On the Variability Secrets of an Online Video Generator
Guillaume Bécan, Mathieu Acher, Jean-Marc Jézéquel, Thomas Menguy

To cite this version:
Guillaume Bécan, Mathieu Acher, Jean-Marc Jézéquel, Thomas Menguy. On the Variability Secrets of an Online Video Generator. Variability Modelling of Software-intensive Systems, Jan 2015, Hildesheim, Germany. pp.96 - 102, 10.1145/2701319.2701328. hal-01104797

HAL Id: hal-01104797
https://inria.hal.science/hal-01104797
Submitted on 19 Jan 2015

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.
On the Variability Secrets of an Online Video Generator

Guillaume Bécan, Mathieu Acher, Jean-Marc Jézéquel
Inria - IRISA Université de Rennes 1
Campus de Beaulieu
35000 Rennes, France
{gbecan, mathieu.acher, jean-marc.jezequel}@irisa.fr

Thomas Menguy
Wildmoka
Sophia Antipolis, France
thomas@wildmoka.com

ABSTRACT
We relate an original experience concerning a popular online video service that offers to generate variants of an humorous video. To further the understanding of the generator, we have reverse engineered its general behavior, architecture, as well as its variation points and its configuration space. The reverse engineering also allows us to create a new generator and online configurator that proposes 18 variation points – instead of only 3 as in the original generator. We explain why and how we have collaborated and are collaborating with the original creators of the video generator. We also highlight how our reverse engineering work represents a threat to the original service and call for further investigating variability-aware security mechanisms.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.6.5 Management of Computing and Information Systems: Security and Protection; D.2.7 Software Engineering: Distribution, Maintenance, and Enhancement—Restructuring, reverse engineering, and reengineering; D.2.9 Software Engineering: Management—Software configuration management

General Terms
Experimentation

Keywords
Reverse engineering, Software product line, Configurator, Video generator, Security

1. INTRODUCTION

The concepts of software product lines and variability are more and more observed in numerous domains and contexts [8, 16, 34, 35]. Abstractions, theories, techniques, languages, and tools have been developed and are widely used for managing and building variants of user interfaces, requirements, source code, architectures, 3D models, or design models, to name a few [6, 10, 11, 17, 26, 27, 32, 36, 39]. The applicability of variability techniques seems infinite – any artefact is virtually subject to customisation, configuration, or extension.

We report on an experience related to an online video service. The service offers to generate variants of an humorous video. Internet users simply have to type their name, select 3 options (or click on a button for a random selection), and a particular video is launched and visualised in the browser (see Figure 1, page ). The service is quite popular and successful: more than 1.7M of video variants have been generated in 1 week.

We had an interest in the Web site, since the service claims that a particular video is resulting from a combination among billions. Moreover the term generator is explicitly employed. Our original intuition was that the video service resembles to a software product line, i.e., generative techniques and variability are likely to be present.

We have first noticed a common property of all the video variants: 18 sequences of videos are assembled; for each sequence of a video, numerous alternatives are possible. These variants represent a product line of videos. We have then contacted the creators of the video generator with two research questions and goals in mind: (1) can we automate the extraction of variation points and configurations (video variants)? (2) can we re-engineer another generator and configurator?

The creators accepted to collaborate and provided us with an access to an offline version of the generator. However we did not have access to the source code neither in the server side nor in the client side. Like this, we can study the generator as a black box system – as it would be the case in reality – but without disturbing the deployed Web generator (e.g., with hundreds of HTTP requests). The interest for the creators was to audit their systems w.r.t. variability.

To address the two research questions and further the understanding of the generator, we have reverse engineered its general behavior, architecture, as well as its variation points and its configuration space. Overall, we have collected 350,000+ configurations and 1620 video sequences. We have automatically determined to which part of the video the 1620 sequences correspond. We have also computed some statistics to understand the configuration process. The paper describes the reverse engineering process, how we gather variability information and insights about the configurations, and points out the importance of barriers for complicating or avoiding a large-scale extraction of configurations.

