

(Un)conditional consensus emergence under perturbed and decentralized feedback controls

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► To cite this version:

Mattia Bongini, Dante Kalise, Massimo Fornasier. (Un)
conditional consensus emergence under perturbed and decentralized feedback controls. NETCO 2014 - New Trends in Optimal Control, Jun 2014, Tours, France. hal-01030745

HAL Id: hal-01030745 https://inria.hal.science/hal-01030745

Submitted on 22 Jul 2014

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(Un)conditional consensus emergence under perturbed and decentralized feedback controls (joint work with D. Kalise and M. Fornasier)



Mattia Bongini

Technische Universität München, Department of Mathematics, Chair of Applied Numerical Analysis

mattia.bongini@ma.tum.de

Netco 2014 Tours June 23-27, 2014




Introduction

Large particle systems arise in many modern applications:



 $Large \ Facebook \ ``friendship" \ network$



Dynamical data analysis: R. palustris protein-protein interaction network



Image halftoning via variational dithering



Computational chemistry: molecule simulation



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A framework for social dynamics


We consider large particle systems of form:

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x}_i = v_i, \\ \dot{v}_i = (H \star \mu_N)(x_i, v_i), \ i = 1, \dots N, \end{cases}$$

where $\mu_N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \delta_{(x_i, v_i)}$. Several "social forces" encoded in the interaction kernel H:

- Repulsion-attraction
- Alignment

. . .



Patterns related to different balance of social forces.



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
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Patterns related to different balance of social forces.

Understanding how superposition of re-iterated binary "social forces" yields global self-organization.

Mattia Bongini





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- we then explore a different strategy to enforce self-organization, namely sparse control policies, and compare it with the previous decentralized approach;
- finally, we shall see how sparse stabilization techniques can be exported successfully to different models.





A framework for consensus emergence

The Cucker-Smale model is obtained by the choice of the interaction kernel H(x, v) = a(|x|)(-v).

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x}_{i} = v_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{d} \\ \dot{v}_{i} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} a\left(\left\| x_{i} - x_{j} \right\|^{2} \right) (v_{j} - v_{i}) \in \mathbb{R}^{d}, \text{ for } i = 1, \dots N, \end{cases}$$

where $a(r) := a_{\beta}(r) = \frac{1}{(1+r^2)^{\beta}}$, $\beta > 0$ models the exchange of information between agents.



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where $a(r) := a_{\beta}(r) = \frac{1}{(1+r^2)^{\beta}}, \beta > 0$ models the exchange of information between agents. We say that a solution $\{(x_i, v_i)\}_{i=1}^N$ tends to consensus if there exists

a vector $w \in \mathbb{R}^d$ such that

$$\lim_{t \to +\infty} \|v_i(t) - w\| = 0 \quad \text{for every } i = 1, \dots, N.$$





Conditional consensus emergence for generic $a(\cdot)$

Consider the symmetric bilinear form

$$B(u,v) = \frac{1}{2N^2} \sum_{i,j} \langle u_i - u_j, v_i - v_j \rangle = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \langle u_i, v_i \rangle - \langle \bar{u}, \bar{v} \rangle,$$

λT

and

$$X(t)=B(x(t),x(t)), \quad V(t)=B(v(t),v(t)).$$






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and

$$\begin{split} X(t) &= B(x(t), x(t)), \quad V(t) = B(v(t), v(t)). \\ & \text{Theorem (Ha-Ha-Kim)} \\ & Let \ (x_0, v_0) \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \times (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \ be \ such \ that \\ & X_0 = B(x_0, x_0) \ and \ V_0 = B(v_0, v_0) \ satisfy \\ & \int_{\sqrt{X_0}}^{\infty} a(\sqrt{2N}r) dr \geq \sqrt{V_0} \,. \end{split}$$



Then the solution with initial data (x_0, v_0) tends to consensus.

