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Reasoning about Computational Systems using Abella

http://abella-prover.org

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2015-08-02
Overview
Overview of Abella

Abella is an interactive tactics-based theorem prover for a logic with the following features

- its underlying substrate is an intuitionistic first-order logic over simply typed lambda terms
- it incorporates a mechanism for interpreting atoms through fixed-point definitions
- it allows for inductive and co-inductive forms of reasoning
- it includes logical devices for analyzing binding structure

Abella also builds in a special ability for reasoning about specifications expressed in a separate executable logic
Abella and Computational Systems

Abella offers intriguing capabilities for reasoning about syntax-directed and rule-based specifications

- such specifications can be formalized succinctly through fixed-point definitions
- formalizations adopt a natural and flexible relational style as opposed to a computational style
- the formalizations allow specifications to be interpreted either inductively or co-inductively in the reasoning process
- binding structure in object systems can be treated via a well-restricted and effective form of higher-order syntax
- a two-level logic approach allows intuitions about the object systems to be reflected into the reasoning process
Objectives for the Tutorial

We aim to accomplish at least the following goals through the tutorial

- to expose the novel features of the logic underlying Abella
- to provide a feel for Abella so that you will be able to (and interested in) experimenting with it on your own
- to show the applicability of Abella in mechanizing the meta-theory of formal systems
- to indicate the benefits of a special brand of higher-order abstract syntax in treating object-level binding structure

We will assume a basic familiarity with sequent-style logical systems and with intuitionistic logic
The Structure of the Tutorial

The tutorial will consists of the following conceptual parts

• an exposure to the syntax of formulas in Abella and the basic theorem proving environment

• a presentation of the special logical features of Abella with examples of their use

• an exposition of the two-level logic approach a la Abella to formalization and reasoning

• extensions to reasoning about specifications in a dependently typed lambda calculus
Outline

1. Setup
2. The Reasoning Logic $\mathcal{G}$
3. The Two-Level Logic Approach
4. Co-Induction
5. Extensions
Setup
How to Run Abella in your Web-Browser

Go to:

http://abella-prover.org/try

- Everything runs inside your browser
- Interface reminiscent of ProofGeneral
Running Abella Offline

- You will need a working OCaml toolchain + OPAM
- `opam install abella`
- To get ProofGeneral support, read the instructions on: [http://abella-prover.org/tutorial/](http://abella-prover.org/tutorial/)
Code for This Tutorial

http://abella-prover.org/tutorial/try

Special on-line version just for this tutorial
## Some Concrete Syntax

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>$A \rightarrow ((B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow D)$</th>
<th>$A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow D$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>$(M N) (J K)$</td>
<td>$M N (J K)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstraction</td>
<td>$\lambda x. M$</td>
<td>$x \backslash M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\lambda x:A. M$</td>
<td>$(x:A) \backslash M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulas</td>
<td>$\top, \bot$</td>
<td>$true, false$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F \land G, F \lor G$</td>
<td>$F /\land G, F \lor G$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F \supset G$</td>
<td>$F \supset G$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\forall x, y. F$</td>
<td>$forall \ x, y, F$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\exists x:A, y. F$</td>
<td>exists $\ (x:A) y, F$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M = N$</td>
<td>$M = N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\neg F$</td>
<td>$F \rightarrow false$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Declaring Basic Types and Term Constructors

• New basic types are introduced with **Kind** declarations.

```
Kind nat type.
Kind bt type.
Kind tm, ty type.
```

Reserved: **o**, **olist**, and **prop**.

• New term constructors are introduced with **Type** declarations.

```
Type z nat.
Type s nat -> nat.
Type leaf nat -> bt.
Type node bt -> bt -> bt.
Type app tm -> tm -> tm.
Type abs (tm -> tm) -> tm.
```
Theorems and Proofs

1 - Syntax
The Reasoning Logic $G$
The Reasoning Logic $\mathcal{G}$

Outline:
1. Ordinary Intuitionistic Logic
2. Equality
3. Fixed Point Definitions
4. Induction
   - Inductive data: lists
   - Kinds of induction: simple, mutual, nested
5. Higher-Order Abstract Syntax
   - Example: subject reduction for STLC
Ordinary Intuitionistic Logic

2.1 - Basic Logic
Equality

For closed terms \( M \) and \( N \), the formula \( M = N \) is true if and only if \( M \) and \( N \) are \( \alpha \beta \eta \)-convertible.

Consequences

- Two closed first-order terms are equal iff they are identical.

```lean
Kind i  type.
Type a,b  i.

Theorem eq1 : a = a \land b = b.
Theorem eq2 : a = b \rightarrow false.
```

- Different constants are distinct.
Equality

For closed terms $M$ and $N$, the formula $M = N$ is true if and only if $M$ and $N$ are $\lambda$-convertible.

Consequences

• Two closed first-order terms are equal iff they are identical.

```
Kind i type.
Type a, b i.

Theorem eq1 : a = a \AND b = b.
Theorem eq2 : a = b \imp false.
```

• Different constants are distinct.
The Nature of Variables

Terminology: variable, eigenvariable, and universal variable used interchangably in Abella.

Variables are interpreted extensionally in the term model of the underlying logic.

In other words, a variable stands for all its possible instances.

\textbf{Kind} nat \textbf{type}.
\textbf{Type} z \textbf{nat}.
\textbf{Type} s \textbf{nat} \to \textbf{nat}.

The formula $\forall x: \text{nat}. \ F$ stands for:

\[
[z/x]F \land [s \ z/x]F \land [s (s z)/x]F \land \cdots
\]
Equality and Extensional Variables

\[
\text{forall } (x: \text{nat}) \ y, \ x = y \rightarrow F \ x \ y
\]

We have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>x = y</th>
<th>x = y \rightarrow F \ x \ y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>z</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>\text{true}</td>
<td>F \ z \ z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z</td>
<td>anything else</td>
<td>\text{false}</td>
<td>\text{true}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s z</td>
<td>s z</td>
<td>\text{true}</td>
<td>F (s z) (s z)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s z</td>
<td>anything else</td>
<td>\text{false}</td>
<td>\text{true}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, the formula is equivalent to:

\[
\text{forall } (x: \text{nat}), \ F \ x \ x
\]
More generally, given an assumption $M = N$:

1. Find all unifiers for $M$ and $N$.
   - A unifier of $M$ and $N$ is a substitution of terms for the free variables of $M$ and $N$ that makes them $\lambda$-convertible.

2. For each unifier, apply the unifier to the rest of the subgoal to generate a new subgoal.

Notes:

- There may be infinitely many unifiers
- Unification in the general case is undecidable
- In practice we work with complete sets of unifiers (csu) that cover all possibilities; csus are often finite, even singletons.
### Equality Assumptions on Open Terms

Example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$f$</td>
<td>i -&gt; i -&gt; i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g$</td>
<td>i -&gt; i.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theorem** $eq3$ : \(\forall x \ y \ z, \ f \ x \ (g \ y) = f \ (g \ y) \ z \ \rightarrow \ x = z.\)

- A csu of $f \ x \ (g \ y)$ and $f \ (g \ y) \ z$ is the singleton set \(\{(g \ y)/x, (g \ y)/z\}\).
- This substitution turns $x = z$ into $g \ y = g \ y$, which is **true**.
Equality Example: Peano’s Axioms

2.2 – Peano
Functions vs. Relations

Say you want to define addition on natural numbers.

