authentication, Anonymity, Impersonation, Session key, Chaotic Chebyshev polynomials

1 Introduction

Nowadays, wireless communication is the necessary fundamental. With non-stop growth of handheld and wearable devices, there are many online services widely deployed on the Internet. Customers demand an immediate response, privacy and cryptography in their transactions with service providers. Therefore, incorporating mathematical results into user authentication schemes is an inevitable trend.

User authentication is the first task which any online service needs to perform. It is said that two basic standards a scheme should achieve are the security and time efficiency. However, simultaneously obtaining those goals is a difficult mission. As for security, there are many criteria and one of them is exactly user identification. Basic method [1] is storing a verification table including records (identity/password) on server side. When a user logs, the server checks the

existence of identity and password in the table. Although simple, this method is vulnerable to stolen verification attack. Furthermore, providing static identity through common channel is not suitable for some applications, such as mobile pay-TV [2] or online voting. To overcome those limitations, some authors proposed the notion of dynamic identity [3, 4, 5], but these results still have some drawbacks such as, symmetric message easy to replay attack or poor design easy to information injection attack. In general, most schemes employ one-way hash function which does not provide scheme with strong security. To enhance security, however, a method of using hard problems is more and more given consideration.

Typically, RSA [6] is one of popular methods incorporated into user authentication scheme, but main disadvantage is using certificates leading to additional computations to its verification. Clearly, this is not suitable for resource-limited handheld or wearable devices. Some authors publish the results [7, 8, 9] based on elliptic curve are considered reasonable for time efficiency and security. However, those results use a special kind of hash function, Map-To-Point which has non-negligible cost and is not standardized. Also, Chebysev polynomial is given consideration [10, 11] and its semi-group property is widely applied in global mobile networks environment [12] or public key based cryptosystems [13]. There are some algorithms [14] used in public key cryptosystem based on this approach. It is said that authentication scheme using Chebysev polynomial is better way to keep the tradeoff between time efficiency and security.

In 2013, Chang et al proposed the time efficiency scheme [15] with one-way hash assumption about collision resistant. Besides, the correctness of the scheme is proved based on BAN-logic [16]. Their scheme truly has some successes, for example, providing mutual authentication, achieving session key establishment and without using time-synchronized mechanism. However, their basic limitations are that challenge is only derived from server side and distribution of common secret information to all valid members. In this paper, we prove that Chang et al.'s scheme does not resist impersonation attack and fail to protect session key. Furthermore, it does not provide users anonymity in their transactions. Next, we apply semi-group of Chebysev polynomial for tradeoff balance and session key protection in generic client-server environment in which this approach has not been considered. In addition, our design has challenges derived from two parties, client and server, to make the fairness in transaction. Also, our scheme is proven correct according to BAN-logic. It is said that our result truly is enhanced security and efficiency in practice, including systems with user authentication using handheld or wearable devices to create smart interactive environments.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 quickly reviews Chang et al.'s scheme and discusses its limitations. Then, proposed scheme is presented in section 3, while section 4 discusses the security and efficiency of proposed scheme. Finally, our conclusions are presented in section 5.

2 Review and Cryptanalysis of Chang et al.'s Scheme

In this section, we review Chang et al.'s scheme [15] and show that their scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack. Besides, it cannot provide user's anonymity.

2.1 Review of Chang et al.'s Scheme

In this subsection, we review Chang et al.'s scheme. Their scheme includes four phases: registration phase, authentication phase, password change phase, and lost card revocation phase. Below are some important notations in this scheme:

- U_i : i^{th} user.
- id_i : U_i 's identity.
- pw_i : U_i 's password.
- S : Remote server.
- id_s : S 's identity.
- x, y : The secret keys of remote server.
- $h(\cdot)$: A cryptographic one-way hash function.
- sn_i : Smart card's serial number.
- SK : Common session key.
- SC : Smart-card.
- \oplus : exclusive-or operation.
- \parallel : concatenation operation.

Registration Phase U_i freely chooses a fixed length id_i and pw_i . Then U_i has to submit his/her id_i, pw_i to S through a secure channel. When receiving U_i 's message, S performs following steps.

