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Antoine Guellier

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Can Homomorphic Cryptography ensure Privacy?

Antoine Guellier

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REPORT**

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Can Homomorphic Cryptography ensure Privacy?

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Project-Team CIDRE

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Abstract: The advent of information technology, the dramatic increase of computational and storage capacities along with the development of worldwide communications promise very personalized, well designed and convenient services. However, although privacy is an important right in our societies, these services often neglect and abuse their consumers' privacy, by collecting sensible data notably. This work focuses on the protection of privacy in information systems. For this, it is known that traditional cryptography (*e.g.* encryption or signature schemes) is necessary, for instance to ensure confidentiality, but it is not sufficient. To enable usability and privacy at the same time, stronger tools are required. Homomorphic cryptography is a possible and promising candidate for this purpose. This technology allows manipulating encrypted data and performing logical operations on it without actually accessing the data in the clear. In particular, homomorphic cryptography is envisioned as the perfect technology for secure computation (or storage) delegation in the cloud. This work investigates how homomorphic cryptography can enable privacy, by first giving a deep insight of the field of privacy in computer science (systems of interest, tools, main goals, ...) and then presenting homomorphic cryptography and more specifically (fully) homomorphic encryption, aggregating the work done in this branch of cryptography in the last 30 years. At last, this work gives clues to answer the main question *can homomorphic cryptography ensure privacy?*, and interesting leads currently investigated or yet to be considered.

Key-words: privacy, anonymity, anonymous, PETs, homomorphic, cryptography, fully homomorphic cryptography

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La cryptographie homomorphe peut-elle assurer la vie privée ?

Résumé : L'avènement des technologies de l'information, l'augmentation des capacités de calcul et de stockage des appareils ainsi que le développement des communications promettent des services personnalisés, faciles d'utilisation et utiles au plus grand nombre. Cependant, et bien que la vie privée soit un droit fondamental de nos sociétés, ces services négligent souvent la vie privée de leurs consommateurs et en abusent, notamment à travers la collecte intensive de données sensibles. Ces travaux s'intéressent à la protection de la vie privée dans les systèmes d'information. Pour cela, il est admis qu'il est nécessaire de faire appel à la cryptographie traditionnelle (*e.g.* schémas de chiffrement ou de signature), par exemple pour assurer la confidentialité, mais cela ne suffit pas. Afin de réconcilier utilité et vie privée, des outils plus puissants sont nécessaires. La cryptographie homomorphe est un candidat prometteur en vue d'atteindre ce but. Cette technologie permet de manipuler et d'effectuer des opérations logiques sur des données chiffrées sans avoir accès aux données sous-jacentes. En particulier, la cryptographie homomorphe est toute désignée pour permettre la délégation au *cloud* du stockage et du calcul sur des données sensibles. Ces travaux étudient comment la cryptographie homomorphe peut être utilisée pour assurer le respect de la vie privée, d'abord en donnant une vue approfondie du champ de recherche que constitue la protection de la vie privée, puis en présentant la cryptographie homomorphe et plus spécifiquement le chiffrement homomorphe complet en faisant une synthèse des travaux effectués dans cette branche de la cryptographie depuis les 30 dernières années. Enfin ce travail donne des éléments de réponse à la question *la cryptographie homomorphe peut-elle assurer la vie privée ?*, ainsi que des axes de recherche en cours et d'autres à considérer.

Mots-clés : vie privée, anonymat, PETs, homomorphe, homomorphisme, cryptographie, chiffrement homomorphe

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Introduction

Context In modern societies, the notion of privacy and the question of its protection has been growing along with the development of individual liberties. Several events in the 2nd millennium can attest of this momentum: the Age of Enlightenment and its writings, the French, British and American revolutions/declarations of independence, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and very recently, the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and other countries of the Arab world. All these events have in common to increase the importance the individual in society. Still today, achieving adequate balance between individual liberties and life in community is a dominating issue in the public place organization.

As described in the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Right of the United Nations*, privacy is a *right* of every individual. The first appearance of privacy as a right dates from the late XIXth century, shortly after the invention and development of photography. According to Warren and Brandeis, it is the continuation of the right of property [WB90].

Because it stems from social considerations, the perimeter of privacy depends on cultures, habits, local history and individual sensitivities. Delimiting privacy is far from trivial, especially because this notion is in constant evolution in the public opinion. As the EDWIGE (in France) or PRISM (mainly in USA) scandals in recent history attest, delimitation of privacy is performed in an ad-hoc manner, *i.e.* by fails and retries. Note that these “scandals” also show an opposition between national security and privacy. Once defined, privacy is neither easy to enforce, even with legal, technological and economical resources. Furthermore, gaps between reality and the proposed legal or technological theorization are always possible.

Issues The advent of information technologies in the second part of the XXth century vastly modified and extended the shape of privacy. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis [WB90] were already concerned that the growing easiness to take pictures would put everyone under constant surveillance and make true the prediction “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops”. We are now far further from this truth, mostly due to the development of Internet along with computational and storage capacities. We are now able to automatically and systematically collect, store, transform, share and duplicate information at will. Furthermore, information can be stored for decades, centuries, or even hundred of centuries. While this is a great advance for information processing, and may help in decision making or facilitate the duty of remembrance, it turns out that one of the most valuable type of information are the individuals’ personal ones. This is where individuals privacy is endangered.

As the public rejoices in the new possibilities offered by technology advances, it is also concerned by the privacy loss incurred (when aware of it). Unfortunately, it is easy to see that the most known and used internet systems (e-commerce, social networks, web search engines, ...) are not privacy-friendly. We could even say they benefit from the privacy losses of their clients, to a certain extent. It falls down to the information technologist and the legislator to inform individuals on the dangers they are exposed to, and to provide protection of their privacy in

information system. Although we will only consider the information technologist and not the legislator in this document, these two actors have to work in pair and in parallel to enforce the protections.

Note that there is an important difference between privacy and information security. Security is based on 3 pillars: confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data. The last two are orthogonal to privacy (although not incompatible), and confidentiality, as it is now widely known, is not enough to ensure privacy. In other words, even though confidentiality is necessary for privacy, it is not sufficient on its own. For instance, in network communications, even if the *payload* (*i.e.* the message) is encrypted, an entity observing the network can easily see who communicates with whom. That is a problem when, for instance, an individual accesses a sensible website, such as aa.org or wikileaks.org.

Related works The same technology advances that endanger privacy can actually be put in profit of privacy-preserving solutions. Indeed, many works in information security focus on designing or using advanced tools in order to adapt existing functionalities (*e.g.* social networks, internet communications, ...) to a privacy-preserving setting.

In this sense, cryptographic tools play a very large role in many privacy-preserving system propositions. Encryption and signature schemes are already widely used to ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication, but can also be used for the larger task of protecting privacy. Trust management is another important component: many solution involve a trusted third party playing the role of a proxy between a client and a service provider, decorrelating the client's queries and data from its actual identity.

However, in many contexts, such as storage or computation delegation, basic cryptography proves itself insufficient. We have to resort to more powerful primitives. Homomorphic cryptography is a powerful, relatively dawning paradigm that might fill the gap. It enables manipulation and computation on encrypted data, without the need to access the underlying data. In other words, a possibly untrusted third party can be securely entrusted with the task of computing complex processes on sensible data. Homomorphic cryptography is, in particular, perfectly suited for computation delegation to the cloud, but is also relevant in many other applications and resolves many information security issues (although sometimes in an inefficient manner).

Approach and Objectives Our main and ultimate goal is to protect the privacy of individuals in information systems using homomorphic cryptography. This means proposing new solution for particular systems where privacy needs to be (re-)enforced and where homomorphic cryptography is a convenient tool. This can also mean drawing a general framework for "homomorphic cryptography based privacy", *i.e.* a generic privacy solution for many systems.

We intend to focus on systems where privacy is crucial, *i.e.* where the individuals *need* to use a system but are refrained by privacy leaks leading to serious consequences. As an example, we consider that reporters inside a totalitarian, censoring regime do need a way to communicate with the outside completely privately and confidentially, safe from the risk of being exposed and condemned by their government. We oppose these kind of systems to those where the user could actually avoid using them, at a reasonable cost. This is the case of social network, where users decide on their own what information they disclose and could make the choice to keep all information secret. Of course, these systems are nowhere near perfect (in terms of privacy): among many things and in particular, users are ill-informed, and the service provider often require the users to give up their property rights on the information they disclose.

Our motivation to focus on the former kind of systems is based on the fact that privacy/efficiency trade-offs are always necessary, and because of the possibly large overhead that imply the use of techniques to protect privacy (and homomorphic cryptography in particular), we believe our

solution(s) will be more easily be accepted and used by individuals if the need of privacy is high or critical.

Organization of the document The rest of this document is organized as follows. In chapter 1, we detail the multiple facets of numerical privacy. We propose a synthetic view of privacy solutions in information systems, and review the fields of computer science where privacy is relevant. In chapter 2, we move on to the presentation of homomorphic cryptography. More specifically, we focus on homomorphic *encryption* schemes: we categorize them according to their homomorphic capacities, describe each class, and review the schemes they are composed of. Both chapters are concluded by discussions and openings. In particular, we question the need for privacy and we present other homomorphic tools than encryption (*e.g.* signatures). In our conclusion, we re-unite privacy and homomorphic cryptography: we give clues as of the way to use the latter in order to protect the former.

Chapter 1

Privacy

This first chapter draws a view of the notion of privacy in computer science in general before taking a closer look at privacy from a technical and technological point of view. Although it takes into account the social dimension of privacy, this chapter leaves aside all social reflexions and does not form a general, complete definition of privacy as understood in a very broad sense: we mainly focus on privacy in the digital world and *numerical privacy* in the rest of this document. This chapter notably reviews the different approaches to privacy and sectors in which privacy is considered desirable or necessary, along with the technical tools provided to the computer scientist willing to take privacy in consideration inside information systems. The last section discusses the facts and results introduced in the chapter and explains the *why* of privacy.

1.1 Proposed definitions

The term “privacy” has been used to refer to multiple notions and concepts, even within the field of computer science alone, and has not always been clearly defined by those using it. We first give attention to the general meanings and acceptations of the term, focusing on *numerical privacy*, *i.e.* privacy in the digital world. After drawing several overlapping but different definitions for this notion, we give a practical way to consider privacy in a composed but synthetic view.

1.1.1 Several meanings

In a first approach, the notion of privacy can be defined aside from any technical considerations: its meaning is intuitive, known to anyone and appears in every day life. Indeed, each individual is most likely to be willing to keep some information about himself or his (past) actions private to himself or a set of adaptively chosen persons. One may want to hide information from journalists, co-workers or the general public, conceal the contents of a communication, or even the very fact that he communicated with a specific entity. For some, privacy can also mean spending time alone or with chosen company to dedicate to certain tasks such as (self-)reflexion or hobbies. Others mean by privacy the possibility to take actions without having to justify them. The concept, even though it seems at first glance intuitive and well understandable, has many facets when considering the plethora of *contexts* in which privacy is crucial, along with the *means* employed to ensure it. In particular, in the digital and ubiquitous computing world, where individuals do not have access or do not have the proper knowledge to understand complex systems, the concept of privacy is not trivial and comprises many dimensions. Several authors tried to give a

definition for privacy in general, which are often partial or far from the above naive and intuitive definition.

Already in 1967, Allan Westin was worried about privacy in the emerging computer society, when electronic devices were becoming more and more accessible. In its seminal book, *Privacy and Freedom* [Wes67], he lays the first elements of reflexion on the conflict between surveillance and privacy: he forms the idea that massive data collection and development of surveillance devices may harm individuals' privacy. To his mind, although privacy was (and is) an essential and necessary notion for the individuals' autonomy and liberty, it had never been well defined in social theory, and most studies on the subject were vague and confused. His proposed definition reduces privacy to a right and is centered on *information flow control* :

“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”

This very general definition has been widely used as a starting point, but as we can see it does not encompass all the examples listed above. Another approach, by Sara Baase [Baa02], defines 3 guarantees that the notion of privacy should imply: (i) freedom from intrusion, (ii) ability to control information dissemination, and (iii) freedom from surveillance, *i.e.* from being tracked, followed, watched. This definition is more complete as it does not *totally* reduce to information flow management. However, we can see points (ii) and (iii) as one and the same (*i.e.* freedom from surveillance is, in definitive, the ability to avoid unwanted information disclosure), and they are more or less equivalent to Westin's definition. The new element here is the freedom from intrusion in the sense of being “left alone” when desired. The definition of privacy is thus augmented compared to Westin's but also more complex. Both definitions are however very abstract and uneasy to work with.

In the field of computer science, privacy needs a practical definition that can be expressed as a formal goal. Following Pfitzmann *et al.* [PK01], privacy is defined by *anonymity*, the state for an individual of being not identifiable within a set of individuals (the anonymity set), and/or the property of *unlinkability* between an individual and its actions or among the actions of a same individual. They are notions specific to computer science, and we can see they differ from Westin and Baase's definitions (although they are not conflicting) as they are much more concrete. The danger using such specific terms is to forget a large portion of what “privacy” means: Pfitzmann's terminology might not embrace all the meanings of privacy.

As we can see, definitions of privacy are either very abstract and unusable, or very specific and possibly incomplete. One of the most relevant and complete definition of privacy, to our knowledge, is depicted in the taxonomy of Daniel Solove [Sol06], which is also a reflexion on the social meaning of privacy:

“Privacy is the relief from a range of kinds of social friction, [...] it is protection from a cluster of related activities that impinge upon people in related ways.”

“Privacy is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single essence. Attempts to find such an essence often end up being too broad and vague, with little usefulness in addressing concrete issues.”

Solove's point of view is, unlike ours, mainly social, and his taxonomy lists the possible privacy harms an individual might suffer in society. He clears out 4 main categories that encompass many (all ?) social meanings of privacy: *information collection*, *information processing*, *information dissemination* and *invasion*. This categorization, depicted in Fig. 1.1, is still driven by information flow control, but in the details it takes into account the social context (a context

that might be very different from one country/culture to another) to create a more complete map of (social) privacy, close to what anyone can experiment by himself. In this document, Solove also insists on the fact that privacy is a complicated concept that refers “to a wide and disparate group of related things”, and underlines the fact that using such a broad term must be done with caution in order to avoid confusion and distraction from real issues. Indeed, privacy is very often confused and reduced with a *fraction* of what the word refers to. In many occasions in computer science, for instance, authors of works on the anonymization of databases containing sensible information (*e.g.* medical databases) use the general word to name their field of work, “privacy”, instead of using the more specific field name, *e.g.* “database anonymization”.




Figure 1.1: Solove’s taxonomy of privacy torts from a social point a view

Solove puts in light the composed nature of privacy, and the need for a careful approach of the field. If privacy is summed up in one phrase, the better it can achieve is to give a very “high level” and abstract definition, which will always be subject to interpretation and largely differ in meaning depending on the reader. On the contrary, a practical and formal definition easily reduces privacy to a fraction of what it refers to. We intend to proceed analogously to Solove when describing the field of *numerical* privacy and trying to obtain a synthetic and complete view of it. We need a way to explicit the many facets of privacy in computer science in order to avoid simplifications. In the subsequent sections we try to sketch a more systematic and concrete way to embrace the notion of privacy.

1.1.2 Multiple dimensions

As we can see, the notion of privacy is composed, we can put forward several definitions for the word, and it is easy to leave aside and “forget” a whole part of the field it represents. To be convinced of this, one simply needs to read from different sources: although most of the literature in privacy use the same word and follow the same abstract goal, the meaning of the term will largely differ when looking closely at the implicit hypothesis made.

We begin by giving here elements that can be used to characterize privacy-enhancing systems or “privacy solutions”, or more generally all works in numerical privacy. The motivation for this list is to have a better view on *how* and *by what* privacy works differs. We do not mean to clear out a new definition of privacy, as we saw the notion is too complex to be reduced to a few phrases, but rather to draw a synthetic and concrete view of it. More generally, the below list gives the different dimensions of privacy, aims to be sufficient to fully characterize a large portion

of works in this field, and will be used in the following section to divide the field of privacy in several classes.

Approach We claim that the most important and the first characteristic of a work in privacy is the chosen approach, that is, the general angle under which we consider privacy. In other words, the approach is the first *implicit* choice we make when designing a privacy solution, and will be omnipresent in every following choices. For instance, when defining privacy as a right and trying to ensure it by laws, one uses a *legal* approach, whereas managing numerical data and designing information flow control system takes place in a *technological* approach. More concrete examples are given in the next section.

Sector The second most important characteristic of a privacy system is the sector it addresses, *i.e.* what “real-life” privacy problem it considers and tries to solve. Examples of sectors include geolocation, authentication, social networks, or data mining.

Privacy Goals Given the approach and the sector, privacy solutions will then differ by their goals in term of privacy. This characteristic put in light *what* privacy properties the solution will provide, and possibly details *how much* privacy is guaranteed (*i.e.* gives a quantification for the privacy properties).

Tools Another important feature to characterize and classify a privacy work is the tools it uses to achieve the given privacy goals. Tools largely depend on the chosen approach and sector: one may use cryptographic and mathematical theories when working in computer science, as in the legal approach it would not make sense.

Assumptions and Models Although these are not always explicit in the literature, all solutions make assumptions on the context or on the parties, and use more or less formal models. This is a characteristic in the sense that when searching for privacy solution for a given problem, one must be cautious of the assumptions made by the authors of the system in order to avoid incompatibilities between the authors’ intention and the real usage.

Efficiency When choosing a privacy solution, and when all other characteristics are equal, the most efficient will often be the most suitable. Thus efficiency is an important characteristic. Note that here efficiency does not necessarily mean fast computability, and we use this term with a broader sense. As the evaluation of the efficiency largely depends on the chosen approach (*e.g.* efficiency relates to easy applicability in the legal approach), what is meant by this term is to be defined when designing the privacy solution.

This list could go deeper in the details, for example taking into account the number and nature of the entities interacting in the system and what protection each of them is guaranteed, but we claim that with the above-listed elements, privacy solutions and privacy-enhancing systems are sufficiently characterized. We go even further, claiming that with only the first two items of the list, we have enough information to obtain a detailed and synthetic view of the term “privacy”. The next section develops this idea.

1.1.3 Trial for a synthetic view of privacy: Approach \times Sector

From the list above we have at our disposal (almost) all the information needed to characterize a privacy solution. We could use those criteria, possibly with additional ones in special cases, to categorize and create a detailed taxonomy of privacy solutions. However, this is not our intention

here. We neither intend to deliver a definition for the word “privacy”, as many have already been proposed and are sufficient for a high level view of privacy. Instead the aim of this section is to clear out a way to embrace the field of privacy in one unified view that would be practical and usable, as a roadmap for categorizing privacy works. This categorization is important to obtain a clear view of the field of privacy, to be able to efficiently choose a privacy solution for a specific application, and lastly to avoid comparing privacy systems that are not comparable (*e.g.* comparing a technology for anonymous internet communications and a law enforcing the notion of *consent* is absurd).

In our criteria list, we already pointed out that some criteria are correlated and that relations between them exist. One of the most obvious relation is the dependence between the *approach* and the used *tools*: using a technological tool in a legal approach does not makes sense, just like law theory does not have its place in a technological solution, although there are links between the two and they must be considered altogether¹. The definition and quantification of *efficiency* also depends on the chosen approach: an efficient law will be an easy to apply and easy to enforce one, but a efficient technical solution will be a fast computable one (for instance). Another example is the choice of the *privacy goals*, that are largely correlated with the chosen sector: if the sector is a privacy-preserving geolocation, the goal may be to hide the user’s location among a group of individuals, which does not makes sense as a goal in private biometric authentication.

In the light of previous paragraphs, we argue that some criteria are more important than others, and a small subset of criteria determines the others. We would like to find a *minimal* number of criteria that are sufficient to determine all the others, and to create classes from this minimal set. Solving this problem would require to acquire knowledge of all works on privacy and characterize them precisely and without mistake. As we do not have this knowledge at hand and because the time necessary to obtain it is way too large, the best we can do is to draw an approximate answer from a non-negligible (hopefully) representative subset of privacy works. Thus we pick few criteria that *seem* to determine others according to our knowledge, which is mainly driven by computer security considerations. The set we propose to consider is { *approach*, *sector* }.

First, to justify the number of criteria in our selection, we argue that to perform a trade-off between ease-of-use and accuracy of our categorization, it is necessary to select only a few criteria (*e.g.* 2 or 3). Indeed, consider for instance using some criterion $crit_1$ to categorize all privacy works in the set Ω . If $Nval_{crit_1}$ is the number of possible values for the criterion $crit_1$, then the space is divided in $Nval_{crit_1}$ classes of size $\approx |\Omega|/Nval_{crit_1}$ ². And if $Nval_{crit_1}$ is small we obtain a few large classes, which allows a simple and fast prune when searching for a privacy solution for a specific application, or when “inserting” a new privacy work in the categorization. Then, to continue the example, if we use a second criterion $crit_2$, we obtain $Nval_{crit_1} \cdot Nval_{crit_2}$ classes of size $\approx |\Omega|/(Nval_{crit_1} \cdot Nval_{crit_2})$: the “pruning” is more effective, however the number of classes grows and so does the complexity of the categorization. With more criteria, we obtain better pruning but more classes and a more complex categorization. We prefer using a moderate number of (large) classes, as it eases the categorizations of privacy works each in its right place, without error. Indeed, many classes means many details to investigate in each privacy work, thus many factors of errors.

Then, the choice of the specific criteria is very important and mainly depends on what information is needed: when searching for *any* efficient privacy solution, of course, a categorization

¹Even though a law may recommend the use of a certain technology in its text, *e.g.* some cryptographic scheme, it will not actually *use* it and it does not look into the details of the scheme. Same goes for the opposite case: a technological approach will not consider using EU directives or governmental institutions to achieve its goals.

²It is true if we suppose that the privacy works are uniformly distributed among the $Nval_{crit_1}$ values of $crit_1$.

with the *efficiency* criterion is most suited. However, this example is not likely to be realistic. Rather, one will often or always have an *approach* and a *sector* in mind when searching for or designing a privacy solution. This is a first element that designates these two criteria over the others. Also, as another element in favor of this choice, we showed (but did not prove) earlier in this section that the couple (*approach*, *sector*) almost completely determines the other criteria of our list. Then, depending on the need, one can for instance append as third criterion the *tools*, when the desired tool for a particular application is chosen beforehand. Furthermore, for the sake of consistency and coherence, we would like that privacy works within a same class share similar characteristics so as to be able to compare them to each other. Precisely, most of the privacy systems within the same (*approach*, *sector*) class are comparable without introducing absurd comparisons. On the contrary, when considering systems from different approaches or from different sectors, there is a great risk of incompatibilities preventing comparisons. Lastly, we will see in section 1.2 that the number of approaches is limited, *i.e.* $Nval_{approach}$ is very small), yielding a small number of large classes. The number of sectors being moderately large, we achieve a trade-off between number of classes and accuracy. This explains our specific choice for these criteria.

Using the couple (*approach*, *sector*) we can divide privacy works in wide classes. Although those still contain a lot of diversity, it is a first sorting that allows to immediately have a synthetic view of the field of privacy. This result is of course not exact and questionable (see section 1.5.1 for a discussion on this matter), but we find it appropriate for an efficient categorization. It can be considered as a trade-off between a complete and accurate but very complex and heavy categorization that puts every privacy system in its own class, and a partial but efficient one (as for the exactness, both categorizations may be flawed independently).

The next two sections give a better insight of our proposed view of privacy by listing the possible approaches and existing sectors.

1.2 Different approaches to privacy

By *approach* to privacy, we mean the highest level angle under which privacy is considered, or more exactly under which the field of *numerical privacy* is considered. When designing a privacy solution, this aspect immediately implicitly chosen. In some cases the approach need not to be made explicit and is well understood, but in many occasions, authors use the word “privacy” with a specific approach in mind, assuming the reader will be in the same state of mind, which is not necessarily the case. Thus clearing out the different approaches is crucial, and in order to avoid confusion, one should always specify which approach is considered when speaking about “privacy”.

Note that enumeration in this section is inevitably tainted by the computer science oriented background of the authors and may not reflect the true nature of each approach.

1.2.1 The legal approach

Already mentioned several times, the *legal approach* is the easiest to picture. In this context, privacy is considered as a right and legal practitioners intend to ensure individuals’ or entities’ privacy using legal means. This can take the form of laws created by governments of course, but many other tools are widely used, such as *directives* (*e.g.* EU directives 95/46/CE [PtC95] and 2002/58/EC [PtC02]), federal laws in the US (*e.g.* Privacy [oE95] HIPA [UC96] Acts), international agreements (OCDE guidelines [fECOD13] or UN resolutions [Nat90]), and governmental institutions (*e.g.* *Federal Trade Commission* in the US and its *Fair Information Practice Principles* [Com00], or the *CNIL* in France).

We give here a very brief overview of the legal approach of privacy in the sector of computer science and information processing, as it is the one we are interested in. We leave aside all discussions about private property and “non-numerical privacy”. In modern society, the fact that privacy is a fundamental right of every individual is widely admitted. It is written in the *Universal Declaration of Human Right* of the United Nations of 1948, the right to privacy has been present in most national legislations since the XVIIIth century [Pio09], and it was adapted along the years to the evolution of information processing. Very broadly speaking, in the numerical privacy sector, modern laws mainly focus on the notion of personal information (*e.g.* the term used in US law is “Personally identifiable information”), and do not include (so far, and to the best of our knowledge) more complex privacy notions such as hiding the fact that *Alice communicated with Bob on date d* or *who are Alice’s friends* for instance. Generally, laws define what is and what is not considered as personal information and try to prevent or reprimand disclosure of individuals’ personal information [Ohm09]. Other points of interest in legal considerations include [Pio09]: the *information* of service users (*e.g.* user needs to be informed on what and how data is collected), the *consent* of the user (*e.g.* explicitly ask the user for some permission before performing an action), and the right of the user to *access and rectify* its information. They also regulate the *duration* of data holding by the service provider, the *communication* of these information to third parties, and the *motive* for collecting and manipulating specific data. All those enumerated points can be summed up in two main principles: *sovereignty* of the user over its data, and *minimization* of the collection of data. However, these laws are always mitigated by others allowing the disclosure of such information for judicial or “national security” reasons.

It is important to note that the blazing fast evolution of technology during the past decade has left the legislation behind: laws are not always adapted to the reality of information processing. Notably, many flaws allow information broker to collect and sell particular data without real legal framework. Indeed, some data are (rightfully) considered by the law as personal to the individual because they allow to directly identify him but recent works in privacy showed that almost any information can be used to indirectly identify an individual, such as the history of one’s web searches [CCP10] or movie ratings [NS08], and laws need time to take these results into account.

For a more complete history of the privacy laws in the United States, the reader might refer to a reflexion about law on personal information and *database anonymization* by Paul Ohm [Ohm09]. Concerning the European Union and more specifically France, see section 1.1.2 of Guillaume Piolle’s thesis [Pio09].

1.2.2 The policy approach

This second approach is quite close to the previous one and both are often presented as one. Actually, in a sense the policy approach is the continuation of the legal approach: it formalizes legal (or more generally, human-readable) statements and transform them into machine-understandable requirements. The goal in this approach is to ensure that some properties, expressed via policy statements, are observed by systems, and optionally to build tools that take human expressed properties as input and formalize them in applicable properties for information systems. This approach is thus also close to a technical approach in the sense that it uses computer technologies to enforce policies. However, in what we call the *policy approach*, pure technological solutions may be *used*, but not *invented*. Actually, when a framework for describing privacy policies is designed, how to enforce the policy with technological tools is not always considered, but comes at the end of the reflexion, sometimes as an optional step, to transform policies from simple “information” on how to handle data, into verifiable system properties. Although the policy approach is in between two other approaches, it is considered here on its own because this step

is necessary for building a bridge between law and technology. Moreover, the complexity of designing and composing policies being great enough, it deserves a special category.

When defining a policy or a “law to policy translator”, several challenges arise, mainly from the fact that the requirements and privacy properties aren’t expressed by computer experts but by legal ones. Indeed, those requirements must be transformed into machine-understandable properties without losing their original meaning, which is far from trivial. Some research focus specifically on that issue [ABSB⁺11, PD11], using deontic logic to express privacy requirements. Another common issue is the management of conflicting privacy rules or requirements [HAJ11] within a set of policies applied to a system. For instance, in a social networks where each user would be given the possibility to express privacy rules for its own data, when Alice publishes a picture depicting Bob and Charlie, how does the system handles the publication when Alice wants to make the picture public, Bob wants to disclose it only to his close friends, and Charlie demands this specific picture to be hidden.

In practice, in the particular sector of web applications, expression of privacy policies is done with the now widely used P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences Project) standard from the World Wide Web Consortium [Con06]. This standard allows web site to specify their data processing and collection policies in XML, via a *P3P policy* accessible through a simple URL, so that it can be read and interpreted by web browsers. The policy is then presented to the user or even automatically compared to its privacy preferences. Another well know tool available in the policy approach and for various sectors are the *sticky policies* [KS02], which are integrated in pieces of information as meta data and specify the allowed uses of the information.

However, none of the two technologies ensure the policy is respected: P3P standard does not check the enforcement of the policy server-side, and sticky policies are just information on how the data *should* be used. In both cases, there is a need for a mean to enforce the observation of policies. The basic solution is to suppose that the client *trusts* the server to do what as it says it will do, and a more complex is to perform an audit by trusted experts such as government institutions. In all cases, the means to enforce the policy lie in the *technological approach*.

1.2.3 The technological approach

The angle to approach privacy we are focusing on in this document is the technological one, where privacy researchers try to enforce privacy via pure technological means, often with cryptographic, mathematical or hardware-based tools. We do not extensively describe this approach here, as the next sections and this whole chapter are dedicated to this purpose. Section 1.3 describes existing sectors and general tools of this approach.

However, we detail here two ideas belonging to the technological approach. First, describe what seems to be the *modus operandi* of every privacy work in this approach (it can possibly be adapted to other approaches). Indeed, it seem that most of the works in privacy are constructed in 4 main steps:

1. Choose a pre-existing system that seems to “need” privacy, and study it;
2. Investigate and decide what should be “private” or not;
3. Modelize and formalize these requirements into properties of the system;
4. Enforce these properties by technological means (e.g. adapt the infractrusture or the protocole, use cryptography or a trusted third party, ...)

We will roughly follow the same procedure in our constructions.