- **Functional** approach:
  - Declare a new symbol:
    
    \[
    \text{Type } \text{sum nat } \rightarrow \text{ nat } \rightarrow \text{ nat.}
    \]

  - Define a closed set of computational rules:
    
    \[
    \text{Rule sum z N } = \text{ N.}
    \]
    
    \[
    \text{Rule sum (s M) N } = \text{ s K where sum M N } = \text{ K.}
    \]

- **Relational** approach:
  - Declare a new notion of propagation:
    
    \[
    \text{Type } \text{plus nat } \rightarrow \text{ nat } \rightarrow \text{ nat } \rightarrow \text{ prop.}
    \]

  - Declare a closed set of properties of the predicate:
    
    \[
    \text{for all M, plus z M M.}
    \]
    
    \[
    \text{for all M N K, plus M N K } \rightarrow \text{ plus (s M) N (s K).}
    \]
## Functions vs. Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modifies term language</td>
<td>No change to terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifies equality</td>
<td>No change to equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires confluence</td>
<td>Can be non-deterministic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed inputs and output</td>
<td>Modes can vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional programming</td>
<td>Logic programming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relational Definitions

Define \( \text{plus} : \text{nat} \to \text{nat} \to \text{nat} \to \text{prop} \) by
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{plus } z \ N \ N \ &= \ N \\
\text{plus } (s \ M) \ N \ (s \ K) \ &= \text{ plus } M \ N \ K.
\end{align*}
\]

- All defined relations must have target type \( \text{prop} \).
- Clauses are universally closed over the capitalized identifiers.
- The body implies the head in each clause.
- An omitted body stands for \( \text{true} \).
- The set of clauses is \( \text{closed} \).
Multiple Clauses vs. Single Clause

Define \( \text{plus1} : \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{plus1} & \: z \: N \: N ; \\
\text{plus1} & \: (s \: M) \: N \: (s \: K) \ := \ \text{plus1} \: M \: N \: K.
\end{align*}
\]

is equivalent to

Define \( \text{plus2} : \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{plus2} \: M \: N \: K \ := \\
(M = z \ \lor \ N = K) \\
\lor \ (\exists \: M' \: K', \ M = s \: M' \ \lor \ K = s \: K' \ \lor \\
\text{plus2} \: M' \: N \: K').
\end{align*}
\]
If \( p \) is a defined relation, then to prove \( p \ M_1 \cdots M_n \):

1. Find a clause whose head matches with \( p \ M_1 \cdots M_n \);
2. Apply the matching substitution to its body;
3. and prove that instance of the body.

Backtracks over clauses and ways to match.
Proving Defined Atoms: Example

**Define** `plus : nat -> nat -> nat -> prop` by

- `plus z N N`;
- `plus (s M) N (s K) := plus M N K`.

**Example:** `plus (s z) (s (s z)) (s (s (s z)))`:

1. Pick second clause with unifier `[z/M, s(s z)/N, s(s z)/K]`.
2. Yields goal: `plus z (s (s z)) (s (s z))`.
3. Now pick first clause with unifier `[s(s z)/N]`.
4. Yields goal `true`, and we’re done!
Reasoning About Defined Atoms

To reason about hypothesis $p \ M_1 \ \cdots \ M_n$:

1. Find every way to unify $p \ M_1 \ \cdots \ M_n$ with some head;
2. Separately reason about each corresponding instance of the body as a new hypothesis.

Generates one premise (subgoal) per unification solution.

Observe the analogy with equality assumptions!
Reasoning About Defined Atoms

To reason about hypothesis \( p \ M_1 \ldots M_n \):

1. Find \textit{every} way to unify \( p \ M_1 \ldots M_n \) with some head;

2. Separately reason about each corresponding instance of the body as a new hypothesis.

Generates one premise (subgoal) per unification solution.

Observe the analogy with equality assumptions!
Reasoning About Defined Atoms: Example

Define \(\text{plus} : \text{nat} \to \text{nat} \to \text{nat} \to \text{prop}\) by
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{plus} \ z \ N \ N \ ; \\
\text{plus} \ (s \ M) \ N \ (s \ K) := \text{plus} \ M \ N \ K.
\end{align*}
\]

Given hypothesis: \(\text{plus} \ M \ N \ (s \ K)\):

1. Generate one subgoal for the first clause and unifier
   \([z/M, s \ K/N];\)

2. Another subgoal for the second clause and unifier \([s \ M'/M]\)

Theorem \(\text{plus}_s : \forall M \ N \ K, \ \text{plus} \ M \ N \ (s \ K) \rightarrow (\exists J, M = s \ J) \lor (\exists J, N = s \ J).\)
The **case** and **unfold** Tactics

2.3 – **case** and **unfold**
Consistency of Relational Definitions

- Relational definitions are given a fixed point interpretation.
- That is, every defined atom is considered to be equivalent to the disjunction of its unfolded forms.
- Such an equivalence can introduce inconsistencies.

Define $p : \text{prop}$ by

\[
p := p \rightarrow \text{false}.
\]

- Abella’s stratification condition guarantees consistency.
2.4 - Stratification
The Expressivity of \texttt{case} and \texttt{unfold}

Consider

\begin{verbatim}
Define is_nat1 : nat \to prop by
  is_nat1 z ;
  is_nat1 (s N) := is_nat1 N.

Define is_nat2 : nat \to prop by
  is_nat2 z ;
  is_nat2 (s N) := is_nat2 N.
\end{verbatim}

\begin{itemize}
  \item With \texttt{case} and \texttt{unfold}, we cannot prove:
    \begin{verbatim}
    forall x, is_nat1 x \to is_nat2 x.
    \end{verbatim}

  \item Abella actually interprets fixed points as \texttt{least fixed points}.
  \item This in turn allows us to perform \texttt{induction} on such definitions.
\end{itemize}
The **induction** tactic

Given a goal

\[
\text{forall } X_1 \ldots X_n, \ F_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow F_k \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow G
\]

where \(F_k\) is a defined atom, the invocation

\[
\text{induction on } k.
\]

1. Adds an **inductive hypothesis** (IH):

\[
\text{forall } X_1 \ldots X_n, \ F_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow F_k \ast \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow G
\]

2. Then **changes** the goal to:

\[
\text{forall } X_1 \ldots X_n, \ F_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow F_k \ast \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow G
\]
Inductive Annotations

Meaning of $F^*$

\[ F \text{ has resulted from at least one application of case to an assumption of the form } F' \cdot. \]

- These annotations are only maintained on defined atoms.
- Applying \textit{case} to $F \cdot$ changes the annotation to $*$ for the resulting bodies in every subgoal.
- The $*$ annotation \textit{percolates} to:
  - Both operands of $\land$ and $\lor$;
  - Only the right operand of $\rightarrow$; and
  - The bodies of \textit{forall} and \textit{exists}.
Natural Number Induction

2.5 - Natural Numbers
Lists of Natural Numbers
Nested and Mutual Induction

2.7 – Nested and Mutual Induction
The Reasoning Logic $G$

Outline:

1. Ordinary Intuitionistic Logic
2. Equality
3. Fixed Point Definitions
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   - Inductive data: lists
   - Kinds of induction: simple, mutual, nested
5. Higher-Order Abstract Syntax
   - Example: subject reduction for STLC
The Reasoning Logic $\mathcal{G}$

Outline:

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   - Example: subject reduction for STLC
Principles of Abstract Syntax

[Miller 2015]

1. The names of bound variables should be treated as the same kind of fiction as we treat white space: they are artifacts of how we write expressions and have no semantic content.

