Analysis of Self-* and P2P Systems using Refinement (Full Report)

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Analysis of Self-⋆ and P2P Systems using Refinement ⋆

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Abstract. Distributed systems and applications require efficient and effective techniques (e.g. self-(re)configuration, self-healing, etc.) for ensuring safety, security and more generally dependability properties, as well as *convergence*. The complexity of these systems is increased by features like dynamic (changing) topology, interconnection of heterogeneous components or failures detection. This paper presents a methodology for verifying protocols and satisfying safety and convergence requirements of the distributed self-⋆ systems. The self-⋆ systems are based on the idea of managing complex infrastructures, software, and distributed systems, with or without minimal user interactions. *Correct-by-construction* and *service-as-event* paradigms are used for formalizing the system requirements, where the formalization process is based on incremental refinement in EVENT B. Moreover, this paper describes a fully mechanized proof of correctness of the self-⋆ systems along with an interesting case study related to the P2P-based self-healing protocol.

Keywords: Distributed systems, self-⋆, self-healing, self-stabilization, P2P, EVENT B, liveness, *service-as-event*

1 Introduction

Nowadays, our daily lives are affected by various advanced technologies including computers, chips, and smart-phones. These technologies are integrated into distributed systems with different types of complexities like mobility, heterogeneity, security, fault-tolerance, and dependability. Distributed systems are largely used in many applications and provide required functionalities from the interactions between a large collection of possibly heterogeneous and mobile components (nodes and/or agents). Within the domain of distributed computing, there is an increasing interest in the self-stabilizing systems, which are able to autonomically recover from occurring the faults [7]. The autonomous property of the self-⋆ systems tends to take a growing importance in the analysis and development of distributed systems. It is an imperative that we need to get a better understanding of the self-⋆ systems (emergent behaviours, interactions between agents, etc.), if we want to reason about their security, correctness and trustworthiness.

⋆ The current report is the companion paper of the paper [4] accepted for publication in the volume 8477 of the serie Lecture Notes in Computer Science. The Event-B models are available at the link http://eb2all.loria.fr. Processed on July 3, 2014.

Fortunately, the formal methods community has been analysing a similar class of systems for years, namely distributed algorithms.

In this study, we use the *correct by construction* approach [12] for modelling the distributed self-$\star$ systems. Moreover, we also emphasize the use of the *service-as-event* [3] paradigm, that identifies the phases of *self-stabilization* mechanism, which can be simplify into more stable and simple coordinated steps.



Fig. 1: Diagram for a Self-Stabilizing System $\mathcal{S}$

We consider that a given system $\mathcal{S}$ (see in Fig.1) is characterized by a set of *events* (*procedures* modelling either phases or basic actions according to an abstraction level) that modifies the state of the system. *Legal states* (correct states) satisfying a *safety property P* are defined by a subset $\mathcal{CL}$ of possible events of the system $\mathcal{S}$. The events of $\mathcal{CL}$ represent the possible big or small computation steps of the system $\mathcal{S}$ and introduce the notion of *closure* [5], where any computation starting from a *legal state* satisfying the *property P* leads to another *legal state* that also satisfies the property *P*. The occurrence of a fault *f* leads the system $\mathcal{S}$ into an *illegal state* (incorrect state), which violates the property *P*. The fault *f* is defined as an event *f* that belongs to a subset $\mathcal{F}$ of events. When considering the hypothesis of having a self-$\star$ system, we assume that there are *procedures* (*protocols* or *actions*) which *implement* the identification of *current illegal states* and recovery for *legal states*. There is a subset $\mathcal{ST}$ of events modelling *recovery* phases for demonstrating the *stabilization* process. The system recovers using a finite number of *stabilization* steps (*r*). The process is modelled as an event *r* of $\mathcal{CV}(\subseteq \mathcal{ST})$ eventually leading to the legal states (*convergence* property) from *recovery* states. During the *recovery* phase, a fault may occur (see dotted transitions in Fig.1).

The system $\mathcal{S}$ can be represented by a set of events $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{CL} \cup \mathcal{ST} \cup \mathcal{F}$, where the model $\mathcal{M}$ contains a set ($\mathcal{CL}$) of events for representing the *computation steps* of the system $\mathcal{S}$. When a fault occurs, a set ($\mathcal{ST}$) of events *simulates* the *stabilization* process that is performed by $\mathcal{S}$. The formal representation expresses a *closed* model but we do not know what is the complete set of events modelling faults/failures. We characterise the fault model in a very abstract way and it may be possible to develop the fault model according to the assumptions on the environment, but we do not consider this in the current study. We restrict our study by making explicit the events of $\mathcal{ST}$ modelling the *stabilization* of the system from illegal/failed states. We ensure that the *convergence* is always possible: a subset $\mathcal{CV}$ of $\mathcal{ST}$ *eventually* leads $\mathcal{S}$ into the *legal states* satisfying the invariant *P* of the system. Whenever the system $\mathcal{S}$ is in a *legal state*, we consider that the events of $\mathcal{ST}$ are either not operative or simply preserve the invariant *P* of the system.