- S randomizes 128-bit sized integer r_i . Then, S computes $R_1 = h(id_i \parallel x \parallel r_i)$, $R_2 = g^{xy} \bmod p$, where p is a large prime number and g is a primitive element in Z_p^* , and $R_3 = h(id_i \parallel R_2) \oplus h(pw_i)$.
- S issues a SC with a 32-bit sized sn_i , where sn_i has a specific format. Then, S combines sn_i with U_i 's id_i as $SID_i = (id_i \parallel sn_i)$.
- Finally, S saves R_1, R_2, R_3, SID_i and $h(\cdot)$ into SC and send it to U_i via a secure channel.

In this registration phase, we see that there are some problems: Because U_i sends plain pw_i to S , S knows user's true password and may try using it in another system. Furthermore, using two secret keys x and y is more security, but we should use only one with high entropy for enough security. Therefore, we will change this in our registration.

Authentication Phase When U_i accesses S , U_i inserts SC into terminal device and provides id_i and pw_i . Then SC performs following steps.

- SC computes $C_1 = R_3 \oplus h(pw_i)$ and $V_1 = R_1 \oplus C_1$.

- Next, SC randomly generates a 160-bit sized integer n_1 , then computes and $DID_i = h(R_2 \parallel n_1) \oplus SID_i$.
- Finally, SC sends $m_1 = \{DID_i, V_1, n_1\}$ to S via common channel.
- Upon receiving m_1 from U_i , S re-computes $SID_i = DID_i \oplus h((g^{xy} \bmod p) \parallel n_1)$. Then, S retrieves id_i and sn_i and checks their format. If they are valid, S continues to compute $R_1^* = V_1 \oplus h(id_i \parallel (g^{xy} \bmod p))$ and randomly generates 160-bit sized integer n_2 .
- Next, S computes $V_2 = h(R_1^* \parallel id_s \parallel n_1)$, $V_3 = h(h(id_i \parallel (g^{xy} \bmod p)) \parallel n_1) \oplus n_2$ and send $m_2 = \{id_s, V_2, V_3\}$ to U_i via common channel.
- Upon receiving m_2 from S , SC computes $V_2^* = h(R_1 \parallel id_s \parallel n_1)$ and check if $V_2^* \neq V_2$. If it holds, S is successfully authenticated; otherwise, the connection is terminated.
- SC obtains random value $n_2 = V_3 \oplus h(C_1 \parallel n_1)$ and generates $SK = h(n_1 \parallel SID_i \parallel R_2 \parallel n_2)$.
- Finally, SC computes $V_4 = h(SK \parallel (n_2 + 1))$ and send $m_4 = \{V_4\}$ to S via common channel.
- After receiving m_4 from U_i , S computes $SK = h(n_1 \parallel SID_i \parallel (g^{xy} \bmod p) \parallel n_2)$ and $V_4^* = h(SK \parallel (n_2 + 1))$. Next, S check if $V_4^* \neq V_4$. If it holds, U_i is successfully authenticated. Otherwise, the connection is terminated.

In their authentication phase, we see that only S generates random value n_2 to challenge U_i , while U_i 's n_1 is opened in a common channel. This design will limit random value's power in scheme. Furthermore, user's identity can be leaked because their scheme distributes $g^{xy} \bmod p$ to all users. We will analyze in next section.

Password Change Phase When U_i wants to change his/her pw_i , U_i can perform following steps.

- U_i inserts SC into another terminal device, and enters id_i, pw_i .
- SC computes $Q_1 = h(id_i \parallel R_2)$ and $Q_1^* = R_3 \oplus h(pw_i)$ and compares with each other. If $Q_1 = Q_1^*$, SC goes to next step; otherwise, the procedure is terminated.
- SC computes $R_3' = h(id_i \parallel R_2) \oplus h(pw_i) \oplus h(pw_i) \oplus h(pw_i')$ and replace R_3 with R_3' .

In their password change phase, we see that password update is performed without interacting with S . In our scheme, we will inherit this idea from [15].

Lost Card Revocation Phase When U_i discovers SC 's information is leaked, U_i can request S to revoke SC via a secure channel. When receiving revocation request, S validates U_i by checking U_i 's secret personal information. After successfully validation, S saves sn_i of revoked SC in the database and issue a new SC with new sn_i' for U_i . Finally, U_i chooses a new pw_i similarly to the steps in registration phase.

2.2 Cryptanalysis of Chang et al.'s Scheme

In this subsection, we present our results on Chang et al.'s scheme. We demonstrate that their scheme is vulnerable to impersonation and session-key stolen attacks. Besides, their scheme does not provide user's anonymity.