2. There is “one binder to ring them all.”

3. There is no such thing as a free variable.
   - cf. Alan Perlis’ epigram #47

4. Bindings have mobility and the equality theory of expressions must support such mobility [...].
Higher-Order Abstract Syntax

Also known as: λ-Tree Syntax

• Binding constructs in syntax are represented with term constructors of higher-order types.
• The normal forms of the representation are in bijection with the syntactic constructs.
• Syntactic substitution is for free – part of the λ-converibility inherent in equality.
Warmup: simple types.

Kind ty type.

Type bas ty.
Type arrow ty -> ty -> ty.

\[[b] = \text{bas} \quad [A \rightarrow B] = \text{arrow} [A] [B]\]
(Closed) $\lambda$-terms

$$
\text{Kind } \text{tm} \quad \text{type}.
$$

$$
\text{Type } \text{app} \quad \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm}.
$$

$$
\text{Type } \text{abs} \quad (\text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm}) \rightarrow \text{tm}.
$$

$$
[[M \ N]] = \text{app} \ [[M]] \ [[N]]
$$

$$
[[\lambda x. \ M]] = \text{abs} \ (x \ [[x/x]M])
$$

$$
[[x]] = x
$$

Examples:

$$
[[\lambda x. \lambda y. \ x]] = \text{abs} \ x \ \text{abs} \ y \ x
$$

$$
[[\lambda x. \lambda y. \lambda z. \ x \ z \ (y \ z)]] = \text{abs} \ x \ \text{abs} \ y \ \text{abs} \ z \ \text{app} \ (\text{app} \ x \ z) \ (\text{app} \ y \ z)
$$

$$
[[\ (\lambda x. \ x \ x \ ) \ (\lambda x. \ x \ x\ )]] = \text{app} \ (\text{abs} \ x \ \text{app} \ x \ x) \ (\text{abs} \ x \ \text{app} \ x \ x)
$$
HOAS: Representing the Typing Relation

\[ \Gamma, x: A \vdash x : A \quad \Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \to B \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash M : A \to B \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash MN : B \]

Kind \[ \text{ctx} \quad \text{type.} \]

Type \[ \text{emp} \quad \text{ctx.} \]

Type \[ \text{add} \quad \text{ctx} \to \text{tm} \to \text{ty} \to \text{ctx.} \]
HOAS: Representing the Typing Relation

\[ \Gamma, x:A \vdash x : A \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \to B}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \to B} \]

\[ \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \to B \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A}{\Gamma \vdash MN : B} \]

Kind \( \text{ctx} \) type.

Type \( \text{emp} \) ctx.
Type \( \text{add} \) ctx \( \to \) tm \( \to \) ty \( \to \) ctx.
HOAS: Representing the Typing Relation

\[ \frac{}{\Gamma, x : A \vdash x : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash M : B}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \to B} \]

\[ \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A}{\Gamma \vdash TN : B} \]

Kind \texttt{ctx} \quad \texttt{type}.

Type \texttt{emp} \quad \texttt{ctx}.

Type \texttt{add} \quad \texttt{ctx} \rightarrow \texttt{tm} \rightarrow \texttt{ty} \rightarrow \texttt{ctx}.
Define \( \text{mem} : \text{ctx} \to \text{tm} \to \text{ty} \to \text{prop} \) by

\[
\text{mem} \ (\text{add} \ G \ X \ A) \ X \ A ; \\
\text{mem} \ (\text{add} \ G \ Y \ B) \ X \ A := \text{mem} \ G \ X \ A.
\]

Define \( \text{of} : \text{ctx} \to \text{tm} \to \text{ty} \to \text{prop} \) by

\[
\text{of} \ G \ X \ A := \text{mem} \ G \ X \ A ; \\
\text{of} \ G \ (\text{app} \ M \ N) \ B := \\
\quad \exists A, \ \text{of} \ M \ (\text{arrow} \ A \ B) \ /\!\!/ \ \text{of} \ N \ A ; \\
\text{of} \ G \ (\text{abs} \ x\backslash \ M \ x) \ (\text{arrow} \ A \ B) := \\
\quad \text{of} \ (\text{add} \ G \ ?? \ A) \ (M \ ??) \ B
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\Gamma, x : A \vdash x : A & \\
\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. M : A \to B & \\
\Gamma \vdash M : A \to B & \Gamma \vdash N : A \\
\end{array}
\]
Define \( \text{mem} : \text{ctx} \to \text{tm} \to \text{ty} \to \text{prop} \) by
\[
\text{mem} \ (\text{add} \ G \ X \ A) \ X \ A ;
\]
\[
\text{mem} \ (\text{add} \ G \ Y \ B) \ X \ A := \text{mem} \ G \ X \ A .
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\Gamma, x:A \vdash x : A & & \Gamma, x:A \vdash M : B \\
\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \to B & & \Gamma \vdash M : A \to B \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A \\
\Gamma \vdash MN : B & & \\
\end{array}
\]

Define \( \text{of} : \text{ctx} \to \text{tm} \to \text{ty} \to \text{prop} \) by
\[
\text{of} \ G \ X \ A := \text{mem} \ G \ X \ A ;
\]
\[
\text{of} \ G \ (\text{app} \ M \ N) \ B :=
\quad \exists \ A, \ \text{of} \ M \ (\text{arrow} \ A \ B) \ \lor \ \text{of} \ N \ A ;
\]
\[
\text{of} \ G \ (\text{abs} \ x \ M \ x) \ (\text{arrow} \ A \ B) :=
\quad \text{of} \ (\text{add} \ G \ ?? \ A) \ (M \ ???) \ B
\]
Contexts

What does $\Gamma, x:A$ mean?

- $x \notin \text{fv}(\Gamma)$
- $x \notin \text{fv}(A)$
- $(\Gamma, x:A)(y) = \begin{cases} A & \text{if } x = y \\ \Gamma(y) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
Names and the \( \nabla \) (nabla) Quantifier

\( \forall x. F \)

For every term \( M \), it is the case that \( [M/x]F \) is true.

\( \nabla x. F \)

For any name \( n \) that is not free in \( F \), it is the case that \( [n/x]F \) is true.

Every type is inhabited by an infinite set of names.

Terminology: sometimes we say nominal constant instead of name.
Some Properties of $\nabla$ vs. $\forall$

- $\nabla x. \nabla y. x \neq y$.
  - For any name $n \notin \{\}$, it is that $\nabla y. n \neq y$.
  - For any name $n \notin \{\}$, for any name $m \notin \{n\}$, it is that $n \neq m$.

- $\forall x. \forall y. x \neq y$ is not provable.
  - Given any term $M$, it must be that $M = M$.

- $(\forall x. \forall y. p x y) \supset (\forall z. p z z)$.

- $(\nabla x. \nabla y. p x y) \supset (\nabla z. p z z)$ is not provable.
  - $\nabla x. \nabla y. p x y$ means that $p$ holds for any two distinct names.
  - $\nabla z. p z z$ means that $p$ holds for any name, repeated.
Mobility of Binding

The equational theory of λ-terms is restated in terms of ∇.

$$(\lambda x. M) = (\lambda x. N) \text{ if and only if } \Box x. (M = N).$$

Why not ∀?