Secondly, we would like to point out here two “sub-approaches” that specify a bit more *where*, *how*, and *to what purpose* technology is used. Note that the separation between the two sub-

approaches is not always clearly defined, and they can be seen as a high level characteristic of (technological) privacy solutions.

Service-centric approach

In this case, privacy technologies are used to enable privacy in existing services, with as less impact on the service provider as possible. For example, designing privacy-preserving targeted advertising or geolocation-based services are within this scope. This approach often takes an existing service, and slightly modifies its implementation to take clients' privacy into account, without substantially modifying the functionality or questioning it. In this case, modifications are often needed on client *and* service side.

User-centric approach

On the contrary, in this case the user's privacy is the first and primary goal. No specific service is considered, and the aim is to fully protect the user and give him control over his "privacy". The only assumptions are that the user do not wish to give away (any) information or more generally compromise his privacy, and is even willing to refuse some services if their privacy terms do not match his requirements. If possible, in this approach, only the client-side is modified and only the user needs to take action, so that his protection only depends on his choices and the technology used, and not on the services accessed. The philosophy of this approach is to allow the user to have "unconditional privacy", *i.e.* to provide the user means to protect his privacy independently of the entity it is in contact with (*e.g.* a service, a system, ...). In other words, "unconditional privacy" refers to the ability of the user to protect its privacy even if no measures have been taken service-side. Achieving this kind of privacy is not always easy, and achieving it with only client-side modifications is almost impossible (there is often the need to make adjustments to the environment, if not the service). Of course, a trivial solution is for the user avoid any interaction with any entity, but we reject this solution as we want the user to still interact with the world and perform meaningful actions.

1.2.4 The economics approach

Finally, we argue there exists a fourth approach to privacy, the one called *economics*. As the name suggests, this approach is actually mainly business-oriented and uses market laws to characterise privacy "transactions". Its starting point is the emerging business model where users do not directly pay for a service, but the service provider collects and analyses their personal information. At first, it seems like a nice solution for the user as the cost of the service is reduced, and for the organisation as it still creates wealth. Society would also benefit from it (in the contemporary economic paradigm), under the form of increased growth and wealth. In the economics approach, works start from these observations, try to keep in mind that users might not actually want that business model if their privacy is endangered, and investigate to what extent the market is efficient to ensure user's privacy. Indeed, the main assumption here is that users manage their privacy the same way they would manage their physical goods and money: individuals choose to trade (or not) private information or a fragment of their privacy against advantages of other nature. Following the definition of Acquisti *et al.* [AG05]:

“According to that view, individuals are forward-looking, utility-maximizing Bayesian updaters who are fully informed or base their decisions on probabilities coming from known random distributions.”

The “*utility-maximizing*” term means that the user *intends* to maximize its total benefits, defined via criteria left to his choice. For instance, if, in the opinion of some individual, privacy prevails over (small) financial advantages, he should choose to refuse a fidelity card in a shopping center, a card that often mentions name and address of the bearer and tracks his purchases, but also proposes reductions and special offers on shopping items. “*Forward-looking*” implies that individuals try to maximize their “utility” in the medium or long term. The notion “*Bayesian updater*” models an individual that is able to make rational decisions based on *a priori* beliefs, and to improve his beliefs at each new event (here, an event is a transaction). In practice, this means an individual makes rational decisions on how to handle a specific privacy transaction based on his expectations of the outcome of the transaction and his past experiences. The last part of the definition supposes the individuals are fully informed, in particular on the consequences on the transaction for all parties, or at least have access to knowledge common to all parties.

Privacy solutions in the economics approach may propose ways to correct the aforementioned business model or the individuals’ behavior model, mitigate users’ privacy loss and try to achieve balance between individuals and data holders, notably via law and technology. Typical questions raised in this approach are for instance “*Who owns the data: the user or the collector ?*”, “*Have the user consented, and do we need explicit consent ?*”, “*Do we really need regulation through legal means, or is the market efficient to achieve balance in the case of privacy ?*”.

One of the main points of interest is the validation (and correction if necessary) of the “*Bayesian updaters*” model for individuals described above. Several works question the model and suspect it does not match reality [AG05, GA07, CS07]. Notably because of information asymmetry between users and service providers, but also because individuals are rarely aware of privacy risks and technological possibilities to prevent them. Other factors [AG05] include the humans’ *bounded rationality* which limits his ability to acquire and use information, and “psychological deviations from rationality” inherent to human nature (that for instance imply time-inconsistent decisions where a lesser immediate good is chosen over a greater good further in time). Some reflexions also speak of a “market failure” in the context of privacy [Acq12], that is to say they wonder if the market laws are applicable directly, and if the market model is valid in this context. On this matter, Acquisti gives some reasons for “hope” and other reasons for “concern” [Acq12]. Briefly, reasons to be concerned by the ability of the market to regulate privacy transactions are: the unprecedented easy access for third parties to a large number of individual’s personal life aspects (often without the person knowing it), partly because of the development of communication technologies; and the fact that giving more control to the users as it is often recommended by privacy advocates would be a false solution because users are unaware of the value of their information (it even sometimes leads to less privacy [WCS+13]). Reasons to hope are that human seems to naturally need publicity *and* privacy, and this tendency should appear in the long term; research on behavior in economics of privacy put in light psychological bias, but can actually help erasing those bias by informing individuals about underlying psychological processes and contradictions; and finally hope lies in technological advancements and “*privacy enhancing technologies*”.

1.3 Different sectors of privacy in computer science

After exposing the main angles under which it is possible to consider numerical privacy, we continue by enumerating the possible sectors, in order to complete our *Approach* × *Sector* view. However, we will see that giving an exhaustive list of sectors in numerical privacy is pointless, as one can envision privacy in all aspects of computer science and all systems are subject to ameliorations in term of privacy. However, there are some that are more relevant than others,

and more significant. We try, in this section, to lay out a succinct hierarchy and list of sectors in which privacy is relevant and those that research already took hold of.

For a more complete list of existing privacy issues in society and the digital age, see the list from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse [Cle13].

1.3.1 Identity management and authentication

Authentication is necessary in many systems where there is a personalized user space or where actions of the user must be imputable to the individual owning the identity. In numerical privacy, we are interested in allowing a user to be anonymous *and* authenticate at the same time. Indeed, in many contexts the *true* identity of a user does not need to be known and systems merely need to distinguish him uniquely in the set of individuals using the service. Sometimes, an even weaker form of authentication is sufficient, for instance when the user and the service only need to recognize each other for a temporary session and the service does not need to “remember” the session. In this case the user can use a different identity (or pseudonym) for each session, and he can use the service without the service provider being able to *link* the different sessions to him. On the contrary, the service provider might specifically want to impute malicious actions to a user in order to ban him from the service. In this case we speak of *accountability* of the user toward its actions. As an extreme example, we can imagine a user undertaking criminal actions while being anonymous: accountability is necessary in order to find the individual responsible for the actions and to prevent anonymity abuse. Although they seem like orthogonal requirements, accountability and anonymity can be guaranteed at the same time, *e.g.* via revocable anonymity [KWF06].

All the cases informally described above can be expressed with the notion of *linkability*: linkability between a user and its actions, and between actions of a same user in a system. The notion (*un*)*linkability* is crucial, and it is a widely accepted term used to define and quantify privacy properties. It has been defined by Pfitzmann *et al.* [PK01], along with the terms *anonymity*, *pseudonymity* and *unobservability*, all of which are relevant to formalize privacy properties:

Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of individuals or users, the anonymity set.

Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as identities. Pseudonymity can be seen as anonymity with accountability: users do not use their real identifier to perform actions, but a pseudonym that may have a known connection with a real identifier. There are several degrees of pseudonymity (see below).

Unlinkability of two items (*e.g.* users, actions, messages, events, ...) in a system means that within this system, these items are no more and no less related after a “run” of the system than they are related with respect to the *a priori* knowledge of an observer. Note that anonymity is the unlinkability between an action and a specific identity, and stronger unlinkability leads to stronger anonymity.

Unobservability is the property of a system to produce unobservable events, *i.e.* events either undistinguishable from any other event, or events undetectable by an observer.

Unobservability being a very strong notion, difficult to achieve because often implying very inefficient constructions in practice, we do not consider it in this section. As anonymity and pseudonymity can be defined in terms of unlinkability, we mainly focus on the unlinkability. Thus we can restate the main objective of privacy-enhanced identity management in terms of unlinkability: the goal is to reconcile authentication, accountability *and* unlinkability.

We distinguish here two main kinds of unlinkability: unlinkability between the user and its actions, which is equivalent to anonymity, and unlinkability between actions of the same user (without knowing *which* user performed them). In many occasions, the two kinds of unlinkability are necessary because from a “sufficient” number of actions known to be related to a specific user, it is possible to infer the identity of the user. The main known method to ensure both types of unlinkability is using different virtual identities, *i.e.* pseudonyms. Depending on the necessary level of unlinkability, a user is provided with different types and numbers of pseudonyms [PK01]. The knowledge of the linking between a pseudonym and the identity of the user using it determines the degree of unlinkability between a user and its actions: a public linking leads to total linkability, a linking known by some specific entities (such as trusted third parties) can lead to revocable anonymity, and a linking known to the user only gives total unlinkability. Then, how and how many times a pseudonym is used determines the linkability between several actions performed by the same user: providing one unique pseudonym for one user leads to total linkability, providing as many one-time pseudonyms as the number of action of a user leads to total unlinkability. In between are 3 alternative solutions: one pseudonym for each *role* the user assumes in the system, one pseudonym for each entity the user is in contact with, or one pseudonym per *role and* entity. The favored approach is to give knowledge of the linking between pseudonym(s) and identity of the user to some trusted third parties so as to enable revocable anonymity. As for the number of pseudonyms and their usage, the choice depends on the available resources and the privacy goals.

It is important to note that the notions of unlinkability, pseudonymity and unobservability are relevant in many other contexts than identity management. In fact, Pfitzmann *et al.* [PK01] proposed this terminology for network communications (see section 1.3.3). In the rest of the chapter, unless specified otherwise, we refer to these notions as defined above.

Example: Biometric authentication We can illustrate identity management systems with the case of biometric authentication. Biometric data such as DNA or iris pattern are very sensitive data, but they are also very reliable for strong authentication as they are often very hard to counterfeit or steal. Thus, we would like to find a privacy-preserving way to perform biometric authentication. In this setting, typically, a user interacts with a secure device which has access to stored biometric profiles, and has the capacity to capture the biometric profile of the user. Authentication succeeds if the captured profile matches a profile in the database. Systems have been designed so that the biometric profile of individuals stored in a database are comparable with captured profiles, but the owner of the database can not link a stored profile to an individual’s identity (*e.g.* name and address). Other useful properties include the unlinkability between several authentications of the same user. Some solutions proposed applying distortions the profile using a one way function that will preserve the similarities between the stored and captured profiles [RCB01], others use fuzzy commitments and error-correcting codes [ZKVB11].

1.3.2 Personal information and data management

As it appears in the previous sections and in this whole chapter, the first, largest and most known sector is the one dealing with personal information management. Most of the works in (numerical) privacy consider this sector, and it is indeed an important one because of its broad sense. Indeed, personal data are everywhere and when interacting with systems, individuals inevitably leave numerical traces, either under a digital form (*e.g.* IP address or email) or “real world” information such as age, country, habits or name of friends. In many occasions, numerical privacy is (but should not be) reduced to personal data management, because of the predominance of the sector.

Even though it is possible to outline multiple sub-sectors of personal information management, there exists general principles that apply to the whole sector, principles that were partly exposed in section 1.2.1, as they are extracted from social and legal reflexions.

Sovereignty of the individual over its personal data: those data belong to him, and he should be able to access, rectify them and to accurately control how, when and who holds and processes them. Among other requirements, this principle implies the *right to be forgotten*, *i.e.* the possibility for the individual to erase all or a part of its numerical traces. When the data is on a distant server not controlled by the user, or in ubiquitous computing, this principle is very difficult to enforce.

Minimization of personal data: the individual should disclose only the information *necessary* to fulfill a given goal. For instance, for an individual to prove that he is adult he does not need to give his age or date of birth, but the only information he should disclose is “*my age is above 18*” (or 21).

Consent of the individual on its personal information collection, processing and dissemination. An *explicit* consent is preferred over an implicit, opt-out one.

Information and transparency: the individual should be able to accurately know *what* is done with his information.

Security against unauthorized access, modification or use is the responsibility of the data holder (and not the data owner, the individual).

Those principles should be enforced by technical means, and are often the starting points of new systems’ privacy goals of the “personal information management” sector. In the following sub-sections, we list some of its most representative sub-sectors, along with short descriptions.

Statistical databases and Big Data

This sub-sector has been given so much attention it could be a sector on its own. However, we argue it is only a small part of numerical privacy. By statistical databases, we mean databases containing demographic information and/or names of many individuals, along with sensible information, such as political opinion, religious orientation or health details. The typical model supposes one entry per individual in the database, composed of several fields for demographical and identification information, and other fields storing the sensible information. The typical example is a hospital database, where people are fully identified and a diagnostic is appended in a last field. These database are called “statistical” because of their main use: computing statistics on populations, and inferring relations between demographic parameters and some properties or events (*e.g.* correlating a specific location and an epidemic). “Big Data” refers to the management of very large statistical databases: as information storage and collection becomes easier every year, we are now in presence of extremely large databases and challenges arise in terms of processing, search, sharing and visualisation. We are not interested in these challenges, and we will consider Big Data and mere statistical databases as the same concept. We are only interested in the process of “curating” those objects in order to ensure the privacy of individuals in the database. Basically, this consists in perturbing or removing a (significant) part of the information contained in the database so that identifying individuals in the database is impossible. The challenge is to do so while leaving enough information in order for statisticians to be able to extract relevant knowledge from the database.

The extensive study of database curation dates from the 80s [Kim86] and can be explained by the need for companies, organisations and institutions to publish or share the data they collect on individuals. The collection is (as for now) legal, but the publication isn’t if the data can

be linked to the individuals it relates to. The publication or sharing of data is often motivated by the need to extract statistics and tendencies from them. It can be for public interests (*e.g.* analysing medical databases can predict epidemics) or for private profits (*e.g.* analyse implicit feedback from service users in order to improve the service). There are also companies that transform their data collection into profit by selling them, for instance to advertisers, for whom this information is crucial to offer better, targeted advertising.

We can distinguish two types of database curation: until beginning of 2000s was the era of database *anonymization* and *sanitization*, an approach that has been shown flawed, and since 2006, the technique called *differential privacy* has been the leading solution. To understand the “failure” of database *anonymization*, the reader may refer to Paul Ohm’s 2009 article [Ohm09] which describes very accurately anonymization techniques and why this approach is now considered obsolete. Here, we outline very briefly the ideas of the two techniques, and explain why *differential privacy* is favored over *anonymization*.

The basic idea behind database anonymization, or database sanitization is to remove from the database the information that could identify the individuals it contains. Several ways of doing so have been proposed, such as suppression of some database entries, randomization and perturbation, or query limitation (in nature or number). But the most known and widely used technique is called *k-anonymization*, invented by Sweeney in 2002 [Swe02]. The basic idea behind *k-anonymity*, besides removing individuals’ names, is to generalize the values of some well chosen attributes, called *quasi-identifiers*. Each entry of the database is processed so that for every individual contained in the database, there are at least $k - 1$ other individuals that share exactly the same values of quasi-identifiers. Before modifying the data, the database owner must choose the appropriate set of quasi-identifiers (*e.g.* demographic attributes such as age or ZIP code). These attributes should be those that can indirectly identify individuals. The database attributes are thus partitioned in 3 categories: the name of individuals (*i.e.* information that directly identify individuals), the quasi-identifiers, and the rest of the attributes. Those last attributes are called *sensible* information and may correspond for instance to the diagnostic in a medical database. Then the database owner removes the names of the individuals, and generalizes the quasi-identifiers in order to obtain a database partitioned in classes, each of them containing k entries sharing the same, generalized, quasi-identifiers before publishing it. Figure 1.2 shows a database ensuring the *k-anonymity* property. As it turns out, *k-anonymity* is not sufficient to avoid re-identification (*i.e.* linking a particular entry of the database to an identifier, thus to an individual). Two complementary variants have been proposed to cope with the flaws of *k-anonymity*, *l-diversity* [MKG07] (ensures a minimum diversity of the sensible attributes in each class of k entries) and *t-closeness* [LLV07] (ensures that the distribution of sensible attributes in each class is close to the global database distribution), but presented the same shortcomings in definitive. See Paul Ohm’s reflexion for more information [Ohm09].

In 2006, Dwork proved what was beginning to be admitted by the whole community: the assumption of the existence of quasi-identifiers was erroneous, in the sense that finding the correct set of attributes to play the role of quasi-identifier is not possible. In fact, several re-identifications, or *inference attacks*, such as Sweeney’s works [Swe00, Swe05] and the Netflix prize competition [NS08], led researchers to believe that *any* information is a quasi-identifier. This fact is particularly obvious with the Netflix inference attack [NS08], where, with only benign data such as users’ movie ratings, researchers were able to re-identify individuals. The key of these attacks is the *side-knowledge* of the attacker, which, combined with the anonymized dataset, leads to re-identification: for instance, combining voters list or public records with a medical database [Swe00, Swe05] or Netflix database with IMDB’s. The issue raised by Dwork [Dwo06] is that it is not possible to predict the attacker’s side-knowledge, thus it is impossible to chose the proper quasi-identifiers. To be more accurate, Dwork’s proof shows it is not possible, with the

	ZIP Code	Age	Disease
1	476**	2*	Heart Disease
2	476**	2*	Heart Disease
3	476**	2*	Heart Disease
4	4790*	≥ 40	Flu
5	4790*	≥ 40	Heart Disease
6	4790*	≥ 40	Cancer
7	476**	3*	Heart Disease
8	476**	3*	Cancer
9	476**	3*	Cancer

Figure 1.2: A 3-anonymous medical database
 Quasi-identifiers: {ZIP Code, Age}, Sensible = {Disease} [LLV07]

“anonymize and publish” approach described previously, to obtain anonymity *and* utility, where utility is a quantifiable parameter specifying *the quantity of useful information extractable from the database*. Indeed, utility is maximal and anonymity minimal when the database is released as is, and conversely if the database is completely emptied before release. The two notions thus seem antagonist.

But in 2006, Dwork proposed a new technique that reconciled anonymity and utility, *differential privacy* [Dwo06, Dwo08, DMNS06], which has been adapted to other context than statistical databases after its creation [AGK12]. In few words, the concept of differential privacy requires that, for a privacy-preserving mechanism \mathcal{M}_Q with Q the query to the database issued by the analyst, the probability distributions of \mathcal{M}_Q 's output on database DB_1 and DB_2 are statistically close, where DB_2 is DB_1 stripped from 1 entry only. Dwork instantiates such a mechanisms by setting $\mathcal{M}_Q(DB) = Q(DB) + \Delta(\text{Sensitivity}(Q))$: the mechanisms gives the exact answer for the query $Q(DB)$, masked using a Laplacian noise Δ calibrated following the *sensitivity* of the query Q^3 computed on the database. As the mechanism is tailored to a specific query which need to be known prior to the computation of the output, this mechanism is said *interactive* as the analyst must provide the query and wait for the answer. The key aspect of differential privacy which makes the difference with sanitization techniques, is that the utility is know *prior* to the database transformation, *i.e.* the query Q is known before the release of the answer, contrary to the “anonymize and publish” paradigm. When the utility is known, it is easier to robustly anonymize the database in a way preserving the desired utility, but *only* this particular utility, specified via the query Q . More details are provided in section 1.4.3.

Online

Online privacy also give rise to a lot of interest in numerical privacy research, as web applications are multiplying and growing in importance. Basically, online privacy works try to enable anonymous *online* service access on internet. Those services include:

Targeted advertising where the goal is to offer tailored adverts to the user, without the advertiser knowing *who* (which IP address) requested a specific ad, thus preventing profiling from the advertiser.

e-Commerce where the user might want to prevent the merchant from knowing its true identity.

³The sensitivity of Q is $\max_{DB_1, DB_2} |Q(DB_1) - Q(DB_2)|$, where DB_1 and DB_2 differ only in one entry.

Web searches and history as it has been shown that web searches reveal a lot of information on users [CCP10].

Anonymous service access can easily be implemented using anonymous proxies that strip all identifying information from the service request issued by the individual [DAM06], but this simple solution only moves the trust from the service provider to the proxy owner.

Other points of interest in online privacy include avoiding **web tracking** of users by websites, especially third party website that try to follow every movements of users in order to infer its habits and/or identity. Also, **(online) social networks** are a problematic topic, as their very definition is an infringement to the sovereignty and minimization principles (see section 1.3.2). Goals of researchers in this context is to re-enforce the control of the user over its data, and to investigate re-identification through social graph reconstruction [ZG09].

Authentication, authorizations and anonymous service access

We complete here section 1.3.1 on identity management with some considerations on authorizations and authentication. Indeed, in this section we left aside cases where the system or service provider does not need to associate any identity at all to the user in order to deliver the service, but it only needs to check some specific properties of the individual such as his age, his affiliation to a certain group, or other specific properties.

In this context, *anonymous credentials* [DAM06] play a large role: those constructions, typically based on zero-knowledge proofs [Gol01, Chapter 4] or group signature [CVH91], allow an individual to prove specific attributes that are certified by an authority recognized by both the service provider and the individual. Only the authority can make the link between an authorization and an individual. After a short protocol, the service provider is assured that the individual fulfils the necessary requirements, but does not know *who* he is. The requirements can take the form of attribute testing (*e.g.* is age above some threshold ?) or authorizations (*e.g.* a signed, anonymous piece of paper granting access some building).

IBM developed the IDEMIX (Identity Mixer) system [CMS10], implementing anonymous credentials and blind verification principles. The implementation involves extensive use of zero-knowledge proofs and group signatures and ensures unlinkability between an individual's actions. If necessary, anonymity is revocable: the issuer of the credentials (*i.e.* the trusted third party) can make the link between a specific use of the identity mixer and an individual.

Anonymous credentials are also used in a proposal for an *privacy-preserving digital identity card* [DG12]. Basically, this card is meant to communicate with a secure device allowed to ask one specific binary question, that can be a boolean expression composed of several questions, such as “*are you over 18 AND are you French ?*”. The device must possess and show a credential issued by the certification authority (*e.g.* the government) for each question it is allowed to ask. Anonymous credentials are then used by the card to answer the questions, and certify those answers. Other challenges in designing a privacy-preserving identity card are notably ensuring the non-transferability (impossibility to lend one's card), correctness (impossibility for the individual to cheat/lie) and unforgeability (impossibility to counterfeit a card) properties. The use of tamper-proof smartcards and biometric authentication embedded in the card helps achieving these goals.

Geolocation

Many services based on location are emerging since the advent of mobile phones and GPS devices, and require the user to share its geographic position with the service provider and/or third parties. The social network *Four Square* is a famous example, but many more systems are geolocated:

a city bus card records users' entry and exit points in and out the network, cellular phones are always (approximately) geolocated using relay antennas, ip addresses give away information on the region of the computer using it, and of course GPS systems communicate very precise location information. In general, geolocation mechanisms always associates a spatial location with a specific device (*e.g.* GPS, card, phone), often itself linked to one individual.

However, location and mobility patterns are very sensible data and should be considered similarly to personal data, as several studies show [GKdPC10, GP09]. In fact, from mobility traces, it is possible to infer *points of interest* such as working place (most stable place in the trace during the day) and home (the last stop of the day), to predict the individual's moves, and even approximate his habits, social relations and income (based on the places visited). Even if the mobility traces are anonymous, studies show it is possible to de-anonymize them using side-information such as social graph [SH12, MYYR13].

Solutions are needed to protect individuals from disclosure of their location, while still enabling the use of location-based services. Some solutions are adapted from other contexts such as k-anonymity [GG03] (called *spatial cloaking*), mix-zones [BS03] (inspired from Chaum's mix-nets 1.3.3), and perturbation techniques such as randomization [ARZ99], insertion of dummies, or suppression or swapping of parts of the traces.

Cloud

The emerging concept called *cloud computing* refers to a powerful computational resource composed of a large distributed network of machines easily accessible via a unified, virtualized interface. It encompasses several services: *infrastructure*, *platform* and *software as a service*, respectively denoted *IaaS*, *PaS* and *SaaS*. Basically, a cloud provider grants computing resources to clients (expressed in terms of software, CPU frequency, storage size, ...), and manages all details concerning hardware, computing power, installation, administration, etc. This is especially convenient for companies willing to easily obtain computing resources without having to administrate a complex and expensive installation. The cloud provider makes extensive use of virtual machines and virtualization in order to abstract from hardware considerations. The challenge is then to design a smart, dynamic, *on demand* allocation of computing resources depending on the clients needs. This is the role of the *hypervisor*, a software that manages the virtual machines. Large cloud providers often control several *pools* of hypervisors.

In the cloud, resources are shared among several clients, and a resource belonging to Alice may pass onto Bob the minute after. This raises concerns in terms of security and privacy for individuals or companies hosting their data in the cloud. In particular, the data owner must be assured of the proper use of its data, of the non-transferability of the data's ownership and of adequate access control management in the cloud. Privacy researches in this sector try to enable the use of the cloud's large computing power, while hiding the actual data manipulated from the cloud provider. Zhang *et al.* proposed [ZYZ⁺12] a taxonomy of key privacy issues in cloud computing and lay the foundations for future researches in cloud security. In particular, they divide researches on the client from those on the cloud provider side. On the provider side, they also subdivide points of interest following the levels of abstraction in the cloud: the platform, virtual machine and hardware levels.

In higher levels of abstraction, *i.e.* at the application level, privacy solutions mainly involve cryptographic primitives. However, these solutions can not rely on cryptography alone to achieve privacy. Indeed, the impossibility result of van Dijk *et al.* [VDJ10] states that software alone can not guarantee privacy in the context of several clients mixing their data in an *off-line* multiparty computation [Gol04] setting (*e.g.* for similarity computations of profiles in social networks). They prove that others tools are necessary, and propose the use of trusted hardware to circum-

vent these shortcomings. Another possibility is to ask for clients involved in the computation to cooperate at some point in the protocol, but this requires dropping the *off-line* property of the protocol. Proposals for privacy-preserving cloud applications involve multiparty computation and homomorphic cryptography [LATV12, AJLA⁺12] (see also Chapter 2). In those solutions, computations performed by the cloud can be made *off-line*, but clients need to be online and cooperate at the decryption phase. Thus they do not allow complete *off-line* multiparty computation.

Misc.

There exist many more sub-sectors within the “personal data management” sector, however we do not provide a complete list here. Other points of interest include:

Mobiles phones Leakage of personal information through mobile OSs and applications, often without the user’s consent, poses serious threats: mobile phones are very personal devices, aware of many personal information and details and it is able to monitor a large portion of its bearer’s actions. The Inria project “Mobilities” [ABC⁺13] investigates these issues.

Radio Frequency Identification RFID tags are small wireless devices used to identify objects or persons. They can notably be used for physical tracking and localization. For instance, stores and malls may track their customers in order to construct profiles and clear out buying habits. Tracking is also possible city-wise, to monitor road traffic and vehicles. It is a major threat to individual’s privacy, as RFID tags can identify *and* locate individuals. The security and privacy of this technology is investigated [Jue06], as the practical threats and attacks are still unclear.

CCTV and video surveillance Along the same lines, surveillance via video cameras poses serious threats as the cost of these devices drops and automated facial recognition technologies progress.

Internet of things With the dropping cost of electronic devices, the emergence of IPv6 (and its very large addressing space) and the easiness of internet access, it is reasonable to assert that in a few years, all objects surrounding human beings will embed computational power and have internet access. In particular, the domestic devices in a house will form an “ambient intelligence” that should facilitate everyday life. These devices, however, form a privileged access inside one person’s sanctuary of privacy, his home. In this context, Oleshchuk [Ole09] proposes solutions based on secure multiparty computation to protect the data collected by these devices.

Digital Rights Management The very design of DRMs is an infringement to privacy, as the goal is to trace ownership of digital items in case of fraud or misuse. DRMs and broadcast encryption infrastructures can lead to consumers tracing and profiling by content distributors (*e.g.* by monitoring who watches which movie). Researches try to reconcile “traitor” (or misbehavior) tracing, while ensuring anonymity, possibly using revocable anonymity [CKSJ03, GPY⁺04].

1.3.3 Anonymous communications and traffic analysis

Although close to anonymous service access or identity management, traffic analysis prevention actually forms a well separated sector. It comprises notions absent in both sectors, notably hiding communication patterns and who communicates with who. Indeed, aside from confidentiality,

integrity and authenticity of the content of the exchanged messages, which are easily enforceable with encryption and signature, the communication link between two parties (or more) itself can also need to be confidential. This problem was introduced by David Chaum in 1981 [Cha81] in the context of electronic mail, under the name “traffic analysis information” and described as “the problem of keeping confidential who converses with whom, and when they converse”.

This work is motivated by the fact that traffic analysis poses an important threat against privacy, since the simple observation of source and destination identities (*e.g.* IP addresses) can reveal sensible information. For instance, observing an IP packet incoming from an identified individual towards a sensitive web page (*e.g.* www.aa.org) reveals private information on the individual. Or, more serious, a totalitarian government could easily eavesdrop outgoing communications from the country and detect dissidents willing to engage in illegal communications with external parties.

Definition

In this context, the notions of unlinkability, unobservability and pseudonymity (see section 1.3.1) are also relevant, as they were actually invented for this context [PK01]. Here, we are interested in the (un)linkability between network nodes (*e.g.* source and destination) and between network nodes and messages. More precisely, we consider the notions listed below. In the following definitions, according to the definition of *unlinkability*, by “impossible to know” we mean that the two items (*e.g.* a node and a message) are no more and no less related compared to the situation before the event (*e.g.* message sending).

Source/Message unlinkability: given a message and the identity of a potential source, it is impossible to know if the source is the actual issuer of the message;

Destination/Message unlinkability: similar to Source/message unlinkability;

Source/Destination unlinkability: given two nodes, it is impossible to know whether they communicate together or not (this notion is composed source/message *and* destination/message unlinkability for the same message⁴);

Relay/Message unlinkability: given a message and a potential relay node in the network, it is impossible to know if the message passed through the relay node;

Node anonymity: all or a subset of nodes in the network stay anonymous, *i.e.* their identities are never disclosed;

Message unobservability: it is impossible for some observer to know whether or not a message is issued, received or relayed in the network. Note: this property typically implies very inefficient solutions and is not considered in the rest of the section.