Inability to Protect User Anonymity In Chang et al.'s scheme, we see that another user sends $m_1 = \{DID_i, V_1, n_1\}$. However, important information ($g^{xy} \bmod p$) is distributed to all valid users. Hence, anyone who is legitimate user can steal other users' identity by performing following steps:

- Malicious user captures $m_1 = \{DID_i, V_1, n_1\}$
- Next, he/she obtains $SID_i = DID_i \oplus h((g^{xy} \bmod p) \parallel n_1)$
- Finally, he/she extracts id_i and sn_i from SID_i and knows who is authenticating with S .

Clearly, their scheme does not defend user's anonymity against attackers.

Impersonation Attack Because of inappropriate design, Chang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to server and user impersonation attack. First of all, we present the steps which another malicious user employs to masquerade as the server:

- Similarly to above steps, malicious user obtains another user's id_i and sn_i .
- With id_i , he/she computes $R_1^* = V_1 \oplus (id_i \parallel (g^{xy} \bmod p))$ and $V_2^* = h(R_1^* \parallel id_S \parallel n_1)$, which V_1 and n_1 belongs to $m_1 = \{DID_i, V_1, n_1\}$ which is captured by him/her.
- Next, he/she generates a random value n_2^* and computes $V_3^* = h(h(id_i \parallel (g^{xy} \bmod p)) \parallel n_1) \oplus n_2^*$.
- Finally, he/she sends $m_2^* = \{id_S, V_2^*, V_3^*\}$ to user.

Upon receiving m_2^* , U_i re-computes $V_2 = h(R_1 \parallel id_S \parallel n_1)$ and compares it with V_2^* . Clearly, they are equal and malicious user successfully impersonates S . Furthermore, he can impersonate another U_i authenticating with S . Following are some steps to masquerade as legitimate user.

- Malicious user captures $m_1 = \{DID_i, V_1, n_1\}$, he/she extracts SID_i by computing $SID_i = DID_i \oplus h(R_2 \parallel n_1)$, where R_2 is his/her smartcard's information.
- Afterwards, he/she generates a random value n_1^* and re-computes $DID_i^* = h(R_2 \parallel n_1^*) \oplus SID_i$.
- Next, he/she sends $m_1^* = \{DID_i^*, V_1, n_1\}$ to S .
- After receiving m_1^* , S computes and re-sends $m_2 = \{id_S, V_2, V_3\}$ to him/her. In this time, he/she computes $n_2 = V_3 \oplus h(h(id_i \parallel R_2) \parallel n_1^*)$, where id_i is obtained by him/her.
- With n_2 , he/she computes $SK^* = h(n_1^* \parallel SID_i \parallel R_2 \parallel n_2)$ and $V_4^* = h(SK^* \parallel (n_2 + 1))$.
- Finally, he/she sends $m_3^* = \{V_4^*\}$ to S .

After receiving m_3^* , S computes V_4 and compares it with V_4^* . Clearly, they are equal and malicious user successfully impersonate another legitimate U_i .

Session Key Attack Another malicious user can observe outside and compute common session-key SK by performing following steps:

- First of all, he captures three packages m_1 , m_2 and m_3 in common channel.
- Next, he computes $SID_i = DID_i \oplus h((g^{xy} \bmod p) \parallel n_1)$ and extracts id_i .
- Afterwards, he obtains n_2 by performing $n_2 = V_3 \oplus h((id_i \parallel R_2) \parallel n_1)$.
- Finally, he computes $SK = h(n_1 \parallel SID_i \parallel R_2 \parallel n_2)$.

Clearly, all data encrypted with session-key will be revealed.

3 Proposed Scheme

At first, we depict Chebyshev polynomial [17] which is our scheme's security foundation. Chebyshev polynomial has the form: $T_n(x) = \cos(n * \arccos(x))$, where n is an integer degree and $x \in [-1, 1]$. Besides, we have its recurrent formulas:

- $T_0(x) = 1$
- $T_1(x) = x$
- ...
- $T_{n+1}(x) = 2xT_n(x) - T_{n-1}(x)$ and $n \geq 2$.