- **Differentiate** between the identity function $\lambda x. x$ and the constant function $\lambda x. c$.
- $\forall x. (x = c)$ is satisfiable.
- $\Box x. (x = c)$ is false, i.e., $\neg \Box x. (x = c)$ is provable.
Names and Equivariance

- Formulas are considered equivalent up to a permutation of their free names, known as equivariance.
- Example: if $m$ and $n$ are distinct names, then:
  - $pm \equiv pn$.
  - $pmn \equiv pnm$.
  - $pmn \neq pnm$.
- Note: terms are not equal up to equivariance!
- In Abella, any identifier matching the regexp $n[0-9]+$ is considered to be a name.
Let \( \text{supp}(F) \) stand for the free names in \( F \).

\[ \forall x. F: \]

For every term \( M \), it is the case that \([M/x]F\) is true.
Let \( \text{supp}(F) \) stand for the free names in \( F \).

\( \forall x. F: \)

\[
\text{For every term } M \text{ with } \text{supp}(M) = \{\}, \text{ it is the case that } [M \text{ supp}(F)/x]F \text{ is true.}
\]
Raising

\(\forall x. F: \)

For every term \(M\) with \(\text{supp}(M) = \{\}\), it is the case that \([M \ \text{supp}(F)/x]F\) is true.

- \(\forall x. \nabla y. p x y\)
  - For every term \(M\), it is that \(\nabla y. p M y\).
  - For every \(M\), for any name \(n \notin \text{fn}(M)\), it is that \(p M n\).
  - Therefore \(M\) cannot mention \(n\).

- \(\nabla y. \forall x. p x y\)
  - For any name \(n \notin \{\}\), it is that \(\forall x. p x n\).
  - For any name \(n\), for every term \(M\), it is that \(p (M n) n\).
  - In other words, \(M\) is of the form \(\lambda x. M'\) where \(M'\) can have \(x\) free.
  - Therefore, \(M\) can (indirectly) mention \(n\).
Back to HOAS: The Typing Relation

\[
\Gamma, x: A \vdash x : A \\
\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \rightarrow B \\
\Gamma \vdash M : A \rightarrow B \\
\Gamma \vdash N : A \\
\Gamma \vdash MN : B
\]

Define \textit{of} : ctx -> tm -> ty -> prop by

\[
\text{of } G \ X \ A := \text{mem } G \ X \ A ;
\]

\[
\text{of } G \ (\text{app } M \ N) \ B :=
\exists A, \text{ of } M \ (\text{arrow } A \ B) \ \land \ \text{of } N \ A ;
\]

\[
\text{of } G \ (\text{abs } x \ M \ x) \ (\text{arrow } A \ B) :=
\nabla x, \text{ of } (\text{add } G \ x \ A) \ (M \ x) \ B
\]
Back to HOAS: The Typing Relation

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma, x:A \vdash x : A \\
\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. M : A \to B \\
\Gamma \vdash M : A \to B, \Gamma \vdash N : A \quad \Rightarrow \\
\Gamma \vdash M \; N : B
\end{align*}
\]

Define \emph{of} : \text{ctx} \to \text{tm} \to \text{ty} \to \text{prop} by

\[
\begin{align*}
of \; G \; X \; A & \ := \ \text{mem} \; G \; X \; A \\
of \; G \; (\text{app} \; M \; N) \; B & \ := \\
& \quad \exists A, \ of \; M \ (\text{arrow} \; A \; B) \ \vee \ \text{of} \; N \; A \\
of \; G \; (\text{abs} \ x \ \downarrow \ M \ x) \ (\text{arrow} \; A \; B) & \ := \\
& \quad \text{nabla} \ x, \ of \ (\text{add} \ G \; x \; A) \ (M \ x) \ B
\end{align*}
\]
\( \nabla \) in the Body of a Clause

\[
\text{of } G \ (\text{abs } x \setminus M\ x) \ (\text{arrow } A\ B) := \\
\text{nabla } x, \ \text{of} \ (\text{add } G\ x\ A) \ (M\ x)\ B
\]

means

\[
\text{forall } G\ M\ A\ B, \\
\text{of } G \ (\text{abs } x \setminus M\ x) \ (\text{arrow } A\ B) <- \\
\text{nabla } x, \ \text{of} \ (\text{add } G\ x\ A) \ (M\ x)\ B.
\]

- None of \( G, M, A, B \) can mention \( x \).
- \( M \) can \textit{indirectly} mention \( x \).
2.8 - Properties of the Typing Relation
The main promise of HOAS: substitution “for free”

Define \( \text{eval} : \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{eval} (\text{abs } R) (\text{abs } R) & ; \\
\text{eval} (\text{app } M N) \ V & := \\
\ & \exists R, \ \text{eval } M (\text{abs } R) \land \text{eval } (R \ N) \ V.
\end{align*}
\]

Notes:

- \((R \ N)\) may be arbitrarily larger than \((\text{app } M N)\).
- However, proving \((\text{eval } (R \ N) \ V)\) will require strictly fewer unfolding steps than \((\text{eval } (\text{app } M N) \ V)\).
INTERMISSION
The Two-Level Logic Approach
Outline

1. Focused Minimal Intuitionistic Logic
2. Two-Level Logic Approach
3. Context Structure
4. Examples
Meta-Theorems

- We have just seen several examples of meta-theorems:
  - Cut (for substituting in contexts)
  - Instantiation (for replacing names with terms)
  - Weakening

- Such theorems can be seen as instances of similar meta-theorems for a proof system

- If we can isolate this proof system and prove the meta-theorems once and for all, we can avoid a lot of boilerplate.
Let us start with intuitionistic minimal logic.

\[
F, G ::= A \mid F \Rightarrow G \mid \Pi x. F \\
\Gamma ::= \cdot \mid \Gamma, F
\]

We are going to build a focused proof system for this logic.

\[
\Gamma \vdash F \quad \text{Goal decomposition sequent} \\
\Gamma, [F] \vdash A \quad \text{Backchaining sequent}
\]
Small Aside: A Bit of Proof Theory

Let us start with intuitionistic minimal logic.

\[
F, G 
\quad ::= \quad A \quad \mid \quad F \Rightarrow G \quad \mid \quad \Pi x. \ F
\]
\[
\Gamma 
\quad ::= \quad \cdot \quad \mid \quad \Gamma, F
\]

We are going to build a focused proof system for this logic.

\[
\Gamma \vdash F \quad \quad \text{Goal decomposition sequent}
\]
\[
\Gamma, [F] \vdash A \quad \quad \text{Backchaining sequent}
\]
Focused Proof System

Goal decomposition
\[
\frac{\Gamma, F \vdash G}{\Gamma \vdash F \Rightarrow G} \quad \frac{(x \not\in \Gamma) \quad \Gamma \vdash F}{\Gamma \vdash \Pi x. F}
\]

Decision
\[
\frac{\Gamma, F, [F] \vdash A}{\Gamma, F \vdash A}
\]

Backchaining
\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Gamma \vdash F \quad \Gamma, [G] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [F \Rightarrow G] \vdash A} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, [[t/x]F] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [\Pi x. F] \vdash A} & \frac{\Gamma, [A] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [A] \vdash A}
\end{align*}
\]
Focused Proof System

Goal decomposition

\[ \frac{\Gamma, F \vdash G}{\Gamma \vdash F \Rightarrow G} \quad \frac{(x \not\in \Gamma) \quad \Gamma \vdash F}{\Gamma \vdash \Pi x. F} \]

Decision

\[ \frac{\Gamma, F, [\textbf{F}] \vdash A}{\Gamma, F \vdash A} \]