These definitions implicitly suppose the existence of an “observer” or and “attacker”, a malicious entity willing to learn as much as possible about the network, network nodes and communication patterns for its own profit. In a military network deployment, this entity can be the opponent army for instance. It is crucial to define the capacities of this observer or attacker in order to evaluate the above properties: a system might provide source/message unlinkability against an attacker *X*, but not against a more powerful attacker *Y*. The main models for network attackers are: *active* or *passive*, *global* or *local*, and *external* or *internal* to the network. In some cases, the location or role of the attacker in the network is also important (*e.g.* the attacker can be on

⁴For source/destination unlinkability to be verified, source/message and message/Destination unlinkability must both be verified.

a message's route or not, impacting its capacities). For more information, [GBP13, Section 3.2] provide a detailed definition of these models.

There exist interactions between the different privacy properties. For instance, if a system provides source unlinkability, but no destination unlinkability, when Alice sends a message to multiple recipients, who all answer back to Alice, an observer will notice a sudden increase in the amount of messages received by Alice and can infer Alice was the sender of the original messages. In other words, source unlinkability without destination unlinkability might result in neither source or destination unlinkability. Thus, the consistency and compatibility of a system's privacy properties must be thoroughly analyzed. Also, it is important to note that, even though *all* the above properties are enforced in the system, confidentiality and integrity of application-level messages are not implied. Adequate encryption and signature techniques must be applied if those are necessary. Conversely, encryption and signature do not provide anonymous communications. Also, it is important to note that providing anonymous communications and confidentiality/integrity is not enough to obtain anonymous access to a service: the two sectors are correlated but not equivalent, and if the application-level messages sent to the service provider contains identifying information, the anonymity provided by the network is vain (see section 1.3.2). However, confidentiality, integrity and more generally the contents of application-level message are not considered in anonymous communication solutions: in this sector, we focus on routing and traffic analysis.

MIX-nets

In its seminal work on traffic analysis and untraceable communications [Cha81], Chaum presented a protocol using particular routers, which he called MIXes. These MIXes have been the building blocks for many of the solutions proposed to provide anonymous communications. Basically, a MIX router hides the link between incoming and outgoing messages, using techniques tampering with time, ordering and appearance of messages. An adversary observing a specific MIX router may try to re-link messages in two main ways. First, following the assumption that an incoming message and an outgoing message have a higher probability to be linked when the time elapsed between the incoming message reception and the outgoing message emission is shorter. To prevent this kind of attack, two types of MIXes exist: *continuous MIXes* introduce a random delay between reception and forwarding (the protection they provide is efficient when traffic is dense, else, timing attacks are still feasible). The alternative is using *Pool MIXes* that function in batches: it waits for n messages to be received before forwarding them, in an order different from the order of arrival. Secondly, using size and/or appearance of message, attacker can very easily trace traffic. MIXes thus use padding techniques and fixed-size packets, along with decryption/re-encryption techniques (using pre-distributed, publicly known keys for instance). For more information on MIXes and MIXing techniques, one may refer to Diaz and Preneel's taxonomy [DP04]. A possible implementation of MIX router is depicted in Figure 1.3.




Figure 1.3: A simple MIX, using re-ordering and re-encryption

In a network, several MIX routers are often used in chain, so that unlinkability properties

are ensured even if all routers are compromised but one. Indeed, when there is only one MIX on the route, this MIX knows the sender and the receiver, thus neither the source/message, destination/message nor the source/destination unlinkability properties are observed. When two MIXes are used one mix can make the source-message link, the other can link message and destination, but none of the two MIXes can break source/destination unlinkability. The risk is that they collude to pool their knowledge and try to re-link source, destination and messages together. Therefore, the more MIXes, the better the unlinkability, but the slower the communication. In standard solutions, the first MIX can link a message and its source, and the last MIX can link the message and its destination [DMS04], but this can be avoided (*e.g.* via anonymous authentication between the source and the first MIX) [ZLLF06]. Moreover, note that an external observer can always trivially detect message emission (or reception) by a particular node, and therefore link a message to a sender (or a destination). This inherent characteristic of network communications is particularly uneasy to circumvent. The main way to get around it is for the network to ensure *unobservability*. For this, Chaum proposes the introduction of dummy messages, which is very costly in terms of bandwidth.

In order to distribute trust among many nodes, solutions like Tarzan [FM02] and Morpnmix [RP02] propose to build a peer to peer network where any node can be a MIX router. Those are called MIX networks. Generally, routes and MIX routers are chosen randomly and adaptively, either by the source or dynamically by the MIXes en route.

High-latency/Low-latency networks

When implementing a MIX router, choices and trade-offs have to be made between delay and unlinkability (or more generally, privacy): while continuous MIXes introduce less delay, anonymity is low when traffic load is low, as pool MIXes may introduce large delay, but ensure high anonymity. Note that the chosen cryptographic primitives can induce more or less delay as well (*e.g.* asymmetric encryption is generally slower than symmetric encryption). In the literature, MIXing solutions are divided between high-latency and low-latency ones. The first category are dedicated to latency-insensitive applications with little interaction such as email and are able to resist a global eavesdropper. Low-latency MIXes support more dynamic applications such as web browsing, or SSH and TCP sessions, but are more vulnerable.

As an example, Mixminion [DDM03] is a high-latency network assuming the loss of efficiency in order to obtain strong anonymity properties. On the contrary, the basic Onion Routing protocol [GRS99] is designed for low-latency networks, and in the presence of low traffic, MIXes must continue forwarding traffic, even if gives a significant advantage to the attacker. The second generation of Onion Routing (Tor) [DMS04] goes even further in to reduce latency, as it no longer uses MIXing techniques. Indeed, the authors consider that the benefits in terms of privacy are too low (and not formally proved) and that the overhead they imply too large to justify their use. In practice, Tor no longer re-order message in batches, but still adds padding after decryption of a layer. The result is an efficient low-latency network, however vulnerable to a global attacker.

1.3.4 Cryptographic constructions and protocols

The last sector we put forward deals with cryptographic schemes and protocols. Although mentioning cryptography as a *sector* instead of a *tool* can be somewhat surprising, we argue cryptography is *both*. Indeed, as we can see, cryptography is extensively employed to enable confidentiality, anonymity and privacy in the technological approach. However, cryptographic constructions themselves can also benefit from privacy properties. One may take as a starting point an existing cryptographic construction as a public key scheme, and try to define, design

and incorporate properties that preserve “anonymity” within the construction. What is meant by “anonymity” in this case is to be defined depending on the cryptographic system considered, and the unlinkability-based definitions from sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 are also relevant here.

A simple example consists in modifying a public key scheme such that it ensures “*key privacy*”, a property preventing an adversary from distinguishing, given a ciphertext and a set of public keys, which key was used to encrypt the message. Indeed, messages intended to Alice are encrypted with Alice’s public key (which is often publicly known), and if, given a ciphertext, it is possible to reveal the key used for encryption, the link between the message and Alice is trivial. It is proven that key privacy is possible in several schemes such as El Gamal or Cramer-Shoup, but not for RSA for instance [BBDP01].

Key exchange and cryptographic authentication are also systems that can integrate anonymity properties [VYT05, GOR14]. As outlined in section 1.3.1 authentication and anonymity seem orthogonal objectives, but the cryptographic tools used in authentication can incorporate privacy properties. The solution is to authenticate users, not as individuals, but as legitimate members of a trusted group. For instance, using group signature, a user proves he has the knowledge of a secret common to a known group, and thus authenticates himself *as member of the group*, but it is impossible to uncover the signer’s identity from the signature. Another way of doing so is to use a certifying trusted third party: this entity delivers certificates that the user can show to prove himself to other entities (who can verify the certificate publicly). The drawback of this approach is that the third party knows the link between anonymous certificates and the users.

In functional encryption, where secret keys’ special construction allows decryption *and* computation of a certain function f at the same time, Boneh *et al.* [BRS13a] propose the notion of *functional privacy*. Typically, in basic functional encryption, an entity is given a secret key sk_f that can be used to compute $Dec(sk_f, Enc(pk, m)) = f(m)$, and security requirements ask that nothing except $f(m)$ leaks about the underlying message. However, nothing is said concerning f , and the computed function can be known and/or learned. Boneh and al. go further, and require that f stays secret, so that only $f(m)$ is computed without revealing neither f nor m . This requirement is useful in a context of computation delegation: for instance, a user might need to delegate email sorting between “urgent” and “other” mails to a proxy, without revealing the contents of its mails nor the “urgent” selection criteria. In practice, authors give a solution for identity-based encryption (a simpler variant of functional encryption where f is a simple predicate checking the identity embedded in a ciphertext) based on the assumption that identities that correspond to a given secret key are sampled from distributions with a certain amount of min-entropy. This result does not provide a strong functional privacy as one would expect, but this work lays the foundations for future developments.

1.4 Measuring privacy in computer science

In order to be able to compare privacy solutions, given a sector in the technological approach, there is a need for a *privacy metric*. In other words, it is necessary to *measure* and quantify privacy precisely. An impartial, objective measure is the only way to obtain certainty of the privacy properties ensured by a system, and to unambiguously compare privacy solutions.

Several ways of measuring privacy have been proposed and used. Some metrics are formally defined, others are more intuitive and easy to use but less accurate. What they measure needs to be specified, as they are generic tools. Depending on what is considered private or not and on the endorsed vision of privacy, the measures must focus on different objects. Indeed, although the metrics are well defined as theories, the intended objects of measurement are not included in their definitions. As a result, there is no precise framework for the measurement of privacy.

This often results in incomparable solutions and measurements, which is exactly the opposite of privacy metrics' primary goal.

However, privacy metrics are necessary, and while this field needs formalization and is quite recent, efforts in this direction can only be beneficial. In this section, we sketch a few privacy measurement tools and illustrate their use in privacy works. Note that, although we listed cryptography as a privacy sector, we do not present measurements of privacy properties in cryptographic schemes: in this particular context, proofs of privacy properties are analogous to those of traditional security properties, and this field of information security uses its own, very strict and formal, mathematical tools.

1.4.1 Information theory

The main privacy measurement tool, the most well defined and the most used is *information theory*. Invented by Shanon in 1949 [Sha49] to be applied to signal processing measurements, this method of information quantification has been widely used in computer science.

The key component of information theory is *entropy*, which measures the quantity of information (often in bits) needed to represent an object. For instance, as there are nearly $2^{33} \approx 7$ billions human beings on earth, 33 bits of information are needed to represent a person. Another way to see entropy is as a quantifier of the uncertainty of a random variable. In our example, if the random variable X is defined by a uniform law and takes as value 1 human being on earth, the entropy of X is 33. Remark that when the entropy is high, the value of the random variable is very uncertain, *i.e.* it can take many values, each with the approximatively same probability (X is close to uniform). When it is very low, the random variable is almost determined, in the sense that there is 1 value with high probability, and a few other very improbable outcomes. The exact formula used to measure the entropy of a random variable X is:

$$H(X) = - \sum_{a|Pr[x=a]>0} Pr[X = a].\log_2(Pr[X = a])$$

This formula computes the expected value of the logarithm of the probabilities, and thus the average number of bits needed to represent X . Indeed, as X can be described by $-\log_2(Pr[X = a])$ bits with probability $Pr[X = a]$ ⁵, the average number of bits to represent X is $\mathbb{E}[-\log_2(Pr[X = a])]$. We reformulate the above explanation with the value $H(X)$: when $H(X) \approx 0$, uncertainty of X is very low and ≈ 0 bits are needed to represent X , thus we can consider X is determined. On the contrary, if $H(X)$ is high, the outcome of X is very uncertain and a lot of information is needed to figure out the outcome of X .

A useful derivative of entropy is the *conditional entropy* $H(X|Y)$ which computes the uncertainty of X provided Y is known:

$$H(X|Y) = - \sum_{a,b|Pr[X=a|Y=b]>0} Pr[X = a \wedge Y = b].\log_2(Pr[X = a|Y = b])$$

This formula quantifies the average quantity of information needed to know the outcome of an event X when the outcome of the event Y is known. For instance, it is useful in cryptography to express a *perfect* cryptosystem: the phrase “knowledge of the ciphertext does not change uncertainty of the plaintext, and knowledge of the plaintext does not change uncertainty of the ciphertext” can be expressed as $H(P) = H(P|C)$ and $H(C) = H(C|P)$, where $H(P)$ is the entropy of the plaintext and $H(C)$ the entropy of the corresponding ciphertext [vTJ11].

⁵The idea is that the lower the probability that X takes value a , the more bits needed to describe a .

Use of entropy in privacy measurements In computer security, a very widely admitted way to verify the security of a system is to suppose the existence of an adversary, give him capacities and limits, and observe the harm that he can do to the system. More or less powerful models of adversary can be imagined according to possibilities given to the adversary and the strength of the assumptions made on the system and the environment. In general, models try to mimic real situations, and to over-estimate the adversary's capacities so that security is over-evaluated (rather than optimistically evaluated). When measuring privacy, we proceed following the same paradigm. We suppose the existence of an adversary who observes the system and the events produced within it, and tries to guess the outcome of an event. For instance, an adversary observing network communications can try to determine who sent a specific message. The knowledge of the adversary is then modeled by a random variable X which distribution probability gives the guesses of the adversary. In the latter example, X may take as value any identity within the network. To measure privacy guaranteed by the system, entropies of all event which outcome needs to be kept secret are computed. Note that the precise list of these events of interest depends on the privacy goals of the system, and may be hard to draw. Notably, there is no way to be certain that *all* sensible events have been considered.

Starting from this basic protocol for measuring privacy with entropy, several works enhanced the measuring by pointing and resolving flaws of the above measuring technique [GTD⁺08, THV04]. In the sector of anonymous communication and traffic analysis, Tóth *et al.* [THV04] notice that even though entropy gives the average guaranteed privacy, high entropy does not always mean good privacy. For instance, the authors consider hiding the identity of a source sending a message: when an adversary studies the outcome of X , where X is the identity of the source, and knows that $Pr[X = ID_0] = 0.5$ and $\forall i \in [1...100] Pr[X = ID_i] = 0.005$, entropy $H(X)$ is the same as uniform distribution over 20 possibilities. However, the adversary will most certainly infer that ID_0 sent the message because this value has much higher probability than any other. The authors thus introduce the notion of *local anonymity* that additionally requires an upper bound on all probabilities. In the presented approach, however, the assumed model does not always reflect real situations or is not trivially usable in practice because of incompatible assumptions between the measurement framework and the communication protocol. In particular, in the presented measures of privacy in anonymous communications, the use of MIX routers in the protocol is assumed, which is not the case in Tor for instance, and in many privacy-preserving communication protocol.

In definitive, information theory is a well defined, formal and powerful tool, but applying and using it must be done with great care. First one must point out *what* needs to be measured, but the most challenging is drawing the probability distribution correctly, *i.e.* in a manner adequately describing reality. The most effective way of doing so is, for now, using simplifying models to describe the environment.

1.4.2 k-privacy

A much more simple but less accurate metric can be derived from the technique of k-anonymity that has been presented in section 1.3.2, which deals with statistical databases. It is indeed a technique transforming a database by forming classes of k undistinguishable entries, but more generally, k-anonymity denotes the partition of the universe of entities in classes of size $\geq k$ where all members are equally probable candidates related to a given event. Therefore, the parameter k determines the size of the anonymity set(s) and measures privacy in the sense that a greater k gives better anonymity. In practice, the universe of entities is simply divided in two: one group of size k containing the possible candidates (the anonymity set), and the rest of the universe. Note that k-anonymity can be seen as a very simple form of information theory: in a sense, the

size k of the anonymity set measures the uncertainty of a random variable X associated to an identity. Within the anonymity set, X is a uniform distribution over k values, and probability associated to values outside the anonymity set is 0.

However, this quantification suffers from several shortcomings. The assumption that all k candidates are equally probable may be flawed, there is no framework or formalisation of k -privacy, and as there is no systematic way to apply it, forgetting or adding false candidates in the anonymity set is always possible. Also, k -privacy is only suitable in contexts where events are issued (or related) to entities, and the aim is to hide who issued which event. Note that information theory is more general as it models the knowledge of the adversary in a context-agnostic manner. Though very informal, this metric is useful as a pre-analysis of privacy properties. Instead of directly using information theory, one will prefer employing the simpler tool of k -privacy. It is easy then to quantify the probability of each candidate within the set of k entities in order to compute the entropy of the random variable answering the question “who is the originator of *this* action” for instance.

Example using k -privacy In the sector of privacy-preserving location-based systems, it is possible to define privacy requirements in terms of k -privacy: a subject is “ k -anonymous with respect to location information, if and only if the location information presented is indistinguishable from the location information of at least $k - 1$ other subjects” [GG03]. In other words, k -privacy in location-based systems is achieved for a given user when at least $k - 1$ other users were in the approximately same place at the approximately same time. The system designed by Gruteser and Grunwald [GG03] takes as parameter a minimum bound on the anonymity set, k_{min} , and ensures it by decreasing the accuracy of spatial information as much as necessary in order to always have k users in the same region at any time. This anonymity comes at the cost of decreased utility: if a user employs very deteriorated location information to enquire a location-based service (*e.g.* a listing the restaurants in the neighborhood), the answer will contain a lot of useless data, and the user might not actually obtain the information he was looking for. As in many sectors of privacy, a trade-off between utility and privacy is necessary.

1.4.3 Differential privacy

Differential privacy has also been presented in section 1.3.2, and, as k -privacy, it can also be seen as a metric. In its basic meaning and roughly speaking, differential privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a single database item does not substantially affect the outcome of any analysis [Dwo08]. However, in a broader sense, a differentially private mechanism \mathcal{M} on data space \mathcal{D} guarantees that the amount of information that is leaked when executing \mathcal{M} on the sensible input data $x \in \mathcal{D}$ is bounded and divided equally among all items in the data. The fundamental equation expressing the above definition for a ϵ -differentially private randomized mechanism $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}'$ is:

$$\forall x, x' \in \mathcal{D} \forall t \in \mathcal{D}', \frac{Pr[\mathcal{M}(x) = t]}{Pr[\mathcal{M}(x') = t]} \leq e^\epsilon, \text{ with } x \subset x' \text{ and } x' \text{ contains 1 more item only}$$

Probability is taken over the coin tosses of \mathcal{M} . A mechanism \mathcal{M} satisfying this definition ensures that by the presence or absence of any item in the dataset, no outputs would become more or less likely. Thus \mathcal{M} protects every item in the dataset independently in a very strong sense, as the above equation is a statistical property of \mathcal{M} , independent from the computational power and knowledge of the adversary.

This equation is not a privacy protection *per se*, but a *goal* and a constraint a mechanism must observe. We mentioned in section 1.3.2 the use of Laplacian noise in order to achieve

differential privacy. However, this is only *one* way of satisfying the above equation. When constructing a privacy-preserving mechanism, one may want to achieve differential privacy, so as to obtain strong proven privacy properties, and it is possible to do so with theoretically any system (actually, if \mathcal{M} is a completely random function, it satisfies differential privacy). In a short survey [Dwo08], Dwork gives examples of differentially private mechanisms.

In the previous equation, the quantification of privacy is given by the ϵ parameter. It can either be fixed to a value arbitrary close to 0 (but then utility of the output is very low), and up to 2 or 3 in some cases, or it can be expressed as a function of the other system parameters. The value of ϵ depends on the acceptable information leakage and the sensitivity of the data. The advantage of this metric is the compositionality property that comes with differentially private mechanism: given a dataset x , if a user makes a k queries on D , the i^{th} query being ϵ_i -differentially private, then the overall mechanism is $\sum \epsilon_i$ -differentially private. This property is useful to bound the sensible information a user of the mechanism can learn with at most k queries. If necessary, the mechanism \mathcal{M} can refuse to answer to a client who has consumed all its “privacy budget”, *i.e.* when the client learned $\sum_{i=0}^k \epsilon_i \geq \Delta$ quantity of information. A proposition for a generalized metric based on ϵ -differential privacy has been recently proposed [CABP13] and applied to sectors different from statistical databases.

Example using differential privacy BLIP (BLoom then FLip) [AGK12] is a technique invented by Alaggar *et al.* to compute profile similarities, for instance in social networks. The profile is represented by a Bloom filter [Blo70], and in order to protect the items contained in the profile, the authors propose a simple bit flipping mechanism that they prove to be differentially private. Each bit is simply independently flipped with a probability $p < 0.5$, and as a result, items are ϵ -differentially private, with relation $p = 1/(1 + e^{\epsilon/k})$, where k is the number of hash functions of the Bloom filter. The utility is best when $p \approx 0$, but the authors show that for their application (similarity computations), utility is non-trivial even for “small” values for the parameter ϵ . As a result, each item is independently protected against computationally unbounded adversary, the information leaked by a bit-flipped bloom filter does not exceed a certain threshold ϵ , and the authors show that reconstructing a user’s profile is hard.

1.5 Discussion

This overview of problematics inherent to privacy protection gives rise to various reflexions on existing solutions and subsequent works that need to be addressed. The proposed view of privacy will also be discussed.

1.5.1 The Approach \times Sector view

This chapter puts forward a categorization of the existing privacy works in research, following a Approach \times Sector matrix. We argue this categorization provides a pertinent and useful synthetic view, and consists in a trade-off between a very complex but complete and exact categorization, and a disorderly inconsistent listing.

As said earlier, the choice of approach and sector as the only two criteria is motivated by their predominance and the possibility to easily compare solutions within the same sector and approach. Of course, many particular privacy works will be problematic and will not fit in one particular class. As an example, biometric authentication relates to the “identity management and authentication” sector, but is also relevant in the “protection of personal data” sector,

because biometric data are extremely personal. Conversely, there will also be “holes” in the Approach \times Sector matrix. Indeed, some sectors are approach-specific, for instance the sector of cryptography is only relevant in the technological approach.

A particular issue with the proposed categorization is that it does not provide an easily retrievable list of general privacy-enhancing tools. Actually, depending on what we are interested in, a new categorization is necessary for each purpose. However, note that the approach criteria is always implicit (*i.e.* when using the word “privacy”, one often has an approach in mind) and will most probably always be the first criteria of a categorization. The choice we made is using it together with the sector criteria, which is indeed discutible. Here, our goal was to obtain a synthetic view of the field of numerical privacy using a minimal number of criterion. Choosing sector above tools, privacy goals or models is justified by the relative precedence of sectors on others dimensions, and above all by the need we expressed.

Another point worth questioning is the completeness of the approaches and sectors lists in sections 1.2 and 1.3, as well as the list of criteria in section 1.1.2. They reflect modern privacy considerations and the author’s sensibilities. Although one might have other criteria in mind, the current list in section 1.1.2 contains the main important ones, and adding more criterion could lead to more, useless complexity. Concerning the list of sectors, as mentioned in introduction of section 1.3, all information systems are subject to privacy research. Thus we merely sketched the main fields in computer science where privacy is an active research theme. As for the list of approaches, although persons from different profession or sensibility might propose different ways to consider privacy, these 4 are the only one concerning *numerical privacy*, to our knowledge.

In a few words, privacy may be conceived under many angles, others than those proposed here. Because of the complexity of the field, a complete, exact and efficient categorization is hard to achieve. Although our categorization is approximative, to our knowledge, this initiative is the first intending to provide such a systematic categorization.

1.5.2 Trust management

In light of existing propositions, we note that trust management is a common issue in privacy, and more generally in information system security. A common goal for all privacy solutions is to ensure the user protection of his privacy when using numerical services and resources, by the mean of diverse technological solutions (we only consider the technological approach here). However, technological solutions are often deployed by the service/resource provider himself, who is precisely the entity that would benefit from a privacy violation. Therefore, default trust of the user should be minimal in the service provider, and instead should rely on other objects.

Typically, to resolve trust issues, there exist two main ways: to invoke a “trusted third party” (*e.g.* a governmental agency) in which the user is willing to place his trust, or to *distribute* the trust. The first proposition only “moves” trust from one entity to another, and in practice takes the form of certification authorities, audit of systems by experts and/or legal enforcements. Distribution of trust divides the user’s trust in multiple entities and relies on the assumption that a majority of entities will be honest. This latter approach avoids the unique point of failure, but it is vulnerable to collusions. In practice, trust is often distributed among the other users of a given system, with the assumption that there are many other users.

We envision a third option to trust management: when a technology is formally proven secure (as well as its implementation), and its deployment depends on the user’s initiative, then the user can place his trust in the technology, and not in entities controlled by human administrators. By user’s initiative, we mean that the user himself can decide alone to use a given technology which ensures that the service provider can not harm his privacy. Of course, the service provider must comply with the technology, but deployment and implementation do not depend on him: if the

user, and solely the user, follow the proper protocol, the service provider can not tamper with his privacy. This is a very strong requirement, and trust is at the lowest in this case (*i.e.* user does not need to trust any entity) provided technology is reliable.

1.5.3 Privacy in public opinion

As, fundamentally, privacy is a social concern, we could have described a “social approach” to privacy in section 1.2. However we argue that the social approach is actually implicit in each other approach and can not form an approach on its own in a categorization of privacy works or privacy solutions. There are however purely social studies dealing with numerical privacy that we did not mention in this chapter. Those studies need to be taken into account in order to design systems that will be used and have a non-negligible utility in society.

To sum up results in this field, a quotation from a survey by Taylor [Tay03] is sufficient:

Most people are “privacy pragmatists” who, while concerned about privacy, will sometimes trade it off for other benefits.

Indeed, Taylor’s survey draws three categories of persons: “privacy fundamentalists” who care about privacy (26 %), “privacy unconcerned” who explicitly do not value their privacy (10 %), and “privacy pragmatists”, who *claim* to care about their privacy, but are willing to trade it against short term benefits (64 %). As explained in section 1.2.4, this is mainly due to misinformation, bounded rationality and human psychology limitations.

Another experimentation, by Grossklags and Acquisti [GA07], investigates the “willingness to pay” for protecting personal information and “willingness to sell” the same information. Although biased because of a small tested population, who does not represent well of the global population (47 persons, almost all students), and the fact that interviewees were aware of the general principle of the study (thus were already willing to take the risk to disclose personal information), this study shows the overwhelming willingness to sell over willingness to pay, or in other words, monetary benefits are preferred over privacy in a large majority of cases.

Several studies attest the misinformation and misunderstanding of the general public regarding consequences of private information disclosure [WNK⁺11, SCK⁺13, WCS⁺13]. Individuals often accept disclosing a large amount of unnecessary information in order to access a service that is convenient for a given purpose, well designed or very used among their social circle. However, they either do not know that their data is collected, the value of those data for information brokers or the consequences and serious harms this collection can do to them, or they simply “do not care” and declare having “nothing to hide”.

1.5.4 Do we need privacy ?

The question immediately emerging from the observations made in the previous section is: “Do we actually need privacy?”. Indeed, privacy is a social concern, but paradoxically the public opinion, in practice, do not want or need privacy. We leave aside special contexts as surveillance in totalitarian regime where common opinion agrees on the fact that privacy is inexistent and people’s right are flouted ; or specific cases involving crimes or socially unacceptable acts where privacy should on the contrary be avoided. We briefly review common arguments against privacy and show their weaknesses, and eventually point two reflexions on the meaning and implications of (numerical) privacy in modern societies.

The most common argument is the “*nothing to hide*” one: supposedly, if an individual has done nothing “wrong”, *i.e.* illegal or socially unacceptable actions, he should not bother being watched and under surveillance, and should not need to keep information about himself secret.

This argument is very close to the “*surveillance is necessary for the nation’s security*” one, extensively employed since the 9/11 events in the United States, and can be refuted in the same manner. A first, easy answer is simply that actually everyone has something to hide, would it only be the moments and discussions with his/her partner. As put forth by David Flaherty [Fla99], no one can “withstand even a few minutes’ questioning about intimate aspects of their lives”. For a more complete analysis of the “nothing to hide” argument, see Daniel Solove’s paper on this matter [Sol07], who argues that this argument narrows privacy to information concealing and surveillance, whereas the problems raised by data collection are numerous and privacy has multiple facets (see section 1.1). Among other issues, Solove mentions the “secondary use” of the data: at first, data is collected for a given purpose, but the data may easily be used for an unrelated goal, without the consent of the user. Thus the data collected by government agencies, at first gathered for public good, may travel across several platforms and be in definitive publicly published.

Other typical arguments include phrases like “*no one cares about privacy anymore*” or “*privacy is dead at the digital age*”. They are more observations than real arguments. Privacy is dead only if all research and social efforts are abandoned, which is far from the case at this moment. The “secondary use” and misinformation issues can also be invoked here to mitigate the first phrase: if individuals were better informed on the use of their data and the true consequences of data collections/analysis/disclosures, they may reconsider their judgement.

On the privacy advocates side we can point the reader toward two reflexions. First, in 2009, Danah Boyd presented a talk on privacy in the context of Big Data [Boy10]. Although she recognizes the potentially great utility of analysing very large datasets (*e.g.* analysing DNA to help cure diseases), she questions the ethics of doing so. Actually, the author calls for a more ethic use of big data and personal data in general. She tries to mitigate the enthusiasm and haste of information brokers who very quickly took hold of the concept of Big Data.

Finally, a recent MIT technology review by Evgeny Morozov, entitled “The Real Privacy Problem” [Mor13], offers a deep understanding of privacy and the social meaning of the lack thereof. In this reflexion, the author considers privacy as a *mean* (as opposed to a goal in itself) toward democracy, arguing that arising automated decision processes, in particular via analysis of large datasets, are replacing societal debates, reflexions and discussions and lead to unjustifiable and unjustified decisions. This is in accordance with Boyd’s opinion. But according to Morozov, in order to grant privacy its right place in the public debate, and to efficiently protect privacy in the long term, legal and technological means are insufficient. There is a true need for a political debate and an ethic vision of privacy, and the solution can only come from a public realization. For this, Morozov argues that individuals need to “sabotage the system and provoke more questions”, in particular by refusing to use services tracking users.

Chapter conclusion Privacy, even restricted to the *numerical* context and to the technological approach, is a very vast field of research. As put forward in section 1.3, many or all information systems can benefit from privacy properties. In other words, privacy researches can focus on any existing system: the choice is open. Of course, some systems or sectors are more relevant than others, in the sense that protecting privacy is more important. For instance, protecting privacy in medical information systems is more important than in digital rights management because privacy leaks in the former lead to more serious consequences. The aim is to clear out pertinent sectors where privacy is crucial.