λT





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Then the solution with initial data (x_0, v_0) tends to consensus. Hence for $a(t) := a_{\beta}(t)$ we have unconditional convergence for $0 \le \beta \le \frac{1}{2}$.

λT





Non-consensus events

If $a(\cdot) = a_{\beta}(\cdot)$ and $\beta > 1/2$ then the consensus condition is not satisfied by all $(x_0, v_0) \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \times (\mathbb{R}^d)^N$, as shown by Cucker and Smale.





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Consider $\beta = 1$, N = 2, d = 1 and let $x(t) = x_1(t) - x_2(t)$ and $v(t) = v_1(t) - v_2(t)$ be the relative positions and velocities of the two agents on the line: rewrite the system as

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} = v \\ \dot{v} = -\frac{v}{1+x^2} \end{cases}$$

with initial conditions $x(0) = x_0$ and $v(0) = v_0 > 0$.





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with initial conditions $x(0) = x_0$ and $v(0) = v_0 > 0$. By direct integration

 $v(t) = -\arctan x(t) + \arctan x_0 + v_0.$

Hence, if $\arctan x_0 + v_0 > \pi/2 + \varepsilon$ we have

 $v(t) > \pi/2 + \varepsilon - \arctan x(t) > \varepsilon, \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}_+.$



A possible way out...

However, in the work Caponigro-Fornasier-Piccoli–Trélat it is shown that the addition of an extra term of the form

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x}_{i} = v_{i} \\ \dot{v}_{i} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} a\left(\|x_{i} - x_{j}\|^{2} \right) (v_{j} - v_{i}) + \gamma(\overline{v} - v_{i}), \text{ for } i = 1, \dots N, \end{cases}$$

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where $\gamma > 0$, implies convergence to consensus unconditionally. This happens because each agent has an additional stirring to reach the common goal \overline{v} . But what happens if every agent has its own "local" goal?



4



Introducing decentralized controls

We study how the convergence to consensus is modified by the introduction of the following extra term

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x}_{i} = v_{i} \\ \dot{v}_{i} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} a\left(\|x_{i} - x_{j}\|^{2} \right) (v_{j} - v_{i}) + \gamma(\overline{v}_{i}^{R} - v_{i}), \text{ for } i = 1, \dots N, \end{cases}$$

where $\gamma > 0$ and

$$\overline{v}_i^R = \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^N \chi_{[0,R]}(\|x_i - x_k\|)} \sum_{j=1}^N \chi_{[0,R]}(\|x_i - x_j\|) v_j,$$

is the local mean velocity calculated by the i-th agent taking into account only the agents inside a ball of radius R centered on him.



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
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is the local mean velocity calculated by the *i*-th agent taking into account only the agents inside a ball of radius R centered on him. GOAL: Study the behavior of the system for $R \to 0$ and $R \to +\infty$.



Behavior of the modified system in function of ${\cal R}$



(Un)conditional consensus emergence under feedback controls





A different approach

To avoid the issues coming from a normalizing factor varying from agent to agent, in our study of the asymptotic behavior we replace it with a function $\eta_R(t) \in L^{\infty}([0, +\infty))$ satisfying

$$\lim_{R \to 0} \eta_R(t) = 1 \left(= \lim_{R \to 0} \sum_{k=1}^N \chi_{[0,R]}(\|x_i(t) - x_k(t)\|) \text{ for every } i \right),$$
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like

$$\eta_R(t) = \max_{i=1,\dots,N} \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^N \chi_{[0,R]}(\|x_i(t) - x_k(t)\|) \right\}.$$





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Hence, we replace \overline{v}^R_i in the system with

$$\hat{v}_i^R = \frac{1}{\eta_R} \sum_{k=1}^N \chi_{[0,R]}(\|x_i - x_k\|) v_j.$$



Theorem

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Replace \overline{v}_i^R with \hat{v}_i^R in the model. Let $(x_0, v_0) \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \times (\mathbb{R}^d)^N$ and define $X_0 = B(x_0, x_0)$ and $V_0 = B(v_0, v_0)$. Then the solution with initial data (x_0, v_0) tends to consensus if one of the following is satisfied:



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•
$$\sqrt{2NX_0} \le R \text{ and } \int_{\sqrt{X_0}}^{\infty} a(\sqrt{2N}r)dr + \gamma \left(\frac{R}{\sqrt{2N}} - \sqrt{X_0}\right) \ge \sqrt{V_0};$$



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Proof. via the Ha-Ha-Kim Theorem.



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Proof.


via the Ha-Ha-Kim Theorem.


• Result generalizable to different forms of η_R and $\chi_{[0,R]}$.






Variation of the empirical and theoretical consensus region in function of R










Sharpness of the result for N = 2



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Efficiency of stabilization

We have shown that an unconditional (w.r.t. the initial data) convergence to consensus is guaranteed only in the case R = ∞, i.e., the agents are completely "open-minded".
 In this case, the Lyapunov functional V decreases at least as

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- Question: are there more economical and efficient strategies which guarantees unconditional stabilization?
- More precisely, we wish to make the quantity $\frac{d}{dt}V(t)$ the smallest possible and use the minimal amount of intervention (e.g., by imposing sparsifying constraints).



Self-organization vs organization by intervention

We introduce a control term in the Cucker-Smale model:

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x}_i = v_i \\ \dot{v}_i = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N a(\|x_j - x_i\|)(v_j - v_i) + u_i, \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, N. \end{cases}$$

The admissible controls will be measurable functions $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_N)$: $[0, +\infty) \to \mathbb{R}^N$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^N ||u_i(t)|| \le M$ for every t > 0, for a given constant M.






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Our aim is then to find admissible controls steering the system to the consensus region and minimizing

$$\mathcal{R}(t, u) := \mathcal{R}(t) = \frac{d}{dt}V(t),$$

in a large class of controls.

Mattia Bongini





Greedy sparse control

Theorem (Caponigro-Fornasier-Piccoli-Trélat)

For every initial condition $(x_0, v_0) \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \times (\mathbb{R}^d)^N$ and M > 0there exist T > 0 and a sparse control $u : [0, T] \to (\mathbb{R}^d)^N$, with $\sum_{i=1}^N ||u_i(t)|| \leq M$ for every $t \in [0, T]$ such that the associated solution tends to consensus.





Greedy sparse control

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We can choose adaptively the control law explicitly as one of the solutions of the variational problem

$$\min B(v, u) + \frac{\mathcal{T}(x)}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \|u_i\| \quad \text{subject to } \sum_{i=1}^{N} \|u_i\| \le M \,,$$

where

$$\mathcal{T}(x) = \int_{\sqrt{B(x,x)}}^{\infty} a(\sqrt{2N}r) dr \quad (threshold \ function \ by \ Ha-Ha-Kim)$$



The 1-sparse feedback strategy

Definition

For every $t \ge 0$ we define the 1-sparse feedback control as

$$u_i(t) = \begin{cases} -M \frac{v_i^{\perp}(t)}{\|v_i^{\perp}(t)\|} & \text{if } i = \hat{\iota}(t) \\ 0 & \text{if } i \neq \hat{\iota}(t) \end{cases}$$

where $\hat{\iota}(t) \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$ is the minimum index such that

$$||v_{\hat{\iota}(t)}^{\perp}(t)|| = \max_{j=1,\dots,N} ||v_j^{\perp}(t)||.$$



The 1-sparse feedback strategy

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For every $t \geq 0$ we define the 1-sparse feedback control as

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$$\|v_{\widehat{\iota}(t)}^{\perp}(t)\| = \max_{j=1,\dots,N} \|v_j^{\perp}(t)\|$$

Theorem

The 1-sparse control is the minimizer of

$$\mathcal{R}(t,u) := \mathcal{R}(t) = \frac{d}{dt}V(t),$$

among all the solution of the variational problem.