The reverse engineering work have also allowed us to re-engineer a new generator and configurator. This time, users can configure in a fine-grained way the 18 variations points – instead of only 3 in the original version. 15 new variation points are now apparent, out of which 13 are configurable (i.e., exhibiting at least 2 alternatives). For the 3 variation points also present in the original configurator, users can now explicitly choose the alternatives. Thumbnails representative of the video sequences are depicted and help the users
Canal+ is a French premium cable television channel launched in 2000. During its 30th anniversary, Canal+ promoted a popular television show which includes sequences related to the main character of the show. The show is presented in a humorous way. Canal+ has been developed and provides an online service to generate variants of an original video. A video variant is a version that is different from the original in some aspects. For example, the case study could be used for presenting concepts of product lines and variability to students [4]. Interestingly, the main character of Bref states, at the very end, that a particular video is resulting from a combination among billions; the term generator is even explicitly employed. Hence we suspect that generative techniques and variability are likely to be present.

We sought to verify this assumption and considered the following research questions: What is the variability and commonality of the generator? How is variability modeled and implemented? How many variation points, commonalities, constraints, and configurations are there? How configurations and video variants are generated on-demand? In short, our original motivation was to understand in a fine-grained way the online video generator. Another related motivation was to determine whether we can re-engineer the generator and provide an alternative configurator, e.g., with more than 3 options. For both understanding and reverse engineering the generator, we adopted a reverse engineering approach. In essence, reverse engineering "consists in deriving information from the available software artifacts and translating it into abstract representations more easily understandable by humans" [9]. Here, we wanted to extract variability information and to translate it into an understandable form, so that we can extract insights and start reverse-engineering a new configurator.

2. "BREF, 30 ANS": AN ONLINE VIDEO GENERATOR

2.1 Bref, 30 ans: A Family of Video Variants

The service is quite popular and successful. More than 1.7M of video variants have been generated in 1 week. When users visit the Web site, they have to type their name (step 1) and select 3 options (step 2, see Figure 1). A particular video is launched and visualized in the browser. The information of step 1 is used during the first sequence (the name appears in a blank screen). The three options of step 2 correspond to programs ("souvenirs" in Figure 1) of Canal+ that a user wants to include in the variant. Users can also choose a randomized selection, corresponding to "Je ne veux pas choisir" (see Figure 1) that can be translated as "I do not want to choose". The service is quite popular and successful. More than 1.7M of video variants have been generated in 1 week.
It is not the case in our context. Not having access to the original source code of the application was a deliberate decision, challenging us to retrieve the variability secrets of the generator.

3.1 Preliminary Inspection

We started the investigation of the Web generator through a manual analysis of its behavior. We first sought to understand, at a high level, what are the properties of the generated videos. We manually generated some videos and we reported the following observations:

- the storyline seems fixed, with some recurrent sequences, as well as the length of the video (3 minutes);
- the variability not only concerns the 3 souvenirs of the configurator, but also some parts of the video (e.g., some actors are replaced by others)

In a sense, we quickly verified the intuition that the generator exhibits commonality and variability.

We then investigated, at the technical level, how the videos are actually produced. We relied on basic Web tooling support to analyze the JavaScript and the requests with the server; we learned that:

- a video variant is a combination of video sequences;
- each video is encoded in .ts format and accessible via a specific URL, based on the filename;
- there is a specification for executing the video sequences in order (a playlist-like file).

At this step, we understood the general principle of the generator but ignored (or had some doubts) about the variation points (e.g., how many variation points are there in the generator?).

3.2 Large Scale Extraction of Configurations

Due to the limits of a manual inspection, we thus sought to automatically extract as many video variants as possible. We first considered the use of crawlers to emulate the user behavior when selecting options in step 2 (see Figure 1); then we could get videos. However the approach is not really scalable since it requires to download every sequence of video, for each variant.