In this chapter, we offered a possible view of numerical privacy that we consider sufficient to organize the knowledge in this field of research. We also presented the main tools to measure privacy, letting us hope for a way to quantify the privacy of newly designed solutions. All these elements provide the necessary tools and knowledge to improve upon existing privacy works or initiate new directions of research in privacy, *e.g.* by formalizing privacy and privacy metrics, or by pointing to new sectors where privacy is yet to be considered.

We now describe in the next chapter *how*, or more precisely *with what tool* privacy can be enforced. We turn toward cryptography, which is the one of main tools in privacy solutions, and in this case we are interested in *homomorphic cryptography*. The great possibilities offered by this cryptographic paradigm let us hope for meaningful applications to the protection of privacy.

Chapter 2

Homomorphic Encryption

As we are interested in protection of *numerical* privacy in all its forms, we expect the need for powerful confidentiality-enhancing tools. Here we consider the use of a rather new, (theoretically) extremely powerful cryptographic tool to achieve privacy requirements in various systems: homomorphic encryption. This particular type of encryption allows to process data in the encrypted domain, *i.e.* it allows any party in possession of the corresponding public key to perform logical operation on encryption of messages, yielding logical operations on the underlying messages. In particular, homomorphic encryption allows to outsource computations on sensible data to a (possibly untrusted) third party while preventing it from learning the actual contents of the data, which is specifically the expressed need in the context of private cloud-assisted computing for instance. For more than 30 years now, this type of encryption has been extensively studied, and in 2009 a major breakthrough by Craig Gentry gave rise to the first *fully homomorphic encryption* (abbreviated FHE) scheme, a scheme capable of evaluating *any* function on encrypted data.

This chapter presents the concept and history of homomorphic encryption, details several fully and non-fully homomorphic encryption schemes along with their implementations and their practical use. This chapter is solely focused on describing homomorphic encryption, while its use to enable privacy is left as discussion in the conclusion (section 2.4.5).

2.1 General points

This first section introduces the notion of homomorphic cryptography and provides the reader with the necessary notions and tools to approach this chapter with the appropriate knowledge. We first define homomorphic encryption, and then give an abstract view of this particular field of cryptography by drawing a short history and categorizing schemes in 3 main classes according to their homomorphic properties. At last, we give a good insight of the main pending issues, both theoretical and practical, in homomorphic cryptography research.

2.1.1 Definition

In a traditional public key cryptography, schemes are typically composed of three primitives¹:

¹More precisely, these primitives are *PPT* algorithms, *i.e.* *probabilistic* algorithms running in *polynomial time* in the size of their inputs.

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \text{params})$: According to the parameters params , outputs a public encryption key pk , and a secret decryption key sk , guaranteeing a security of λ bits, *i.e.* $\geq 2^\lambda$ operations are needed to break the scheme. Typically, $\lambda = 80, 128, 256$ or more. Note that λ specified *via* a value of λ bits, but we merely use its *length* as parameter for security. Sometimes, KeyGen is split in two primitives: Setup inputs 1^λ and outputs params , and KeyGen only uses params as input.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: Outputs an encryption c of message m under public key pk .

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Using sk , decrypts the ciphertext c to recover the message m . If sk is not the key corresponding to the encryption key pk , or if an error occurs, outputs \perp .

Basically, a homomorphic encryption scheme possesses a fourth primitive:

Evaluation $C \leftarrow \text{Eval}(pk, f, c_1, \dots, c_n)$: with $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_i)$, computes $f(m_1, \dots, m_n)$ in the encrypted domain, and outputs an encryption of the result under pk such that

$$\text{Dec}(sk, C) = f(m_1, \dots, m_n) \quad (2.1)$$

The set \mathcal{F} of functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ a scheme can accept as input for Eval while guaranteeing correct decryption determines its homomorphic capacities. This set is defined by the properties of the scheme and can be expressed through various computation model (see section 2.1.4). Equation 2.1 formalizes the *correctness* of the homomorphic scheme's operations, and in some case is expressed in a probabilistic manner: a scheme is said correct if equation 2.1 holds with “very high” probability.

Example of homomorphic encryption: RSA Unpadded In its original design, RSA is multiplicatively homomorphic, that is to say it is possible to compute $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1 \times m_2)$ from the encryptions of m_1 and m_2 : with $pk = (N, e)$, we have

$$\text{Enc}(pk, m_1) = m_1^e \pmod N \quad \text{Enc}(pk, m_2) = m_2^e \pmod N$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Enc}(pk, m_1) \times \text{Enc}(pk, m_2) &= m_1^e \times m_2^e \pmod N \\ &= (m_1 \times m_2)^e \pmod N \\ &= \text{Enc}(pk, m_1 \times m_2) \\ &= \text{Eval}(pk, [(x, y) \mapsto x \times y], \text{Enc}(pk, m_1), \text{Enc}(pk, m_2)) \end{aligned}$$

2.1.2 Historical overview

The search for an homomorphic encryption scheme goes back to the year 1978, shortly after the invention of RSA: the accidental malleability of RSA (see previous section) led Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78] to form the idea of “computing on encrypted data”. The existence of such a mechanism was unknown at the time and considered an open question. A first answer was (informally) given in the form “Yes, but there must be interaction between the owner of the secret key sk and the *evaluator*”, and led to the creation of Secure Multi-party Computation [Gol04], a possible way to compute with encrypted data we will merely evoke here. See section 2.4.5 for a brief description of this technology and its link with our concerns here.

The question of the existence of a *non-interactive* mechanism was reformulated and somewhat formalized by Feigenbaum and Merritt [FM91] in 1991, who proposed the notion of *algebraic*

homomorphic cryptographic schemes that could securely evaluate $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1 + m_2)$ and $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1 \times m_2)$ solely from pk , $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1)$ and $\text{Enc}(pk, m_2)$, without interaction between any party, and without knowledge of the secret key. Such a homomorphic scheme enables arbitrary computations from encrypted data, *i.e.* its associated set of evaluable functions \mathcal{F} contains all functions that are computable “in the clear”, and has been sought during many years.

However, the first homomorphic schemes that appeared allowed only addition *or* multiplication but not both. The first known, if we leave aside RSA which is insecure in its unpadded version, is the scheme of Goldwasser and Micali [GM82] in 1982. It allowed homomorphic addition of messages in $\{0, 1\}$, which corresponds to a homomorphic XOR on bits. Goldwasser-Micali is also the first probabilistic semantically-secure scheme, and at the time, the size of a ciphertext encrypting 1 bit was very large, *e.g.* ≥ 1024 bits. Many other schemes allowing *one* operation were proposed, among them the most known are ElGamal [ElG85] in 1985 and Paillier [Pai99] in 1999 (see section 2.2).

Early 2000s began to appear schemes that allowed more than one operation [BGN05]. For instance, MGH [MGH10] can perform many additions and “several” multiplications. However, these schemes are particularly inefficient and can not handle a reasonable number of multiplications (*e.g.* 100), because of the *exponential ciphertext size blowup* phenomenon which seriously limits the schemes: after L multiplications, the size of a resulting ciphertext is C^L for some (possibly constant) C , and becomes too large to be manipulated. Because of the difficulties encountered while trying to enable homomorphic addition *and* multiplication in a same scheme, some works relied on simpler computation models different from Feigenbaum and Merritt’s such as boolean circuits [SY99] or branching programs [IP07]. Note that schemes of this type all share this exponential ciphertext blowup characteristic and are inherently limited in their homomorphic operations: we will call these schemes *somewhat* homomorphic.

It is only recently, in 2009, that was invented the first *fully* homomorphic encryption (FHE) in the sense of Feigenbaum and Merritt, *i.e.* allowing both unlimited additions and multiplications. Before this date, neither theoretical or practical solution existed to evaluate *any* function on encrypted data. Gentry’s thesis [Gen09a] brought the first theoretical result for doing so, basing security on hard problems in *ideal lattices*. His construction was designed to encrypt *bit* messages only, and to evaluate boolean circuits. Note that most FHE schemes still provide encryption only for bits, even recent ones. Two elements were decisive for the apparition of FHE: first, Gentry proposed a powerful somewhat homomorphic scheme capable of evaluating many additions and a few multiplications, but with constant ciphertext size. In other words, Gentry solved the exponential ciphertext size growth. Or, to be more accurate, Gentry “moved” the problem: the ciphertext from his schemes did not grow in size but contained “noise” that would grow exponentially *inside* the ciphertext, such that when the noise exceeds a certain threshold, decryption can not be performed anymore (or decryption outputs erroneous values). The key idea to obtain a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is then to “refresh” ciphertexts when noise becomes too large by *homomorphically evaluating the decryption primitive on ciphertexts*, thus resetting its noise to a minimal level. This step is called *bootstrapping*, and is still today the only known method to obtain pure fully homomorphic encryption (see section 2.3.1 for details).

Since 2009, FHE has been an extensively studied subject, especially since 2011 when Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11b] noted that FHE could be based on the *Learning With Errors* (LWE) problem, a much simpler tool compared to ideal lattices. The result from Gentry’s thesis was almost purely theoretical: as expressed by Smart in his talk at CRYPTO’12 [GHS12b], in 2009 FHE was “totally and utterly impractical”, in 2012 it became “totally impractical” and was already about to become only “impractical”. Today, FHE is still impractical compared to efficient public key schemes such as RSA or elliptic curve-based schemes, but are (almost) practical for use-cases involving a reasonable number of multiplication, as noted in the conclusion

of [AMFF⁺13]. However, recent results still show severe limitations even for recent constructions: for instance, encrypting 4MB of plaintext yields 73TB of ciphertext [LN14]. This suggests FHE function evaluation can not run on average desktop computer and require a computationally very powerful entity such as the cloud.

2.1.3 Mathematical tools and notations

Before starting the main matter of this chapter, we define the main mathematical notions and notations we use.

First, all logarithms, unless specified otherwise, are logarithms base 2. We use Landau complexity notations in $O(\cdot)$, $o(\cdot)$, $\Omega(\cdot)$, $\omega(\cdot)$. The notation $\tilde{O}(n)$ refers to $O(n)$ along with logarithmic factors disregarded because of their asymptotic smaller values compared to n (for instance). We also sometimes use the notation $poly(n)$ to denote a polynomial complexity in n and $polylog(n)$ to denote a polynomial complexity in $\log n$. By $|N|$ we denote the bit-size of the number N , equal to $\log_2 N$ (we make use of both notations alternatively).

Vectors are denoted by bold font letters \mathbf{a} , matrices by upper case bold font letters \mathbf{A} and its transpose \mathbf{A}^T . The term $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \rangle$ denotes the scalar product of vector \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} . The reduction of x modulo some number n , $x \bmod n$, is sometimes denoted $[x]_n$. This operator for compactness. When applied to vectors or matrix, *e.g.* $[\mathbf{a}]$, it is simply defined as the reduction modulo n of the vector or matrix coefficients.

Cryptography

We use the notions of security from the *Foundations of Cryptography* (Vol. 2) [Gol04]: IND-CPA, IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2. When using other security notions, they will be explained. We sometimes mention elliptic curve cryptography and pairing-based cryptography [HMV04]. In the document, λ always denotes the security parameters of cryptographic schemes, unless specified otherwise.

In order to characterize homomorphic schemes, we make use of *Nick's complexity classes*, denoted NC . In particular, NC^i refers to circuits of polynomial *size* (number of gates) and *depth* (number of gates of the longest path from inputs to output) in $O(\log^i(\text{size of input}))$ built from fan-in 2 logical gates. The schemes' capacities can also be expressed in terms of multivariate polynomials, which most general form is

$$P(x_1, \dots, x_k) = \sum_{i=1}^M a_i \left(\prod_{j=1}^k x_j^{d_{i,j}} \right)$$

With M the number of monomials, k the number of variables, $d_i = \sum_{j=1..k} d_{i,j}$ the degree and a_i the coefficient of the i^{th} monomial, and $d = \max_{i=1..M} d_i$ the degree of the polynomial.

The link between the polynomial and NC classes (circuits) models is direct: the circuit needed to evaluate a polynomial of degree d is usually of depth $O(\log d)$ [Vai12, MGH10]. Thus, a scheme capable of evaluating a polynomial of degree d can evaluate a boolean circuit of multiplicative depth $O(2^d)$.

2.1.4 Categorization of homomorphic schemes

As observed in previous sections, a homomorphic encryption scheme is mainly defined by its computational capacities over encrypted data, *i.e.* the set \mathcal{F} of functions it can evaluate. The functions in this set can be expressed through various computation models: polynomials of a

specific degree, *Nick's classes* or more generally boolean circuits. However, the simplest way of characterizing the capacities of a scheme is in terms of simple algebraic operations, as Feigenbaum and Merritt propose.

Typically, the two desirable operations are multiplication and addition of messages in the encrypted domain. Indeed, these two operations are the basic operations of a computer arithmetic logic unit and are sufficient to evaluate any function (in theory). If plaintexts are bits instead of integers, which is the case in many homomorphic schemes, multiplication is equivalent to a logical AND gate, and addition to a logical OR. More exactly, addition of two bits modulo 2 is a logical XOR, but it can easily be turned into a OR gate by re-implementing arithmetics in \mathbb{F}_2 using the fact that each ciphertext encrypts one bit. As with the set of gates $\{AND, OR\}$, we achieve functional completeness and any function can (in theory) be evaluated.

We propose the following categorization of homomorphic schemes. For each category, we detail its computational capacities in terms of algebraic operations (in nature and number), as well as in terms of polynomials² and/or circuits if relevant.

Partially homomorphic encryption (PHE)

Allowing only 1 operation, *i.e.* addition or multiplication but not both, in a limited or unlimited manner.

This corresponds to the evaluation of multivariate polynomials of degree $d = 1$ in the case of unlimited additions, or multivariate monomials of arbitrary degree in the case of unlimited multiplication.

Somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE)

Allowing 2 operations, one of which in a very limited number. In general, multiplications are limited, and additions are unlimited (or considered as such, because they are negligible compared to multiplications' cost).

This corresponds to evaluation of multivariate polynomials of degree $d = L$ if L multiplications are possible in the scheme.

In some cases, it is relevant to characterize the scheme in terms of boolean circuits of bounded size and depth, using *Nick's classes* for instance. When the scheme allows a limited number of multiplication L , we are interested in the *multiplicative depth* (depth of the circuit, counting only the multiplicative gates, *i.e.* AND gates), which must be under L .

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)

Allowing both operations in an unlimited manner.

This corresponds to multivariate polynomials of arbitrary degree.

There are two other elements we did not take into account in this categorization by homomorphic capacities: the category called *Leveled* homomorphic encryption which is the main matter of section 2.3.2, and the *scalar multiplication* property. The scalar multiplication is an operation that takes place at the frontier between the encrypted and clear domains: one operand m_2 is in clear, and the other m_1 is encrypted by $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1)$. Schemes allowing scalar multiplication respect the equation: $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1) \odot m_2 = \text{Enc}(pk, m_1.m_2)$. In other words, they allow multiplication of an encrypted value with a clear value. The famous cryptosystem of Paillier [Pai99] is scalar homomorphic, and this property has been used in several protocols [Cha04].

In the rest of this chapter, we rely on this categorization and provide one section each for partially and fully homomorphic encryptions (respectively, sections 2.2 and 2.3). However, because of their small number, their inefficiency and their relatively limited capacities, some-

²For simplicity, we will consider all polynomials coefficients a_i as equal to 1 in the following paragraphs.

what homomorphic schemes are not given a section on their own. We merely mention them in section 2.2.5.

2.1.5 Main theoretical and practical issues

In order to offer the reader a better understanding of problematics encountered when designing a homomorphic scheme, we provide in this section a brief description of horizontal issues in homomorphic encryption.

In traditional encryption schemes, we have to perform trade-off between security and efficiency: the scheme must be secure in order to adequately hide information, and efficient so that its primitives are easily computable by the appropriate parties. Indeed, in a perfectly efficient scheme $\text{Enc}(pk, m) = m$, and to communicate m to Bob, Alice simply sends it in clear. On the contrary, a secure but inefficient solution (to the point it is not actually working) is for Alice to keep the message m secret and not disclosing it. To this security-efficiency duo, homomorphic encryption adds a third element to take into account: the *homomorphic capacities*. Indeed, in somewhat homomorphic encryption, the homomorphic capacities of the schemes could be made arbitrary large and theoretically achieve FHE, but it comes at the cost of exponential or worse running times of cryptographic primitives, and notably Eval. All three components have to be taken into account in the same time, and trade-offs have to be performed.

The above abstract remarks do not reveal much on the actual points of issues of homomorphic schemes. To be more precise, the common issues in homomorphic encryption include:

Inefficiency Obviously, as per the security-efficiency-homomorphism trade-off, in order to enable homomorphism, we have to give up some security and/or efficiency. As security can hardly be compromised, most homomorphic schemes trade some efficiency against homomorphic capacities. Thus, most homomorphic schemes *intend* to obtain security and efficiency levels comparable to traditional encryption schemes, but hardly actually reach them.

Public key size A common issue with traditional cryptography: reducing the public key size. This is especially a problem in SHE and FHE, where some schemes have extremely large public keys, up to several GBs.

Ciphertext expansion The ciphertext expansion is defined as the ratio of the ciphertexts size on the messages size (in bits). During many years cryptographers tried to minimize this ratio in order to save space and bandwidth. Starting from Goldwasser-Micali's cryptosystem [GM82] in 1982, with a ciphertext expansion of roughly $|N|$ bits (with N similar to a RSA modulus, of *e.g.* 1024 bits), a ratio arbitrary close to 1 has been achieved by Damgård-Jurik [DJ01] only in 2001. This result comes at the cost of degraded running time performances, and increased messages and ciphertexts sizes (paradoxically !). However, SHE and FHE schemes, in order to ensure security and homomorphism traded some efficiency: many schemes show even worse ciphertext expansions than the Goldwasser-Micali scheme.

Ciphertext size growth Independently from the ciphertext expansion, the ciphertext size growth is defined as the growth of ciphertexts' size when they are applied homomorphic operation. In other words, the ciphertext size growth is the ratio between $|\text{Eval}(pk, f, c_1, \dots, c_2)|$ and $|c_i|$. This problem mainly rises in SHE schemes, where it is uneasy to enable multiplication on top of addition, and schemes use redundant structures to store information (see section 2.2.5).

Ciphertext noise expansion Equivalent of the ciphertext expansion problem of SHE in the FHE context. In a sense, this issue is “replaced” by the *noise growth* issue (see section 2.3)

Computation model The goal of homomorphic encryption is to compute on encrypted data. In this sense, we naturally think of computations in the encrypted domain in the *random-access machine* (RAM) model, *i.e.* if possible, we could like to execute RAM programs directly in the encrypted domain. But as we already showed, in practice, much simpler but less powerful models are used. In PHE we mainly use the simple algebraic model because of the limited capacities of the scheme. However in SHE and FHE schemes capable of evaluating more complex processes, we do not use RAMs but *circuits*. It is known that any RAM program can be turned into a circuit, yet this comes at a great cost: a RAM program running in time T transforms into a circuit of size $O(T^3 \log T)$ [GHRW14]. The problem is even more complex than this, and we discuss these limitations in section 2.4.3

2.2 Partially homomorphic schemes

The main idea of this section is to introduce the main existing partially homomorphic schemes, and detail their capacities, performances and security. The aim is not to draw an exhaustive listing, but rather to give an overview of the field and what can be achieved with such schemes. This section is partially inspired by a 2007 survey on homomorphic cryptography [FG07].

The 4 first subsections present the 4 main partially homomorphic encryption schemes, along with their derivatives. For each scheme, we briefly describe its functioning and provide details on its homomorphic capacities, security and efficiency. These schemes are summarized in Table 2.1, page 51. The 5th subsection briefly presents a few SHE schemes. The last part of this section deals with the practical uses of PHE schemes.

2.2.1 Goldwasser-Micali

Created in 1982 by Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali [GM82], the GM cryptosystem is the first semantically secure public key encryption scheme (thus probabilistic), and thereby the first secure homomorphic scheme.

To explain this scheme, we need to define the notions of quadratic residue and the Legendre and Jacobi symbol. Very briefly, we say that an integer a is a quadratic residue modulo N if there exist an integer b such that $b^2 \equiv a \pmod{N}$, *i.e.* such that a is congruent to a square modulo N . If N is prime, a is a quadratic residue modulo N if and only if $a^{(N-1)/2} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$, which is easily computable [GM82]. The Legendre symbol of an integer a and the prime number p , noted $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$, is equal to: 0 when $a \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, else, +1 when a is a quadratic residue modulo p , and -1 when a is not a quadratic residue modulo p . The Jacobi symbol³ is defined with the Legendre symbol and its notation is similar: for any integers a and a $N = p_1 p_2$ product of two primes $\left(\frac{a}{N}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p_1}\right) \left(\frac{a}{p_2}\right)$. Even though computing the Jacobi symbol $\left(\frac{a}{N}\right)$ when the factorization of N is not known is considered “easy” in general, the idea is using the fact that when $\left(\frac{a}{N}\right) = +1$, it is difficult to know if a is a quadratic residue modulo N . Indeed, for a to be a quadratic residue modulo N , it must be a quadratic residue modulo p_1 and p_2 [GM82]. Yet, to have $\left(\frac{a}{N}\right) = +1$, we can have $\left(\frac{a}{p_1}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p_2}\right) = +1$ or -1 . In the first case, a is indeed a quadratic residue modulo

³For simplicity, we offer a restricted definition of the Jacobi symbol

N , in the other it is not, but knowing only $\left(\frac{a}{N}\right) = +1$ and without the factorization of N , it is believed hard to decide. Note that with the factorization of N the problem is easy, but factoring is known to be hard given a large N . We can now detail the functioning of the scheme:

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: Pick two large prime numbers p_1 and p_2 , compute $N = p_1 p_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$. Pick $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ such that $\left(\frac{x}{N}\right) = +1$ and it is *not* a quadratic residue modulo N . Output $((N, x), (p_1, p_2))$.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: For $m \in \{0, 1\}$, pick a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and output $x^m r^2 \bmod N$. Note that in any case $\left(\frac{c}{N}\right) = +1$, but c is a quadratic residue modulo N only if $m = 0$.

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Test whether c is a quadratic residue modulo N using the factorization of N and the fact that $\left(\frac{c}{p}\right) = +1 \Leftrightarrow c^{(p-1)/2} = 1 \pmod p$ for any prime p . If c is a quadratic residue modulo N , output 0, else output 1.

The GM scheme is homomorphic in the sense that $\text{Enc}(pk, b_1) \times \text{Enc}(pk, b_2) = x^{b_1+b_2} r_1^2 r_2^2 \bmod N = \text{Enc}(pk, b_1 \oplus b_2)$, and ciphertexts can be combined this way in an unlimited manner. The homomorphic operation is indeed a XOR, and not a OR, because when $b_1 = b_2 = 1$, the resulting ciphertexts is $x^2 r_1^2 r_2^2 \bmod N$ which is a quadratic residue modulo N , thus it decrypts to 0. Note that this is a very limited homomorphism, and the GM scheme is very limited.

The cryptosystem is semantically secure (*i.e.* IND-CPA secure) under the assumption that the quadratic residuosity problem modulo a composite number N is intractable, and on the assumption that factorizing such a N is hard. To obtain $\lambda = 80$ bits of security, it is widely believed that with $|N| = 1024$ is sufficient. For $\lambda = 128$ bits, $|N|$ should be 2048, etc. Parameters size are actually similar to those of RSA.

Considering efficiency, note that a message M composed of $l = |M|$ bits expands to $l \cdot |N|$ bits. Ciphertext expansion is thus $l \cdot |N| / l = |N|$ bits, which is very large. The complexity of these primitives largely depends on $|N|$ as well: encryption asks for a square and one multiplication and can be computed in time $\tilde{O}(|N|)$, and decryption requires 2 exponentiations, computable in time $\tilde{O}(|N|^2)$ [GM84]. Thus, the trade-off security-efficiency appears: as $|N|$ increases, security increases, but efficiency diminish.

Finally, note that according to Gjøsteen [Gjø05], security of GM can also be based on the decisional subgroup membership problem. This problem is defined over a group \mathbb{H} (the ciphertext space) and two “non-trivial” subgroups \mathbb{H}_1 (the encoded message space) and \mathbb{H}_2 (set of the “cloaking” elements of the encryption) such that $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{H}_1 \times \mathbb{H}_2$ and $\mathbb{H}_1 \cap \mathbb{H}_2 = \{1\}$. It consists in deciding if, given a element $x \in \mathbb{H}$, it belongs to \mathbb{H}_1 or \mathbb{H}_2 . For an appropriate choice of groups, the problem is believed to be hard. GM is actually a special case of the subgroup membership problem, where \mathbb{H} is the subgroup of \mathbb{Z}_N^* whose elements have Jacobi symbol $+1$, and \mathbb{H}_1 is the subgroup of \mathbb{H} of quadratic residue modulo N . In the same article, Gjøsteen actually notes that many homomorphic cyptosystems’ security is based on the subgroup membership problem. In the rest of the section, we use this problem to describe security (when relevant).

2.2.2 ElGamal

Defined a few years later, in 1985 by Taher ElGamal [ElG85], this cryptosystem is one of the most used in practice, after RSA. Note however that it is not always used for its homomorphic property, but in many cases it is simply employed as a standard, efficient, public key scheme. It is defined as follows:

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: Pick an adequate (see below) cyclic group \mathbb{G} subgroup of \mathbb{Z}_p^* , of large prime order q (such that $q|(p-1)$) with generator g . Pick at random $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and compute $h = g^x \in \mathbb{G}$. Output $((p, q, g, h), x)$.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: For $m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, pick a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Encode m into an element m' of \mathbb{G} . Output the pair $(g^r, m'.h^r) \in \mathbb{G}^2$ (values are computed modulo p).

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Let $c = (c_1, c_2)$. Compute

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1^x} = m' \frac{h^r}{(g^r)^x} = m' \frac{g^{xr}}{g^{xr}} = m' \pmod{p}$$

Output m , the decoding of m' in \mathbb{Z}_q .

Before exposing the homomorphic property of ElGamal, we have to detail the scheme's security and explain why we need group encoding of messages. First, we have to bear in mind that we would like the message space to be $\mathcal{M} = \{0, \dots, n\}$ for some n , as it is often the case in public key cryptography. As it was proposed initially [ELG85], we could fix \mathcal{M} and \mathbb{G} to be \mathbb{Z}_p^* for a large prime p : as $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}$, we can directly encrypt integers from a set close to our goal, *i.e.* $\{1, \dots, p\}$. However, in this setting, the scheme is insecure [CMPP06]. Indeed the security this scheme relies on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [TY98] which states that given g a generator of some commutative group $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$, along with $g^a, g^b, h \in \mathbb{G}$ for some $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$, it is impossible to know if $h = g^{ab}$ or not. However, for this assumption to hold, \mathbb{G} must be a group of prime order q , which is not the case when $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ because the order of \mathbb{G} is $(p-1)$, which is not a prime number when p is prime. Hence, we need to change our choice for \mathbb{G} . There are several types of groups in which the DH assumption holds, but typically \mathbb{G} is chosen as a small subset of \mathbb{F}_p^* of prime order q , with p a large prime, q that divides $(p-1)$, $|p| = 1024$ bits and $|q| = 160$ bits (\mathcal{G} is a Schnorr group). However, if we want to keep the message space close to $\{0, \dots, n\}$ for some n , it is necessary to *encode* messages into \mathbb{G} , because the scheme operates inside this structure. Also, this encoding must be efficiently invertible so that at the decryption phase, the correct message is decoded. Thus, we set the message space to be \mathbb{Z}_q . With these settings and parameters, ElGamal, as described above, is proved IND-CPA secure under the Decisional DH assumption.

Note that an alternative construction of secure ElGamal's consists in using hash functions in the encryption process, but we disregard this solution for it implies loss of homomorphism [CMPP06]. Another alternative is to use the *encoding-free* version of ElGamal [CMPP06], which slightly modify the scheme to avoid encoding and still ensure IND-CPA security. This scheme shows performance similar to the original ElGamal, and we do not describe it here. Finally, as GM, ElGamal's security relies on a specific case of the subgroup membership problem, where the ciphertext space is $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{L} \times \mathbb{L}$, with $\mathbb{L} = \langle g \rangle$ a group of prime order q , and $\mathbb{H}_1 \subset \mathbb{H}$ is generated by (g, g^x) with $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ [Gjø05], and \mathbb{H}_2 is generated by $(1, g)$.

We now consider homomorphism. Let's first suppose that the message space is actually \mathbb{G} . Then, for $m'_1, m'_2 \in \mathbb{G}$ and $c_i = \text{Enc}(pk, m_i) = (c_{i,0}, c_{i,1}) = (g^{r_i}, m'_i.h^{r_i})$,

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 \otimes c_2 &= (c_{1,0} \times c_{2,0}, c_{1,1} \times c_{2,1}) \\ &= (g^{r_1+r_2}, m'_1.m'_2.h^{r_1+r_2}) \\ &= \text{Enc}(pk, m'_1.m'_2) \end{aligned}$$

Then, if the encoding from the message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{Z}_q$ to \mathbb{G} is an isomorphism the scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic, *i.e.* $\text{Encode}(m_1).\text{Encode}(m_2) = \text{Encode}(m_1.m_2)$. Note that ElGamal is also scalar homomorphic: let $(c_1, c_2) = \text{Enc}(pk, m_1)$, then $(c_1, c_2 \times m_2)$ encrypts $m_1.m_2$.

ElGamal can also be additively homomorphic (and still scalar homomorphic), using a simple trick [CGS97]. To encrypt $m \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the idea is to encrypt g^m using standard ElGamal encryption: $\text{Enc}(pk, m) = (g^r, g^m \cdot h^r)$, and clearly multiplying two ciphertexts c_1 and c_2 component to component yields $(g^{r_1+r_2}, g^{m_1+m_2} \cdot h^{r_1+r_2}) \in \text{Enc}(pk, m_1 + m_2)$. Note that there is no need for encoding in this variant, but decryption requires computing a discrete logarithm, which is computationally impossible in general, but feasible for small message values.