Mattia Bongini



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For every $t \ge 0$ we define the 1-sparse feedback control as

$$u_i(t) = \begin{cases} -M \frac{v_i^{\perp}(t)}{\|v_i^{\perp}(t)\|} & \text{if } i = \hat{\iota}(t) \\ 0 & \text{if } i \neq \hat{\iota}(t) \end{cases}$$

where $\hat{\iota}(t) \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$ is the minimum index such that

$$||v_{\hat{\iota}(t)}^{\perp}(t)|| = \max_{j=1,\dots,N} ||v_j^{\perp}(t)||.$$

Theorem

The 1-sparse control is the minimizer of $% \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{L}}^{(n)}(x) = 0$

$$\mathcal{R}(t,u) := \mathcal{R}(t) = \frac{d}{dt}V(t),$$

among all the solution of the variational problem.



The control acts on the most "stubborn" agent. We may call it the "shepherd dog strategy"

Mattia Bongini

(Un)conditional consensus emergence under feedback controls



Dynamical systems driven by attraction and repulsion forces

The Cucker-Dong model: for every $1 \le i \le N$

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x}_{i} = v_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{d} \\ \dot{v}_{i} = -b_{i}v_{i} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} a\left(\|x_{i} - x_{j}\|^{2}\right)(x_{j} - x_{i}) + \sum_{\substack{j=1\\ j \neq i}}^{N} f\left(\|x_{i} - x_{j}\|^{2}\right)(x_{i} - x_{j}) \in \mathbb{R}^{d} \end{cases}$$

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where

- $b_i: [0, +\infty) \to [0, \Lambda]$ is the friction acting on the system,
- $a: [0, +\infty) \to [0, +\infty)$ is the rate of communication,
- $f: (0, +\infty) \to (0, +\infty)$ such that

$$\int_{\delta}^{+\infty} f(r) \, dr < \infty \text{ for every } \delta > 0, \quad \int_{0}^{+\infty} f(r) \, dr = +\infty$$

models the repulsion between agents.

Mattia Bongini





Example: Lennard-Jones potential

• It is the potential of the Van der Waals force.





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- It can be seen as a Cucker-Dong system with


$$a(r) = \frac{\sigma_a}{r^7}$$
 and $f(r) = \frac{\sigma_f}{r^{13}}$.





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Difference f(r) - a(r) for Lennard-Jones potentials.





Total Energy of Cucker-Dong Systems

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$$P(t) := \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\substack{i,j=1\\i \neq j}}^{N} \int_{0}^{\|x_i(t) - x_j(t)\|^2} a(r) dr + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\substack{i,j=1\\i \neq j}}^{N} \int_{\|x_i(t) - x_j(t)\|^2}^{\infty} f(r) dr,$$



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• the total energy E(t) := K(t) + P(t).



Conditional consensus emergence

Theorem (Cucker - Dong)

Consider a population of N agents modeled by a Cucker-Dong system with $a(t) := a_{\beta}(t) = \frac{1}{(1+t^2)^{\beta}}, \ \beta > 0$

$$||x_i(0) - x_j(0)|| > 0 \text{ for all } i \neq j.$$

Then there exists a unique solution (x(t), v(t)) of the system with initial state (x(0), v(0)). Moreover if one of the two following hypotheses holds:



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
- 1. $\beta \leq 1$
- 2. $\beta > 1$ and $E(0) < \vartheta := (N-1) \int_0^\infty a(r) dr$

then the population is cohesive and collision-avoiding, i.e., there exist two constants B_0 and $b_0 > 0$ such that, for every $t \ge 0$

$$b_0 \le ||x_i(t) - x_j(t)|| \le B_0 \text{ for all } 1 \le i \ne j \le N.$$




Non-consensus events need intervention





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
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• Assume we are in the case $\beta > 1$ and $E(0) \ge \vartheta$. Can we again stabilize the society by external parsimonious intervention?