Backchaining

\[ \frac{\Gamma \vdash F \quad \Gamma, [G] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [F \Rightarrow G] \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Gamma, [[t/x]F] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [\Pi x. F] \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Gamma, [A] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [A] \vdash A} \]
Focused Proof System

Goal decomposition

\[
\frac{\Gamma, F \vdash G}{\Gamma \vdash F \Rightarrow G} \quad \frac{(x \not \in \Gamma) \quad \Gamma \vdash F}{\Gamma \vdash \Pi x. F}
\]

Decision

\[
\frac{\Gamma, F, [F] \vdash A}{\Gamma, F \vdash A}
\]

Backchaining

\[
\frac{\Gamma \vdash F \quad \Gamma, [G] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [F \Rightarrow G] \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Gamma, [[t/x]F] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [\Pi x. F] \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Gamma, [A] \vdash A}{\Gamma, [A] \vdash A}
\]
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine $\Gamma = R_1, R_2$ where:

$R_1$: $\Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m (\text{arr } a b) \Rightarrow \text{of } n a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m n) b.$

$R_2$: $\Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r x) b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) (\text{arr } a b).$

Consider the result of deciding on $R_1$ and $R_2$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M (\text{arr } A B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M N) B \vdash C \\
\Gamma, [[M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b] \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots] & \vdash C \\
\Gamma, [R_1] & \vdash C \\
\Gamma & \vdash C
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M (\text{arr } A B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A \\
\Gamma & \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M N) B
\end{align*}
\]
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine $\Gamma = R_1, R_2$ where:

$R_1$: $\Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m \text{(arr a b)} \Rightarrow \text{of } n a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m n) b$.

$R_2$: $\Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r x) b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) (\text{arr } a b)$.

Consider the result of deciding on $R_1$ and $R_2$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \text{(arr } A B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A & \quad \Gamma, [\text{of } (\text{app } M N) B] \vdash C \\
\Gamma, [[M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b] \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots] \vdash C \\
\Gamma, [R_1] \vdash C \\
\Gamma \vdash C
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \text{(arr } A B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A \\
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M N) B
\end{align*}
\]
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine $\Gamma = R_1, R_2$ where:

$R_1$: $\Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m (\text{arr } a b) \Rightarrow \text{of } n a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m n) b.$

$R_2$: $\Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r x) b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) (\text{arr } a b).$

Consider the result of deciding on $R_1$ and $R_2$.

$$
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M (\text{arr } A B) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A \quad \Gamma, \{\text{of } (\text{app } M N) B\} \vdash \jmath
$$

$$
\Gamma, \{M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b\} \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \vdash \jmath
$$

$$
\Gamma, [R_1] \vdash \jmath
$$

$$
\Gamma \vdash \jmath
$$

$$
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M (\text{arr } A B) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A
$$

$$
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M N) B
$$
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine \( \Gamma = R_1, R_2 \) where:

\[
R_1: \Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m \ (\text{arr } a \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } n \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m \ n) \ b.
\]

\[
R_2: \Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r \ x) \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) \ (\text{arr } a \ b).
\]

Consider the result of deciding on \( R_1 \) and \( R_2 \).

\[
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \ (\text{arr } A \ B) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A \quad \Gamma, [\text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B] \vdash C
\]

\[
\Gamma, [[M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b] \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \vdash C
\]

\[
\Gamma, [R_1] \vdash C
\]

\[
\Gamma \vdash C
\]

\[
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \ (\text{arr } A \ B) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A
\]

\[
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
\]
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine $\Gamma = R_1, R_2$ where:

$R_1$: $\Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m \,(\text{arr } a \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } n \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m \ n) \ b$.

$R_2$: $\Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r \ x) \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) \ (\text{arr } a \ b)$.

Consider the result of deciding on $R_1$ and $R_2$.

$$
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \ (\text{arr } A \ B) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A
\quad \Gamma, [\text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
\quad \Gamma, [[M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b] \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
\quad \Gamma, [R_1] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
\quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
$$

$$
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \ (\text{arr } A \ B) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A
\quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
$$
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine $\Gamma = R_1, R_2$ where:

$R_1$: $\Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m \ (\text{arr } a \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } n \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m \ n) \ b$.

$R_2$: $\Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r \ x) \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) \ (\text{arr } a \ b)$.

Consider the result of deciding on $R_1$ and $R_2$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M \ (\text{arr } A \ B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N A \\
\Gamma, [\text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\Gamma, [[M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b] \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\Gamma, [R_1] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B
\end{align*}
\]
Synthetic (Derived) Rules

Imagine $\Gamma = R_1, R_2$ where:

$R_1$: $\Pi m, n, a, b. \text{of } m (\text{arr } a \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } n \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{app } m \ n) \ b.$

$R_2$: $\Pi r, a, b. (\Pi x. \text{of } x \ a \Rightarrow \text{of } (r \ x) \ b) \Rightarrow \text{of } (\text{abs } r) (\text{arr } a \ b).$

Consider the result of deciding on $R_1$ and $R_2$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M (\text{arr } A \ B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N \ A & \quad \Gamma, [\text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\Gamma, [[M/m, N/n, A/a, B/b] \Rightarrow \ldots \Rightarrow \ldots] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B & \quad \Gamma, [R_1] \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } M (\text{arr } A \ B) & \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } N \ A \\
\Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{app } M \ N) \ B \\
\end{align*}
\]
Deciding on \( R_2 \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\[1\] & \quad \Gamma, \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \\
& \quad \Gamma, \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \\
\end{align*}
\]

where \([1]\) is:

\[
\begin{align*}
(x\#\Gamma) & \quad \Gamma, \text{of } x A \vdash \text{of } (R x) B \\
& \quad \Gamma \vdash \Pi x. \text{of } x A \Rightarrow \text{of } (R x) B \\
\end{align*}
\]

So:

\[
\begin{align*}
(x\#\Gamma) & \quad \Gamma, \text{of } x A \vdash \text{of } (R x) B \\
& \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \\
\end{align*}
\]
Deciding on $R_2$

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\Gamma, [\text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B)] \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \\
\Gamma, [[R/r, A/a, B/b](\Pi x. \cdot \cdot \cdot \Rightarrow \cdot \cdot \cdot) \Rightarrow \cdot \cdot \cdot] \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \\
\Gamma, [R_2] \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \\
\Gamma \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B)
\end{array} \]

where \[ \Box \] is:

\[ (x \# \Gamma) \quad \Gamma, \text{of } x A \vdash \text{of } (R x) B \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash \Pi x. \text{of } x A \Rightarrow \text{of } (R x) B \]

So:

\[ (x \# \Gamma) \quad \Gamma, \text{of } x A \vdash \text{of } (R x) B \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash \text{of } (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B) \]
Synthetic Rules vs. SOS rules

Reasoning about SOS derivations is isomorphic to reasoning about focused derivations for its minimal theory.
Synthetic Rules vs. SOS rules

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash M : A \rightarrow B & \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A \\
\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash (M \cdot N) : B} \\
\Gamma, x : A \vdash M : B & \quad (x \# \Gamma) \quad \Gamma, \text{of} x A \vdash \text{of} (R \cdot x) B \\
\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x. M) : A \rightarrow B} & \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{of} (\text{abs } R) (\text{arr } A B)}
\end{align*}
\]

Reasoning about SOS derivations is isomorphic to reasoning about focused derivations for its minimal theory.
Minimal Logic Definable in $G$

Kind $o$ type.