We finally consider the efficiency of the scheme (only the multiplicatively homomorphic variant). As the messages are represented by 1 group element, and the ciphertexts by 2 group elements, the ciphertext expansion is 2, which is much better than GM. Encryption requires 2 exponentiations and 1 multiplication and time in $\tilde{O}(|q||p|)$, as decryption consists in 1 exponentiation and 1 division, computable in time $\tilde{O}(|q||p|)$. These figures do not consider the time required for encoding/decoding, and complexity may be larger in practice.

2.2.3 Benaloh, Naccache-Stern and Okamoto-Uchiyama

Benaloh's cryptosystem can be seen as an improved generalization of GM [Ben94]. Designed in 1994, the main goal of the scheme was to create a "dense" probabilistic cryptosystem, *i.e.* a scheme with ciphertext expansion as close to 1 as possible. We detail the scheme as described by Fousse *et al.* [FLA11] which provide a corrected version of Benaloh⁴:

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: Choose a block size $l \in \mathbb{Z}$, and two large primes p and q , such that: l divides $(p-1)$, $\gcd(l, (p-1)/l) = 1$ and $\gcd(l, q-1) = 1$. Compute $N = pq$. Pick $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ such that $\gcd(l, \alpha) = 1$, and compute $y = g^\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ with g a generator of \mathbb{Z}_p^* . Note that $y^{(p-1)(q-1)/l} \neq 1 \pmod{N}$. Output $((y, l, N), (p, q))$.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: For $m \in \mathbb{Z}_l$, pick a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$. Output $y^m r^l \pmod{N} \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Notice that, because $r^{(p-1)(q-1)} = 1 \pmod{N}$, $c^{(p-1)(q-1)/l} = y^{m(p-1)(q-1)/l} r^{l(p-1)(q-1)/l} = y^{m(p-1)(q-1)/l} \pmod{N}$.

Thus, if $c^{(p-1)(q-1)/l} = 1 \pmod{N}$, output $m = 0$.

Else, if l is small enough, perform an exhaustive search, *i.e.* $\forall m' \in \mathbb{Z}_l$, test if $y^{-m'} c$ is an encryption of 0. If yes, output $m = m'$.

If l is larger but has many small prime factors, we can rely on index calculus techniques [FLA11].

Benaloh is additively homomorphic: $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1) \times \text{Enc}(pk, m_2) = y^{m_1+m_2} (r_1 r_2)^l \pmod{N} \in \text{Enc}(pk, m_1 + m_2 \pmod{l})$. It is also scalar homomorphic: $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1)^{m_2} = y^{m_1 \times m_2} (r_1^{m_2})^l \pmod{N} \in \text{Enc}(pk, m_1 \times m_2 \pmod{l})$.

Security of the private key is based on factorization, so p and q should be large enough so that $|N| \geq 1024$. The scheme is IND-CPA secure, based on the *higher residuosity problem*, which is similar to the quadratic residue problem: the assumption is that given z , l and N , it is computationally impossible to decide if z is a l^{th} residue modulo N , *i.e.* it is impossible to find x such that $z \equiv x^l \pmod{N}$. Once more, according to Gjosteen [Gj05], this scheme's security can be based on the subgroup membership problem where $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, \mathbb{H}_1 is the cyclic subgroup of order l of \mathbb{H} generated by y , and \mathbb{H}_2 is the set of invertible l^{th} powers in \mathbb{H} .

We can see that there is a balance between security, ciphertext expansion and efficiency. Indeed, for security reasons, N to be a 1024 bits value at least. Then, on one hand, the ciphertext expansion is $|N|/|l|$, which decreases when l increases. Its minimum value is 2 because l must divide $(p-1)$. On the other hand, encryption (consisting in 2 exponentiations) runs in time

⁴[FLA11] proves the original scheme incorrect in the sense that decryption is ambiguous.

$\tilde{O}(|l||N|)$ and decryption in time $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{l}|l|)$ (this is, if l is not too large to perform exhaustive search, and with the use of pre-computations and the baby-step-giant-step algorithm). Thus, in definitive, complexity increases but ciphertext expansion decreases with l . Furthermore, note that if we use a large l along with the alternative decryption method, we provide a large smooth factor for $(p-1)$ to factorization algorithms, endangering the security of the secret key.

Naccache-Stern [NS98] (1998) is a derivative of Benaloh and improves upon the basic scheme. The main differences lie in the properties of the values p , q and l and in the definition of the decryption process, which uses the Chinese Remainder theorem. This leads to a less complex decryption, in time $\tilde{O}(|N|^4)$. Thus l can be set higher than in Benaloh, yielding a better ciphertext expansion. Security is based on the same assumptions (the higher residuosity problem or alternatively the subgroup membership problem) and homomorphic properties are the same.

Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98] (1998) is an improvement of Benaloh, and lays the foundations of Paillier's scheme. The main difference with previous works is that N is defined as p^2q , for p and q primes of k bits. Messages m are taken modulo p and encrypted by $c = g^{Nr+mi} \bmod N$ with $g \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and r a random element of \mathbb{Z}_n . As decryption is more complex and similar to Paillier's, we do not detail it in this paragraph. Ciphertext expansion is exactly 3: messages are modulo p (thus k bits) and ciphertext are modulo N (thus $3k$ bits). Security is again, based on similar assumptions.

2.2.4 Paillier and derivatives

Designed in 1999 by Pascal Paillier, this scheme is the most known, and maybe the most efficient partially homomorphic encryption scheme. Although Paillier interestingly comes back to a standard RSA modulus $N = pq$, it can be seen as the continuation of previous works, and is in some points similar to Okamoto-Uchiyama. In the following description, $\lambda(N)$ denotes the Carmichael function (in our case, $\lambda(N) = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$), and $L_N(\cdot)$ denotes the function defined over the set $\mathcal{S}_N = \{x < N^2 | x \equiv 1 \pmod{N}\}$ as $L_N(x) = (x-1)/N$.

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: Pick two large primes p and q and compute $N = pq$. Randomly select $g \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ such that $\gcd(L_N(g^{\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2), N) = 1$. Output $((N, g), (p, q))$. Alternatively, the secret key is $\lambda(N)$.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: For $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, pick a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$. Output $g^{m+rN} \bmod N^2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$.

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Output

$$\frac{L_N(c^{\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2)}{L_N(g^{\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2)} \bmod N$$

We explain how the decryption works in a few paragraphs. First, we note that the scheme is additively homomorphic: $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1) \times \text{Enc}(pk, m_2) = g^{m_1+m_2}(r_1.r_2)^N \bmod N^2 \in \text{Enc}(pk, m_1 + m_2 \bmod N)$. It is also scalar homomorphic: $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1)^{m_2} = g^{m_1 \times m_2}(r_1^{m_2})^N \bmod N^2 \in \text{Enc}(pk, m_1 \times m_2 \bmod N)$.

Its security is based on the *composite residuosity class problem*, close to the subgroup membership problem. It states that deciding whether a number z is a N^{th} residue modulo N^2 , *i.e.* deciding if there exists $y \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ such that $z = y^N \bmod N^2$, is intractable. Alternatively, we can base security of Paillier on the decisional subgroup membership, where $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{Z}_{n^2}^*$ is the ciphertext

space of order $(p-1)(q-1)N$, \mathbb{H}_1 is the subgroup of order N generated by g , and \mathbb{H}_2 is the subgroup of invertible N^{th} powers modulo N^2 of order $(p-1)(q-1)$.

The real practical improvement compared to previous work is the quasi-optimal ciphertext expansion equal to 2. This result is quasi-optimal, because in probabilistic encryption, 1 message has many encryptions, thus ciphertexts have to be larger than messages. We will see that an expansion factor in $]1, 2]$ is possible, but 2 is the smallest possible integer factor. As for performances, encryption requires 2 exponentiations computable in time $\tilde{O}(|N|^2)$. The most computationally expensive task in decryption is the exponentiation $c^{\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2$, computable in time $\tilde{O}(|N|^3)$. The value $1/L_N(g^{\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2)$ can be pre-computed once and for all at the key generation. Those asymptotic complexities are comparable to previous works, but the scheme is sensibly better in practice.

Now, to understand how the decryption works, we first describe the case when the generator g is $1+N$, which is the typical choice in most implementations (it is easy to check that $1+N$ is a suitable candidate for g in the **KeyGen** procedure). In this case, we have, for any $c = (1+N)^{m \cdot r^N} \bmod N^2$: $c^{\lambda(N)} = (1+N)^{m\lambda(N) \cdot r^{N\lambda(N)}} = (1+N)^{m\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2$ because of Carmichael's theorem stating that for all x , $x^{N \cdot \lambda(N)} = 1 \bmod N^2$. Then, we have the following :

$$c^{\lambda(N)} = 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{m\lambda(N)} \frac{m\lambda(N)(m\lambda(N)-1)\dots(m\lambda(N)-k+1)}{k!} N^k = 1 + m\lambda(N) \cdot N \bmod N^2$$

Because all terms in the sum are equal to 0 modulo N^2 for all $k > 1$. Now, applying L_N on $c^{\lambda(N)}$ yields $m\lambda(N)$. Computing $L_N((1+N)^{\lambda(N)} \bmod N^2)$ in the same way leads to $\lambda(N)$, therefore the decryption procedure outputs $\frac{m\lambda(N)}{\lambda(N)} = m \bmod N$.

In the general case, when $g \neq 1+N$, the decryption procedure is also correct. Indeed, as $1+N$, and more generally all suitable g in the **KeyGen** procedure, is a member and a generator of the subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ we denoted \mathbb{H}_1 earlier, any value $v = g^a \in \mathbb{H}_1$ can also be written as $v = (1+N)^{a'} \in \mathbb{H}_1$ for some a' . In particular, $\exists x$ s.t. $g = (1+N)^x \bmod N^2$. Thus $c = g^{m \cdot r^N} = ((1+N)^x)^{m \cdot r^N} \bmod N^2$, and we have $\text{Dec}(sk, c) = x \cdot m \cdot \lambda(N) / (x \cdot \lambda(N)) = m \bmod N$.

Damgård-Jurik [DJ01] (2001) simplifies and generalizes Paillier. The main modification is the replacement of the message and ciphertext space: messages are taken in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$, and ciphertexts lie in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s+1}}^*$. Also, the parameter g is simply set to $1+N$, reducing the public key size without endangering security. We can see that, if $s = 1$ this yields Paillier's cryptosystem, and when s increases, the ciphertext expansion $\frac{s+1}{s}$ gets close to 1. This is the main achievement of DJ: to offer an expansion arbitrary close to 1. However, this comes at the cost of increased complexity: encryption costs $(1/6)s(s+1)(s+2)$ times Paillier's encryption, and decryption is $(1/6)(s+1)(s+2)$ more costly [FG07]. The authors show that the security of their scheme is equivalent to Paillier's security. In the same paper, Damgård and Jurik describe a threshold version of Paillier, and detail an application to electronic voting.

Galbraith [Gal02] (2002) transposes Paillier and DJ in the elliptic curves setting. The scheme is however less efficient: expansion is equal to 3, and encryption and decryption are slower than Paillier's, but the exact comparison of the schemes is unclear [FG07]. The scheme works over the group defined by the elliptic curve $E(\mathbb{Z}_{N^2})$. In this context, we have as public parameters $N = pq$ and the description of the elliptic curves (*i.e.* its coefficients), and the secret key is a value derived from factorization of N , noted $d = \text{lcm}(\#E(\mathbb{F}_p), \#E(\mathbb{F}_q))$. The public key also contains a point Q of order d , *i.e.* such that $dQ = 0$ in $E(\mathbb{Z}_{N^2})$. To encrypt $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, choose a

random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and output the point $S = rQ + (mN : 1 : 0)$. Thus homomorphic addition of messages is performed by point addition. Decryption is done by multiplying S with the secret value d : $dS = r(dQ) + (mdN : 1 : 0) = (mdN : 1 : 0)$. Knowing d and N , it is easy to recover m using the first coordinate of the result. In Rappé's thesis, a threshold version of Galbraith's cryptosystem can be found [Rap06].

This paragraph closes the presentation of PHE schemes. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely to present the main PHE schemes and try to put in light the evolution of this technology. We could have also mentioned the scheme of Castagnos [Cas06], the Paillier-ElGamal amalgam [DJ03], or the Regev [Reg05] and LPR [LPR10] schemes, respectively based on the LWE and Ring-LWE problems. The last two schemes are actually the foundations of FHE schemes and will be given more attention in section 2.3.5. All the presented schemes are summed up in Table 2.1. We detail homomorphic capacities, ciphertext expansion, complexity of encryption and decryption, and parameters size for a 128-bit security.

Scheme	Op.	Exp.	Times		Security $\lambda = 128$	Misc.
			Enc	Dec		
RSA (77)	\times	1	$ N ^2$	$ N ^2$	$ N = 2048$	Deterministic. Insecure if homomorphic.
GM (82)	\oplus	$ N $	$ N $	$ N ^2$	$ N = 2048$	Bit-wise
ElGamal (85)	$\times, +, \odot$	2	$ q p $	$ q p $	$ q = 320$ $ p = 2048$	Encoding required
Benaloh (94)	$+, \odot$	$ N / l $	$ N l $	$\geq \sqrt{l} l $	$ N = 2048$	$l \geq 2$ arbitrary
N-S (98)	$+, \odot$	$ N / l $	$ N l $	$ N ^4$	$ N = 2048$	Improves Benaloh
O-U (98)	$+, \odot$	3	$ N ^2$	$ N ^3$	$ N = 2048$	Improves Benaloh
Paillier (99)	$+, \odot$	2	$ N ^2$	$ N ^3$	$ N = 2048$	Improves O-U
D-J (01)	$+, \odot$	$\frac{s+1}{s}$	$s^3 N ^2$	$s^2 N ^3$	$ N = 2048$	Generalizes Paillier. $s \geq 1$ arbitrary.
Galbraith (02)	$+$	3	\geq D-J		$ N = 2048$ $ E(\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}) = 256$	D-J in elliptic curves

All **Times** are complexity given in \tilde{O} notation (except Galbraith).

The **Operation** denoted by \odot is the scalar multiplication.

Note: these figures are estimations, and may hide substantial complexity factors.

Table 2.1: Comparison of PHE schemes

2.2.5 Somewhat homomorphic schemes

As mentioned before, SHE schemes are of little interest, therefore we do not dedicate an section to them. We merely present the few most known schemes in the literature.

The first construction allowing to compute on encrypted data in an *non-interactive* manner dates from 1999 [SYY99]. It was designed to evaluate NC^1 circuits (*i.e.* circuits of logarithm depth): one party, Alice, possesses an input x , and the other, Bob, has a circuit C . Both parties want to keep their input secrets, but should learn $C(x)$ at the end. Though it is not a SHE scheme *per se*, this construction allows computation of several OR and NOT gates. As the set of logical gates $\{NOT, OR\}$ provides functional completeness, we can theoretically evaluate any function. However, the limitation comes from the huge ciphertext size growth: for a depth d circuit, ciphertexts' size at output is $O(8^d)$. It is because of this exponential growth that the construction can only evaluate logarithmic depth circuits, *i.e.* in order to still have polynomial-time algorithms, one ought to limit the circuit's depth to $O(\log |inputs|)$.

A second construction, also similar but different from SHE, have been proposed by Ishai and Paskin in 2007 [IP07]. It uses another computation model: *branching programs*. Barrington proved that a branching programs (BP) include NC^1 circuits [Bar89], thus this construction is slightly better than the previous one. It allowing evaluation of a branching program BP owned by Bob, on Alice's secret input x . The idea can be summed up as follows: to encrypt x , Alice encrypts each of its bits by generating $|x|$ Oblivious Transfer requests. Bob recursively generate Oblivious Transfers answers in a bottom-up manner, and sends to Alice the answer associated to the branching program's initial node. Alice then recursively decodes the Oblivious Transfer answers and eventually recovers the branching program output corresponding to x . Ciphertexts size are polynomial in the BP length (*i.e.* the longest path in the branching program). Alice's workload is also polynomial in $length(BP)$, but Bob's workload depends polynomially on the *size* (*i.e.* number of nodes) of the program. However, as a NC^1 circuit of depth $O(\log n)$ is equivalent to a branching program of length $O(n)$, we did not make much progress and the scheme is limited to evaluating polynomial size branching programs (with gates fan-in⁵ possibly above 2), or equivalently, logarithmic depth NC^1 circuits (with gates fan-in equal to 2, by definition).

One of the most known SHE scheme, though not used in practice, is BGN (for Boneh-Goh-Nissim) designed in 2005 [BGN05] and improved by Gentry *et al.* in 2010 [GHV10]. The homomorphic property of this scheme are quite odd: it allows unlimited additions and 1 multiplication. As the title of the original article suggests, this corresponds to evaluation of multi-variate polynomials of degree 2. Actually, BNG is originally an additive homomorphic scheme where ciphertexts lie in a multiplicative group, and the trick to enable 1 multiplication is to use a bilinear application. The schemes follows the lines of Paillier, and security is based on the subgroup membership problem. The main limitation of this scheme is the size of the plaintexts space: the scheme allows encryption of "small" values up to a bound T . Indeed, the decryption operation depends polynomially on T , limiting the value of T . There is no ciphertext size growth, but ciphertext expansion is quite large: $|N|/|T|$ with $T \approx \log N$. The authors propose 3 applications for their scheme: efficient PIR⁶ with communication complexity in $\sqrt[3]{n}$ (instead of \sqrt{n}), electronic voting and verifiable computations. In Gentry's improvement [GHV10], the homomorphic capacities stay the same, but the plaintext space is larger, the encryption/decryption complexities are lower, and the ciphertext expansion is also lower. The scheme actually uses matrices and is well suited to encrypt polynomials or large integers. This scheme is also the first SHE scheme which security is based on the LWE problem (see section 2.3.5).

⁵The gate fan-in is its number of input wire.

⁶*Private Information Retrieval*, schemes allowing private queries to public databases.

We close our short SHE schemes list with the MGH cryptosystem [MGH10], the most recent but also the most homomorphic one. Indeed, it allows many additions and several multiplications, or equivalently it evaluates multivariate polynomials of degree d , which corresponds to circuits of depth $\log d$. The scheme is limited because of the exponential ciphertexts growth in d . However, as the growth is slower than Sander *et al.* [SYY99] and Ishai *et al.* [IP07], more multiplications are possible in practice. The main idea is to use a simply additive homomorphic encryption scheme (satisfying some reasonable properties), along with a tensorial product technique in order to enable multiplications. In a sense, multiplication of encrypted messages corresponds to tensorial product of ciphertexts, where the resulting ciphertext size is quadratic (*i.e.* if $|c| = n$, $|c \otimes c| = n^2$) and contains redundant data. The workload at decryption thus depends exponentially on d (the degree of the evaluated polynomial). Their construction is actually a general template to transform any additive scheme into a SHE scheme by “chaining” it multiple times with itself. However, they argue that their template fits very well with the BNG transformation of Gentry *et al.*, allowing unlimited additions and $2d$ multiplications for the same price.

To sum up the results in SHE, we can say that SHE schemes all allow many additions and either a very limited number of multiplications (with no ciphertext size growth), either many multiplications but at the cost of an exponential ciphertext growth. Moreover, none of these schemes is efficient, and their security may be somewhat hazardous. Therefore, we disregard these schemes in the rest of the chapter.

2.2.6 Implementations and practical considerations

In conclusion of this section on PHE schemes, we discuss practical results of the most practical PHE schemes, and present known implementations.

In practice the main schemes used in the (homomorphic) cryptography community or in cryptographic libraries are either ElGamal, Paillier (and its generalization), and Okamoto-Uchiyama. To the best of our knowledge, other schemes’ implementations (if they exist) are merely academic proof of concepts.

ElGamal is a serious alternative to RSA, and is actually used many standards, for instance in GPG (Gnu Privacy Guard, an implementation of the PGP protocol). However, this scheme is not used in its homomorphic, IND-CPA secure form. It is modified in order to provide IND-CCA2 security, thus loses its homomorphic properties. ElGamal usage seems to be restricted to traditional cryptography, and we do not explain why the homomorphic version was not used. An element of response may be because of the necessary message encoding or because the original scheme was homomorphic for multiplication, and not addition (and as we will see literature made extensive use use *additive* homomorphic schemes). In the same order of idea, the scheme of Okamoto and Uchiyama was used to design EPOC, a cryptosystem standardized by IEEE (IEEE P1363, submitted in 2000), but here again the scheme is in a IND-CCA2, non-homomorphic variant, thus of little interest to us.

In definitive, only Paillier and Damgård-Jurik are actually used for their homomorphic properties, yet no actual standard or practical implementation have been issued. The main applications of Paillier include electronic voting [Ste08] and private information retrieval [Cha04]. There exists many implementation of Paillier, in Java⁷, Python⁸ or in C^{9,10}. However, according to the

⁷The homomorphic encryption project

⁸<https://github.com/mikeivanov/paillier>

⁹libpaillier, from John Hopkins University

¹⁰PaillierGMP

authors themselves, these implementations should not be used to perform sensible computations, as their code have not been studied and secured. Therefore, in practice, even Paillier and its derivatives are still almost academic objects.

Although not used in production, there are many applications for PHE schemes: electronic voting, secure multi-party computation, private information retrieval, oblivious transfer, (non-interactive) knowledge proofs, secret sharing, commitment schemes, e-auctions, ... Many of these applications can be found in Rappe's thesis [Rap06].

To conclude on practical considerations, we give further details on practical figures of the most efficient PHE schemes, *i.e.* Paillier and ElGamal. As we already gave the ciphertext expansion (and thus the size of ciphertexts) and the rough complexity of these schemes, we are only interested in practical execution times. We ran tests of the python implementation of Mike Ivanov on a Intel i7 2.20GHz, which, for $|N| = 512$ (thus $\lambda < 80$), returned times were well above what expected: 390.7ms for KeyGen, 2.2ms for Enc, 2.8ms for Dec, and < 0.05 ms for homomorphic addition and scalar multiplication. Although these figures are consistent, that is to say Enc is faster than Dec, in turn faster than homomorphic operations, they are extremely high. This can be explained by the simple, unoptimized implementation and the relative "inefficiency" of python compared to C (for instance). More reasonable figures can be found in the Damgård-Jurik paper [DJ01], where RSA, ElGamal, Paillier and the DJ schemes are compared in terms of ciphertext expansion and number of multiplications in encryption and decryption. Also, Jakobsen *et al.* [JMN10, Section 5.3] construct a highly efficient version of Paillier and measure their results for the encryption primitive in number of CPU cycles for several key sizes. In particular, for $|N| = 2048$, the number of CPU cycles for encryption is between 2^{26} and 2^{27} , which corresponds, for a 2GHz single core CPU, to roughly a time of 30ms.

Although it would be desirable to know how efficient is Paillier in a simple use-case such as electronic voting, there is actually very few tests that were run, or at least we were not able to find them in the literature. There exist an interactive demonstration of electronic voting with Paillier¹¹, but it runs on Javascript (which has very poor performances), and only offer very small modulus size $|N|$ that do not represent real world secure settings. This demonstration is however useful to understand a concrete working example of electronic with Paillier, as it details the parameters of the schemes, and it offers to modify the votes, and even to "cheat".

2.3 Fully homomorphic schemes

As we have seen so far, cryptographers have been searching for a way to compute arbitrary functions on encrypted data for more than 30 years. Early 2000s, homomorphic encryption has made a lot of progress, and eventually, in 2009, the groundbreaking work of Gentry in his thesis [Gen09a] gave rise to the first (theoretically) fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This type of scheme is capable of evaluating any program that would be executable in the clear. This section is dedicated to the description of techniques and schemes derived from Gentry's construction, starting from 2009 until today.

First, we describe the emergence of FHE schemes and the main idea developed by Gentry. We then detail the main existing schemes, dividing them among according to their underlying cryptographic concepts. At last, as in the previous section, we consider FHE from a practical point of view.

¹¹<http://security.hsr.ch/msevote/paillier>

2.3.1 Outbreak of FHE and Gentry’s procedure

Before Gentry’s thesis, even theoretically, FHE was considered as impossible. In 2009, it became a tangible possibility, although it was at the time extremely far from practical (and still today, to some extent). Two main ideas were crucial for the apparition of FHE: the suppression of the ciphertext size growth, and the *bootstrapping* technique. Indeed, in Gentry’s original proposition, ciphertexts no longer suffered size growth when they were applied homomorphic operations, unlike SHE schemes. This refers to the notion of *compactness*: the output of the *Eval* primitive do not depend on the complexity of the evaluated function or the number of inputs. However, Gentry did not resolve, but merely “moved” the ciphertext size growth problem, as the ciphertexts from his scheme contained “noise” growing exponentially with homomorphic operations. In other words, ciphertexts were of fixed size, but some inner structure, the noise, was now growing inside it, in such a way that above a certain threshold, decryption would no longer work. Actually, the noise is simply the randomness contained in ciphertexts: as FHE schemes (like any other schemes) need to be semantically secure, they are probabilistic, *i.e.* they contain randomness to blind plaintexts. This randomness is added and multiplied along with the plaintexts when homomorphic operations are performed, and when it exceeds a certain threshold (typically, a modulo), decryption outputs erroneous values. To circumvent this issue, the trick proposed by Gentry is to *bootstrap* the scheme, *i.e.* to *homomorphically decrypt* ciphertexts when the noise becomes too large, so as to reset their noise. The operation resetting the noise is called “recrypt” and is the key to create a FHE scheme. We describe it here in an abstract manner:

Recrypt $c_{clear} \leftarrow \text{Recrypt}(pk, C_{\text{Dec}}, \{\text{Enc}(pk, sk[i])\}_i, c_{noisy})$: Takes as input the public key, the decryption primitive circuit, the secret key sk encrypted bit-wise under its corresponding public key, and a noisy ciphertext $c_{noisy} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, b)$ with $b \in \{0, 1\}$ (FHE schemes are often bit-wise). Performs the following operations:

1. Generates $\{c_i\}_i$ from the encryption of c_{noisy} ’s bits, $\text{Enc}(pk, c_{noisy}[i])$. The set $\{c_i\}_i$ can be seen as a *doubly encrypted* ciphertext.
2. Outputs $\text{Eval}(pk, C_{\text{Dec}}, \{\text{Enc}(pk, sk[i])\}_i, \{c_i\}_i)$, a valid ciphertext of b encrypted under pk , with low noise.

Note that in the recrypt primitive takes as input the secret key encrypted under its own public key. Disclosing this value may be harmful for the scheme’s security. The assumption that disclosing $\{\text{Enc}(pk, sk[i])\}_i$ does not endanger the security is called *circular assumption*. It is a very strong assumption, and in his thesis, Gentry provided elements to believe that the circular assumption was reasonable, but did not prove it.

We now have all the elements to formulate Gentry’s bootstrapping theorem, central in Gentry’s work.

Theorem 1 - Bootstrapping [Gen09a] (Informal)

A SHE scheme capable of evaluating its own decryption circuit plus at least one operation can be transformed into a FHE scheme under the circular security assumption.

We presented the main ideas that gave rise to the first FHE scheme. We sum them up in the following description of what is now called “Gentry’s blueprint”, or Gentry’s procedure to construct FHE schemes (we provide a simplified version of it):

Definition 1 - Gentry’s blueprint

1. Construct a SHE schemes capable of evaluating a few AND and OR gates.

2. Express the decryption primitive under the form of a circuit, and simplify (Gentry uses the term “squashing”) the decryption circuit so that the SHE scheme is capable of evaluating its own decryption circuit plus an additional AND gate (so that at least 1 operation can be done between two reencrypt operations).
3. If one is willing to make the circular security assumption, use the bootstrapping theorem to turn the scheme into a FHE scheme.

This blueprint is, as of today, the only known way to achieve fully homomorphic encryption. Gentry explains the application of this blueprint in details and in a quite simple way for the scheme of van Dijk *et al.*, making the parallel between FHE and a jewelery store owner delegating tasks to untrusted workers [Gen10]. However, this approach presents several strong shortcomings, both concerning security and efficiency, and most modern schemes actually deviate from it (thus they are no longer actual *fully* homomorphic schemes). We discuss this point in the next section.

In the rest of this section on FHE, we borrow the categorization from Cheon *et al.* [CCK⁺13] and divide schemes in 3 main classes, according to the concepts and cryptographic problems they relate to. First schemes, including Gentry’s original one, were based on ideal lattices. After what, in 2011, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11b] noticed that FHE could be based on much simpler problems, to wit *Learning With Errors* (LWE) or Ring-LWE. A year after, the number of FHE schemes exploded, as shown by Figure 2.2, and remain high until today (note that many schemes are not represented in the timeline). Also, starting from 2010, a different branch of FHE schemes is investigated in parallel, based on plain integers. At the rate of 1 new scheme every year approximately, this branch incorporates the new techniques developed in the “main” branch consisting in (R-)LWE-based schemes. Although integer-based schemes are very inefficient, they provide different assumptions and concepts to base security, which is crucial in cryptography. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of underlying concepts of FHE schemes, and Figure 2.2 presents the main FHE schemes from 2009 until today. As we can see, the LWE/R-LWE branch is by far the most productive one.

Note that in the rest of the chapter, we present *public key* FHE schemes, but most schemes can be either symmetric or asymmetric. Actually, there exist a generic transformation from symmetric to asymmetric FHE [Rot11]. Also, bear in mind that, unless specified otherwise, all FHE schemes are meant to encrypt bits only, *i.e.* messages are in the set $\{0, 1\}$.

2.3.2 Leveled HE: an alternative to bootstrapping

As we have seen, although bootstrapping is the only way to achieve pure FHE, many schemes choose not to use it. Prior to describing FHE schemes, we briefly explain why recent FHE schemes deviate from Gentry’s blueprint, and how they achieve “near-fully” homomorphic encryption.




Figure 2.1: Evolution of underlying concepts of FHE schemes




Figure 2.2: Listing of FHE schemes

First shortcoming of the blueprint: when simplifying the decryption circuit, one may need to make strong assumptions (in addition to the circular security assumption). For instance, in his thesis, Gentry simplifies the decryption procedure by publicizing a “hint” on the secret key, and relies on the *sparse subset sum* problem to prove that the scheme stays secure, a non-standard assumption (*i.e.* not extensively studied yet). This problem assumes that, given a large set of numbers S and a number s , it is hard to find the subset of numbers in S which sum is equal to s . Secondly, the bootstrapping operation is extremely costly: in the first schemes, its complexity was $\Omega(\lambda^4)$, with λ the security parameter, and even though great advances and a drastically reduced cost today, bootstrapping is still impractical. Indeed, FHE schemes’ efficiency is mainly measured by their *per-gate overhead*, a metric defined as the time required to compute a logical gate in the encrypted domain over the time to compute the same gate in the clear. As the complexity of bootstrapping is $\Omega(\lambda^4)$, the per-gate overhead of FHE schemes using bootstrapping is $\tilde{\Omega}(\lambda^4)$ because bootstrapping is usually performed at every gate.