Non-consensus events need intervention



 $\beta \leq 1$

 $\beta > 1$ and $E(0) \geq \vartheta$

- Assume we are in the case $\beta > 1$ and $E(0) \ge \vartheta$. Can we again stabilize the society by external parsimonious intervention?
- We again introduce a control term inside the model

$$\dot{x}_{i} = v_{i}$$

$$\dot{v}_{i} = -b_{i}v_{i} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} a\left(\|x_{i} - x_{j}\|^{2}\right)(x_{j} - x_{i}) + \sum_{\substack{j=1\\j \neq i}}^{N} f\left(\|x_{i} - x_{j}\|^{2}\right)(x_{i} - x_{j}) + \frac{u_{i}}{u_{i}}$$

under the sparsifying constraint $\sum_{i=1}^{N} ||u_i(t)|| \leq M$ for M > 0.



Sparse control strategy for the Cucker-Dong model

Definition

For every $t \ge 0$ we define the 1-sparse feedback control as

$$u_i(t) = \begin{cases} -\frac{M}{E(0)} E(t) \frac{v_i(t)}{\|v_i(t)\|} & \text{if } i = \hat{\iota}(t) \\ 0 & \text{if } i \neq \hat{\iota}(t) \end{cases}$$

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where $\hat{\iota}(t) \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ is the minimum index such that $\|v_{\hat{\iota}(t)}(t)\| = \max_{j=1,\dots,N} \|v_j(t)\|.$

Define for every t > 0 the set

$$K(t) := \left\{ u \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \mid \sum_{i=1}^N \|u_i\| \le M \cdot \frac{E(t)}{E(0)} \right\},\$$

and for every t > 0 and q > 0 the functional $\mathcal{J}_{t,q} : (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \to \mathbb{R}$

$$\mathcal{J}_{t,q}(u) = \langle v(t), u \rangle + \frac{\left\| \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} v_i(0) \right\|}{q} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \|u_i\|.$$



Under the following hypotheses...

Theorem

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Fix M > 0. Let $(x_0, v_0) \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^N \times (\mathbb{R}^d)^N$ be such that the following hold:

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 for all $i \neq j$,
2. $||\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} v_i(0)|| > 0$,
3. $E(0) \ge \vartheta > E(0) \exp\left(-\frac{2\sqrt{3}}{9} \frac{M||\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} v_i(0)||^3}{E(0)\sqrt{E(0)} \left(\Lambda \sqrt{E(0)} + \frac{M}{N}\right)}\right)$.

Then...





... we can prove the following.

Theorem (continues...)

- ... then there exist T > 0 and q > 0 such that
- the 1-sparse feedback control belongs to the set $\operatorname{argmin}_{u \in K(t)} \mathcal{J}_{t,q}(u)$ for every $t \leq T$;





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Theorem (continues...)

- \dots then there exist T > 0 and q > 0 such that
- the 1-sparse feedback control belongs to the set $\operatorname{argmin}_{u \in K(t)} \mathcal{J}_{t,q}(u)$ for every $t \leq T$;
- the 1-sparse feedback control is an instantaneous minimizer of the functional

$$\mathcal{D}(t,u) = \frac{d}{dt}E(t)$$

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over all possible feedback controls in $\operatorname{argmin}_{u \in K(t)} \mathcal{J}_{t,q}(u)$;

• there exists a solution of the controlled Cucker-Dong system associated to a control solving the variational problem

$$\widetilde{u} \in \operatorname*{argmin}_{u \in K(t)} \mathcal{J}_{t,q}(u) \text{ for every } t \leq T.$$





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 ⇒ we don't know if the conditions are necessary.



A few info

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WWW: http://www-m15.ma.tum.de/

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