In the previous paragraph, we name *procedures* (*protocols* or *actions*) by the term *events*. An *event* is modelling a process which is defined by its pre and post specifications or a state transformation belonging to a larger process. It means that we need to play with abstraction levels to develop a self-$\star$ system. For instance, one can state that an event called stabilise is ensuring the functionality of getting a stable system (the *what*) without giving details of the detailed process itself (the *how*). Hence, the notion of

event is identified to an abstraction level and can be either modelling a global process (the *what*) or a local update of a variable (the *how*). We formalise the system $\mathcal{S}$ using the EVENT B modelling language [1], dealing with *events* and *invariant* properties including *convergence* properties by using a temporal framework. The *service-as-event* paradigm [3] helps to express this *concretisation* process: the procedures **(1)** *leading* from the *illegal states* to the *recovery states*, and **(2)** *leading* from the *recovery states* to the *legal states* are stated by (abstract) events, during the first stages of the EVENT B development. The next step is to unfold each (abstract procedure) event, by refinement, to a set of coordinated and concrete events, which form the body of the procedure.

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related works. Section 3 introduces the EVENT B modelling framework including *service-as-event* paradigm and a formal definition of self-$\star$ systems. Section 4 presents the formal verification approach and illustrates the proposed methodology with the study of the self-healing P2P-based protocol [14]. Section 5 discusses on approaches for studying temporal properties for EVENT B models. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper along with future work.

2 Related Works on Formal Modelling for Self-$\star$ Systems

Systems usually run in intricate environments, with frequent and unexpected changes. This feature increases interest towards autonomous and self-$\star$ architectures, as they are able to adapt themselves according to the changes that may occur in the systems (faults, etc.) or in the environment. Applying formal methods to self-$\star$ systems originates from the needs of understanding how these systems behave and how they meet their specifications. A self-$\star$ system relies on *emergent behaviours*, resulting from interactions between components of the system [21].

Traditionally, the correctness of self-$\star$ and autonomous systems is validated through the simulation and testing [20, 22]. However, simulation and testing are not sufficient to cover the whole set of possible states of a system [2]. Therefore, formal methods appear as a promising land for validating self-$\star$ systems, as long as formal techniques can assert the correctness of these systems and certify target properties, like trustworthiness, security, efficiency, etc. under the rigorous mathematical reasoning [6, 8, 24].

Smith et al. [21] have applied the stepwise refinement using Z to study a case of self-reconfiguration, where a set of autonomous robotic agents is able to assemble and to reach a global shape. They do not validate models using an adequate tool (e.g. proof checker, proof assistant, etc.) and models are not localized. Calinescu et al. [6] have used Alloy to demonstrate the correctness of the autonomic computing policies (ACP). However, Alloy does not provide a mechanism for expressing the *correct-by-construction* paradigm. Méry et al. [2] have also investigated a self-reconfiguring system (Network-on-Chip: adaptative XY routing) using the EVENT B framework and the *correct-by-construction* approach.

State exploration approaches such as model-checking are also used to study self-$\star$ systems. Model-checkers like SPIN, PRISM, SMV, UPPAAL are used for properties specification and getting evidences that properties, such as flexibility, robustness of the self-$\star$ systems hold [6, 8, 10, 24]. Moreover, these tools allow users to obtain the metrics

for the self-⋆ systems, such as performance, and quantitative evaluations [6, 8, 10, 24]. Model-checking and state-space evaluation can be used during the conception of self-⋆ systems, but they are especially used for runtime verification [10, 24]. The limit of model checking is clearly the size of models.

Other formal techniques like static analysis and design by contract are also applied for the formal specification of self-⋆ systems [23]. These techniques are mainly used for *runtime verification*. Graphical approaches, such as Petri Nets, are used to model the temporal aspects and communication flows between different components of a self-⋆ system, and helped to study the cases like self-reconfiguration (replacement of a component, removal of a link between two components, etc.) [24].

Finally, graphical notations (e.g. UML) help to represent self-⋆ systems with understandable figures [25]. Their general purpose is to provide users an insight of a self-⋆ system by describing its architecture, the relationships between agents of the system (OperA methodology [17], ADELFE [20]) or by presenting the system as a composition of extendable/instantiable primitives (FORMS [25]). These notations are generally graphical front-ends for the more complex representations of self-⋆ systems, where the source code [20], and formal models [25] can be generated from the notations.

Our proposed methodology integrates the EVENT B method and elements of temporal logics. Using the refinement technique, we gradually build models of self-⋆ systems in the EVENT B framework. Moreover, we use the *service-as-event* paradigm to describe the *stabilization* and *convergence* from *illegal* states to *legal* ones. Self-⋆ systems require the expression of traces properties like liveness properties and we borrow a minimal set of inference rules for deriving liveness properties. The concept of *refinement diagrams* intends to capture the intuition of the designer for deriving progressively the target self-⋆ system. The RODIN platform provides a laboratory for checking, animating and validating the formal models.

