

# Modeling and control of pedestrian behaviors: An environment optimization approach

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## Modeling and control of pedestrian behaviors: An environment optimization approach

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Istituto per le Applicazioni del Calcolo - Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche

New Trends in Optimal Control (NetCo 2014)

June 23-27, 2014, Tours (France)

Modeling pedestrian rationality

2 Controlling pedestrian rationality

## Background assumptions

- Basic<sup>1</sup>: Path is computed once at the initial time, assuming that the environment is empty.
- Rational<sup>2</sup>: Path is recomputed continuously, taking into account the current pedestrian distribution.
- Highly rational<sup>3</sup>: Path is computed once, taking into account the pedestrian distribution at *current and later* time. Highly rational crowd → Nash equilibrium.
- $\theta$ -rational: Path is recomputed continuously, taking into account the pedestrian distribution at current and later time up to a time  $t + \theta$ .

Bellomo & Dogbé, 2008; Cristiani et al., 2011; Helbing & Molnár, 1995; Xia et al., 2009

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Hughes, 2002

Burger et al., preprint; Hoogendoorn & Bovy, 2003-4; Lachapelle & Wolfram, 2011

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  Nash equilibrium.
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## A multi-purpose approach

### First goal

Creating a unique model such that the degree of rationality can be freely tuned.

We consider a macroscopic first-order model based on a nonlinear nonlocal anisotropic conservation law

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\rho(x,t) + \operatorname{div}(\rho(x,t)v[\rho](x,t)) = 0$$

with

$$v[\rho](x,t) = \frac{v_b^*}{} + v_i$$

and

$$v_i = v_i[\rho(\cdot, t)](x) = \int_{S(x)} \mathcal{F}(y - x)\rho(y, t)dy$$

This model is 2D and fundamental-diagram free

## Basic behavior + minimum time problem

## Perceived dynamics

$$\dot{y}(t)=v_b(t), \qquad t>0.$$

At the initial time we solve once

## Eikonal equation

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} |\nabla \phi(x)| - 1 = 0, \quad x \in \Omega \\ \phi(x) = 0, \quad x \in \mathit{Target} \end{array} \right.$$

Then, the optimal behavioral velocity field is taken in feedback form as

$$\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}}^{*}(x) = -\frac{\nabla \phi(x)}{|\nabla \phi(x)|}, \qquad x \in \Omega.$$

 $v_b^*$  is time-independent coherently with the fact that pedestrians are insensitive to the evolution of the crowd.

## Rational behavior + minimum time problem

## Perceived dynamics

$$\dot{y}(t) = v_b(t) + v_i[\rho(\cdot,\tau)](y), \quad t > \tau.$$

At any given time  $t = \tau$  we solve

## Modified eikonal equation

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} |\nabla \phi_{\tau}(x)| - v_{i}[\rho(\cdot,\tau)](x) \cdot \nabla \phi_{\tau}(x) - 1 = 0, \quad x \in \Omega \\ \phi_{\tau}(x) = 0, \quad x \in \mathit{Target} \end{array} \right.$$

Then, the optimal behavioral velocity field is taken in feedback form as

$$\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}}^{*}(x) = -\frac{\nabla \phi_{\tau}(x)}{|\nabla \phi_{\tau}(x)|}, \qquad x \in \Omega.$$

At any fixed time, the HJB equation is independent of the conservation law for  $\rho$ .

## Highly rational behavior + minimum time problem

## Perceived dynamics

$$\dot{y}(t) = v_b(t) + v_i[\rho(\cdot,t)](y), \quad t > 0.$$

We solve once the following forward-backward equation

## Mean-field equation

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t \rho(t,x) + \operatorname{div} \big[ \rho(x,t) \big( v_b^*(x,t) + v_i [\rho(\cdot,t)](x) \big) \big] = 0 & t \to \\ \max_{v_b \in \overline{B_1(0)}} \big\{ - \big( 1, \ v_b + v_i [\rho(\cdot,t)](x) \big) \cdot \nabla_{x,t} \phi(x,t) - 1 \big\} = 0 & \leftarrow t \\ v_b^*(x,t) \in \arg\max_{v_b \in \overline{B_1(0)}} \big\{ - \big( 1, \ v_b + v_i [\rho(\cdot,t)](x) \big) \cdot \nabla_{t,x} \phi(t,x) - 1 \big\} \end{cases}$$

The HJB and the CL are fully coupled.

## $\theta$ -rational behavior + minimum time problem

## Perceived dynamics

$$\dot{y}(t) = v_b(t) + v_i[\rho^{\theta}(\cdot, t)](y),$$

$$\rho^{\theta}(x, t) := \rho(x, t), t \in [\tau, \tau + \theta], \quad \rho^{\theta}(x, t) := \rho^{\theta}(x, \tau + \theta), t > \tau + \theta.$$

At any given time  $t = \tau$  we solve

#### Mean-field equation /2

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t \rho^\theta + \operatorname{div} \big[ \rho^\theta \big( v_b^{*,\theta} + v_i[\rho^\theta] \big) \big] = 0 & \text{in} \quad (\tau,\tau+\theta) \times \Omega \qquad t \to \\ \max_{v_b \in \overline{B_1(0)}} \Big\{ - \Big( 1, \, v_b + v_i[\rho^\theta(\cdot,t)](x) \Big) \cdot \nabla_{x,t} \phi^\theta(x,t) - 1 \Big\} = 0 \qquad \leftarrow t \\ v_b^{*,\theta}(x,t) \in \arg\max_{v_b \in \overline{B_1(0)}} \Big\{ - \Big( 1, \, v_b + v_i[\rho^\theta(\cdot,t)](x) \Big) \cdot \nabla_{x,t} \phi^\theta(x,t) - 1 \Big\} \end{cases}$$

## Inducing unconscious rationality

## Second goal

Forcing people to behave more rationally than they would naturally do

By means of the models described above we can describe

#### The natural behavior

The expected behavior according to their real limited predictive ability (f.e., the basic one)

## The target behavior

A particularly efficient behavior one would like they to assume (f.e., the rational or highly rational one)

## Key idea

But people are hardly controlled... So we want to get the target behavior still *keeping* the natural one

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## Environmental optimization

#### Environmental control

We assume that one can introduce in the domain additional controlled obstacles, hoping they improve the dynamics (Braess' paradox)

#### Environmental cost


The natural behavior in the new environment should be as close as possible to the target behavior in the original environment in terms of

- evacuation times;
- exits usage (if more than one);
- maximal densities (related to overcompression and then injuries);
- . . .


## Minimization strategy (rectangular obstacles)


Exhaustive search, compass search + simulated annealing.

#### Room with fixed obstacle




#### Room with fixed obstacle






## natural behavior with best obstacle [ $t_{evac} = 99.0$ ]



## Sapienza campus




x [m]


450 Ö

x [m]


450 Ö

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



## Sapienza campus



## Current work


### Obstacles with free shape (with D. Peri)





## Coming soon

## Multiscale Modeling of Pedestrian Dynamics



## Thank you

## THANK YOU

(pay attention when you leave the room, I'm watching you...)