Type $=>$ $o \to o \to o$.
Type $\Pi$ $(A \to o) \to o$.

Kind olist type

Type nil olist.
Type :: $o \to$ olist $\to$ olist.

Define $member : o \to$ olist $\to$ prop by ...
Minimal Logic Definable in $\mathcal{G}$

Kind $o$ type.

Type $=>$ $o \rightarrow o \rightarrow o$.

Type $\pi$ $(A \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$.

Kind olist type

Type $\text{nil}$ olist.

Type $::$ $o \rightarrow \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{olist}$.

Define member : $o \rightarrow \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{prop}$ by ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequent</th>
<th>Encoding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma \vdash F$</td>
<td>seq L F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, [F] \vdash A$</td>
<td>bch L F A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Define seq : olist -> o -> prop,
    bch : olist -> o -> o -> prop by

% goal reduction
seq L (F => G) := seq (F :: L) G ;
seq L (pi F) := nabla x, seq L (F x) ;

% decision
seq L A :=
    exists F, member F L /\ bch L F A ;

% backchaining
bch L (F => G) A := seq L F /\ bch L G A ;
bch L (pi F) A := exists T, bch L (F T) A
bch L A A.
Theorem **cut**: \( \forall L \ C \ F, \)
\[ \text{seq } L \ C \rightarrow \text{seq } (C :: L) \ F \rightarrow \text{seq } L \ F. \]

Theorem **inst**: \( \forall L \ F, \ \nabla x, \)
\[ \text{seq } (L \ x) \ (F \ x) \rightarrow \forall T, \ \text{seq } (L \ T) \ (F \ T). \]

Theorem **monotone**: \( \forall L1 \ L2 \ F, \)
\[
\begin{align*}
\%\% \ L1 & \subseteq \ L2 \\
(\forall G, \ \text{member } G \ L1 \rightarrow \text{member } G \ L2) & \rightarrow \\
\text{seq } L1 \ F & \rightarrow \text{seq } L2 \ F.
\end{align*}
\]
The Two Level Logic Approach of Abella

• **Specification Logic**
  - Focused sequent calculus for minimal intuitionistic logic
  - Shares the type system of $\mathcal{G}$, but formulas of type $\circ$
  - Concrete syntax the same as $\lambda$Prolog

• **Reasoning Logic**
  - Inductive definition of the specification logic proof system
  - Inductive reasoning about specification logic derivations
  - Syntactic sugar:
    
    \[
    \begin{align*}
    \text{seq} & \ L \ F \ & \{L \ |- \ F\} \\
    \text{bch} & \ L \ F \ A \ & \{L, \ [F] \ |- \ A\}
    \end{align*}
    \]
Example: STLC Specification

3.1 - Typing and Subject Reduction
Uniqueness of Typing

Change to a Church style representation:

\[
\text{type } \text{abs } \text{ty } \to (\text{tm } \to \text{tm}) \to \text{tm}.
\]

\[
\text{of (abs } A \ R) (\text{arr } A \ B) :-
\]

\[
\text{pi } x \text{ of } x \text{ A } \Rightarrow \text{of (R } x \text{) B}.
\]

Want to show that every term has a unique type.

**Theorem** \(\text{type}_\text{uniq} : \text{forall } M \ A \ B,\)

\[
\{\text{of } M \ A\} \Rightarrow \{\text{of } M \ B\} \Rightarrow A = B.
\]

Need to generalize!

**Theorem** \(\text{type}_\text{uniq}_\text{open} : \text{forall } L \ M \ A \ B,\)

\[
\{L \ |- \ \text{of } M \ A\} \Rightarrow \{L \ |- \ \text{of } M \ B\} \Rightarrow A = B.
\]
Uniqueness of Typing

Change to a Church style representation:

\[
\text{type} \quad \text{abs} \quad \text{ty} \rightarrow (\text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm}) \rightarrow \text{tm}.
\]

----

\[
of \ (\text{abs} \ A \ R) \ (\text{arr} \ A \ B) :-
\quad \text{pi} \ x \ \text{of} \ x \ A \Rightarrow \text{of} \ (R \ x) \ B.
\]

Want to show that every term has a unique type.

**Theorem** \(\text{type}_\text{uniq} : \forall M \ A \ B,\)
\[
\{\text{of} \ M \ A\} \rightarrow \{\text{of} \ M \ B\} \rightarrow A = B.
\]

Need to generalize!

**Theorem** \(\text{type}_\text{uniq}\_\text{open} : \forall L \ M \ A \ B,\)
\[
\{L \mid- \text{of} \ M \ A\} \rightarrow \{L \mid- \text{of} \ M \ B\} \rightarrow A = B.
\]
Uniqueness of Typing

Change to a Church style representation:

\[
\text{type} \quad \text{abs} \quad \text{ty} \rightarrow (\text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm}) \rightarrow \text{tm}.
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{of (abs A R)} \ (\text{arr} \ A \ B) & :- \\
\pi x \ \text{of} \ x \ A & \Rightarrow \ \text{of} \ (R \ x) \ B.
\end{align*}
\]

Want to show that every term has a unique type.

**Theorem** \(\text{type_uniq} : \forall M A B,\) \(\{\text{of} \ M \ A\} \rightarrow \{\text{of} \ M \ B\} \rightarrow A = B.\)

Need to generalize!

**Theorem** \(\text{type_uniq_open} : \forall L M A B,\) \(\{L \ |- \ \text{of} \ M \ A\} \rightarrow \{L \ |- \ \text{of} \ M \ B\} \rightarrow A = B.\)
Structure of Contexts

- The typing **dynamic context** \( L \) is a list of assumptions.
- Already seen how to inductively define the structure of lists.
- Therefore:

  \[
  \text{Define } \text{ctx} : \text{olist} \to \text{prop} \text{ by}
  \begin{align*}
  \text{ctx} & \text{ nil ;} \\
  \text{ctx} \ (\text{of} \ X \ A :: L) & := \text{ctx} \ L.
  \end{align*}
  \]

- But this does not capture \( x \# L \)!
“∇ In The Head”

Meaning of the second clause:

\[ \forall L \ A \ X, \ctx L \rightarrow \ctx(\text{of } X \ A :: L). \]

Let us change the “flavor” of \( x \).

\[ \forall L \ A, \nabla x, \ctx L \rightarrow \ctx(\text{of } x \ A :: L). \]

Equivalent to:

\[ \forall L \ A, \ctx L \rightarrow \nabla x, \ctx(\text{of } x \ A :: L). \]

This suggests:

Define \( \text{ctx} : \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ctx} \text{ nil } &; \\
\nabla x, \text{ctx (of } x \ A :: L) &:= \text{ctx } L.
\end{align*}
\]
Meaning of the second clause:

\[
\forall L A X, \quad \text{ctx} L \to \text{ctx} (\text{of } X A :: L).
\]

Let us change the “flavor” of \( x \).

\[
\forall L A, \text{nabla } x, \quad \text{ctx} L \to \text{ctx} (\text{of } x A :: L).
\]

Equivalent to:

\[
\forall L A, \text{ctx} L \to \text{nabla } x, \text{ctx} (\text{of } x A :: L).
\]

This suggests:

Define \( \text{ctx} : \) olist \( \to \) prop by

\[
\text{ctx} \text{ nil } ; \\
\text{nabla } x, \text{ctx} (\text{of } x A :: L) := \text{ctx} L.
\]
“∇ In The Head”