3 Modelling Framework

3.1 EVENT B

We advocate the use of *correct-by-construction* paradigm for modelling the self-⋆ systems. The key concept is the incremental refinement (simulation) which provides link between discrete models by preserving properties. The EVENT B modelling language designed by Abrial [1] is based on *set theory* and the *refinement* of models: an abstract model expressing the requirements of a given system can be verified and validated easily; a concrete model corresponding to the actual system is *constructed* progressively by *refining* the abstraction. EVENT B is supported by a complete toolset RODIN [19] providing features like refinement, proof obligations generation, proof assistants and model-checking.

Modelling Actions over States The EVENT B modelling language can express *safety properties*, which are either *invariants* or *theorems* in a model corresponding to the system. Two main structures are available in EVENT B : **(1)** Contexts express static

informations about the model (for instance, graph properties as connectivity); **(2)** Machines express dynamic informations about the model, safety properties, and events. An EVENT B model is defined by a context and a machine. A machine organises events (or actions) modifying state variables and uses static informations defined in a context. An EVENT B model is characterised by a (finite) list x of *state variables* possibly modified by a (finite) list of *events*. An invariant $I(x)$ states properties that must always be satisfied by the variables x and *maintained* by the activation of the events. The general form of an event e is as follows: ANY t WHERE $G(t,x)$ THEN $x :\mid P(t,x,x')$ END and corresponds to the transformation of the state of the variable x, which is described by a *before-after* predicate $BA(e)(x,x')$: the predicate is semantically equivalent to $\exists t \cdot G(t,x) \wedge P(t,x,x')$ and expresses the relationship linking the values of the state variables before (x) and just after (x') the *execution* of the event e. Proof obligations are produced by RODIN, from events: INV1 and INV2 state that an invariant condition $I(x)$ is preserved; their general form follows immediately from the definition of the before-after predicate $BA(e)(x,x')$ of each event e; FIS expresses the feasibility of an event e, with respect to the invariant I. By proving feasibility, we achieve that $BA(e)(x,z)$ provides a next state whenever the guard $grd(e)(x)$ holds: the guard is the enabling condition of the event.

INV1	INV2	FIS
$Init(x) \Rightarrow I(x)$	$I(x) \wedge BA(e)(x,x') \Rightarrow I(x')$	$I(x) \wedge grd(e)(x) \Rightarrow \exists z \cdot BA(e)(x,z)$

Model Refinement The refinement of models extends the structures described previously, and relates an abstract model and a concrete model. This feature allows us to develop EVENT B models of the self-$\star$ approach gradually and validate each decision step using the proof tool. The refinement relationship is expressed as follows: a model *AM* is refined by a model *CM*, when *CM simulates AM* (i.e. when a concrete event *ce* occurs in *CM*, there must be a corresponding enabling abstract event *ae* in *AM*). The final concrete model is closer to the behaviour of a real system that observes events using real source code. The relationships between contexts, machines and events are illustrated by the following diagrams (Fig. 2) , which consider refinements of events and machines.



Fig. 2: Machines and Contexts relationships

The refinement of a formal model allows us to enrich the model via a *step-by-step* approach and is the foundation of our *correct-by-construction* approach [12]. Refinement provides a way to strengthen invariants and to add details to a model. It is also used to transform an abstract model to a more concrete version by modifying the state description. This is done by extending the list of state variables (possibly suppressing some of them), by refining each abstract event to a set of possible concrete versions, and by adding new events. We suppose (see Fig. 2) that an abstract model *AM* with variables x and an invariant $I(x)$ is refined by a concrete model *CM* with variables y. The abstract state variables, x, and the concrete ones, y, are linked together by means of a, so-called, gluing invariant $J(x,y)$. Event *ae* is in abstract model *AM* and event *ce* is in

concrete model CM. Event ce refines event ae. $BA(ae)(x,x')$ and $BA(ce)(y,y')$ are predicates of events ae and ce respectively; we have to discharge the following proof obligation: $I(x) \wedge J(x,y) \wedge BA(ce)(y,y') \Rightarrow \exists x' \cdot (BA(ae)(x,x') \wedge J(x',y'))$

Due to limitations on the number of pages, we have briefly introduced the EVENT B modelling language and the structures proposed for organising the formal development. However, more details are available in [1] and on the Internet[1]. In fact, the refinement-based development of EVENT B requires a very careful derivation process, integrating possible *tough* interactive proofs. For assisting the development of the self-$\star$ systems, we use the *service description* and *decomposition* that is provided by the *service-as-event* [3] paradigm (derived from the *call-as-event* approach [15]).

3.2 The *Service-as-Event* Paradigm

This section introduces the *refinement diagrams* [3, 15] and presents the *service-as-event* paradigm. A brief overview on the usage of these formalisms for modelling the self-$\star$ systems is given.

Objectives The *service-as-event* paradigm [3, 15] is a semantical extension of EVENT B and introduces a way to deal with liveness properties and traces, for modelling the self-$\star$ systems.