Moreover, our scheme utilizes polynomial's semi-group property: $T_q(T_w(x)) = \cos(q * \arccos(\cos(w * \arccos(x)))) = \cos(qw * \arccos(x)) = \cos(wq * \arccos(x)) = \cos(w * \arccos(\cos(q * \arccos(x)))) = T_w(T_q(x))$.

Next, we propose an improved scheme that eliminates aforementioned security problems. Before presenting each phase, we present general ideas in our scheme. In registration phase, our main objective includes providing authentication key $h(X_S \parallel e)$ and storing $h(id_i) \oplus X_S$ in server's database to check identity's validity. Especially, random value e helps to create different keys at different time. In login and authentication phases, we use two random values R_U and R_S combined with Chebyshev polynomials for challenge. In addition, we employ three-way challenge-response handshake technique to better resist replay and impersonation attacks [9]. Eventually, it is essential to obtain SK for encrypting data transmitted between user and server after successfully authentication phase. Our scheme is also divided into five phases of registration, login, mutual authentication, password update and lost card revocation.

3.1 Registration Phase

Before presenting this phase, we suggest three conditions which registration phase should satisfy: Firstly, user's password should be concealed from the server. In our scheme, although the server generates user's password, the user will change his/her password after receiving it from the server. Secondly, the server must provide different authentication keys at different time. By using random value, our scheme completely achieves this requirement. Thirdly, the server should store

user's identity for later checking in next phases such as login or authentication phase. Our scheme is designed to achieve these fundamentals.

When U_i registers to S , he/she must submit his/her chosen id_i via a secure channel. When receiving this information, S performs following steps:

1. S generates pw_i and random value e .
2. Next, S computes authentication key $K = h(X_S \parallel e)$, masked key $M = K \oplus h(id_i \parallel pw_i)$ and confirmation $L = h(K \parallel id_i \parallel pw_i)$, where X_S is S 's master key.
3. Afterwards, S stores $h(id_i) \oplus X_S$ in S 's database for later checking.
4. Finally, S sends $\{pw_i, SC(M, L, e, h(\cdot), T_s(x))\}$ via a secure channel, where $\{x, T_s(x)\}$ is S 's public information.

After receiving SC and pw_i , U_i updates pw_i via our password-update phase.

3.2 Login Phase

In login phase, checking user's identity and password must be performed at client side to prevent the attackers from overwhelming the server with a false identity and password in order to busy the server for a long time. Besides, login-message should be dynamic at different time to protect user's information especially identity. Our login phase is also designed to satisfy these requirements.

When U_i inputs his/her id_i and pw_i to login S , then SC performs:

1. SC computes $K = M \oplus h(id_i \parallel pw_i)$ and $L^* = h(K \parallel id_i \parallel pw_i)$.
2. Next, it compares L^* with L . If they are the same, id_i and pw_i are correct and SC goes to next steps; otherwise, it terminates the session.
3. Afterwards, SC generates a random large integer r_U , computes $R_U = T_{r_U}(x)$, $DID_i = id_i \oplus h(R_U \parallel K)$ and $R_2 = h(K \parallel id_i \parallel R_U)$.
4. Finally, it sends $\{e, R_U, R_2, DID_i\}$ to S via common channel.

3.3 Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase

In authentication phase, both user and server must challenge each other to prove their legitimacy. Additionally, they should obtain common session-key after successful authentication. Our phase has these two important features.

In this session, after receiving U_i 's $\{e, R_U, R_2, DID_i\}$ in login phase. S performs the steps to authenticate U_i .

1. S computes $h(X_S \parallel e)$ and extracts $id_i = DID_i \oplus h(R_U \parallel h(X_S \parallel e))$.
2. Next, S check id_i by performing $h(id_i) \oplus X_S$, and searches its existence in S 's database. If it exists, id_i is valid; otherwise, S terminates the session.
3. Afterwards, S computes $R_2^* = h(h(X_S \parallel e) \parallel id_i \parallel R_U)$ and compares R_2^* with R_2 . If they are the same, S goes to next step; otherwise, S terminates the session.
4. S generates r_S , computes $R_S = T_{r_S}(x)$, $SK = h(T_{r_S}(R_U) \parallel h(X_S \parallel e) \parallel id_i)$ and $R_4 = h(h(X_S \parallel e) \parallel id_i \parallel SK)$.