Now that we have pointed out flaws in the blueprint, we have two possibilities. The first, trivial one, is to directly tackle the shortcomings listed above and reduce the cost of bootstrapping. However, as of today, even though the asymptotic cost have been reduced to $\tilde{O}(\lambda \log \lambda)$ [ASP13, ASP14], in practice it is still prohibitive. Another idea is to avoid using bootstrapping at each gate, *i.e.* to reduce the number of bootstrapping during the homomorphic evaluation of a circuit, while avoiding exceeding the noise threshold. This direction was investigated by Lepoint and Paillier [LP13], but have not been given much attention for now. The second possibility is to simply disregard bootstrapping, *i.e.* not using it. This is actually the approach favored by the community. As a result, schemes are no longer fully homomorphic, but they present substantial homomorphic capacities, and are much less costly. Such schemes are called *leveled homomorphic*. Note that somewhat and fully homomorphic encryptions have been defined in section 2.1.4, and we omitted the definition of the leveled variant for more simplicity. We provide it here.

Definition 2 - Leveled Homomorphic Encryption

A scheme is said *Leveled* if it can evaluate circuits of depth at most L , with L a parameter of the scheme. L can be set arbitrarily high, but the complexity of the scheme increases with L .

To better understand this notion, we detail the differences between SHE, FHE and LHE:

Somewhat vs. Leveled In SHE schemes, homomorphic capacities are not clearly defined, *i.e.* we do not have precise bound on the complexity of the functions they can evaluate. In most cases, the multiplicative depth of evaluable circuits is logarithmic (in size of the inputs). On the other hand, LHE schemes can evaluate linear-multiplicative-depth circuits, and the depth can be exactly controlled with the parameter L . Also, correctness of the scheme is guaranteed for

circuits of depth $\leq L$.

Leveled vs. Fully Complexity and overhead of LHE schemes depend on the requested depth L , as in FHE, complexity only depends on the security parameter (*i.e.* it is independent of the evaluated function). It seems like FHE is always better, but because of the great cost of the bootstrapping operation, LHE is much more efficient than FHE. This is true up to a certain threshold L_{max} , above which the cost of LHE becomes larger than FHE's. The value of this threshold is unclear and depends on the scheme considered.

In consequence, we can divide research in FHE in two main (complementary) directions: improving bootstrapping, or improving LHE. Note that the two directions follow the same goal: to manage and minimize the ciphertext noise growth. We have seen how bootstrapping manages noise. Now, as LHE does not use bootstrapping, it must find other ways to keep noise at a low level, at least until the depth L is reached. Thus, FHE schemes focus on inventing and improving "techniques" to minimize the ciphertext noise growth during homomorphic operations. The main techniques are: tensoring [BGV12], modulus switching [BGV12], key switching (also called re-linearization) [BGV12, Bra12], packing (or batching) of many plaintexts in 1 ciphertext [SV10, BGV12], and scale invariance [Bra12] (which cancels the costly technique of modulus switching). The description of these techniques are outside the scope of this document.

2.3.3 Schemes over ideal lattices

The first FHE schemes were based on ideal lattices [Gen09a, Gen09b, SV10, SS10, GH11b, GH11a], involving complex mathematical and cryptographic notions we will not detail here. Very briefly, a lattice \mathcal{L} is a discrete subgroup of \mathbb{R}^n , often taken on \mathbb{Z}^n . A lattice is generated by a *basis* $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$ composed of n linearly independent vectors, *i.e.* $\mathcal{L} = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n a_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid a_i \in \mathbb{Z} \right\}$.

An ideal of some ring R is defined as the set $I \subset R$ such that $\forall a \in I, b \in R, a + b \in I$ and $a \times b \in I$, *i.e.* I is closed under addition and multiplication by elements of R . An *ideal lattice* is, for instance, a subset $I \subset \mathbb{Z}[X]/f(X)$ of the set of polynomials over \mathbb{Z} modulo an irreducible polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$: it can be seen as an ideal of the ring $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/f(X)$, and also, by mapping the polynomials in I to the vector of their coefficients, it can be seen as a sub-lattice of \mathbb{Z}^n .

Schemes based on these tools are in limited number, but also of limited practical use. Indeed, their theoretical complexity is huge (they all use bootstrapping), and in practice, running times of their primitives are far beyond reasonable. We still describe the characteristics of the scheme of Gentry as it appears in [Gen09b], but do not give the details of its primitives, as the mathematical notions involved are too complex to be summed up in a few paragraphs.

The structure of ideal lattice seemed well suited as a first candidate for FHE, because they naturally provide additive and multiplicative homomorphism. Also, schemes in ideal lattices typically have low complexity decryption functions, *e.g.* logarithmic in the size of the lattice [Gen09b], which is convenient to enable bootstrapping. Gentry's first scheme's security was based on the (decisional) *closest vector problem* (CVP) for ideal lattices, which consists, given a lattice \mathcal{L} , a vector space V and a vector $\mathbf{v} \in V$ not in the lattice, in finding $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathcal{L}$ the vector in \mathcal{L} closest to \mathbf{v} up to an approximation factor, *i.e.* such that $\|\mathbf{v}'\| \leq \gamma \cdot \|\mathbf{v}_{exact}\|$ with \mathbf{v}_{exact} the closest vector to \mathbf{v} in \mathcal{L} . The SHE building block was, according to Gentry, slightly better than the SHE scheme BGN [BGN05], *i.e.* it allowed unlimited additions and more than one multiplication for comparable efficiency. Then, in order to simplify the decryption circuit, the scheme is modified to publish a set of vectors with a secret sparse subset whose sum is roughly equal to the secret key. The decryption circuit is then simply a sparse subset sum plus some other minor operations (compared to a matrix-vector product in the original SHE scheme), and can be evaluated by

the scheme. The hardness assumption invoked to prove the security of the modified scheme is the *sparse subset sum* (SSS) problem, which states that it is impossible to distinguish a random set of elements from a set of elements for which the sum of a secret subset is equal to 0. The two hardness assumption, SSS and CVP problems, are strong assumptions, *i.e.* the security of this scheme is proved, but relies on hazardous assumptions that need to be further studied. The per-gate overhead of this scheme is roughly $\tilde{O}(\lambda^6)$ [SS10], a cost mainly explainable by the need for bootstrapping a each gate.

Two main contributions tried to improve upon this scheme. Stehlé and Steinfield obtained a per-gate overhead of $\tilde{O}(\lambda^{3.5})$ by providing a more precise analysis of the SSS problem yielding smaller parameters, and by allowing negligible but non-zero decryption error (*i.e.* the decryption primitive can fail with small probability, even for valid ciphertexts). The second work, by Gentry and Halevi [GH11a], marks the first deviation from the blueprint: it still uses bootstrapping, but it does not need to simplify the decryption circuit, and thus gets rid of the sparse subset sum assumption. To do so, they express the decryption function of their basic SHE scheme as a sequence composed of: a series of additions, then a series of multiplications, and finally a series of additions. The series of additions are performed by the SHE scheme, as the multiplications are done by switching to a multiplicative PHE such as ElGamal. This involves homomorphically evaluating ElGamal’s decryption function to switch back to the SHE. Eventually, they obtain a scheme as complex as the original one, they also use bootstrapping, but get rid of the strong SSS assumption and achieve better security.

Although very inefficient, these schemes were actually implemented two times: one by Smart and Vercauteren [SV10] and the other by Gentry and Halevi [GH11b]. As the first implementation only includes the basic SHE scheme, we do not consider it here. The second one implements all the scheme, including the bootstrapping part, and make use of many minor optimizations in order to make the scheme work in practice. For a claimed security of $\lambda \approx 80$ bits¹², they propose 4 parameter settings, mainly driven by the dimension n of the lattice, ranging from $n = 512$ (toy) to $n = 32768$ (medium). Public keys size are respectively ranging from 17MB to 2.3GB, and running time on a 64-bit quad-core Intel Xeon at 3.4GHz with 24 GB of RAM, are respectively 0.190s and 3min for Enc, < 0.010s and 0.660s for Dec, 2.5s and 2.2 hours for KeyGen, and 6s and 31min for Recrypt in the toy and medium settings. Even though the implementation gave up some security in order to gain some performances, and even with optimizations, these numbers are far from practical (compare it to RSA: pk size of 2KB, Enc takes 0.045ms and Dec 1.47ms on an average laptop with Intel i7 core of 2.2GHz). However, this implementation is a proof that FHE is possible.

2.3.4 Schemes over the integers

As soon as 2010, van Dijk *et al.* decided to transpose Gentry’s FHE scheme to plain integers [vdGHV10], a much less complex tool to work with compared to ideal lattices. Drafts of these schemes were previously proposed prior to 2009 as SHE candidates, but van Dijk *et al.* formalized it, improved it, and integrated it within Gentry’s blueprint to create a FHE scheme. Along the years, more integers-based schemes were designed [CMNT11, CNT12, CCK⁺13, CLT14], mostly adapting the new techniques borrowed from the (R-)LWE “branch” to the integer settings, which is often non-trivial (except [CNT12] which proposed a novel public key compression technique). As the authors note, the main appeal of the integer approach is its conceptual simplicity. Also, as noted by Cheon *et al.* [CCK⁺13], these schemes provide FHE schemes with similar capacities, but based on different techniques and assumptions, and diversifying assumptions to base security is a necessary effort in cryptography (especially since the security of Ring-LWE has not been

¹²The actual security is below 80 bits, as the authors do not make n , the lattice dimension, depend on λ

well studied yet). Indeed, concerning efficiency, all integer-based schemes are worse than their counterparts in the (R-)LWE branch. As for the security, similarly to Gentry's original scheme which is based on approximation problems in ideal lattices (to wit, the closest vector problem), integer-based schemes are based on the approximate GCD problem. This problem asks to find p given many $x_i = p \cdot q_i + r_i \approx p \cdot q_i$ for q_i large integers, r_i a "small" values and p an odd integer, constant between values (see below for descriptions of ρ and γ). Note that this assumption is still being studied and new attacks have been recently disclosed [CN12, CNT12].

As the 2010 scheme from van Dijk *et al.* is one of the simplest existing scheme, we describe it here. We then review the ameliorations brought by the community until today, and finally present some concrete fact on efficiency and security. Note that the scheme described below is not FHE, but SHE, and that we do not describe the description simplification operation enabling bootstrapping. Thanks to the accurate description of the scheme, we are able to provide the **Setup** primitive generating the *params* from the security parameter λ . Note: in the following, the value $x \bmod y$ lies in $(-y/2, y/2]$, and not in $[0, y)$ as traditionally.

Setup $params \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Set $\rho = \omega(\log \lambda)$ the bit-length of the noise (high enough to protect against brute-force attack on the noise) ; $\eta \geq \rho \cdot \Theta(\lambda \cdot \log^2 \lambda)$ the bit-length of the secret key (high enough to support homomorphism and evaluate the simplified decryption circuit) ; $\gamma = \omega(\eta^2 \log \lambda)$ the bit-length of the integers in the public key (high enough to thwart lattice-based attack on the approximate GCD problem) ; and $\tau \geq \gamma + \omega(\log \lambda)$ the number of integers in the public key (high enough for the security proof to hold). Let $\mathcal{D}_{\gamma, \rho}(p)$ the distribution outputting $x_i = pq_i + r_i$ for $q_i \in \{0, \dots, \lfloor 2^\gamma/p \rfloor\}$ and $r_i \in \{\lceil -2^\rho \rceil, \dots, \lfloor 2^\rho \rfloor\}$. Output $params = (\rho, \eta, \gamma, \tau, \mathcal{D}_{\gamma, \rho}(p))$.

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(params)$: Pick a large η -bit prime $p \in \{2^{\eta-1}, \dots, 2^\eta - 1\}$. Sample τ values x_i from $\mathcal{D}_{\gamma, \rho}(p)$ and relabel then so that x_0 is the largest. Restart unless x_0 is odd and $(x_0 \bmod p)$ is even. Output $((x_0, \dots, x_\tau), p)$.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: For $m \in \{0, 1\}$, pick a random $r \in \{-2^{2\rho} + 1, \dots, 2^{2\rho} - 1\}$, and a random subset $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, \tau\}$. Output $c = (m + 2r + 2 \sum_{i \in S} x_i) \bmod x_0$.

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Output

$$\begin{aligned} (c \bmod p) \bmod 2 &= \\ \left((m + 2r + 2x_i - (p \cdot q_0 + r_0) \cdot \lfloor c/x_0 \rfloor) \bmod p \right) \bmod 2 &= \\ \left((m + 2r + 2(p \sum_{i \in S} q_i + \sum_{i \in S} r_i) - (p \cdot q_0 + r_0) \cdot \lfloor c/x_0 \rfloor) \bmod p \right) \bmod 2 &= \\ \left((m + 2r' + pq') \bmod p \right) \bmod 2 &= \\ (m + 2r') \bmod 2 &= m \end{aligned}$$

Noting that ciphertexts have the form $\text{Enc}(pk, m) = m + 2r' + pq'$ (see above), we can see that $c_1 + c_2 = (m_1 + m_2 + 2(r'_1 + r'_2) + p(q'_1 + q'_2))$ encrypts $(m_1 + m_2 \bmod 2)$ with noise bit-length $|r'| + 1 = (2\rho + 1)$, and that $c_1 \times c_2 = (m_1 \cdot m_2 + 2(r'_1 \cdot m_2 + r'_2 \cdot m_1 + 2r'_1 \cdot r'_2) + p(q'_1 m_2 + q'_2 m_1 + pq'_1 q'_2 + 2r'_2 q'_1 + 2r'_1 q'_2)) = m_1 \cdot m_2 + 2r'' + pq''$ encrypts $m_1 \cdot m_2$ with a $(2 \cdot 2\rho)$ -bit noise. Thus, after L multiplications, the noise bit-length is $2^L \cdot 2\rho$. As for the decryption to be correct, the noise must remain smaller than the modulo p , *i.e.* $2^L \cdot 2\rho < |p| = \eta$, the scheme roughly allows $\log \eta / (2\rho)$ multiplications (or $\eta / (2\rho)$ multiplications in the special case where we use a fresh ciphertext at every multiplication). In other words, η is exponential in L , which imposes a strong limitation of L to small values.

For the proposed parameters [vDGHV10] $\rho = \lambda$, $\eta \approx \lambda^2$, $\gamma \approx \lambda^5$ and $\tau = \gamma + \lambda$, the public key size is $\tilde{O}(\lambda^{10})$, *i.e.* above 10^6 TB for $\lambda = 80$, which is above any practical system. We can see that $\approx |\lambda|$ successive multiplications are possible, which is almost enough to evaluate the decryption circuit. To simplify the decryption circuit, which in its original form asks for a computation of $\lfloor c/p \rfloor$, the authors augment the public and secret keys so that the decryption can be computed with only additions and subtractions. Finally, note that the ciphertext expansion is $\approx |p \cdot q_i| = \eta \cdot (\gamma/\eta) = \gamma \approx \lambda^5$, which is enormous.

We can see that this scheme is utterly impractical. We sum up a few improvements on this scheme along the years, but do not detail them. In 2011 Coron *et al.* [CMNT11] reduce the public key size from $\tilde{O}(\lambda^{10})$ to $\tilde{O}(\lambda^7)$, by encrypting using a quadratic (instead of linear) form in the x_i values, thus yielding a scheme asymptotically comparable to ideal lattice-based schemes. In 2012, Coron *et al.* [CNT12] again reduce the public key size, to $\tilde{O}(\lambda^5)$ using higher degree in the x_i values, and import the modulus switching technique from [BGV12] to the integer setting, yielding a leveled scheme on the integers. A year later, Cheon *et al.* [CCK⁺13] incorporated the ciphertext batching/packing technique from [SV10, BGV12] using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, lowering the ciphertext expansion from $\tilde{O}(\lambda^5)$ in the original scheme to $\tilde{O}(\lambda^3)$, *i.e.* one ciphertext can encrypt $\tilde{O}(\lambda^2)$ plaintexts. Finally, in 2014, Coron *et al.* [CLT14] integrated the scale invariant property of Brakerski [Bra12], allowing $|p| = \eta$ to be *linear* in L instead of exponential, which in other words means exponentially more multiplications are possible with the same p compared to the 2010 scheme. This last scheme is the first LHE scheme over the integers (all the previous ones use bootstrapping).

In each paper, and each year, the authors provide and update the implementation of their scheme. In 2013 and 2014, they also evaluate the AES. Enc primitive, in the manner of [GHS12b] with [BGV12] (the 2013 version is with bootstrapping, the 2014 one without). We provide running times and public key sizes for the 2014 paper that includes all the above improvements. We only detail their “toy” ($\lambda = 42$) and “standard” ($\lambda = 80$) settings: public key size are respectively 3.2MB and 100GB, and running times on a Intel Xeon at 2.9GHz are respectively 0.5s and 213h for KeyGen, ≤ 0.1 s and 5min for Enc, ≤ 0.1 s and 24s for Dec, and 0.1s and 277s to multiply two ciphertexts. Their evaluation of the encryption primitive of AES with their leveled scheme takes 15s in the toy setting, and 102 hours in the standard one. These timings are huge, but comparable to the performance of Ring-LWE schemes (the most efficient so far) two years before, and much better than the original 2010 integer-based scheme. Note that for the standard setting, figures are worse than those presented in the previous section on ideal lattices, but this is explained by two factors: in the previous section, security is below 80 bits, and the platform is more powerful. Indeed, for $\lambda = 72$, the 2014 integer scheme is slightly better than the ideal lattice one.

2.3.5 Schemes based on the (R-)LWE problem

We close our survey of FHE schemes with the ones based on the LWE and Ring-LWE problems [BV11a, BV11b, BGV12, GHS12a, Bra12, FV12, BLLN13, GSW13, BV14, ASP14]. Those are the most efficient schemes to date, and the FHE research is lead by schemes issued from this branch. Except for the two 2011 schemes, all the schemes from this branch are leveled, but can be made fully using bootstrapping. In general, leveled schemes are quite efficient, but using bootstrapping lowers their efficiency to a level comparable to, say, integer-based schemes. In this section, we will present the LWE problem and Brakerski’s scheme [Bra12], and derive concrete parameters to instantiate the scheme. By this mean, we want to put in light the security-efficiency-homomorphism trade-off in modern FHE schemes. Finally, we give the differences between LWE and Ring-LWE, and sump up recent advances in FHE.

The Learning With Error problem

First, we describe the *Learning With Errors* (LWE) problem along with its parameters. There are 3 of them: the dimension n , the modulus q , and the error factor α . The last two depend on n .

In the rest of the section, we denote the uniform distribution over some set S by $\mathcal{U}(S)$, and \mathcal{N}_s denotes a discrete Gaussian distribution on \mathbb{Z} centered in 0 and of parameter s . For more information on discrete Gaussians, see the description of Regev [Reg05, Sec. 2, §2]. By $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ we denote the sampling of an element from distribution \mathcal{D} .

Definition 3 - The $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\alpha}$ problem

Let $n > 1$ and $q > 2$ be two integers, and $\alpha \in]0, 1[$. Define $\mathcal{D}_{n,q,\alpha}^{\text{LWE}}(\mathbf{s})$ for a vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ as the distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} obtained as follows:

$$\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n), e \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_{\alpha q}, \text{ output } (\mathbf{a}, \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$$

The decisional version asks to distinguish between $\mathcal{D}_{n,q,\alpha}^{\text{LWE}}(\mathbf{s})$ and $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1})$.

The computational version asks, given polynomially many samples of $\mathcal{D}_{n,q,\alpha}^{\text{LWE}}(\mathbf{s})$, to find \mathbf{s} .

Both versions are intractable for the right choice of parameters, and were proven equivalent [Reg05]. We do not describe the ring-based variant of this problem, because it is very similar except it works with the ring $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/f(X)$ for $f(X)$ an irreducible polynomial of degree d , and that \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{s} are no longer vectors but polynomials. We will see later what it implies for FHE schemes, and why R-LWE-based schemes are much more efficient than LWE ones.

For the security of LWE to hold, n , q and α need to respect several constraints. We defer the description of these constraints to a latter paragraph.

Brakerski's scheme

The scheme of Brakerski [Bra12] is one of the simplest LWE-based Leveled HE schemes to date, and we use it as a representative example of recent FHE schemes. However, to be more precise, the following scheme is a description of Regev's encryption scheme [Reg05], which is the starting point of Brakerski. We will not detail Brakerski scheme, but only give a glimpse of it so as to extract the necessary knowledge to understand the security-efficiency-homomorphism trade-offs in modern FHE schemes.

Setup $params \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: The parameters are the same as the LWE problem. Output (n, q, α) accordingly to λ (see below).

Key generation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(params)$: Sample $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$. Let $N = (n+1)\lceil \log q \rceil$, and sample a matrix $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{N \times n})$, a vector $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_{\alpha q}^N$. Compute $\mathbf{b} = [\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}]_q$. Output $((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}), \mathbf{s})$.

Note that the public key is an instance of $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\alpha}$ for the vector $\mathbf{s} = sk$ with N samples from $\mathcal{D}_{n,q,\alpha}^{\text{LWE}}(\mathbf{s})$.

Encryption $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)$: For $m \in \{0, 1\}$, pick a random $\mathbf{r} \in \{0, 1\}^N$ and output

$$\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{b} + \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$$

Note that \mathbf{c} is again the re-randomized version of the instance of LWE linking pk and sk . By the *Leftover Hash Lemma* [ILL89], this re-randomized version is equivalent to a "normal" LWE instance.

Decryption $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, c)$: Let $\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{u}, v)$. Compute

$$v - \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \mathbf{r}^T (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}) + \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor m - \langle \mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor m + \mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{e}$$

If the result is closer to 0, output 0, if the result is closer to $q/2$, output 1.

It is easy to see that the scheme is additively homomorphic:

$$c_1 + c_2 = (\mathbf{u}_1 + \mathbf{u}_2, v_1 + v_2) = ((\mathbf{r}_1^T + \mathbf{r}_2^T)\mathbf{A}, (\mathbf{r}_1^T + \mathbf{r}_2^T)\mathbf{b} + \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor (m_1 + m_2))$$

Therefore, addition of two ciphertexts yields the ciphertext of the added messages. However, decryption works *only if* $(\mathbf{r}_1^T + \mathbf{r}_2^T)\mathbf{e} \leq q/4$, because the term $\mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{e}$ in ciphertext $\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{r}^T \mathbf{e} + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor . m)$ must be under $q/4$.

However, the Regev scheme is not multiplicatively homomorphic, at least not in the sense of FHE which asks for *compactness* (see section 2.3.1), because the multiplication of two ciphertext vectors yields a matrix: the size of a ciphertext is squared at multiplication. Thus it can not give rise, in its basic form to a FHE or LHE scheme.

We will not describe all the techniques used by Brakerski, as it would require a lot of time and space for only little usefulness. We however sketch the main ideas enabling multiplication and leading to a LHE scheme.

- Encryption and decryption primitives do not need substantial changes;
- In KeyGen, Brakerski generates:
 - $L + 1$ secret keys, *i.e.* $\mathbf{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ for $i \in \{0, \dots, L\}$, set $sk_i = \mathbf{s}_i$ and the decryption secret key to $sk = s_L$;
 - L matrices $\mathbf{P}_{i-1:i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{N^2 \lceil \log q \rceil \times (n+1)}$ (recall that $N = (n+1)\lceil \log q \rceil$), called *re-linearization matrices*, that can be seen as an application transforming ciphertexts encrypted under $sk_{i-1}^2 = \mathbf{s}_{i-1} \otimes \mathbf{s}_{i-1}$ (we abuse the square notation for simplicity) into ciphertexts encrypted under $sk_i = \mathbf{s}_i$.
- To multiply two ciphertexts $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$:
 1. Set $\mathbf{c}_i^{(1)} = \text{PowersOfTwo}(c_i) = [(\mathbf{c}, 2\mathbf{c}, 4\mathbf{c}, \dots, 2^{\lceil \log q \rceil - 1} \mathbf{c})]_q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N$.
 2. Compute the *tensor product* of $\mathbf{c}_1^{(1)} \otimes \mathbf{c}_2^{(1)}$.
This yields a matrix of size $N \times N$, which is flattened in a vector $\mathbf{c}^{(2)}$ of size N^2 .
At this point, $\mathbf{c}^{(2)}$ contains in some way the encryption of $m_1.m_2$ under a tensor secret key $\mathbf{s}_i \otimes \mathbf{s}_i$ ¹³: indeed, the secret key “hidden” in the ciphertext was multiplied along with the messages.
It also contains a lot of noise because randomness inside \mathbf{c}_1 and \mathbf{c}_2 (\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{e}) was also multiplied. In particular, a factor q^2 appearing in the formula participates in the noise increase.
The goal of the next steps are threefold: (1) to reduce the noise, (2) to come back to a “linear” secret key, and (3) to obtain a ciphertext vector in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} .

¹³Equivalently, we can see $\mathbf{c}^{(2)}$ as an encryption under a “double” public key, because sk is hidden in pk via a LWE instance.

3. Compute $\mathbf{c}^{(3)} = \lfloor \frac{2}{q} \cdot \mathbf{c}^{(2)} \rfloor$.

This step is crucial to reduce the noise in the ciphertext, and is the main contribution of Brakerski: it allows *scale invariance*.

The interested reader may easily check that (at the end of the multiplication procedure), ciphertexts have the right form, *i.e.* can be decrypted with Regev’s decryption primitive.

4. Compute $\mathbf{c}^{(4)} = \text{BitDecomp}(\mathbf{c}^{(3)}) = (\mathbf{w}_0, \dots, \mathbf{w}_{\lceil \log q \rceil - 1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{N^2 \lceil \log q \rceil}$

Such that $\mathbf{c}^{(3)} = \sum_i 2^i \mathbf{w}_i \pmod q$.

5. Finally, compute and output $[\mathbf{P}_{i-1:i}^T \cdot \mathbf{c}^{(4)}]_q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$.

We eventually come back to a vector of size $n+1$, because $\mathbf{P}_{i-1:i}$ is of size $(N^2 \lceil \log q \rceil) \times (n+1)$ and \mathbf{C}' is of size $N^2 \lceil \log q \rceil$.

And thanks to the structure of $\mathbf{P}_{i-1:i}$ the ciphertexts is now encrypted under $sk_i = \mathbf{s}_i$, without losing information.

This last step is called *re-linearization* (in the sense that ciphertexts are transformed back into a vector) or *key-switching* (in the sense that ciphertexts are now encrypted under s_i instead of s_{i-1}), and it is the crucial procedure making the difference with the MGH scheme [MGH10] that also used tensoring (the MGH was actually the first to propose the use of tensoring, but it “only” achieved SHE). It is the most expensive step of the whole scheme. So, in other words, multiplication is the most expensive operation.

At the end of the procedure, for “freshly” encrypted ciphertexts \mathbf{c}_1 and \mathbf{c}_2 with bounded noise¹⁴ $|\mathbf{e}_1| = |\mathbf{e}_2| \leq B \approx \alpha q$ and noise ratio (defined as the noise over the modulus) B/q , the noise ratio becomes $(B/q) \cdot \text{poly}(n)$. This is to be compared to previous schemes, where the noise grew to $(B^2/q) \cdot \text{poly}(n)$. Generalizing this for L multiplications, we get that the noise ratio will be $(B/q) \cdot \text{poly}(n)^L$. In other words, if we set $q \approx B \cdot \text{poly}(n)^L$ for a chosen L and a reasonable bound B on the initial noise, we can perform L multiplication and achieve a leveled homomorphic scheme. A detailed analysis of the noise growth in Brakerski’s scheme [Bra12] leads to the relation $q/B \geq O(n \log q)^{L+O(1)}$.

However, we can see that the public key will be extremely large, containing L re-linearization matrices of size $N^2 \lceil \log q \rceil \times (n+1) \approx (n \lceil \log q \rceil)^3$. And as n and q are related in the $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\alpha}$ in the sens that $q \approx \text{poly}(n)$, when q augments in order to allow the desired L multiplications, the size of the public key also augments. In a general manner, the overall complexity of the scheme (and of every primitive) increases when n or q increases.

Deriving the parameters: the security-efficiency-homomorphism trade-off

Now we have almost all the tools to derive asymptotic values of the parameters. On one hand, we known that q/B must be “high enough” to allow the desired L multiplications: we derive lower bounds on n and q . On the other hand, q must not be “too large” to keep the message efficient or practical: we derive upper bounds on n and q . There is a third family of constraints that limit the values of n , q and α : those dictated by the security requirements of LWE.

Indeed, as for any cryptographic problem, the parameters of LWE must be set according to the best known attack against it. In our case, the best known attacks against LWE are algorithms resolving approximation problems in (standard) lattices such as the *shortest vector problem* denoted GapSVP_γ . It is interesting to note that FHE schemes tried to emancipate from lattices using the LWE problem, but their security still relies on problems similar to Gentry’s original scheme. In GapSVP_γ , the goal is to find a short vector in a given lattice, up to an approximation

¹⁴More formally, we say that the distribution $\mathcal{N}_{\alpha q}$ is supported on $[-B, B]$ with very high probability.

factor γ , and the lower γ is, the harder $GapSVP_\gamma$ is. Two different cryptographic proofs (called *reductions*) show that if an algorithm exists for breaking $LWE_{n,q,\alpha}$ in polynomial time, there exists an algorithm to break $GapSVP_\gamma$ in polynomial time: the first is quantum [Reg05] (*i.e.* uses a quantum computer), and the second is classical [BLP⁺13] (*i.e.* uses a classical computer). We will only consider the classical proof, which imposes more constraints on the parameters and is more relevant, as quantum computing is not a tangible reality (for now). However, bear in mind that LWE is quantum *and* classical resistant. We sum up the constraints from this proof, along with the accumulated relations from previous paragraphs:

1. $B \approx \alpha q$ (by definition),
2. $q/B \geq O(n \log q)^{L+O(1)}$ (for homomorphism),
3. $q \geq 2^{n/2}$ (for security),
4. $\alpha q \geq \sqrt{n}$ (for security),
5. $\gamma \approx \tilde{O}(n/\alpha) \approx \tilde{O}(n \cdot q/B)$ (for security).
6. γ should be at the maximum sub-exponential in n for $GapSVP_\gamma$ to be secure. Ideally it should be in $O(n^c)$ for a very small c , *e.g.* 2 (for security).

