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Abstract

Zheng, Xiang and Zhou published in Journal of Computer and System Sciences in 2015 a "strong provably secure IBE scheme without bilinear map". In this note, we provide two very simple attacks on their scheme.

Keywords: Cryptanalysis, Identity-based encryption

1. Introduction

Identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir in [7]. It aims tosimplify key management by removing the need for digital certificates used in traditional public-key infrastructures. In such systems, users' public keys are public identifiers (e.g. email addresses) and the matching private keys are derived by a trusted party (called the private key generator). The first practical constructions for Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [1] and relies on the existence of efficient bilinear maps on specific groups. Since then, a large body of work has been devoted to the design of schemes with additional properties or relying on different algorithmic assumptions (*e.g.* [4, 5]).

It is desirable for cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem to be constructed without relying on bilinear maps. In [8], Zheng, Xiang and Zhou proposed a "strong provably secure IBE scheme without bilinear map". They claimed that their proposal achieves the so-called IND-ID-CCA security assuming the classical computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this note, we show that this claim is wrong and we show two very simple polynomial-time attacks on their scheme: the first one is against the one-wayness of the scheme and uses only the public parameters and the second one is a key-recovery attack that requires a few extraction queries (*i.e.* users' private keys for chosen identities).

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2. Cryptanalysis of Zheng-Xiang-Zhou scheme

Description of Zheng-Xiang-Zhou scheme. Let $(\mathbb{G}, +)$ be a group of prime-order q (following [8], we use additive notation for the group law). Given two generators P and $Q = [a]P$ of $\mathbb{G}$, the private key generator picks uniformly and independently at random h scalars $r_1, \ldots, r_h$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ for some integer h. It publishes the points $[r_i]P$ and $[r_i]Q$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, h\}$ as the public parameters and keeps the values r_i for $i \in \{1, \ldots, h\}$ as its secret key.

From a user public-key ID, a binary string of length h is derived using a hash function H_{id} whose security properties are not specified in [8]. Given this binary string $H_{id}(\mathrm{ID}) = a_1 \ldots a_h \in \{0,1\}^h$, the user secret key is derived by the private-key generator as $\mathrm{SK}_{\mathrm{ID}} = \sum_{i=1}^{h} a_i \cdot r_i \bmod q$ and we denote $P_{\mathrm{ID}} = \sum_{i=1}^{h} [a_i r_i]P$ and $Q_{\mathrm{ID}} = \sum_{i=1}^{h} [a_i r_i]Q$ two elements in $\mathbb{G}$ that can be publicly computed from ID and the public parameters.

The encryption algorithm uses two additional hash functions $H_1 : \mathbb{G} \to \{0,1\}^k$ and $H_2 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ modelled as random oracles in the (flawed) secutity analysis. Given a message $m \in \{0,1\}^k$ and an identity ID, the encryption algorithm picks at random $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^k$, computes $r = H_2(\sigma, \mathrm{ID})$, and outputs $c = ([r]P, H_1([r]P_{\mathrm{ID}}) \oplus \sigma, H_1([r]Q_{\mathrm{ID}}) \oplus m, H_2(\sigma, \mathrm{ID}))$ as the ciphertext. The decryption algorithm is described in [8] (but is not relevant for the attacks).

Description of the attack on the one-wayness. Given a ciphertex $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4)$, an adversary can trivially recover r as $c_4 = H_2(\sigma, \mathrm{ID})$ and then the associated plaintext as $c_3 \oplus H_1([r]Q_{\mathrm{ID}})$. This attack is actually more efficient than the decryption algorithm described in [8]. It comes from the use of a very poor redundancy scheme in order to achieve CCA-security that actually weakens the security of the IBE scheme. Even if this can be easily fixed, our second attack demonstrates that the scheme is broken beyond repair.

Description of the key-recovery attack. For the key-recovery attack, we consider an adversary that is allowed to query only h times the *Extract* algorithm in order to obtain secret keys of users of its choice (and in particular is legitimate in the IND-ID-CCA security game describe in [8]).

Even if H_{id} is a strong cryptographic hash function or a random oracle (see [3]), a very simple attack can be mounted. The adversary can simply pick iteratively identities ID_j for $j \in \{1, \ldots, h\}$ at random such that the matrix $A_t = (a_i^{(j)})_{i \in \{1,\ldots,h\}, j \in \{1,\ldots,t\}}$ is of rank t in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{h \times t}$ for $t \in \{1, \ldots, h\}$ (where $H_{id}(\mathrm{ID}_j) = a_1^{(j)} \ldots a_h^{(j)}$ for $j \in \{1, \ldots, h\}$).

If H_{id} is a random oracle, then A_h is a random binary matrix over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. It is well-known that a random $(h \times h)$-matrix over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ where each entry is chosen independently and uniformly at random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is non-singular with at least some constant probability [6]. The problem is less studied for random binary matrices over finite fields but one can easily prove (e.g. [2, Lemma 4]) that if one concatenates a random binary vector of length h to a binary $(h \times n)$-matrix of rank $r < h$, then the rank of the resulting $(h \times n + 1)$-matrix is $r + 1$ with probability at least $1/2$. Therefore, by picking on average only $2h$ identities ID, the adversary can construct an invertible matrix A_h as described and it

can recover the secret key vector $(r_1, \ldots, r_h)$ as $(\mathrm{SK}_{\mathrm{ID}_1}, \ldots, \mathrm{SK}_{\mathrm{ID}_h}) \cdot {}^t(A^{-1})$ (by quering the *Extract* algorithm on the h identities ID_j for $j \in \{1, \ldots, h\}$).

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