5. Finally, S sends $\{R_S, R_4\}$ to U_i via common channel.
6. After receiving S 's $\{R_S, R_4\}$, U_i re-computes $SK = h(T_{r_U}(R_S) \parallel K \parallel id_i)$, $R_4^* = h(K \parallel id_i \parallel SK)$ and compares R_4^* with R_4 . If they are the same, U_i successfully authenticates S .
7. U_i computes $R_5 = h(SK)$ and sends to S via common channel.
8. After receiving U_i 's $\{R_5\}$, S re-computes $R_5^* = h(SK)$ and compares it with R_5 . If they are the same, S successfully authenticates U_i .

3.4 Password Update Phase

When U_i wants to change pw_i , U_i performs:

1. U_i inserts SC and inputs id_i and pw_i .
2. Next, SC computes $K = M \oplus h(id_i \parallel pw_i)$ and $L^* = h(K \parallel id_i \parallel pw_i)$.
3. Afterwards, SC compares L^* with L stored in it. If they are the same, SC accepts user's request; otherwise, it terminates the session.
4. U_i inserts new password pw_{inew} . Then, SC computes $M_{new} = K \oplus h(id_i \parallel pw_{inew})$ and $L_{new} = h(K \parallel id_i \parallel pw_{inew})$.
5. Finally, SC replaces L, M with L_{new}, M_{new} .

3.5 Lost Card Revocation Phase

If U_i loses his/her SC , U_i must notify S . Then, S will re-issue new SC with the old U_i 's id_i .

1. U_i re-submits id_i and *request-re-issue-smart-card* to S via a secure channel.
2. After receiving U_i 's request, S computes $h(id_i) \oplus X_S$ and searches its existence in S 's database. If it exists, S accepts U_i 's request; otherwise, S terminates the session.
3. Next, S generates a new random value e_{new} and performs steps which are the same as registration phase's. Finally, S re-issues new SC to U_i via a secure channel.

4 Security and Efficiency Analysis

In this section, we analyze our scheme on two aspects: security and efficiency. Before further analysis, we introduce three basic computational assumptions which proposed scheme employs, that are one-way hash function ([15] for more details), Chebysev discrete logarithm problem (**CDLP**) and Diffie-Hellman problem (**CDHP**)([18, 11] for more details).

- Chebysev Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given $x \in [-1, 1]$, $T_n(x)$, where $n, s \in \mathbf{N}$, the discrete logarithm problem is to find unknown degree n .
- Chebysev Diffie-Hellman Problem: Given $x \in [-1, 1]$, $T_q(x)$ and $T_s(x)$, where $q, s \in \mathbf{N}$, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to find $T_{q*s}(x)$ or $T_{s*q}(x)$, where $T_{q*s}(x) = T_q(T_s) = T_s(T_q) = T_{s*q}(x) \in [-1, 1]$.

4.1 Correctness Proof

To correct evaluate about authentication scheme, we employ BAN-logic [16] proposed by Burrows. We introduce some basic symbols used in this method as follows: symbols P and Q stand for principals, X and Y range over statements, and K represent the cryptographic key. For more details about the notations and postulates, please refer to Burrows' result. In the following, we use BAN-logic to prove proposed scheme achieves correct mutual authentication and session key agreement. In stead of using P , Q , we let U_i , S stand for user and server participating in the scheme. Furthermore, we formalize our goals denoted as \mathbf{G}_j , where $j \in [1, 8]$ as follows:

1. $U_i \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$
2. $U_i \mid\equiv S \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$
3. $S \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$
4. $S \mid\equiv U_i \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$
5. $U_i \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S$
6. $U_i \mid\equiv S \mid\equiv S \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} U_i$
7. $S \mid\equiv S \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} U_i$
8. $S \mid\equiv U_i \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S$

Then, we idealize proposed scheme as follows:

- $\mathbf{DID}_i = \langle U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, T_{r_U}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S \rangle$
- $\mathbf{R}_2 = \langle U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, T_{r_U} \rangle$
- $\mathbf{R}_4 = \langle U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S \rangle$
- $\mathbf{R}_5 = \langle T_{r_S}(R_U), U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S \rangle$

Next, we give some assumptions (denoted as \mathbf{A}_t , where $t \in [1, 8]$) about proposed scheme's initial states

1. $U_i \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$
2. $U_i \mid\equiv U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S$
3. $U_i \mid\equiv S \Rightarrow U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S$
4. $S \mid\equiv U_i \Rightarrow U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$
5. $S \mid\equiv U_i \Rightarrow U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S$
6. $S \mid\equiv S \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} U_i$
7. $U_i \mid\equiv \#(T_{r_S})$
8. $S \mid\equiv \#(T_{r_U})$

Finally, with \mathbf{A}_t and BAN-logic's postulates, we demonstrate our scheme successfully achieves \mathbf{G}_j .