A Definition of Self-$\star$ Mechanism We characterize a self-stabilizing system $\mathcal{S}$ (more generally a self-$\star$ system) by its ability to recover autonomously from an *illegal* (faulty) state (violating the invariant P of the system) to a *legal* (correct) state statisfying the invariant property P of system $\mathcal{S}$. Temporal logic [3, 11, 15, 18] can be used to describe such mechanism, using the liveness properties: we represent the *stabilization* (especially the *convergence*) property as a *service* where a system $\mathcal{S}$, in an *illegal* state (characterized by $\neg P$), reaches *eventually* a *legal* state (satisfying P). This service is expressed, with the *leads to* ($\rightsquigarrow$) operator, as follows: $(\neg P) \rightsquigarrow P$. This *leads to* property (equivalently $((\neg P) \Rightarrow \diamond P)$) states that every *illegal* state (satisfying $\neg P$) will *eventually* (at some point in the future) lead to a *legal* state (satisfying P).

We define a temporal framework for the EVENT B model M of the studied system $\mathcal{S}$ by the following TLA specification: $\mathcal{S}pec(M)$: $Init(y) \wedge \Box[Next]_y \wedge L$, where $Init(y)$ is the predicate specifying initial states; $Next \equiv \exists e \in E.BA(e)(y,y')$ is an action formula representing the next-state relation; and L is a conjunction of formulas $WF_y(e)$: we express a *weak fairness* assumption over each event e modelling a step of the recovery process (we do not add any fairness on events leading to *illegal states* (*faults*)).

[1] `http://lfm.iti.kit.edu/download/EventB_Summary.pdf`

Refinement Diagrams We express the self-$\star$ mechanism using EVENT B , together with liveness properties under fairness assumptions. *Refinement diagrams* (see in Fig.3), introduced by Méry et al in [3, 15], allow to develop EVENT B models and add control inside these models. They are also used for stating (proofs of) liveness properties (under fairness assumptions), and for supporting refinement. Therefore, these diagrams are suitable for representing the models of self-$\star$ systems. A *refinement diagram* $D \mathrel{\widehat{=}} PD(M)$ for a machine M is defined as follows: $PD(M) = (A, M, G, E)$, where A is a set of assertions, G a set of assertions for M called conditions/guards of the form $g(x)$, E is the set of events of M. The diagram $PD(M)$ is a labelled directed graph over A, with labels from G or E , satisfying the following rules: **(1)** if an assertion R is related to another assertion S, by an unique *non-dotted* arrow labelled $e \in E$ (where e does not model a fault), then the property $R \rightsquigarrow S$ is satisfied; **(2)** if R is related to $S_1, \ldots S_p$, then each arrow from R to S_i is labelled by a guard $g_i \in G$. The diagram D possesses proved properties:



Fig. 3: A Refinement Diagram

1. If M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$ and $Q \rightsquigarrow R$, it satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow R$.
2. If M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$ and $R \rightsquigarrow Q$, it satisfies $(P \vee R) \rightsquigarrow Q$.
3. If I is invariant for M and if M satisfies $P \wedge I \rightsquigarrow Q$, then M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$.
4. If I is invariant for M and if M satisfies $P \wedge I \Rightarrow Q$, then M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$.
5. If $P \xrightarrow{e} Q$ is a link of D for the machine M, then M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$.
6. If P and Q are two nodes of D such that there is a path in D from P to Q and any path from P can be extended in a path containing Q, then M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$.
7. If I, U, V, P, Q are assertions such that I is the invariant of M; $P \wedge I \Rightarrow U$; $V \Rightarrow Q$; and there is a path from U to V and each path from U leads to V; then M satisfies $P \rightsquigarrow Q$.

These *refinement diagrams* are attached to EVENT B models and are used for deriving liveness properties. As an example, the diagram in Fig.3 represents a model of a self-stabilizing system: the diagram relates a pair of assertions $(\neg P, P)$, where $\neg P$ is a precondition stating that the studied system is in an *illegal* state (P does not hold); and P is the post-condition, describing the *desired legal* state. We observe that the *leads to* property $(\neg P) \rightsquigarrow P$, demonstrating the stabilization and convergence, is satisfied by the diagram and the model linked to it.

Applying the *Service-as-Event* Paradigm [3] We apply the *service-as-event* paradigm, for formalizing the self-$\star$ systems.

1. **Describing *stabilization* and *convergence* as a service**. We express the *stabilization* and *convergence* properties of a self-$\star$ system $\mathcal{S}$, where service is stated by the following property: $(\neg P) \rightsquigarrow P$. An abstract event (e) is used for describing the service/procedure represented by $(\neg P) \rightsquigarrow P$: $(\neg P) \xrightarrow{e} P$; where $(\neg P)$ is a *pre-condition* for triggering event (e); and P is a *post-condition* defined by the actions of event (e), which should be satisfied by the *"execution"* of event.