We thus decided to reverse engineer the way the playlist is retrieved. We analyzed the HTTP and JSON requests of the client with the server. We came to the conclusion that a playlist is documented as an ordered list of 18 string-based values (an example is given below):

```
"sq": ["dwlcjv", "1y60t3z", "llyfhk", "wqzv0y", "1xxivi2", "1oxnvtu", "lolbe9", "wvo06o", "1u6y5t2", "1eqb8bu", "1j9aij7", "nr7jom", "1jmv11y", "1qgn9dh", "1bv7rka", "19ykyyw", "5znrg7", "116hvlk"]
```

Each value of the ordered list actually corresponds a sub-playlist, accessible via an URL. For example, for ml7ila:

```
#EXTINF:05.72,
http://XXX/../ml7ila_med0.ts
#EXTINF:05.96,
http://XXX/../ml7ila_med1.ts
#EXTINF:03.96,
http://XXX/../ml7ila_med2.ts
#EXTINF:02.12,
http://XXX/../ml7ila_med3.ts
```

From a conceptual point of view, the ordered list corresponds to a configuration (we will use this term in the remainder of the paper). Overall we automatically generated 363,281 configurations. We also retrieved the sub-playlists corresponding to each value of the configurations. We combined wget and curl to operate over URLs.

We stopped at 350,000+ configurations as we did not observe new values composing a configuration, compared to a 50,000+ configurations sample we first obtained. An attacker is likely to limit the number of requests in order to not draw attention. A defender can also apply defensive strategies to limit the requests. An interesting research direction is thus to determine the number of requests for which the reverse engineering and understanding remains effective (e.g., comprehensive). We discuss this perspective in the conclusion.

3.3 Automated Analysis of Configurations

We processed the collected set of configurations to further understand the variability of the generator. We observed
that each configuration is constituted of 18 values, that is, there are 18 variation points (we will use this term in the remainder of the paper). We collected some statistics for each of the variation point (see Table 1). 2 variation points, VP2 and VP18, have only 1 alternative. We can consider them as two commonalities or mandatory features of a video variant. 16 variation points exhibit at least 2 alternatives and are thus configurable.

The number of alternatives varies for a given variation point. VP1, VP7, and VP16 correspond to "souvenirs" and the three options originally proposed in the video generator of Bref, 30 ans. These variation points have the highest number of alternatives (resp. 63, 51, and 86). There are only two alternatives for VP9. The first alternative appears in 362,903 configurations; the second alternative only 378 times, i.e., 0.1 % of the configurations contains this video sequence. More generally, we observed that the frequencies of alternatives for a given variation point:

- are almost uniformly distributed (e.g., VP11 has 6 alternatives, and each alternative appears between 60,194 and 60,634 times). It is the case for VP1, VP2, VP4, VP5, VP6, VP7, VP10, VP11, VP15, VP16, VP17, VP18;
- or the distribution support is not equally probable (e.g., see the previous explanations with VP9; for VP3, an alternative only appears 3253 times while the other frequencies of alternatives of VP3 are around 42,000). It is the case for VP3, VP8, VP9, VP12, VP13, VP14.

Besides we observed hard-constraints between the alternatives within the sample, e.g., there are some logical, binary exclusions. For example, some alternatives of VP16 are mutually exclusive with the least frequent alternative of VP9. Similarly there are soft constraints [12] within the sample, i.e., there is a conditional probability of a configuration to contain one alternative together with another. It is tempting to interpret these hard- or soft-constraints as design decisions of the creators. However, we recall that the configuration set is only a subset of the whole configuration set. Some hard- or soft-constraints may be due to the incompleteness of the extracted configuration set. It is thus premature to draw any conclusions.

Finally, it should be noted that an alternative is constituted of a series of videos (e.g., in the example of ml7ila, there are 4 videos); in total, we collect 1620 video sequences. Another form of variability observed in the generator is as follows. The videos constituting an alternative may be partly assembled. For example, in the case of ml7ila, only the 3 last videos (instead of the 4 videos) can be assembled – the goal is to reduce the length of the video or propose yet another subtle variant of a video. A thorough analysis of the obfuscated client side code could reveal such kind of variability. We leave it as future work.