- U_i registers id_i with S , so we achieve \mathbf{G}_1

$$U_i \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S$$

- With **A**₆ and *DID*_i, applying the message-meaning rule to derive

$$\frac{S \mid \equiv S \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} U_i, S \triangleleft (U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, T_{r_U}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S)_{h(X_S \parallel e)}}{S \mid \equiv U_i \mid \sim U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, T_{r_U}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (1)$$

- With **A**₈ and applying freshness rule to infer

$$\frac{S \mid \equiv \#(T_{r_U})}{S \mid \equiv \#(U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, T_{r_U}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S)} \quad (2)$$

- With (1) and (2), applying the nonce - verification rule to derive

$$\frac{(1), (2)}{S \mid \equiv U_i \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, T_{r_U}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (3)$$

- With (3), applying believe rule to derive

$$\frac{(3)}{S \mid \equiv U_i \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (\mathbf{G}_4)$$

- With **G**₄ and **A**₄, applying jurisdiction rule to infer

$$\frac{S \mid \equiv U_i \Rightarrow U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, S \mid \equiv U_i \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S}{S \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (\mathbf{G}_3)$$

- With **A**₂ and *R*₄, applying the message-meaning rule to derive

$$\frac{U_i \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \triangleleft (U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S)_{h(X_S \parallel e)}}{U_i \mid \equiv S \mid \sim U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (4)$$

- With (4) and **A**₇, applying the freshness rule to derive

$$\frac{(4), U_i \mid \equiv \#(T_{r_S})}{U_i \mid \equiv \#(U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S)} \quad (5)$$

- With (4) and (5), applying the nonce - verification rule to derive

$$\frac{(4), (5)}{U_i \mid \equiv S \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (6)$$

- With (6), applying the believe rule to derive

$$\frac{(6)}{U_i \mid \equiv S \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (\mathbf{G}_2)$$

With **G**₁, **G**₂, **G**₃, and **G**₄, we prove U_i and S can mutually authenticate with dynamic identity. Next, we demonstrate U_i and S can share SK as follows.

- With *R*₄ and **A**₂, applying the message-meaning rule to derive

$$\frac{U_i \mid \equiv U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \triangleleft (U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S)_{h(X_S \parallel e)}}{U_i \mid \equiv S \mid \sim U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \parallel e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (7)$$

- With *R*₄ and **A**₇, applying the freshness rule to derive

$$\frac{U_i | \equiv \#(T_{r_S})}{U_i | \equiv \#(U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S)} \quad (8)$$

– With (7) and (8), applying the nonce - verification rule to derive

$$\frac{(7), (8)}{U_i | \equiv S | \equiv U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (9)$$

– With (9), applying the believe rule to derive

$$\frac{(9)}{U_i | \equiv S | \equiv S \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} U_i} \quad (G_6)$$

– With **A**₃ and **G**₆, we apply the jurisdiction rule to infer

$$\frac{U_i | \equiv S \Rightarrow U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i | \equiv S | \equiv U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S}{U_i | \equiv U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (G_5)$$

– With **R**₅ and **A**₆, applying the message-meaning rule to derive

$$\frac{S | \equiv S \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} U_i, S \triangleleft (T_{r_U * r_S}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S)_{h(X_S \| e)}}{S | \equiv U_i | \sim T_{r_U * r_S}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (10)$$

– With **R**₅ and **A**₈, applying the freshness rule to derive

$$\frac{S | \equiv \#(T_{r_U})}{S | \equiv \#(T_{r_U * r_S}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S)} \quad (11)$$

– With (10) and (11), applying the nonce - verification rule to derive

$$\frac{(10), (11)}{S | \equiv U_i | \equiv T_{r_U * r_S}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (12)$$

– With (12) and **A**₆, applying the believe rule to infer

$$\frac{(12), S | \equiv S \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} U_i}{S | \equiv U_i | \equiv U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (G_8)$$