2. **Decomposing *stabilization* and *convergence* into simple steps**. We decompose the abstract service stated by $(\neg P) \rightsquigarrow P$ into simple *sub-procedures/steps*, using the *inference rules* [11] related to the *leads to* properties:

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dots \quad \dots}{(\neg \mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{R}_0}\ trans_2 \qquad \dfrac{\dfrac{\dots \quad \dots}{\mathsf{R}_0 \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{R}_1}\ trans_4 \qquad \dfrac{\dots \quad \dots}{\mathsf{R}_1 \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}}\ trans_5}{\mathsf{R}_0 \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}}\ trans_3}{(\neg \mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}}\ trans_1$$

Fig. 4: Proof Tree - Usage of Inference Rules

This process is similar to refinement (see Fig.5), since we add, at each level of the proof tree, a new state R_k $(0 \leq k \leq n)$ leading from $(\neg \mathsf{P})$ to P. The initial property $(\neg P) \rightsquigarrow P$ is decomposed, until the identification of the *stabilization* steps is satisfactory. The *stabilization* phase is expressed by the property $(\neg \mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow R_0 \wedge R_0 \rightsquigarrow R_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge R_{n-1} \rightsquigarrow R_n \wedge R_n \rightsquigarrow P$, which states the *convergence* leading to the *desired legal* states. Each level of the proof tree corresponds to a level of refinement (see Fig.5) in the formal development. Each *leads to* property demonstrates a *service* of *stabilization*, which is defined by an event in the model.



Fig. 5: Decomposition and Refinement

4 Stepwise Design of the Self-Healing Approach

4.1 Introduction to the Self-Healing P2P-Based Approach

The development of *self-healing P2P-based approach* is proposed by Marquezan et al. [14], where *system reliability* is the main concern. The self-healing process ensures the maintenance of proper functioning of the system services. If a service fails then it switches from a *legal* state to a *faulty* state. The self-healing/recovery procedure ensures that the service switches back to the *legal* state. The services run in a distributed (P2P) system composed of *agents/peers* executing instances of tasks. The *services* and *peers* notions are introduced as: **(1) Management Services:** Tasks/Services are executed by the peers; **(2) Instances of Management Services:** Peers executing a certain type of management service; **(3) Management Peer Group (MPG):** Instances of the same management service. The self-healing property can be described as follows: **(1) Self-identification** triggers to detect the failure of service. This mechanism identifies running or failed instances of a management service. **(2) Self-activation** is started, whenever a management service will be detected fail by the *self-identification*. *Self-activation* evaluates if the management service needs a recovery, based on the criticality of the failure: if there are still enough instances for running the service, the recovery procedure is not started; otherwise, the *self-configuration* mechanism is triggered for repairing the service. **(3) Self-configuration** is activated if the failure of service is critical: the role of this mechanism is to instantiate the failed management service, and to return the service into a *legal* state.

4.2 The Formal Design

Figure 6 depicts the formal design of *self-healing P2P-based approach*. The model M0 abstracts the self-healing approach. The refinements M1, M2, M3 introduce step-by-step the *self-detection*, *self-activation* and *self-configuration* phases, respectively. The remaining refinements, from M4 to M20, are used for localisation of the system: each step of the algorithm is made *local* to a node. The last refinement M21 presents a local model that describes a set of procedures for recovering process of P2P system.



Fig. 6: Architecture

Abstracting the Self-Healing Approach (M0) This section presents an abstraction of the self-healing procedure for a failed service. Each service (s) is described by two states: *RUN* (*legal/running* state) and *FAIL* (*illegal/faulty* state). A variable *serviceState* is defined as $s \mapsto st \in serviceState$, where s denotes a service and st denotes a possible state. A property P expresses that a service (s) is in a *legal running* state that is formalised as $\mathsf{P} \mathrel{\widehat{=}} (s \mapsto RUN \in serviceState)$. An event FAILURE models a faulty behaviour, where service (s) enters into a faulty state (*FAIL*), satisfying $\neg\mathsf{P}$. The *self-healing* of management service (s) is expressed as $(\neg\mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}$. The *recovery* procedure is stated by an event HEAL ($(\neg\mathsf{P}) \xrightarrow{\mathsf{HEAL}} \mathsf{P}$), where service ($s$) recovers from an *illegal faulty* state (*FAIL*) to a *legal running* state (*RUN*). The refinement diagram[1] (see Fig.7) and events sum up the abstraction of a *recovery* procedure.



Fig. 7: Abstraction

EVENT FAILURE
ANY
  s
WHERE
  $grd1 : s \in SERVICES$
THEN
  $act1 : serviceState :=$
  $(\{s\} \lhd serviceState) \cup \{s \mapsto FAIL\}$

EVENT HEAL
ANY
  s
WHERE
  $grd1 : s \in SERVICES$
  $grd2 : s \mapsto FAIL \in serviceState$
THEN
  $act1 : serviceState :=$
  $(serviceState \setminus \{s \mapsto FAIL\})$
  $\cup \{s \mapsto RUN\}$

This *macro/abstract view* of the *self-healing* is detailed by refinement[2], using intermediate steps. A set of new variables is introduced to capture the system requirements. The variables are denoted by $NAME\_\{Refinement\ Level\}$.