We can see that augmenting q/B , *i.e.* augmenting q or lowering B , leads to better homomorphism, but lowers security: we would like to have very small noise B and large modulus q to leave “room” to the noise in the ciphertexts, but constraint 6 limits $q/B < 2^n$ and constraint 4 imposes a minimal initial noise for ciphertext of \sqrt{n} , which is often very large. Putting constraint 2, 3 and 5 together, we obtain: $\gamma \approx \tilde{O}(n^{2L+O(1)})$. Such an approximation factor γ is said “quasi-polynomial” in the size of the lattice, which is far above standard PKE security, but supposed sufficient as of today. However, for γ to remain sufficiently small, L can not be “too large”, or in other words, the homomorphic capacities of the scheme are limited for security reasons.

Now that we have asymptotic bounds on n , q and α , if we want to get practical, concrete values for these parameters, we must look at the best attack against LWE, *i.e.* the best attacks against $GapSVP_\gamma$. The best known algorithm against this problem is BKZ [CN11], a lattice basis reduction algorithm running in time $2^{\tilde{\Omega}(n/\log \gamma)}$. To obtain a security of λ bits, we must have $2^{\tilde{\Omega}(n/\log \gamma)} \geq 2^\lambda \Leftrightarrow \tilde{\Omega}(n/(\log n/\alpha)) \geq \lambda$. However, as the complexity of BKZ is not exactly known, we do not know how to exactly instantiate n , q and α : further studies are necessary to disclose what is hidden inside the $\tilde{\Omega}$ notation. However, in the literature, n is often set between 5000 and 10^5 , and the other parameters follow.

The reader may find a similar analysis for two Ring-LWE-based schemes in [LN14]. The authors follow the same procedure as in this section (in a highly more accurate manner):

1. Analyse the best known attacks, and derive an upper bound on the underlying lattice approximation problem.
2. Analyse the security of LWE/Ring-LWE, deduce upper bounds on parameters.
3. Analyse the noise growth, deduce lower bounds on parameters.

Differences between LWE and Ring-LWE-based schemes

We have not given much attention to the Ring-LWE problem, and we will not describe it here. We neither provide description of a Ring-LWE-based scheme, but the reader may refer to the schemes of Fan *et al.* [FV12] or Bos *et al.* [BLLN13]. We merely give the main elements making

the difference between Ring-LWE and LWE, and explain why the former leads to more efficient constructions.

Firstly, we have seen that LWE is resistant against quantum *and* classical algorithms. Ring-LWE is only proven quantum resistant. We conjecture its classical security, but it has not been proved. In other words, Ring-LWE may be breakable by a classical computer in polynomial time, although such an attack has not been exhibited yet. Also, Ring-LWE reduces to $GapSVP_\gamma$, but in *ideal* lattices.

Secondly, LWE works with vectors and matrices, as Ring-LWE works with polynomial ring elements, *i.e.* polynomials. It is known that a polynomial can be represented as the vector of its coefficients (and conversely), but the great difference is that in Ring-LWE there exist efficient arithmetic operations to combine polynomials: adding or multiplying two polynomials lead to a polynomial. As multiplying two vectors leads to a matrix or a scalar. For these reasons, the public key in Ring-LWE is simply 1 ring element and ciphertexts are a couple of ring elements, whereas in LWE, the public key and ciphertexts are large matrices.

To sum up LWE is (for now) more secure, but induces an inherent quadratic overhead compared to Ring-LWE.

Recent evolutions

We conclude this section on (R-)LWE-based schemes by describing the recent advances. After the first FHE schemes by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11b, BV11a], the major result in FHE has been brought by Brakerski, Vaikuntanathan and Gentry [BGV12] in their 2012 paper, which marks a major milestone in FHE: this paper formalizes LHE and offer a new blueprint, and introduces or improves many techniques (tensoring, re-linearization, batching, modulus switching). All following paper will be based on this work, and in this paragraph, we will only discuss the leveled versions of the scheme. At this time, the approximation factor γ is sub-exponential, security is based on quantum $GapSVP_\gamma$ (which is less restrictive on parameters), and the per-gate overhead is $O(\lambda.L^3)$.

Then Brakerski [Bra12] gets rid of modulus switching, too costly and quite uneasy to work with, reduces the approximation factor to quasi-polynomial while basing security on classical $GapSVP_\gamma$ at the same time. Brakerski's scheme is also the first scheme for which the noise grows from B to $B.poly(n)^L$ instead of $(B.poly(n))^L$ with L multiplication, and its per-gate overhead is lower than [BGV12], although we do not hold a precise information. The schemes from [BGV12] and [Bra12] were initially described for LWE, but can be easily ported to R-LWE for better performances.

The schemes of Fan-Vecauteren [FV12] and Bos *et al.* [BLLN13], however, were directly designed on R-LWE. As security and noise growth analysis are quite complex and differ sensibly from LWE-based schemes, we do not detail them here. However, qualitatively speaking, public key and ciphertext sizes and running times are smaller by a quadratic factor than LWE-based schemes. Note that the scheme of Bos *et al.* is also proposed in a slightly modified version relying on stronger assumptions (*i.e.* with lower security), and is as of today one of the most efficient FHE scheme (see below).

In 2013, another LWE-based scheme from Gentry *et al.* [GSW13] (which does not transpose to R-LWE well), using matrix as ciphertexts, "natural" matrix addition and multiplication for homomorphic operations, and a technique based on *eigenvector* for decryption. The great improvement compared to previous schemes is that there is no longer the need for key-switching and re-linearization matrices. In the above description of Brakerski's scheme, this were the most costly elements (respectively, in terms of computation and space). Also, the noise growth is slightly lower than in Brakerski's scheme: for L multiplications, it grows from B to $B.(n+1)^L$.

The approximation factors are roughly the same as in Brakerski.

Finally, a 2014 scheme from Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV14] reached a major stage in FHE: they made LWE-based FHE as secure as traditional lattice-based public key encryption, *i.e.* using approximation factors in $O(n^2)$. Their construction provide a LHE scheme based on an improved version GSW13, with a *polynomial* noise growth: after L multiplications, it is $B.L.poly(n)$. This is the first scheme with this feature, and this almost optimal noise growth allows to set polynomial factors in $O(n^{2+\epsilon})$, with ϵ as close to 0 as necessary. However, we have the relation $n \approx (\lambda \cdot \log q)^{c/\epsilon}$ for some constant c : the dimension n which determines public key and ciphertext size, grows *exponentially* with $1/\epsilon$, *i.e.* the efficiency of the scheme degrades exponentially when ϵ gets closer to 0.

2.3.6 Implementations and practical considerations

We already gave a list of implementations and practical figures for ideal lattice and integer-based FHE in their respective sections. Here, we will only consider the most up-to-date, efficient schemes which happen to be Ring-LWE-based schemes. We also provide a list of known FHE implementations.

We first recall the figures issued by Gentry *et al.* [GHS12b] when implementing the R-LWE version of [BGV12] to evaluate the encryption primitive of AES. The purpose of this work was to prove that, although very inefficient, FHE was nearly practical. This idea later inspired Coron *et al.* who also evaluated the AES. Enc primitive with their integer-based scheme [CCK⁺13, CLT14]. We detail the results from the latter in the next paragraph. Using all possible optimizations and techniques, Gentry *et al.* used [BGV12] to evaluate AES-128 by transforming AES. Enc into a circuit. They propose 3 variants, but we will only present the 2 most efficient ones. Their circuits are of depth $L \approx 60$, and the claimed security parameter is $\lambda_{AES} = \lambda_{BGV} = 128$ bits (although their practical security is unclear). They run the tests on the BlueCrystal computer from Bristol University, a high performance computer with 256GB of RAM. Such a large RAM was necessary for the public key to fit inside! The first setting batches 54 AES blocks inside each ciphertexts, and took 34 hours to evaluate AES. Enc, so that is 37min per AES block. The second circuit batches 720 blocks, and takes 65h to evaluate, but yields a time of 5min per block. Clearly, these numbers are much too high, and show that (at the time), FHE could not be run on off-the-shelves platforms. However, it is the proof that FHE *can* evaluate meaningful operations in the encrypted domain.

The only other implementation we detail is actually an implementation and comparison of 2 Ring-LWE schemes from Lepoint and Naehrig [LN14]. As already mentioned, this paper offered a very detailed and complex analysis of the FV [FV12] and BLLN¹⁵ [BLLN13] schemes. They first analyse Ring-LWE security and deduce the relation between λ and the appropriate approximation factor underlying Ring-LWE. They then focus on the bounds on the bit-size of q , and give an upper bound on it for several values of n . In the same way, they provide lower bounds on $|q|$ for each of the 2 schemes by analysing their noise growth. This shows interesting fact: for instance, for $\lambda = 80$ and $n = 2048$, $|q|$ must be under 95.4 for security of 80 bits, but above 265 for $L = 10$, which is incompatible!

Here, using the values for n , $|q|$ and L available in [LN14] that Lepoint and Naehrig derived from their analysis, we extracted 3 settings, *i.e.* 3 pair of values for n and $|q|$. We then evaluate (by linear interpolation) the approximate depth L consequently allowed in the FV scheme and observe the resulting ciphertext and key sizes. The 3 chosen settings are: (1) “small” with $n = 4096$, $|q| = 127$ and $L \approx 4$, (2) “medium” with $n = 8192$, $|q| = 300$ and $L \approx 10$, and (3) “large” with $n = 16384$, $|q| = 700$ and $L \approx 23$. All settings assume a security of $\lambda = 80$ bits.

¹⁵Also denoted YASHE for “Yet Another Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption” scheme.

For the BLLN scheme, the values for L would be slightly under those. From these figures, it is straightforward to get the size of one ring element, and thus the keys and ciphertexts sizes: a ring element a degree n polynomial with coefficients bit-size $|q|$, and polynomials are represented simply as the vector of their coefficients. Then, a ciphertext is composed of 2 elements, the secret key is 1 element, and the public key is the largest component as it is composed of $1 + \log_{2^{32}} q$ ring elements. With simple computations we obtain sizes given in Table 2.2:

	$ ring\ elem. $	$ ciphertext $	$ sk $	$ pk $
Small	63.5KB	127KB	63.5KB	315.5KB
Medium	300KB	600KB	300KB	3MB
Large	1.4MB	2.8MB	1.4MB	31.3MB

Table 2.2: Ciphertexts and key sizes in the FV12 schemes

Although far above traditional public key encryption schemes, these number are very reasonable, compared to all previous implementations we presented. This is explained by the efficiency of R-LWE-based schemes, and by the precise analysis of Lepoint *et al.* Also, it may be explained by the possible insecurity of the scheme: the authors claim a 80 bits security, but do not make n directly depend on λ .

We also report timings of the schemes primitives for FV (on a Intel Core i7-2600 at 3.4 GHz): KeyGen takes 200ms, Enc 34ms, Dec 16ms, adding two ciphertext takes 1.4ms and multiplying takes 148ms (including 89ms for re-linearization). BLLN is roughly twice as fast as FV except for Dec where times are almost the same, and KeyGen which takes 3.4s.

We can see that we are getting closer to reasonable times, even though they are still above RSA 2048 (*i.e.* with better security) by a factor 100. However, FHE is not practical yet: remind that Enc only encrypts 1 bit, so the ciphertext expansion is $n \cdot |q| \gg 10000$. For instance, Lepoint and Naehrig evaluate that 4MB of plaintext becomes 73TB once encrypted [LN14]. This translates in an impossibility to communicate the encrypted data, thus losing most of the interest of homomorphic cryptography, *i.e.* we can not delegate computation. For this reason, the authors propose to encrypt the data using a simple block cipher (they chose SIMON [BSS⁺13]) and sending it to a computationally powerful entity along with the symmetric secret key encrypted with the FHE scheme. The receiver then homomorphically evaluates the decryption circuit of the block-cipher and is able to compute on the encrypted data. This solution is more viable than sending the 73TB, but it trades communication complexity against computation.

Finally, we list the existing FHE implementation in Table 2.3. Note that many are not public, most of them are only at the stage of academic tool, and none is actually secure (their code has not been audited). Also, to manipulate large number, most of them use the GMP or Flint libraries. Keep in mind that this table is not a comparison of FHE schemes implementation, as it would be vain to try and compare them: there are too many differences and too many parameters to take into account. Trying to compare running times of schemes based on different concepts, with different security levels (not always well defined), and whose implementation is run on different platform would not let us learn anything we do not already know: qualitatively, R-LWE schemes perform better than LWE schemes, which in turn are better than integer-based schemes (and ideal lattices come last).

Scheme	Concept	L/FHE	Origin	Public	Remarks
vDGHV10	Int	Fully	[vDGHV10]	No	Updates: [CMNT11, CNT12, CCK ⁺ 13, CLT14]
Gen09	Ideal \mathcal{L}	Fully	[GH11b]	No	
vDGHV09	Int	Fully	Stephen Crane	Yes	C++, Not maintained
SV11	Ideal \mathcal{L}	Fully	hcrypt [BPS12]	Yes	Encrypted VM, C++ and Java
BGV12	R-LWE	Leveled	[GHS12b]	No	Eval. AES
BGV12	R-/LWE	Leveled	[AMFF ⁺ 13]	No	
BGV12	R-LWE	Leveled	Shai Halevi <i>et al.</i>	Yes	C++, Still maintained
FV12 BLLN13	R-LWE	Leveled	[LN14]	Yes	Most up-to-date

Column 2 says whether the implementation is based on ideal lattices (“Ideal \mathcal{L} ”), integers (“Int”), R-LWE, LWE or both (“R-/LWE”).

Column 3 says whether the Leveled or fully homomorphic version was implemented.

Table 2.3: Main FHE/LHE implementations

2.3.7 Future of FHE

Along the section, we have seen the progress made by the FHE technology. In only 5 years, the complexity of FHE has dropped dramatically, thanks to a very active community and a great interest of cryptographers in this topic. Although not practical as of today, we can conjecture that in 1 or 2 years, FHE will be practical for simple use-cases such as email filtering, and for a computationally powerful entity such as the cloud.

Even though efficiency (and of course security) is still a delicate issue, cryptographers have identified several other problems worth considering. We sum up all problems that are, to the best of our knowledge, considered today, and point the reader towards references addressing them.

- Can bootstrapping be practical, and performed with “natural” operations? [ASP14]
- Is there an alternative to bootstrapping to achieve FHE?
- Can FHE be as secure *and* as efficient as standard lattice cryptography, while allowing non-negligible homomorphism?
- Is it possible to construct an Identity-based LHE/FHE scheme? The answer is theoretically, yes [GSW13].
- Is it possible to construct an Attribute-based LHE/FHE scheme? Idem [GSW13].
- Is it possible to use FHE to design functional encryption schemes, or vice-versa? [GGH⁺13]
- Is it possible to use FHE to obfuscate programs, or vice-versa? [GGH⁺13]

Finally, we conclude this section by recalling that the state-of-the-art FHE is constantly changing, and that the state-of-the-art technologies are in constant evolution. This translate into difficulties to search, compare and choose a FHE scheme for a specific purpose. We tried to be as broad as possible, without being too abstract, and without going into complicated details. It is not rare that, by the time one terminates developing an implementation for some scheme, one, 2 or even 3 more efficient schemes were newly designed.

2.4 Discussion

In the light of the elements presented in this chapter, we now have enough knowledge to start using homomorphic encryption in new systems designs. However, there are several points we did not mention, mainly for simplicity reasons. First of all, we did not compare the security of homomorphic encryption schemes and traditional ones: indeed, as HE ciphertexts are by definition alterable, security seems to be compromised. Also, in this last section we review the basic pros and cons of PHE and FHE, the evaluation of programs on encrypted data with FHE, advanced homomorphic properties of other types of schemes than encryption, and the link between HE and other similar technologies to compute over encrypted data.

2.4.1 Security of homomorphic encryption

In traditional public-key encryption schemes, the highest and most desirable level of security is IND-CCA2, *i.e.* *indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack* [Gol04]. With a simple glance at the definition of the IND-CCA2 security (with decryption oracle access before *and after* the challenge step), it is easy to see that any homomorphic scheme can not attain this level of security. Indeed, after supplying m_0 and m_1 in the challenge part, and upon receiving $\text{Enc}(pk, m_b)$ for a random b , the adversary can simply ask for the decryption of $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1 - m_b)$ (resp. $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1/m_b)$ for multiplicative schemes) as she knows the encryptions $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1)$ and $\text{Enc}(pk, m_b)$. If the result is 0 (resp. 1), the adversary knows that $m_b = m_1$, else $m_b = m_2$, and wins the game with probability 1.

Therefore, because of the *malleable* nature of HE schemes (*i.e.* the possibility to apply operations on ciphertexts that imply meaningful transformations on underlying messages), in general, their maximum security level is IND-CPA [FG07]. Some schemes were proven IND-CCA1 secure [BSW12], but in the general case it is unclear. Actually, to the best of our knowledge, this question have not been studied yet. We can say however, that bootstrappable FHE schemes are never IND-CCA1 secure: as the encryption of the secret key is public, the adversary only needs to ask for its decryption to break the scheme.

This (in)security is not a point in favor of homomorphic encryption: using a HE scheme means that ciphertexts and their messages can be modified publicly by any entity, creating an open door for various attacks. However, note that this malleability is precisely what is sought in homomorphic encryption, and the loss of security and the homomorphic properties are bound: we can not strictly have both IND-CCA2 security and homomorphism. Thus, in practice, one may need a second layer of traditional encryption to communicate ciphertexts over untrusted channels, or to sign them.

There are however recent works that try to reconcile homomorphism and security. For instance, Canneti *et al.* [CKN03] relax and modify the IND-CCA2 security game so as to forbid decryption oracle queries with ciphertexts that are related to the challenge messages m_1 and m_2 . This yields a new security definition denoted “Replayable CCA” (RCCA). In a similar way, An *et al.* [ADR02] define gCCA security for “benignly-malleable security”, where the decryption oracle do not answer to queries on ciphertexts satisfying a particular binary relation with the challenge ciphertext. These two notions were generalized by Prabhakaran *et al.* [PR08], with the notion of “homomorphic CCA” (HCCA) security. In their definition, only some operations on the ciphertexts are allowed, and the oracle does not answer queries on ciphertexts obtained from non-authorized operations. However these result only modify the security definition, but do not provide more security, *i.e.* homomorphic schemes’ security stays the same, but security definitions change so as to match their reality. Indeed, in gCCA and RCCA security, the “attack” described above where the adversary asks for the decryption of $\text{Enc}(pk, m_1 - m_b)$ is still possible,

and HCCA security does not guarantee any higher security neither.

In order to reconcile homomorphism and IND-CCA2 security in the same scheme, Emura *et al.* [EHO⁺13] proposed the interesting notion of *Keyed-Homomorphic Public-Key* encryption, where the knowledge of a *secret evaluation key* sk_{ev} allows to modify ciphertexts (but not to decrypt them). Without this key the scheme is IND-CCA2 secure, and when it is known, the scheme is only IND-CCA1 secure. With this definition, CCA2 security is guaranteed for all parties without knowledge of sk_{ev} , while homomorphism is still possible for privileged parties. This construction does not give rise to a strictly speaking IND-CCA2 secure homomorphic scheme, but it is as close as we can get, considering the opposition between the two notions. A realisation of a threshold keyed homomorphic encryption scheme has been proposed by Libert *et al.* [LPJY14], the first of this kind according to the authors.

Broken HE schemes

We conclude this paragraph on HE schemes security by a brief overview of broken HE schemes. Indeed, several attempts for efficient PHE or SHE schemes were proposed and dismantled shortly after their release. In particular, two PHE schemes by Domingo-Ferrer [DF96, DF02] were broken respectively by Cheon *et al.* in 2006 [CKN06] and Wagner *et al.* [Wag03], and a 2006 PHE scheme by Grigoriev and Ponomarenko [GP06] was broken the same year [CBW07]. By “broken” we mean that the attacks against the schemes showed that the claimed IND-CPA security was actually flawed. These attacks do not seem to use the homomorphic properties of the schemes, *i.e.* their cryptanalysis do not rely on their homomorphism, and therefore are of little interest to us.

There is however, to our knowledge, one cryptanalysis using the homomorphic properties of the schemes it attacks. Indeed, Brakerski [Bra13] showed that the powerful SHE scheme from Bogdanov and Lee [BL11] was insecure *due to its homomorphic capacities*. Even better, the author proved that homomorphism “becomes a liability” when the decryption function is weakly-learnable. A weakly learnable function is, very informally, a function whose output can be guessed with non-negligible but small probability, given many input-output samples. In the case of Bogdanov-Lee, the decryption function is a noisy scalar product. What Brakerski shows is that, if a scheme is “homomorphic enough” (in this case, if it can evaluate the majority function), and if its decryption function is “weakly learnable”, then it is insecure. Using the majority function, Brakerski transforms ciphertexts with noise, say, $1/10$ to ciphertexts with noise $1/(10n)$ for some $n > 1$, thus yielding a collection of low-noise ciphertexts, making the decryption function easier to learn, to a point that the secret key can be uncovered. The Bogdanov-Lee scheme was based on the “*Learning parity with noise*” problem, very close to the LWE problem but for elements in $\{0, 1\}$, it was quite efficient, allowed several additions and multiplications and was considered as a FHE candidate. But due to this cryptanalysis, it was not retained.

2.4.2 Partially or Fully homomorphic encryption ?

This chapter presented three main classes of HE schemes: partially, somewhat and fully/leveled HE schemes. However, we did not explicitly compare them nor gave reasons to use one class more than the others. We fill this lack in this short paragraph, but only for PHE and FHE/LHE schemes, as we have seen SHE ones are of little practical interest.

Firstly, we can state the obvious differences between PHE and FHE schemes: the former are almost as efficient as traditional public-key encryption (PKE) schemes but allow very restricted computations, while the latter are computationally very expensive (although a lot of progress were made) but are theoretically extremely powerful. As for their security, they both claim to be

IND-CPA, but FHE/LHE schemes work on less standard assumptions, in particular the circular security one and other lattice-based problems still “new” compared to factorisation and subgroup membership assumptions. This implies a possibly lower security for FHE, but ongoing studies on FHE schemes’ assumptions may re-establish equivalent security between PHE and FHE. Finally, we can say that, in general, PHE schemes provide algebraic homomorphic operations, such as natural addition over the integers, while FHE/LHE schemes are meant to encrypt and manipulate bits. This implies in particular that programs to be evaluated on encrypted data must first be transformed into a circuit (on this point, see paragraph 2.4.3).

As guidelines, we can say that the choice of using a PHE or FHE/LHE scheme completely depends on the use-case and the expressed needs. Indeed, before choosing a scheme, one should always clearly state what are the operations that must be performed in the clear, *i.e.* what information needs to be kept secret from which party. Then, there are many “tricks” to employ PHE schemes in a smart way (for instance, addition and scalar multiplication are enough for several secure multi-party protocols), which again depend on the application. And in definitive, FHE/LHE schemes should be considered only if there is no other choice. Typically, the big FHE/LHE machinery is used only in very complex systems or delicate open problems.

Also, it is widely recommended to use LHE rather than FHE, at least up to a certain multiplicative depth. In many occasions, only a few multiplications are needed, and for $L = 1, 2$ or 3 , R-LWE-based schemes are relatively efficient when used on computationally powerful platforms.

2.4.3 Evaluating a program on encrypted data: in practice

In the section dedicated to FHE schemes, we explained that those were able to compute arbitrary functions on encrypted data. However, we did not detail the procedure to do so. Indeed, it is not possible to simply take a program in C and run it on encrypted data!

It is more complicated than this: suppose we have a RAM program¹⁶ $P(\cdot)$ that we want to evaluate on input x in the encrypted domain. First, as FHE schemes work with bit messages, x needs to be bit-wise encrypted. We denote $\tilde{x} = \{\text{Enc}(pk, x[i])\}_i$ this collection of encryptions. Then, we can not give \tilde{x} as input to $P(\cdot)$: the program needs to be transformed into a boolean circuit. Moreover, in this circuits, AND and OR gates must be replaced by their corresponding operations on ciphertexts. At the end, the circuit may output several encrypted bit, which need to be decrypted separately and re-assembled to give the final result.

The most complex step is the transformation of $P(\cdot)$ from a RAM program into a circuit: transforming a RAM program running in time T into a circuit yields a circuit of size (*i.e.* number of gates) $O(T^3 \log T)$ [GHRW14]. This means a considerable overhead in terms of time and space. The cost of the transformation is explained quite simply by Vaikuntanathan [Vai12]: imagine that given an encryption of an integer $n > 0$, we are asked to execute the RAM program “`while(n < 106) n++;`”. The only way known as of today is to flatten the program, *i.e.* to create 10^6 hard coded conditional statements. Where the RAM program takes 10^6 rounds in the worst case, the equivalent circuit will *always* need 10^6 rounds. In other words, the RAM program may stop directly if $n = 10^6 + 1$, but the circuit will need go through 10^6 rounds still: the circuit represents the *worst case* execution of the program.

Thus, it is considered an open problem to design “input-specific” (as opposed to “worst-case”) program evaluation on encrypted data. With an input-specific procedure, the circuit from the above example would not always perform 10^6 rounds, and its average complexity would be lower. However, input-specific evaluation poses another threat: if the evaluation of the above program on encrypted data terminates early, this means n was slightly under 10^6 (or above it), and if it takes a long time to terminate, this means n was closer to 0. Therefore we obtain an hint on

¹⁶A program running on a *random-access machine*, the natural computation model for computer programs.

the value of n . However, this value was precisely the one we wanted to keep secret in the first place (that is why we encrypted it). The problem is even more complex than this, as it appears even in if the execution is not input-specific. Indeed, as the program “`while (n < 106) //do nothing`” either terminates immediately if $n \geq 10^6$, or never terminates if $n < 10^6$, executing it on encrypted data leaks information on n [Vai12]. The source of difficulty in the program-circuit transformation is the presence of input-dependent loops in programs: the evaluation is highly inefficient, and information is leaked on the sensible data.

To mitigate the results from above and avoid circuit transformation, “Garbled RAM” can be used [LO13, GHRW14]. The main idea is to get rid of the costly circuit transformation step and directly evaluate RAM programs on encrypted (or “garbled”) data. However, Garbled RAM constructions are not meant to work with FHE, and the link between the two technologies is unclear. Section 2.4.5 gives more details on Garbled RAMs.

2.4.4 Advanced notions: other homomorphic constructions

This chapter presented the notion of homomorphic *encryption*, and encryption only. However, other cryptographic constructions can be said homomorphic. As we do not intend to make extensive use of these technologies, we do not detail them, but merely mention their existence here. Note that the compatibility and links between the following technologies are still unclear, and therefore they are presented each individually.

Homomorphic Signatures Johnson *et al.* [JMSW02] put forward the notion of homomorphic *signature*, the analog of homomorphic encryption for signature schemes. A signature scheme is said homomorphic if it allows operations on signed messages, in the sense that the modified signature is a valid signature of the modified message. It is not trivial to understand why one would want such a property on signatures, which are precisely meant to attest the integrity and authenticity of a message. Initially motivated by applications to network coding, they are actually very useful to enable verifiable computation mechanisms. Verifiable computation is employed when some computation is delegated to an untrusted third party: we give the input and a homomorphic signature on it, the third party modifies the data and the signature accordingly, so that when the third party outputs the result, the authenticity of the data can still be universally verifiable.

In the seminal paper of Johnson *et al.* [JMSW02], the authors construct 3 signature schemes, respectively homomorphic for: set operations, integer addition, and for sanitization. Of course, a homomorphic signature scheme is not secure against existential forgeries (EUF-CMA), and a new security definition is required for these construction. Basically, a homomorphic signature scheme is secure with respect to the operations it can compute if an adversary can not forge signatures for messages independent from the message she previously queried to the signing oracle. Interestingly, Johnson *et al.* prove that an additive homomorphic signature scheme can not be secure.

Several constructions have then been designed, and in particular, Libert *et al.* recently proposed *structure preserving*¹⁷ homomorphic signatures [LPJY13]. There are other types of signatures supporting alterations, which we did not investigate: sanitizable signatures [ACMT05, CJL12], and content extraction signatures [SBZ02].

¹⁷Structure preserving signatures have the particularity that messages, signatures and public keys are all bilinear group elements [AFG⁺10], which makes them easy to compose with other cryptographic tools such as Groth-Sahai proofs.

Malleable proofs Along the same lines, there exist proofs and commitment systems allowing modifications on what is proved/committed [AFG⁺10, CKLM12]. Motivations for these constructions are more or less the same as homomorphic signatures, *i.e.* mainly, to enable verifiable computation with short and non-interactive proofs. Chase *et al.* [AFG⁺10] put forward the notion of *controlled* malleability for proofs, which refers to the limitation of the possible modifications on the proofs. Indeed, in practice, one may want to restrict and control what modifications third parties are allowed to perform. The authors also note that Groth-Sahai proofs are malleable, and show how simulation sound extractability and controlled malleability properties can be both satisfied in a same construction.

Targeted Malleability Using malleable proofs, Chase *et al.* [AFG⁺10] then propose the construction of *controlled malleable encryption* schemes: thanks to the controlled malleability property of their proofs, they actually attain the HCCA security level put forward by Prabhakaran *et al.* (and presented earlier in this section). This type of encryption has been formalized later by Boneh *et al.* [BSW12] and given the name of “targeted malleability”. Whereas Chase *et al.* use a IND-CPA secure encryption scheme along with malleable proofs, Boneh *et al.* use homomorphic schemes along with “standard” proofs. The main challenge in their construction is to avoid ciphertext size blowup. Indeed, the naive solution for targeted malleability is to ask to the entity modifying the ciphertexts to output a proof for each computation she performed that the new ciphertext was obtained applying an authorized function on the original one. However, this solution makes the ciphertext size grow at least linearly with the number of homomorphic operations. Here, the authors require the ciphertext growth to be sub-linear. They achieve this goal using a “double encryption” paradigm (the same message is encrypted twice, under two different keys), and “succinct” (non-interactive) arguments that have the property to be smaller than their corresponding witness by a constant factor (say, 1/4). Then again, the notion of targeted malleability is useful in the setting of computation delegation, in order to ensure that only a certain set of allowed functions are computed on encrypted data.