– With (12) and **A**₅, applying the message-meaning rule to infer

$$\frac{(12), S | \equiv U_i \Rightarrow U_i \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} S}{S | \equiv T_{r_U * r_S}, U_i \stackrel{h(X_S \| e)}{\leftrightarrow} S, U_i \stackrel{id_i}{\leftrightarrow} S} \quad (13)$$

– With (13), applying the believe rule to derive

$$\frac{(13)}{S | \equiv S \stackrel{SK}{\leftrightarrow} U_i} \quad (G_7)$$

With **G**₅, **G**₆, **G**₇ and **G**₈, we prove both S and U_i believe the other believes SK shared between U_i and S . Below are common kinds of attacks proposed scheme can withstand.

4.2 Resistance to Common Attacks

In this subsection, we prove our scheme can withstand many common kinds of attacks based on above two basic assumptions. Our context is that both server and user are authenticating in open channel. Hence, anyone is capable of intercepting all messages transmitted between them. Besides, we assume anyone can obtain SC 's information.

Replay Attack In this kind of attack, adversary captures the user's old messages for next transaction. It is hard to perform in proposed scheme. For example, when adversary sends package $\{e, R_U, R_2, DID_i\}$ at another session to cheat the server, he/she needs to resend R_5 at the end of the session. Clearly, knowing U_i 's r_U, id_i and $h(X_S \parallel e)$ is impossible to adversary. It is said that proposed scheme can withstand replay attack.

User And Server Impersonation Attack In this kind of attack, adversary has two options, which are user and server impersonation. Firstly, we consider the case of user impersonation. In the users login message, only two messages that adversary can forge are e and $R_U = T_{r_U}(x)$ because they do not include identity information. Consequently, adversary randomly chooses r_U^* to compute $R_U^* = T_{r_U^*}(x)$, where e^* is adversary's own random value. Finally, he/she sends $\{e^*, R_U^*, R_2, DID_i\}$ to server. When receiving, server computes $h(X_S \parallel e^*)$ and extracts id_i by computing $DID_i \oplus h(R_U^* \parallel h(X_S \parallel e^*)) = id_i \oplus h(R_U \parallel h(X_S \parallel e)) \oplus h(R_U^* \parallel h(X_S \parallel e^*))$. Clearly, we see the result of this computation is nonsense. Therefore, server will detect and terminate this session. Secondly, we consider the case of server impersonation. We see that adversary needs to successfully compute $\{R_S, R_4\}$ and this is impossible because $R_4 = h(h(X_S \parallel e) \parallel id_i \parallel SK^*)$, where SK^* is random session key computed from adversary's random value r_S^* . Hence, adversary needs U_i 's $h(X_S \parallel e)$ and id_i . In short, proposed scheme can resist two-side impersonation attack.

User Anonymity Protected In this kind of attack, adversary wants to know whose transaction this is. Therefore, he/she will find the way to extract identity from the message DID_i . We see that user's identity is combined with random value R_U and key $K = h(X_S \parallel e)$. With two values, adversary has no chance to extract true identity. Specially, DID_i is different at each session due to random value R_U . Also, adversary does not know whether or not DID_i and DID_i' belong to the same person. Hence, proposed scheme achieves strong user anonymity.

Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) In this kind of attack, assume that long-term key of the server and all users is leaked, so the system is broken. However, the previously transactions should be secured from the adversary and this means that generated session keys should be secured. In proposed scheme, in case of leakage of server S 's X_S and user U_i 's $h(X_S \parallel e_i)$, the adversary has $R_U = T_{r_U}(x)$, $R_S = T_{r_S}(x)$ and id_i . Nevertheless, computing $T_{r_S} * r_U(x)$ is the same as computing the **CDHP**. It is said that proposed scheme can achieve **PFS** based on **CDHP**.

Chang et al.'s ideas are inherited by proposed scheme. For example, no using password or state table due to the increase of computational overload, or using random value instead of time-stamp to save time-synchronization mechanism cost. Likewise, using cryptographic hash function allows the users to freely choose their password without worrying about bit-length. In short, those properties

Table 1. The comparison between our scheme and previous ones for security

Items	Das's[19]	Wang's[20]	Chang's[15]	Ours
Mutual authentication	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Password chosen by users	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
User anonymity	Yes	No	No	Yes
Without registration table	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Withstand impersonation attack	No	No	No	Yes
Without time-synchronized mechanism	No	No	Yes	Yes
Session key establishment	No	No	Yes	Yes
Perfect forward secrecy	No*	No*	No	Yes
* Do not provide session key establishment				

completely exist in proposed scheme. Table 1 is the comparison between our scheme and previous schemes including Chang et al.'s for security.