Introducing the Self-Detection (M1) The variable *serviceState* is replaced, by refinement, with a new variable *serviceState*_1, since new states are introduced. The states *RUN*, *FAIL* are refined into *RUN*_1, *FAIL*_1, and a new state (FL_DT_1) is defined. A service (s) can ***suspect*** and ***identify*** a failure state (*FAIL*_1) before triggering the recovery (HEAL). We introduce a property $\mathsf{R}_0 \mathrel{\widehat{=}} (s \mapsto FL\_DT\_1 \in serviceState\_1)$ and a new event FAIL_DETECT in this *self-detection* mechanism. Let P and $\neg$P be redefined as follows: $\mathsf{P} \mathrel{\widehat{=}} (s \mapsto RUN\_1 \in serviceState\_1)$ and $\neg\mathsf{P} \mathrel{\widehat{=}} (s \mapsto FAIL\_1 \in serviceState\_1)$.

[1] The assertions ($s \mapsto st \in serviceState$), describing the state (st) of a service (s), are shorten into (st), in the nodes of the refinement diagrams, for practical purposes.

[2] $\oplus$: to add elements to a model, $\ominus$: to remove elements from a model

The intermediate steps of self-detection are introduced according to the refinement diagram (see Fig.8) and proof tree.



Fig. 8: Self-Detection

$$\frac{(\neg \mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{R}_0 \qquad \mathsf{R}_0 \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}}{(\neg \mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}}\ trans$$

The event FAIL_DETECT is introduced to express the *self-detection*: the failure state ($FAIL\_1$) of a service (s) is detected (state FL_DT_1). The property $(\neg \mathsf{P}) \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{R}_0$ is expressed by the event FAIL_DETECT, where the failure ($FAIL\_1$) of service (s) is identified (FL_DT_1). $\mathsf{R}_0 \rightsquigarrow \mathsf{P}$ is defined by the event HEAL, where the service (s) is restored to a *legal running* state (RUN_1) after failure detection. The same method is applied to identify all the phases of *self-healing* algorithm. Due to limited space, we focus on the interesting parts of models and liveness properties. The complete formal development of models can be downloaded from web[3].

EVENT FAILURE REFINES FAILURE ... WHERE $\oplus\ s \mapsto RUN\_1 \in serviceState\_1$ THEN $\ominus\ act1\ :\ \ldots$ $\oplus\ serviceState\_1 :=$ $(serviceState\_1 \setminus \{s \mapsto RUN\_1\})$ $\cup \{s \mapsto FAIL\_1\}$	EVENT FAIL_DETECT ANY s WHERE $grd1\ :\ s \in SERVICES$ $grd2\ :\ s \mapsto FAIL\_1 \in serviceState\_1$ THEN $act1\ :\ serviceState\_1 :=$ $(serviceState\_1 \setminus \{s \mapsto FAIL\_1\})$ $\cup \{s \mapsto FL\_DT\_1\}$	EVENT HEAL REFINES HEAL ... WHERE $\ominus\ grd2\ \ldots$ $\oplus\ s \mapsto FL\_DT\_1 \in serviceState\_1$ THEN $\ominus\ act1\ \ldots$ $\oplus\ serviceState\_1 :=$ $(serviceState\_1 \setminus \{s \mapsto FL\_DT\_1\})$ $\cup \{s \mapsto RUN\_1\}$

Introducing the Self-Activation (M2) and Self-Configuration (M3) The *self-activation* is introduced in this refinement M2 (see Fig. 9), where a failure of a service (s) is evaluated in terms of critical or non-critical using a new state FL_ACT_2 and an event FAIL_ACTIV. The *self-configuration* step is introduced in the next refinement M3 (see Fig.10), which expresses that if the failure of service (s) is critical, then the *self-configuration* procedure for a service (s) will be triggered (state FL_CONF_3), otherwise, the failure will be ignored (state FL_IGN_3).



Fig. 9: Self-Activation



Fig. 10: Self-Configuration

The Global Behaviour (M4) The developed models are refined and decomposed into several steps (see Fig.11) [14]. These steps are: **(1)** ***Self-Detection***, **(2)** ***Self-Activation***, and **(3)** ***Self-Configuration***. Self-Detection phase is used to detect any failure in the autonomous system using two events FAIL_DETECT and IS_OK. The event FAIL_DETECT models the failure detection; and the event IS_OK states that if a detected failure of a service (s) is a *false alarm*, then the service (s) returns to a *legal* state (RUN_4). Self-Activation process is used to evaluate when actual failures are identified, using

[3] http://eb2all.loria.fr/html_files/files/selfhealing/self-healing.zip

the following events: FAIL_ACTIV, FAIL_IGN, IGNORE, and FAIL_CONF. The events FAIL_IGN and IGNORE are used to ignore the failure of service (s) when failure is not in critical state (FL_IGN_4). The event FAIL_CONF is used to evaluate the failure of service (s) when failure is critical (FL_CONF_4). The last phase *Self-Configuration* presents the healing procedure of a *failed* service using an event REDEPLOY.