Meaning of the second clause:

\[
\forall L A X, \\
\text{ctx } L \rightarrow \text{ctx } \text{(of } X A :: L). \]

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\[
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\text{forall } L \ A \ X, \\
\text{ctx } L \rightarrow \text{ctx } (\text{of } X \ A :: L).
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\[
\text{forall } L \ A, \ \text{ctx } L \rightarrow \\
\text{nabla } x, \ \text{ctx } (\text{of } x \ A :: L).
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This suggests:

**Define** \( \text{ctx} : \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) **by**
\[
\text{ctx nil} ; \\
\text{nabla } x, \ \text{ctx } (\text{of } x \ A :: L) := \text{ctx } L.
\]
Unification with $\nabla$ In Heads

Clause head: $\nabla x, \text{ctx (of } x A :: L)$
Assumption: $H : \text{ctx (of } U B :: LL)$

- $U$ must be a name ...
- ...that does not occur in $B$ or $LL$!
- Therefore, case $H$ picks an $n \notin \text{supp}(B) \cup \text{supp}(LL)$ for the unifier for $U$. 
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Unification with ∇ In Heads

Clause head:  nabla x, ctx (of x A :: L)
Assumption:   H : ctx (of n1 B :: (LL n1))
Tactic:       case H.

Unification prunes n1 from LL n1.

Clause head:  nabla x, ctx (of x A :: L)
Assumption:   H : ctx (of n1 B :: kon n1)
Tactic:       case H.

Cannot prune n1, so unification fails!
Unification with $\forall$ In Heads

Clause head: $\nabla x, \text{ctx (of } x \text{ A :: L)}$
Assumption: $H : \text{ctx (of } n1 \text{ B :: (LL n1))}$
Tactic: case $H$.

Unification prunes $n1$ from $\text{LL } n1$.

Clause head: $\nabla x, \text{ctx (of } x \text{ A :: L)}$
Assumption: $H : \text{ctx (of } n1 \text{ B :: kon } n1)$
Tactic: case $H$.

Cannot prune $n1$, so unification fails!
Unification with $\forall$ In Heads

Clause head: \( \text{nabla } x, \text{ctx } (\text{of } x \text{ A :: L}) \)
Assumption: \( H : \text{ctx } (\text{of } n1 \text{ B :: (LL n1)}) \)
Tactic: \( \text{case } H. \)

Unification prunes \( n1 \) from \( \text{LL } n1 \).

Clause head: \( \text{nabla } x, \text{ctx } (\text{of } x \text{ A :: L}) \)
Assumption: \( H : \text{ctx } (\text{of } n1 \text{ B :: kon n1}) \)
Tactic: \( \text{case } H. \)

Cannot prune \( n1 \), so unification fails!
Unification with \( \nabla \) In Heads

Clause head: \( \nabla x, \ ctx \ (of \ x \ A :: L) \)
Assumption: \( H : ctx \ (of \ n1 \ B :: (LL \ n1)) \)
Tactic: \( \text{case } H. \)

Unification prunes \( n1 \) from \( LL \ n1 \).

Clause head: \( \nabla x, \ ctx \ (of \ x \ A :: L) \)
Assumption: \( H : ctx \ (of \ n1 \ B :: kon \ n1) \)
Tactic: \( \text{case } H. \)

Cannot prune \( n1 \), so unification fails!
Some Puzzles

• Define \( \text{name} : \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) that holds only for names.
  
  \[
  \text{Define name : tm \rightarrow prop by}
  \n  \text{nabla } x, \text{ name } x.
  \]

• Define \( \text{fresh} : \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) such that \( \text{fresh } X \ Y \) means \( x \) is a name that does not occur in \( Y \).
  
  \[
  \text{Define fresh : tm \rightarrow tm \rightarrow prop by}
  \n  \text{nabla } x, \text{ fresh } x \ Y.
  \]
Some Puzzles

- Define \texttt{name} : \texttt{tm} \rightarrow \texttt{prop} that holds only for names.

  \begin{verbatim}
  Define name : tm -> prop by
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- Define \texttt{fresh} : \texttt{tm} \rightarrow \texttt{tm} \rightarrow \texttt{prop} such that \texttt{fresh} \texttt{X Y} means \texttt{x} is a name that does not occur in \texttt{Y}.

  \begin{verbatim}
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Some Puzzles

- Define \( \text{name} : \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{prop} \) that holds only for names.

  \[
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Some Puzzles

- Define \texttt{name : tm -> prop} that holds only for names.

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\begin{verbatim}
Define fresh : tm -> tm -> prop by
  nabla x, fresh x Y.
\end{verbatim}
Extended Example: Uniqueness of Typing

3.2 – Type Uniqueness
No reason for \texttt{ctx} relations to be unary.

Define \texttt{ctx\_len} : olist \to nat \to prop by
\begin{verbatim}
ctx\_len nil z ;
nabla x, ctx\_len (of x A :: L) (s N) :=
ctx\_len L N.
\end{verbatim}

Define \texttt{ctxs} : olist \to olist \to prop by
\begin{verbatim}
ctxs nil nil ;
nabla x, ctxs (term x :: L) (neutral x :: K) :=
ctxs L K.
\end{verbatim}
Context Relations

No reason for \texttt{ctx} relations to be unary.

\begin{verbatim}
Define \texttt{ctx\_len} : olist -> nat -> prop by
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  nabla x, ctx\_len (of x A :: L) (s N) :=
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No reason for $\text{ctx}$ relations to be unary.

Define $\text{ctx_len} : \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{prop}$ by

\[
\text{ctx_len} \text{ nil } z ; \\
\text{nabla } x, \text{ctx_len} \ (\text{of } x A :: L) \ (s N) := \\
\text{ctx_len} L N.
\]

Define $\text{ctxs} : \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{olist} \rightarrow \text{prop}$ by

\[
\text{ctxs} \text{ nil } \text{ nil} ; \\
\text{nabla } x, \text{ctxs} \ (\text{term } x :: L) \ (\text{neutral } x :: K) := \\
\text{ctxs} L K.
\]
Example: Partitioning of Lambda Terms

3.3 - Partitioning
Extended Example: Relating HOAS and De Bruijn Representations

3.4 - HOAS vs. Indexed
Co-Induction
Interpretations of Co-Induction

- Non-termination
- Greatest Fixed Point
- Dual of Induction

```latex
Define p : prop by
  p := p.

Theorem pth : p -> false.

CoDefine q : prop by
  q := q.

Theorem qth : q.
```
The \textbf{coinduction} Tactic

Given a goal

\[
\forall X_1 \ldots X_n, F_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow F_n \rightarrow G
\]

where $G$ is a co-inductively defined atom, the invocation \textbf{coinduction}

1. Adds a \textbf{co-inductive hypothesis} (CH):

\[
\forall X_1 \ldots X_n, F_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow F_n \rightarrow G +
\]

2. Then \textbf{changes} the goal to:

\[
\forall X_1 \ldots X_n, F_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow F_n \rightarrow G 
\]
## Annotations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annotation</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@</td>
<td>hypothesis</td>
<td>case</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@</td>
<td>goal</td>
<td>anything</td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>goal</td>
<td>unfold</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>hypothesis</td>
<td>anything</td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Example: Automata Simulation

![Automata Diagram]

**Definition:** \( q \) simulates \( p \), written \( p \preceq q \), iff:

- for every \( p' \), \( a \) such that \( p \xrightarrow{a} p' \),
- there is a \( q' \) such that \( q \xrightarrow{a} q' \), and
- \( p' \preceq q' \).