4. RE-ENGINEERING THE GENERATOR AND CONFIGURATOR

The result of the previous reverse engineering process is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variation Point</th>
<th># Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP1</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP7</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP16</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Number of alternatives per variation point

- an abstraction of variation points and alternatives. We can infer a variability model (e.g., a feature model);
- an understanding of how video variants are generated.

It is simply an ordered combination of video sequences.

Our objective was to demonstrate the feasibility of devising a new generator and configurator – this time exhibiting all variation points. The re-engineering of the same exact version of the generator could have been another objective. In particular we could have tried to replicate the process of generating unique configurations that respect the frequencies of alternatives. We leave it as future work.

4.1 New Configurator

By reusing our observations on how the variability is realized in the original service and by analyzing some parts of the Javascript code, we were able to re-engineer a new configurator. The result is depicted in Figure 2. Users can configure in a fine-grained way the 16 variations points – instead of only 3 in the original version – and visualize the result of the two common videos of all variants. For instance, the variation point "Tu m’écoutes", corresponding to VP8 in Table 1, depicts 30 alternatives. For the 9th sequence (VP9, "Jean Jacques") two videos can be selected, etc.

15 new variation points are now apparent, out of which 13 are configurable (i.e., exhibiting at least 2 alternatives). For the 3 variation points also present in the original configurator (the "souvenirs"), users can now explicitly choose the alternatives.

For each variation point, thumbnails representative of the video sequences are depicted and help the users during the selection. We generated the thumbnails from the video sequences using ffmpeg2. Overall the creation of the new configurator was largely automated thanks to the result of the reverse engineering process. The manual task consists in giving a proper name to each variation points (in the form of french sentences) and engineering the generator for playing the video sequences. It should be noted that our generator assembles and reuses videos located in the servers of the original service.

2https://www.ffmpeg.org/
4.2 The Threats of Variability Secrets

We presented the re-engineered configurator to the original creators of the video generator. The new configurator represents an important threat and could "kill the original idea". That is, with our solution, the surprise effect is limited when getting a new video variant. Instead, users can control, choose and visualize any alternative (video sequence). The creators of the generator did not have this intention. In other words, they have taken a strategic decision for, on-purpose, delimiting the scope of variability and restraining the visibility of some variation points and alternatives.

The main lessons we can learn from this experience is that (1) the large scale extraction of configurations is key and allows us to re-engineer another competing configurator that could have annihilated the original innovation of the generator; (2) whenever the scoping of variability does matter, mechanisms should be used to prevent or limit the mining in the large of non visible alternatives.

With regards to the last point, some defensive techniques have been considered, for instance, the use of block lists for banning IP addresses that perform numerous HTTP requests in a short amount of time. Other security mechanisms have been discussed with the creators of the video generator but are out of the scope of this paper. Our experience so far shows that the problem of protecting the variability requires a careful attention and certainly the use of innovative techniques.

5. RELATED WORK

5.1 Variability and Video

The use of variability techniques in the video domain is not new and has already been reported [3, 17, 25]. However the underlying motivations and realizations vastly differ. In [3,25], Moisan et al. model variability of video processing algorithms. The goal is to systematize the parametrization of highly configurable algorithms composing a processing chain. The algorithms exhibit variability at runtime and are able to adapt to evolving and variable contexts (e.g., a change of luminosity in the video).

In [17], Galindo et al. presented an approach for generating synthetic variants of a video. The developed generator relies on a base (a video sequence) that is modified for changing the luminosity, adding elements (e.g., vehicles) in the scene, etc. The derivation process is thus quite different. Instead of assembling pre-defined video sequences, the derivation consists in altering an existing video sequence through a series of transformations. The techniques are more advanced and are based on video processing algorithms. Another important difference concerns the objective. The industrial motivation of [17] is that companies providing or consuming algorithms have severe difficulties to evaluate or compare the quality of existing solutions. The use of variability techniques allows practitioners to generate as much as possible videos, with different characteristics, in order to test or benchmark algorithms on a rich and diverse dataset.