From model M5 to M20, we localise the events (we switch from a *service* point of view to the instances/peers point of view) and detail the macro (global) steps by adding new events, variables, and constraints. The refinements M5, M6, M7 introduce the running ($run\_peers(s)$),faulty ($fail\_peers[\{s\}]$), suspicious ($susp\_peers(s)$) and deployed peers/instances ($dep\_inst[\{s\}]$) for a service (s). A function (min_inst) associates each service (s) with the minimal number of instances that is required for running service (s), and helps to detail the *self-activation* phase: if the number of running instances of service (s) is below than minimum, then the failure is critical. The models M8, M9, M10 detail the *self-detection* and *self-configuration* phases to introduce the *token owners* for the services. Models from M11 to M20 localise gradually the events (to switch from a *service* point of view to the instances/peers point of view). The detailed formal development of various steps from M5 to M20 are given in the archive [3]. Due to limited space, in the following section, we present only the local model M21.



Fig. 11: Self-Healing steps

The Local Model (M21) This model details locally the *self-healing* procedure of a service (s). The peers instantiating management service (s) are introduced, as well as the notion of *token owner*. The *token owner* is a peer instance of service (s) that is marked as a *token owner* for the Management Peer Group (MPG). It can perform the *self-healing* procedure using *self-detection*, *self-activation*, and *self-configuration* steps. **(1) Self-Detection** introduces an event SUSPECT_INST that states that the *token owner* for service (s) is able to *suspect* a set ($susp$) of unavailable peers instances of service (s). Other events RECONTACT_INST_OK and RECONTACT_INST_KO are used to specify the successful recontact, and failed recontact, respectively, of the unavailable instances for ensuring the failed states. Moreover, the *token owner* is able to monitor the status of service (s) using two events FAIL_DETECT, and IS_OK. If there are unavailable instances after the recontacting procedure, the *token owner* informs the safe members of MPG of failed instances using the event FAIL_DETECT, otherwise, the *token owner* indicates that service is running properly. **(2) Self-Activation** introduces an event FAIL_ACTIV that states that if there are failed instances of service (s), then the *token owner* evaluates if the failure is critical. Another event FAIL_IGNORE specifies that the failure is not critical. An event IGNORE can ignore the failure if several instances (more than minimum) are running correctly. If the number of instances for the running service (s) will be less than the minimum required services, then the failure will be declared critical, and the *self-healing* process will be triggered using an event FAIL_CONFIGURE. **(3) Self-**

Configuration introduces three events REDEPLOY_INSTC, REDEPLOY_INSTS and REDEPLOY that specify that if the failure of service (s) is critical, then new instances of running service (s) can be deployed until to reach the minimal number of instances, and after the event HEAL can be triggered corresponding to the *convergence* of the self-healing process.

It is noticeable that the *architectural decomposition* of the self-healing process is emphasized in this model, by the events related to the algorithm. There is also a set of events describing actions related to the environment. MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL: a set of peers (prs) becomes unavailable (can not be contacted); MAKE_PEER_AVAIL: a formerly unavailable instance (p) becomes available; UNFAIL_PEER: a failed instance re-enters a *legal running* state.

MACHINE 21 ...
EVENT SUSPECT_INST
ANY
s,$susp$
WHERE
$grd1 : s \in SERVICES$
$grd2 : susp \subseteq PEERS$
$grd3 : susp = run\_inst(token\_owner(s) \mapsto s) \cap unav\_peers$
$grd4 : suspc\_inst(token\_owner(s) \mapsto s) = \varnothing$
$grd5 : inst\_state(token\_owner(s) \mapsto s) = RUN\_4$
$grd6 : susp \neq \varnothing$
THEN
$act1 : suspc\_inst(token\_owner(s) \mapsto s) := susp$
END
EVENT FAILURE ...
EVENT RECONTACT_INST_OK ...
EVENT RECONTACT_INST_KO ...
EVENT FAIL_DETECT ...
EVENT IS_OK ...
EVENT FAIL_ACTIV ...
EVENT FAIL_IGNORE ...
EVENT IGNORE ...
EVENT FAIL_CONFIGURE ...
EVENT REDEPLOY_INSTC ...
EVENT REDEPLOY_INSTS ...
EVENT REDEPLOY ...
EVENT HEAL ...
EVENT MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL ...
EVENT UNFAIL_PEER ...
EVENT MAKE_PEER_AVAIL ...

This model M21 describes locally the *Self-Healing P2P-Based Approach*, where we have formulated *hypotheses* for ensuring the correct functioning of the self-healing process: *(1) Event MAKE_PEER_AVAIL: If the token owner of a service (s) becomes unavailable,at least one peer, with the same characteristics as the disabled token owner (state, local informations about running, failed peers, etc.) can become the new token owner of service (s); (2) Event REDEPLOY_INSTC: There is always a sufficient number of available peers that can be deployed to reach the legal running state of a service (s).*

In a nutshell, we say that our methodology allows users to understand the self-$\star$ mechanisms and to gain insight into their architectures (components, coordination, etc.); and gives evidences of the correctness of self-$\star$ systems under some assumptions/hypotheses.