Multi-key and threshold (F)HE Another interesting feature of homomorphic schemes are their threshold capacity. For instance, in PHE, the Damgård-Jurik scheme is an adaptation of Paillier to the threshold setting, and in FHE the BGV scheme has been similarly adapted by Asharov *et al.* [AJLA⁺12]. In a threshold encryption scheme, basically, several parties hold 1 secret key each but share the same public key: encryptions with the public key can only be decrypted using all (or a subset) of the secret key. In the FHE case, the same authors also note another interesting properties of (R-)LWE-based schemes: they are *key-homomorphic*, *i.e.* addition of two key pairs yields a valid key pair. Threshold FHE allows server-aided multi-party computation: several parties provide inputs encrypted under the same public key to the server, who performs the computation and send back the output to all parties, who in turn cooperate together in a small decryption protocol using their respective secret keys. However, in this setting, the users have to interact to generate the public key and the secret keys, *i.e.* they have to be *online* before the computation. To thwart this issue, López-Alt *et al.* [LATV12] go even further and propose the notion of *multi-key* FHE: based on NTRU (a LWE-based scheme that can be turned into a FHE scheme), they construct a scheme capable of evaluating operations on data encrypted under several, totally unrelated keys. They also provide a generic construction to transform other FHE schemes into a multi-key FHE one. Unfortunately, in their solution the clients involved in the computation still have to cooperate at the decryption phase in order to get the result of the server’s computation. However, as it has been proven that completely *off-line* server-aided multi-party computation using *only* FHE is impossible [VDJ10], this solution is so far optimal in terms of communication and cooperation between parties. The threshold or multi-key properties

may prove useful, as in many settings we need to “mix” data encrypted under different keys.

2.4.5 Link with Functional Encryption, Garbled Circuits, MPC and Searchable Encryption

Homomorphic cryptography links to many other cryptographic constructions that we did not mention in this presentation. We selected a few cryptographic notions we find the most close to homomorphic cryptography, but there may be more we are unaware of. We do not detail *how* these constructions work, but merely what they do. We then explicit the link and differences with homomorphic cryptography, and point references for the interested reader.

Secure Multi-party Computation Basically, secure multi-party computation (SMPC) [Yao82] is a setting where n parties each own an input x_i they wish to keep secret from all other parties, and they want to compute a function f on these inputs (this function can be the input of an additional party, or can be decided by consensus). In other words, all (or a subset) of parties should learn $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ without learning any x_i other than its own input. Variants of SMPC also exist: in Verifiable SMPC all parties should be able to check that the computation performed was indeed the agreed function f , which is useful when only 1 party (the *evaluator*) performed the computation ; in Non-interactive SMPS, each party should send only 1 message in total during the protocol ; and in Private SMPC, it is required that f stays private to the evaluator (*i.e.* it can be considered as its private input). Verifiable SMPC is achievable thanks to zero-knowledge proofs for instance, and Private SMPC can use Garbled Circuits (see below).

The link between HE and SMPC is straightforward: like HE, SMPC allows to compute on “hidden” inputs. Also, it is interesting to note that SMPC can be achieved using FHE or PHE. Actually, the works of López-Alt *et al.* [LATV12] and Asharov *et al.* [AJLA⁺12] presented in section 2.4.4 are mainly focused on FHE-based SMPC. As for PHE schemes, there are many multi-party computation protocols that can be found in the literature [Rap06].

Garbled Circuits Garbled circuits (GC) are the first practical tools to compute on “encrypted data”. Proposed by Yao [Yao82]¹⁸, the main idea behind GCs was to enable secure two-party computations with function privacy. Actually, Yao proposed a two-party *protocol* between a “garbler” who creates the garbled circuit and encodes its inputs, and an *evaluator* who evaluates the garbled circuit. The circuit can take inputs from the garbler and the evaluator simultaneously, and the protocol ensures that each party keeps his input private. To garble a given circuit, the idea is to replace each of its gates with a garbled version of it, such that the truth table of the gate is preserved but unintelligible. The garbled circuit can then be evaluated by any party, but this party can not guess what he is actually evaluating. To garble the inputs, the garbler choses two keys per input wire w_i : $k_{i,0}$ and $k_{i,1}$, one for each value of the wire. Suppose there are n inputs, and that the garbler secret inputs are from 1 to k , and the evaluator’s ones are from $k + 1$ to n . The garbler sends the evaluator: (i) the garbled circuits, and (ii) the keys k_{i,b_i} for $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ where b_i is the value of the garbler’s i^{th} input. Then, the challenge is to hand the evaluator the keys corresponding to its inputs, without the garbler learning the evaluator’s inputs, and without the evaluator having access to both keys (else security is compromised). For this, the parties run $n - k$ oblivious transfers protocols so that the evaluator obtains the keys k_{k+j,b_j} where $j \in \{1, \dots, n - k\}$ and b_j is the j^{th} input of the evaluator. The protocol can also be made non-interactive, *i.e.* to work in 1 round of communication, by using non-interactive

¹⁸Yao actually first presented GC in an oral presentation of [Yao86]. A writing description can be found in [Gol03, Section 5.3.2].

oblivious transfer protocols. Garbled circuits, in their original version are usable only one time. Indeed, if the evaluator obtained (in the worst case) all the keys for all inputs, it could easily infer the structure and the gates composing the circuit. Recent works [GKP⁺13] show how to construct “re-usable” garbled circuits.

Although the construction is inefficient (especially because of the circuit computational model), it is still studied today and considered as a possible candidate for computing over encrypted data. An interesting work from Kolesnikov [KSS09] show how to combine HE and garbled circuits to produce two-party computation protocols with better efficiency.

Garbled RAM As discussed earlier in this section, executing *random access machines* programs is much more efficient than transforming them into circuit and evaluate them. Consequently, a (relatively) new field or research aims to directly garble RAM programs [LO13, GHRW14, LO14]. As defined by Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13], garbled RAM consists in an alternative to securely evaluate programs. The idea is, instead of always going evaluating *all* the paths of a program, *i.e.* instead of evaluating the worst-case execution of the program flattened into a circuit, to “prune off” dead paths in the execution tree. In other words, only the relevant path in the program execution are evaluated. This yields a great efficiency improvement when the program accepts large inputs. The main challenge is then to keep the path and the memory access pattern secret. To hide the access pattern, garbled RAMs use the Oblivious RAM computation model of Goldreich *et al.* [GO96], that exactly fulfills this goal. To hide the execution path, the authors actually use one garbled circuit for each atomic step of the execution. The trick is that, the garbled circuit at step i actually dynamically generates the garbled circuit for the step $i + 1$. As garbled circuits, garbled RAMs are actually protocols between a server and a client and requires oblivious transfers instances.

Garbled RAMs are still at early an development stage, and are quite inefficient for now. The authors in [GHRW14] claim a running time in $t \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) \cdot \text{polylog}(n) \cdot |C_{CPU}|$, where t is the original running time of the program, λ is the security parameter, n is the size of the input, and $|C_{CPU}|$ is the size of the step-circuit. In other words, the overhead of garbled RAMs is polylogarithmic. Also re-usable garbled RAMs have not been investigated yet, but are an open problem. In definitive, garbled RAMs are still theoretical object, but may become a viable candidate for computing on encrypted data.

Functional Encryption Functional encryption (FE) may be the best concurrent to FHE. As formalized by Boneh *et al.* [BSW11], functional encryption schemes comprise special secret keys that allow evaluation of a given function and decryption *at the same time*. A FE scheme is composed of the 4 traditional primitives, but slightly modified: **Setup** outputs the public key and a master secret key msk , **KeyGen** takes as input a function f and msk and outputs a secret key sk_f , **Enc** works as usual, but **Dec**, given sk_f and a ciphertext $\text{Enc}(pk, m)$, outputs $f(m)$. The more functions f the scheme is able to evaluate, the more powerful it is. The security of such scheme is not trivial. Note that FE is a generalization of several encryption paradigm (including standard encryption): it can lead to attribute-based encryption (ABE) where the class of function is restricted to predicates on a user’s attribute (*i.e.* **Dec** outputs m only if $P(\text{attributes}) = \text{true}$ for some predicate P , else \perp), and identity-based encryption (IBE) where the predicates are further restricted to identity checking (*i.e.* **Dec** outputs m only if $id_decryptor = ID$ for some ID , else \perp).

It is easy to see the resemblance between FE and HE, and actually there is more to it than it seems. For instance, it is considered an open problem to design an ABE or IBE FHE scheme [GSW13], and FE for all functions can be constructed from FHE (see next paragraph). On the other hands there are some conceptual differences between HE and FE: evaluation on

encrypted data with HE is made publicly using only the scheme’s public key while in FE special secret keys must be delivered by the authority holding msk ; and also, evaluation with FE outputs plaintexts data whereas after an FHE evaluation, one has to ask the owner of the secret key for decryption. Another difference is that (F)HE is actually more advanced than FE: it is more powerful and more efficient (because designing a secure FE scheme with is also efficient and somewhat powerful is very hard).

Proposed constructions of FE schemes [BRS13a, BRS13b] are very limited in the set of functions f it allows, and are quite inefficient. But it is interesting to note that FE for *any* function f can be enabled using FHE, at least in theory. The idea is to (1) evaluate the function f with FHE, and (2) to input the result and non-interactive proofs that the computed function was indeed f to a secured functionality (*e.g.* a tamper-proof secure hardware token [DMMQN11]) so that (3) it checks the proofs and securely executes the FHE decryption function (the secret key can be hard-coded into the secure functionality). An alternative to the hardware token method is using obfuscation (see last paragraph of this section). Both constructions are very far from practical, and consist in a first step toward powerful FE.

Searchable Encryption Searchable encryption (SE) can yet be seen as another flavor of FE, where the functions f are of the form “Is the word w present in the document?”. However, it has a literature of its own thus we present it apart from FE. The basic, most general setting in SE is as follows. A database owner \mathcal{D} needs to delegate storage of her database to a computationally powerful server \mathcal{E} (*e.g.* the cloud). We suppose that the database contains sensible data, thus it is encrypted before it is handed to \mathcal{E} . Then, some clients \mathcal{C} , upon authorization from \mathcal{D} , can perform requests to the server on the database, with the constraint that \mathcal{E} does not learn the content of the queries but answers it appropriately, and without \mathcal{C} learning anything more than the information requested. This setting is the one described by Jarecki *et al.* [JJK⁺13], but then, many settings can be derived from this one: for instance, \mathcal{E} can be a mail server, \mathcal{D} the receiver of some mails, and the goal is for \mathcal{E} to test (non-interactively) tags on emails so as to forward them in the proper folder (*e.g.* it can act as a spam filter). In this sense \mathcal{E} will also act as client and use SE to filter mails. This example setting is the one put forward in [BC04].

We distinguish two kinds of SE schemes: public key (asymmetric) or private-key (symmetric). In the public key setting, anyone can publish data in the database (so there is no actual “owner” \mathcal{D}), whereas generally speaking symmetric SE is more efficient thanks to the efficiency of symmetric over asymmetric cryptography. Also, we can differentiate single-keyword SE, general boolean queries SE, and fully-qualified queries SE: the former allows the search for 1 keyword at a time, boolean queries SE allows queries consisting in any boolean formula, and the latter allows any SQL-like queries. Recently, two works proposed practical symmetric SE schemes for arbitrary boolean queries on relational databases or free text. The first [CJJ⁺13] mainly provide a protocol for conjunction queries, which is extensible to general boolean queries, and works for 1 client only, which is actually the owner of the database. The other [JJK⁺13] extends this work in the multi-client setting, where the database owner can delegate querying rights to other clients, actually yielding a “outsourced symmetric private information retrieval” scheme. All their constructions are nearly practical, and the complexity of the scheme is substantially independent of the size of the database. A protocol supporting general SQL queries can be found in [PRZB11], but is not as efficient.

Misc. As we can see all the presented constructions (SMPC, GC, GRAM, FE, SE) are ways to “compute on encrypted data”. This phrase can be extended to comprise even more constructions, such as obfuscation. Actually the notions of SE, FE, FHE, garbling and obfuscation are closely related. In particular, an obfuscator for any program can be constructed using FHE and an

obfuscator for NC^1 circuits, and in turn this leads to functional encryption for any function f [GGH⁺13].

Chapter conclusion As the first chapter provided a detailed view of numerical privacy, this chapter did the same for homomorphic encryption. The field of (fully) homomorphic cryptography is thriving, and the state-of-the-art schemes are constantly changing. However, the division of encryption schemes in two classes (PHE and FHE schemes) remains relevant. Also, as a general trend, we can see that the paradigm of homomorphic cryptography is being extended to other schemes than encryption, and this progression should continue during the next years. Generally speaking, the “computing on encrypted data” idea has too many applications in society for its development to stop suddenly. After encryption, the homomorphic paradigm has been extended to signatures and proofs, and some other constructions to compute on encrypted data have been developed, such as functional and searchable encryptions. While these other schemes show significant improvements in the last decades, they are generally less developed. For instance, there is no *fully* signature scheme, or any equivalent notion. One of the reasons why homomorphic encryption is developing faster may be because it is even harder to define the security of homomorphic signatures and proofs than encryption.

To sum up this chapter, we provided in the first section a very high level historical and technical overview of homomorphic encryption, while the following sections detail partially and fully homomorphic schemes, list them, and compare them when possible. We expect to only *use* homomorphic cryptography, and not to design new schemes, but argue that a deep understanding of this tool is necessary. Indeed, it ensures we use them in proper the way, *e.g.* it avoids degrading security by using them in context they are not supposed to. It also permits to take into account the efficiency-security-homomorphism trade-off and to be able to *compose* HE with other cryptographic primitives. At last, if some minor modifications to some scheme are necessary, for example to adapt it to some setting, a good understanding of the scheme allows to easily conclude if and how it is possible.

Because our main goal in this document is to protect privacy, and because we assume that for this end, homomorphic *encryption* is the main necessary tool, we only briefly exposed other homomorphic constructions. Indeed, homomorphic signatures and proofs are mainly useful to handle malicious parties: they come on top of a privacy solution, to re-enforce its security and ensure it is well applied.

Conclusion and perspectives

This document presented in details privacy in computer science on one hand, and homomorphic cryptography on the other hand. This succinct concluding chapter gives insight on how to combine both, *i.e.* how to use homomorphic cryptography for the protection of privacy.

What can homomorphic cryptography do for privacy?

Our main goal, as stated in introduction, is to design privacy-enhancing systems using homomorphic cryptography and similar technologies. The natural question we need to tackle is “what can HE do to enable/enhance privacy in information systems?”. We give two different answers, a first naive one, and a less trivial one.

A first naive answer As noted in section 1.3, almost any information system can benefit privacy properties, although some systems are more pertinent than others, *i.e.* although it makes more sense to protect privacy in some systems than others. On the other hand, we have at our disposal the power of (fully) homomorphic encryption, that can theoretically evaluate any processing on data without actually accessing it.

Therefore, a first answer to the above question is “*everything*”: FHE can resolve every privacy problem. Indeed, intuitively and for any system, we can imagine encrypting all sensible data with a FHE scheme, and for any necessary processing by any party, this party uses the homomorphic properties of the scheme to produce the desired encrypted output. To decrypt, 1 round of communication with the owner of the data (which is also the owner of the secret key) is then necessary. By this mean, the owner of the data can also verify what computation were performed using verifiable computation techniques, and what output the evaluator is going to learn.

Actually, this fact has already been put forward by Barak and Brakerski in a couple of blog posts [BB12a, BB12b], in a slightly more formal manner. They say of FHE that it is the “swiss-army knife of cryptography”, a tool which resolves many cryptographic problems. As examples, they detail how to design two-party SMPC and zero-knowledge proofs systems from FHE. But there are many more applications, such as electronic voting, social networks, program obfuscation, ... They argue that FHE provides a *unified* and generic solution to many problems, but are aware that for each specific system, there exist more secure and efficient solutions tailored for it.

A more cautious answer As second, more moderate, non trivial and efficient answer to our question is possible. It consists in saying that a solution must be designed case by case in a tailored and “smart” way for each problem we encounter. It is the favored answer in the community, and actually, in the literature it is possible to find many use of PHE or FHE schemes

for specific applications. We detail some of these applications in the following section, where we make the difference between PHE and FHE applications.

HE-based privacy in the literature

In light of our second answer, we give several existing solution of homomorphic encryption based privacy. We will see that this approach is far not recent, and many systems have been considered already.

Using PHE schemes As the first PHE scheme appeared more than 30 years ago, its applications are many. Though not all are privacy-oriented, a non-negligible part is. The main, established application is secure electronic voting, where the users' vote must absolutely stay private. Generally speaking, constructing on Yao's concept of multi-party computation [Yao82], many works are devoted to designing efficient and secure multi-party protocols for various purposes such as integer comparison (known as the millionaires problem), PIR, Oblivious Transfer, Commitment, (Non-Interactive) Zero-knowledge Proofs, electronic auctions or secret sharing schemes. There are even proposition for system as complex as media fingerprinting for traitor tracing [PW97]. Many references of privacy-preserving PHE applications can be found in Rappe's thesis [Rap06].

To provide a minimum insight on how constructions with PHE work, we detail simple protocols: one for electronic voting, and one MIX-net protocol (see section 1.3.3), both extracted from [DJ03], which propose yet another extension of Paillier, building on the work of Damård-Jurik [DJ01]. Their scheme is a threshold variant of Paillier: for a given public key, the secret key can be split into several parts so that all owners of the parts must collaborate to decrypt a ciphertext. Alternatively, the public key can also be split in several parts. The authors also design simple ways to prove validity of encryption, *i.e.* to prove that a given ciphertext actually encrypts a valid message. We simplify the protocols in order to put in light the use of homomorphic properties.

Electronic voting using Threshold Paillier

Setting The scheme is designed for a set of voters $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$, 1 candidate and "yes/no" votes. It can be used l times for l candidates. No need for trusted authority.

Protocol

1. Each voter $i \in V$ publishes (*i.e.* broadcasts) n values $c_{ij} = \text{Enc}(pk_j, s_{ij})$ for $j \in [1, n]$, where pk_j is voter j 's public key and such that $\sum_{j \in V} s_{ij} = 0$.

2. Each voter $j \in V$ retrieves encryptions c_{ij} for all $i \in V$ and computes

$$c_j = \prod_{i \in V} c_{ij} = \text{Enc}(pk_j, \sum_{i \in V} s_{ij})$$

3. Each voter $j \in V$ computes $t_j = \text{Dec}(sk_j, c_j)$ (t_j is a "random looking" value).

4. Each voter $j \in V$ submits his vote $v_j \in \{0, 1\}$ by publishing $x_j = v_j + t_j$.

5. All voters can compute and agree on the result of the vote:

$$result = \sum_{j \in V} x_j = \sum_{j \in V} v_j + \sum_{j \in V} t_j = \sum_{j \in V} v_j + \sum_{i \in V} \sum_{j \in V} s_{ij} = \sum_{j \in V} v_j$$

Properties of the protocol Decentralized, dispute-free (honest voters all agree on the result), perfect ballot secrecy (even a majority of corrupted voters can not learn honest voters' votes).

Handling cheaters The complete protocol handles cheaters using several proofs of valid encryptions and NI-ZK proofs at step 1 and 4, and by discarding invalid values.

MIX-net using Threshold Paillier

This MIX-net protocol is not network oriented, and merely focuses on hiding the sender of a message. In other words, there is no routing procedure, and the model supposes a “bulletin board” where all users and server can read/write values publicly.

Setting Any number n of users and w MIX servers. Need for a trusted trust party at setup.

- Protocol*
1. The trusted third party generates (pk_i, sk_i) for each server i and securely distributes them. It also publishes on the board the public parameters of the scheme, g and N , and the product of the public keys, resulting in 1 valid Paillier public key, noted $pk = h = g^{sk_1 + \dots + sk_w}$.
 2. To send a message m a user posts its encryption $c = \text{Enc}(pk, m)$ on the board.
 3. Iteratively, each MIX server (one at a time) re-randomize the encryption on the board and re-writes the result. For example in basic Paillier, re-randomisation of a given $c = g^m r^N \pmod{N^2}$ is $c' = c \cdot r'^N \pmod{N^2}$ for a random r' .
Note that the link between c and c' is hidden because each MIX server always processes a *batch* of ciphertexts, all of which are of the same size.
 4. When all MIXes finished the iterative re-randomization phase on c , they proceed to a threshold decryption protocol, and write the output on the board.
As a result, the sender of a message can not be found.

Properties of the protocol Universally verifiability of MIXes outputs, strong correctness even against $(w - 1)/2$ malicious MIXes and $n - 2$ malicious users, order flexible (order of MIXes at step 3 is not important). Ciphertext and public key sizes are do not depend on the number of servers and the protocol is provably secure.

Handling malicious servers or users Proofs of valid encryptions and NI-ZK proofs are used at several steps

Using FHE schemes Although fully homomorphic encryption is much more recent and still in development, there are already many applications envisioned by cryptographers. Considering our second answer from the previous section, where we require solutions to be (relatively) efficient and tailored for the system they apply to, we will not use FHE as a simple magic tool for all problems. Instead, we will only use the heavy and powerful machinery of FHE for very complex systems or for hard open problems in computer science. Indeed, there are some systems or problems at the cutting edge of computer research, where finding even a theoretical solution is very complex. In such a setting, we can consider using FHE.

As with PHE schemes, the literature already contains privacy solutions using FHE, which roughly correspond to the ones presented in section 2.4: functional encryption for all functions [GKP⁺13, GGH⁺13], program obfuscation [GKP⁺13, GGH⁺13], private machine learning [GLN13], re-usable garbled circuits [GKP⁺13]...

There is also a setting we mentioned several times in this document where using FHE is relevant: storage and computation delegation in the cloud. FHE is indeed suited, because the

cloud is supposed to have a very large computing power, and because there is (as of today) no other known way of delegating computation to a third party without giving up access to the underlying data. Even garbled circuits and RAMs presented in section 2.4.5 are less pertinent, as their efficiency is comparable to FHE or worse, and most of those constructions yields a one-time executable program. Furthermore, garbled circuits/RAMs hide the computed function, which is not the main goal in this setting.

Note that using FHE in the cloud is not as simple as just encrypting and sending data: there are several difficulties, when looking into it. Indeed, if we consider the most general case, the requirements are quite challenging. Ideally, we would like every cloud client to simply encrypt her data with her public key, send it to the cloud along with a description of the functions it is allowed to compute on it, and then be able to adaptively ask for computations involving her data and possibly data from other users. Additionally, if some user u_1 asks for a computation involving data from herself, u_5, u_8 and u_{12} for instance, we would like that neither u_5, u_8 nor u_{12} need to be *online* (*i.e.* connected to the cloud) at this moment. As a simple use-case, social networks profile similarity computations are included in this setting. Now, in this quite simple description, there are already several issues. First, the basic step of encrypting and sending data to the cloud using a FHE scheme is as of today impracticable: a few megabytes of cleartext yields several terabytes of encrypted data [LN14]. The solution proposed to overcome this issue is to encrypt the data using a symmetric block cipher, encrypt the symmetric key with the FHE scheme, and send that to the cloud. As a result, the necessary bandwidth is dramatically reduced, and the server can obtain the data encrypted under the FHE scheme by re-encrypting what it received from the client with the FHE public key, and then *homomorphically* evaluating the decryption procedure of the block cipher, using the encrypted symmetric key. But the most serious limitation have been pointed out by Van Dijk *et al.* [VDJ10]: the authors actually prove that if the protocol described above is possible, then virtual black box obfuscation is possible. Yet, this is in contradiction with the impossibility result from Barak *et al.* [BGI⁺12] stating that this kind of obfuscation is, in general, impossible. Solutions to overcome this issue were already described in section 2.4.4: the idea is to require a minimum of interaction between the users, *i.e.* between u_1, u_5, u_8 and u_{12} in our example [AJLA⁺12, LATV12].

What’s left to do?

We have seen that there are many applications of HE to protect privacy in the literature. Yet, our goals is actually yo use HE for privacy. Therefore, it is reasonable (and necessary?) to ask “what more can be done in this field of research?”. Indeed, with a glance at the existing works, it may seem like there is “no room left” for other privacy solutions using homomorphic encryption. However, we believe it is not the case, may it be simply because FHE is a very recent technology and no practical privacy solution has ever been proposed yet. We go even further, arguing that the full potential of FHE may not have been discovered yet. And generally speaking, new privacy issues keep appearing every year, providing matter for new works in this field.

We give three general directions to design HE-based privacy solutions.

Direction 1: proceed « traditionally » The first, natural one is to proceed as presented in the previous section, and by following the procedure described in section 1.2.3: Chose one or several existing information system(s), study them, and use homomorphic cryptography to ensure privacy.

The main difficulty in this direction is to clear out pertinent and relevant systems where HE is (or at least *seems*) the suited tool to ensure privacy. In other words, the difficulty is to show

that HE is a or *the* good solution, possibly compared to state-of-the-art privacy solutions, for the chosen system(s). Indeed, as said earlier, HE and specially FHE are generic tools that can be used for privacy, but they produce generic and sometimes inefficient solutions. The chosen system(s) should fit well with HE, in the sense that a non-trivial and efficient way of using HE should be possible.

The envisioned systems are the following:

Computation delegation to the cloud As explained earlier, this setting is the main use-case for FHE.

Private network communications The literature in *ensorship* [Win14], *i.e.* in strongly private anonymous communications, is thriving. In particular, the efficient Tor [DMS04] protocol is very popular. However, its efficiency comes at the cost of degraded privacy, and we believe that stronger privacy properties such as *deniability*, which makes it nearly impossible to even know if a user uses a privacy-preserving protocol or not, can and need to be ensured in this kind of system.

Authentication protocols Authentication and authenticated key-exchange protocols are the building blocks of many cryptographic protocol. Achieving authentication and privacy at the same time is very challenging, but may prove useful in many contexts such as seller-buyer interactions on Internet. Recently, a milestone was reached by Gambs *et al.* by achieving prover anonymity, deniability and security at the same time [GOR14].

Direction 2: Improving controlled homomorphic cryptography A second option is to improve the nascent field of controlled (or targeted) malleability for encryption, signature and/or proof schemes. This direction is very cryptographic-oriented and requires the knowledge and ability to compose complex cryptographic primitives while preserving the security proofs. The finality would be to create a generic (but non trivial) solution for privacy using controlled FHE: instead of “simply” encrypting the sensible data and allowing anyone to perform any computation on the data, one would precisely control what is done with it. By covering the gap between security and homomorphism, we believe homomorphic cryptography would become more easily accepted as privacy-preserving solution.

The basic idea would be to continue the works of Boneh *et al.* presented in section 2.4.4, while improving efficiency and ciphertext size growth. Ideally, we can imagine a controlled malleability system directly embedded into the gears of homomorphic schemes. That is to say, a scheme would, by itself and without need for proofs on the side, inherently limit the possible operations on ciphertexts. Also, it would be interesting to combine the keyed-homomorphism property from Emura *et al.* [EHO⁺13] with controlled malleability, so as to fully control *who* modifies the data and *what* are the modifications.

The main difficulty in this approach is, as said earlier, the acquisition of a strong knowledge in cryptography and cryptographic proofs. The task is also uneasy because there are already several highly skilled cryptographers working on this matter. At last, even if this the objective is fulfilled, there is a great chance that efficiency turn out to be even worse than plain FHE. This is a limitation for short term practical consideration, but improving efficiency may be, of course, part of further works.

Direction 3: a « HE-based privacy » framework Finally, we see a third possible, very abstract goal: designing a generic (non-trivial) framework for “homomorphic cryptography based privacy”, which would directly answer our ultimate goal. In other words, instead of proposing

very specific solutions for some systems, the idea would be to offer a solution for a substantial number of systems. The desired framework would need to be very generic, but different from the “encrypt-and-publish” one discussed earlier, and it should not be *void* (*i.e.* it should provide privacy technicians useful, non-trivial information). And of course, the framework should mainly use homomorphic cryptography. Finally, to instantiate the framework, one should need less work than for designing a tailored solution.

This very abstract description is a *desiderata*, but tells very little about how to design it. To obtain elements of answer, one need to first work on several systems, study them and enforce privacy within them. With the acquired experience, we can hope that some common elements between particular solutions will emerge. In other words, the goal would be to infer general properties from particular solutions. Then, one needs to see how homomorphic cryptography connects with these general properties, *i.e.* how homomorphic cryptography can help ensuring them.

This exercise might prove very difficult, and such a framework may actually not exist. Even though the practicality of the solutions derived from the framework might be limited (because generic solutions often imply limited efficiency), cryptography and privacy always benefit from theoretical positive result. The idea is that the framework would directly yield theoretical solution for many privacy problems, thus bringing an easy answer to the question “is ensuring privacy in *that context* possible?”. Therefore, we believe a HE-based privacy framework would be pertinent and desirable. As side contribution, it would bring a formalization of privacy with HE, which as of today lacks to the literature.

We could also say there is a fourth approach/direction, which is a combination of the others. Indeed, one way to proceed may be to begin with direction 1, deduce general properties, and join with direction 3 afterwards. Alternatively, the join can be made with direction 2, if we assume that the acquired experience from direction 1 can be put to profit of understanding homomorphic cryptography and the needs in term of controlled malleability. The limiting factor of this fourth composite approach is the time: studying one system and ensuring privacy in it is already time-consuming, and trying to repeat this for 2 or 3 other systems in order to tackle direction 2 or 3 afterwards is quite ambitious.

Concluding remarks

This document offers a deep understanding of privacy and presents homomorphic cryptography. Privacy is an emergent problematic on the rise. Recent actuality and the fact that the general public is now willing to use privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor in censorship, anti-PRISM systems in the USA, or anonymizing proxy everywhere in the world, witnesses it. Also, the blazing fast evolution of (F)HE let us hope for practical solutions within the next decades. On the other hand, because the state-of-the-art (F)HE is instable, it is hard to conceive systems using current schemes: one needs to foresee and plan ahead in order to produce viable solutions in the long term.

To sum up the knowledge extracted from the two chapters, we can say that there are many possibilities to combine HE and protection of privacy: a very large portions of information systems can benefit from privacy properties, and FHE is a solution for many cryptographic or privacy issues. In other words, there are many ways to use (F)HE for privacy, but some choices are more pertinent than others. The goal is now to clear out the most relevant ones, and focus on the applications the most useful to the public.

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