Here,

- \( q_0 \preceq p_0 \).
- \( q_1 \preceq p_0 \).
- \( p_0 \npreceq q_0 \).
Example: Automata Simulation

4.1 - Automata
Example: Diverging $\lambda$-Terms

4.2 - Divergence
Summary So Far

You have now seen the *headline features* of Abella.

- Higher-Order Abstract Syntax and \( \nabla \)
- Inductive and Co-Inductive Definitions
- Two-Level Logic Approach

Next:

- Re-ification of the type system
- Beyond simple types
- Automation
You have now seen the *headline features* of Abella.

- Higher-Order Abstract Syntax and $\nabla$
- Inductive and Co-Inductive Definitions
- Two-Level Logic Approach

Next:

- Re-ification of the type system
- Beyond simple types
- Automation
Extensions
Reasoning about typing

Abella’s induction mechanism has two simple principles:

- Every inductive proof is based on an inductive definition
- All inductive definitions are explicit, fixed, and finite

Consequences:

- **Typing** is not itself inductive
- Signatures can always be extended

```lean
Type z nat.
Type s nat -> nat.

Theorem nat_str : forall (x:nat),
  x = z / exists (y:nat), x = s y.
% not provable
skip.

Type p nat -> nat -> nat.
```

Is `nat_str` still true?
Reasoning about typing

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• Every inductive proof is based on an inductive definition
• All inductive definitions are explicit, fixed, and finite

Consequences:

• **Typing** is not itself inductive
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```plaintext
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Theorem nat_str : forall (x:nat),
  x = z \/
  exists (y:nat), x = s y.
% not provable
skip.

Type p nat -> nat -> nat.
```

Is **nat_str** still true?
Re-ifying Typing

Sometimes the typing relation can be reified.

\[
\text{Define } is\_nat : \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{prop} \text{ by } \\
\quad is\_nat \ z ; \\
\quad is\_nat \ (s \ N) := is\_nat \ N.
\]

\[
\text{Theorem } nat\_str : \forall x, is\_nat \ x \rightarrow \\
\quad x = z \lor \exists y, is\_nat \ y \land x = s \ y.
\]

... 

But not always!

\[
\text{Define } is\_tm : \text{tm} \rightarrow \text{prop} \text{ by } \\
\quad is\_tm \ (\text{app} \ M \ N) := is\_tm \ M \lor is\_tm \ N ; \\
\quad is\_tm \ (\text{abs} \ R) := \nabla x, is\_tm \ x \rightarrow is\_tm \ (R \ x).
\]

This is not stratified.
Sometimes the typing relation can be reified.

Define is_nat : nat -> prop by
    is_nat z ;
    is_nat (s N) := is_nat N.

Theorem nat_str : forall x, is_nat x ->
    x = z \/ exists y, is_nat y /
    x = s y.
...

But not always!

Define is_tm : tm -> prop by
    is_tm (app M N) := is_tm M /
    is_tm N ;
    is_tm (abs R) := nabla x, is_tm x -> is_tm (R x).

This is not stratified.
Re-ifying Typing

Sometimes the typing relation can be reified.

\[
\text{Define } \text{is\_nat} : \text{nat} \to \text{prop} \text{ by}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{is\_nat} \ z & ; \\
\text{is\_nat} \ (s \ N) & := \text{is\_nat} \ N.
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{Theorem } \text{nat\_str} : \forall x, \text{is\_nat} \ x \to
\begin{align*}
x & = z \lor \exists y, \text{is\_nat} \ y \land x = s \ y.
\end{align*}
\]

... 

But not always!

\[
\text{Define } \text{is\_tm} : \text{tm} \to \text{prop} \text{ by}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{is\_tm} \ (\text{app} \ M \ N) & := \text{is\_tm} \ M \lor \text{is\_tm} \ N \\
\text{is\_tm} \ (\text{abs} \ R) & := \text{nabla} x, \text{is\_tm} \ x \to \text{is\_tm} \ (R \ x).
\end{align*}
\]

This is not stratified.
Two-Level Reification

% typing.sig

type is_nat nat -> o.
type is_tm tm -> o.

% typing.mod

is_nat z.
is_nat (s N) :- is_nat N.

is_tm (app M N) :- is_tm M, is_tm N.
is_tm (abs R) :- pi x\ is_tm x => is_tm (R x).

Then

Theorem nat_str : forall x, {is_nat x} ->
    x = z \/ exists y, {is_nat y} /\ x = s y.

Theorem tm_str : forall T, {is_tm T} ->
    (exists M N, {is_tm M} /\ {is_tm N} /\ T = app M N)
    /\ (exists R, (forall x, {is_tm x} => {is_tm R x})
        /\ T = abs R).
Two-Level Reification

% typing.sig
type is_nat nat -> o.
type is_tm tm -> o.
----
% typing.mod
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is_nat (s N) :- is_nat N.

is_tm (app M N) :- is_tm M, is_tm N.

is_tm (abs R) :- pi x\ is_tm x => is_tm (R x).

Then

Theorem nat_str : forall x, {is_nat x} ->
  x = z \/ exists y, {is_nat y} \/ x = s y.

Theorem tm_str : forall T, {is_tm T} ->
  (exists M N, {is_tm M} \/ {is_tm N} \/ T = app M N)
  \/
  (exists R, (forall x, {is_tm x} -> {is_tm R x})
    \/ T = abs R).
Beyond Simple Types: LF (a.k.a. $\lambda\Pi$)

http://abella-prover.org/lf

- All kinds of typing relations can be reified.
- Encoding dependent types (and DT$\lambda$ terms):

\[
\begin{align*}
[\Pi x : A. \ U] & = [A] \to [U] & [M \ N] & = [M] [N] \\
[a \ M_1 \ \cdots \ M_n] & = a \ M_1 \ \cdots \ M_n & [\lambda x : A. \ M] & = \lambda x : [A]. [M] \\
[type] & = lftype
\end{align*}
\]

- Encoding typing as specification formulas.

\[
\begin{align*}
[M : \Pi x : A. \ U] & = \Pi x. \ [x : A] \Rightarrow [M \ x : U] \\
[M : P] & = \text{hasType} [M][P] \\
[A : type] & = \text{isType} [A]
\end{align*}
\]

- Encoding LF signatures

\[
[[c : U]] = \text{type} c \ [U].
\]

\[
[[c : U]] = \text{type} c \ [U].
\]
Abella/LF Examples
Many theorems about contexts are:
  - Tedious, and
  - Predictable

This is particularly the case for regular contexts.

We have a proof of concept for some rather sophisticated and certifying automation procedures (LFMTP 2014)

Look out for it in Abella 2.1!
More Resources
Related Material

• See list on: http://abella-prover.org/tutorial/


• Course notes by Gopalan Nadathur for: Specification and Reasoning About Computational Systems

Some Work in Progress
That I Know Of

- Compiler verification project in λProlog + Abella
  - Using step-indexed logical relations
  - Yuting Wang, Gopalan Nadathur

- ORBI-to-Abella
  - Alberto Momigliano & his student(s)

- Certified procedures for type checkers
  - Yuting Wang, Kaustuv Chaudhuri

- Polymorphism and reasoning modules
  - Polymorphic definitions and theorems already part of the upcoming Abella 2.0.4.
  - Polymorphic data being worked on by Yuting Wang

- Declarative proof language
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