4.3 Efficiency Analysis

To compare efficiency between our scheme and previous ones, we let H be the hash operation, \uparrow be modular exponentiation operation, \oplus be exclusive-or operation and T be computational operation of polynomial. At registration phase, Das's scheme needs $1 \times \oplus, 2 \times H$; Wang's needs $2 \times \oplus, 2 \times H$; Chang's needs $1 \times \oplus, 3 \times H, 1 \times \uparrow$; Ours needs $2 \times \oplus, 4 \times H$. At login and authentication phases, Das's scheme needs $14 \times \oplus, 7 \times H$; Wang's needs $14 \times \oplus, 6 \times H$; Chang's needs $7 \times \oplus, 10 \times H, 1 \times \uparrow$; Ours needs $4 \times \oplus, 14 \times H, 4 \times T$. Compared with previous schemes, our scheme's computational cost increases perceptibly. However, this is essential because of enhancement of security. Furthermore, in according to [14], we believe if practical implemented, our scheme will be still efficient enough. The theoretical comparison of cost at this phase is presented in Table 2.

Let $t_H, t_{\oplus}, t_T, t_{\uparrow}$ denote running-time corresponding to each operation H, \oplus, T, \uparrow . We see that $t_{\oplus} \ll t_H \ll t_{\uparrow} < t_T$, so we only compare between two algorithms, modular exponentiation and Chebysev polynomial which are used in Chang's scheme and ours. To relatively compare, we re-implement $T_n(g) \bmod p$ using BigInteger class in Java. Also, we re-use 'ModPow' function in Java to stand for $g^n \bmod p$. Our experiment is conducted in personal computer, Intel Core 2 Quad CPU 2.66GHz. By measuring running-time between two algorithms with prime numbers which range from 10 to 400 digits, we propose using 512-bit

Table 2. A comparison of computation costs

Items	Authentication	Login	Registration
Das[19]	$3 \times H, 7 \times \oplus$	$4 \times H, 7 \times \oplus$	$2 \times H, 1 \times \oplus$
Wang[20]	$4 \times H, 10 \times \oplus$	$2 \times H, 4 \times \oplus$	$2 \times H, 2 \times \oplus$
Chang[15]	$8 \times H, 4 \times \oplus, 1 \times \uparrow$	$2 \times H, 3 \times \oplus$	$3 \times H, 1 \times \oplus, 1 \times \uparrow$
Ours	$10 \times H, 2 \times \oplus, 3 \times T$	$4 \times H, 2 \times \oplus, 1 \times T$	$4 \times H, 2 \times \oplus$




Fig. 1. Comparison of time cost between $T_n(g) \bmod p$ and $g^n \bmod p$

prime number to guarantee time efficiency ($\approx 150\text{ms}$) and security because of solution space up to 2^{512} when facing **CDLP**. Although running-time between $g^n \bmod p$ used by Chang's scheme and $T_n(g) \bmod p$ used by ours is a little different, practical running-time of our scheme $\sum_{i=1}^4 t_T \approx 0.6\text{s}$ when using prime number with appropriate bit amount. Therefore, it is said that our scheme is still enough efficiency when practically implemented. Experiment's result with different prime numbers is presented in Figure 1.

5 Conclusions

In this paper, we review Chang et al.'s scheme. Although their scheme has some positive characteristics but it is vulnerable to impersonation attack. Furthermore, it cannot provide user's anonymity and does not have the property of perfect forward secrecy. Hence, we suggest a different improved scheme using Chebyshev polynomial to overcome such pitfalls. Compared with Chang's scheme schemes, our scheme has the following main advantages; (1) A user need not choose the password at first. (2) It provides user's anonymity. (3) It does not maintain verification table. (4) It provides property of perfect forward secrecy.

From our security evaluation, our proposed method can resist known methods of attacks. As the proposed scheme can be used in various client-server environment for remote user authentication, it can be applied for systems that accept user authentication with mobile or wearable devices to create smart interactive environments. Furthermore we also study to integrate biometric features into Chebyshev polynomial-based authentication scheme.

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