It is possible to apply the video processing techniques exposed in [17] in the case of the online video generator. We envision to process variants of pre-defined video sequences and then assemble the new variants for deriving a comprehensive video.

5.2 Reverse Engineering Variability
Numerous works address the reverse engineering of variability [1,5–7,10,12–14,18–20,23,26,27,31,33,36,38,39]. The artefacts considered as input are product descriptions [12,14,18,19], requirements [6,10,27,36], configurators [1], source code [5,26,33,39], or models [23]. The objectives are usually to locate features or configuration options, to formalize logical relations, and possibly to re-engineer a system with a generative, variability-based approach.

The experience report of this paper leans on (1) an intensive and manual observation of a generator (2) the use of automated techniques for a large-scale extraction of configurations and a classification of variations points. The approach has the originality of targeting videos and Web artefacts. Abbasi et al. [1] propose generic techniques to reverse engineer Web configurators, but do not develop techniques to extract configurations. Our reverse engineering process leads to a fine-grained understanding of variability (see Section 3) and a re-engineering of the configurator (see Section 4).

5.3 Configuration

Techniques for automatic reasoning have been proposed to manage the configuration process, being for guiding users (e.g., [24,28]) or for piloting an adaptation [32]. Decision or feature-based configuration techniques and environment have been proposed [2, 15, 28–30]. Web configurators are engineered along different practices [21] for representing options, managing constraints, guiding users, scheduling the configuration process, etc. We can reuse and apply part of these techniques when re-engineering the configurator (see Section 4).

6. CONCLUSION

We reported an experience in reverse engineering and re-engineering the variability secrets of an online video generator. We described our collaboration with the original creators of the video generator to audit their systems w.r.t. variability. The contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We described how we have inferred the general behavior of the generator (including its variation points) and how we have automatically extracted and classified 1620 video sequences out of 350,000+ configurations;
- We presented the creation of a new configurator exposing 18 variation points instead of only 3 as in the original video generator;
- We explained why letting an attacker re-engineers a new configurator is a threat for the creators, thus motivating the use of defensive mechanisms for complicating his or her task.

Education material. Describing the implementation of the video generator (or even relating our experience) can be considered for illustrating the concept of generative techniques and variability. We believe the concreteness and the relative accessibility of the case study are likely to reach a broad audience (e.g., students [4]). At University of Rennes 1 (graduate level), we have already started to illustrate the software product line course with the video generator.

Lessons learned. A key aspect of our work is that the ability to reverse engineer a large number of configurations dramatically helps to understand the variability and behavior of the generator. It also helps us to devise a quite comprehensive configurator – at least competing with the original solution. Our conclusion – and the main lesson learned – is that defensive mechanisms should be considered and developed to prevent such large-scale extraction of configurations.

Future work. The main limitation of our current and ongoing work is that we do not yet validate our understanding and re-engineering with the creators of the generator. For instance, we ignore if the extraction of alternatives and 1620 video sequences is complete. When considering the sample of 350,000+ configurations, we did not observe new alternatives compared to 50,000+ configurations. However we may still have missed very low frequencies of alternatives. Similarly we cannot draw definitive conclusions w.r.t. hard and soft constraints between alternatives since the configuration set is by construction only a sample. Mining a larger number of configurations is a possible strategy and can increase the statistical significance of the results. Generally speaking it is hard to cover the whole configuration space due to the exponential combinations of alternatives. An even more ambitious research direction is to characterize the minimum number of configurations an attacker needs to have an accurate and complete understanding of the generator and configurator. We are currently continuing the discussions with the creators of the video generator along these lines. A comprehensive report of our future exchanges is planned but is out of the scope of this research-in-progress paper.

We conjecture that similar security issues, due to the presence of hidden variability, arise in other contexts – beyond the case of the Web video generator. Some proprietary systems or applications hide on purpose some features. Users typically have to pay for activating the features. For example, Windows 7 was subject to a hack that allows a clean install of the operating system using an upgrade disc rather than the full version upgrades [22]. It calls for investigating variability-aware security mechanisms.

7. REFERENCES