5 Analysis of Temporal Properties for Event-B Models

Leuschel et al. [13] developed a tool ProB for animating, model-checking, and verifying the consistency of Event-B models. ProB provides two ways for analysing Event-B models : constraint-based checking and temporal model-checking. We focus on temporal model-checking, since we are interested in liveness properties. Temporal model-checking [13] allows ProB to detect problems with a model (invariants violation, deadlocks, etc.) and to verify if the model satisfies LTL properties: ProB explores the state space of the model and tries to find a counter-example (i.e. a sequence of events) leading to the violation of invariants or LTL properties.

A difference with TLC (model-checker for TLA$^+$) is that ProB does not support *fairness* [9], allowing unfair traces to be analysed during model-checking. Therefore, the TLA$^+$ framework is more suited to our work, since we are verifying liveness properties, in Event-B models, under fairness assumptions.

6 Discussion, Conclusion and Future Work

We present a methodology based on liveness properties and *refinement diagrams* for modelling the self-$\star$ systems using EVENT B. We characterize the self-$\star$ systems by three modes (abstract states): 1) *legal (correct)* state, 2) *illegal (faulty)* state, and 3) *recovery* state. We have proposed a generic pattern for deriving correct self-$\star$ systems (see Fig.1). The *service-as-event* and *call-as-event* paradigms provide a way to express the relationships between modes for ensuring required properties as convergence. The *correct-by-construction* principle gives us the possibility to refine procedures from events and to link modes. The key idea is to identify the modes (considered as abstract states) and the required abstract steps to allow the navigation between modes, and then to gradually enrich abstract models, using refinement to introduce the concrete states and events. We have illustrated our methodology by the *self-healing approach* [14].

The complexity of the development is measured by the number of proof obligations (PO) which are automatically/manually discharged (see Table 1). It should be noted that a large majority ($\sim$ 70%) of the 1177 manual proofs is solved by simply running the provers. The actual summary of proof obligations is given by Table 2. The manually discharged POs (327) require analysis and skills: searching and adding premises, simplifying the complex predicates, and even transforming goals are needed to discharge these POs. Examples of difficult POs are related to proving the *finiteness* of *Management Peer Groups (MPG)*, during the *redeployment operation* of the *self-configuration phase*.

Model	Total	Auto		Interactive	
CONTEXTS	30	26	86.67%	4	13.33%
M0	3	3	100%	0	0%
M1	21	15	71.4%	6	28.6%
M2	46	39	84.8%	7	15.2%
M3	68	0	0%	68	100%
M4	142	16	11.27%	126	88.75%
M5	46	17	39.95%	29	63.05%
OTHER MACHINES	1065	141	12.44%	924	87.56%
M21	13	0	0%	13	100%
TOTAL	1434	257	17.9%	1177	82.1%

Table 1: Summary of Proof Obligations

Total	Auto		*Quasi*-Auto		Manual	
1434	257	17.9%	850	59.3%	327	22.8%

Table 2: Synthesis of POs

Furthermore, our refinement-based formalization allows us to produce final local models close to the *source code*. Our future works include the development of techniques for generating applications from the resulting model extending tools like EB2ALL [16]. Moreover, further case studies will help us to discover new patterns; these patterns will be added to a catalogue of patterns that could be implemented in the Rodin platform. Finally, another point would be to take into account dependability properties in our methodology.

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A Appendix : EVENT-B models

```
    CONTEXT
        C00      ›
    SETS
        SERVICES      ›
        STATES    ›
    CONSTANTS
        RUN   ›
        FAIL      ›
        InitState     ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   SERVICES ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        axm2:   STATES = {RUN, FAIL} not theorem ›
        axm3:   RUN ≠ FAIL not theorem ›
        axm4:   InitState ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES not theorem ›
        axm5:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN ∈ InitState not theorem ›
        axm6:   ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES ∧ st2 ∈ STATES ∧ s ↦
st1 ∈ InitState ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C01      ›
    EXTENDS
         C00
    SETS
        STATES_1      ›
    CONSTANTS
        RUN_1     ›
        FAIL_1    ›
        FAIL_DETECT_1     ›
        InitState_1   ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   partition(STATES_1, {RUN_1},{FAIL_1},{FAIL_DETECT_1}) not
theorem ›
        axm2:   InitState_1 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_1 not theorem ›
        axm3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ InitState_1 not theorem ›
        axm4:   ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_1 ∧ st2 ∈ STATES_1 ∧
s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_1 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_1 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C02      ›
    EXTENDS
         C01
    SETS
        STATES_2      ›
    CONSTANTS
        RUN_2     ›
        FAIL_2    ›
        FAIL_DETECT_2     ›
        FAIL_ACTIV_2      ›
        InitState_2   ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   partition(STATES_2, {RUN_2},{FAIL_2},{FAIL_DETECT_2},
{FAIL_ACTIV_2}) not theorem ›
        axm2:   InitState_2 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_2 not theorem ›
        axm3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_2 ∈ InitState_2 not theorem ›
        axm4:   ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_2 ∧ st2 ∈ STATES_2 ∧
s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_2 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_2 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C03      ›
    EXTENDS
         C02
    SETS
        STATES_3      ›
    CONSTANTS
        RUN_3     ›
        FAIL_3    ›
        FAIL_DETECT_3     ›
        FAIL_ACTIV_3      ›
        FAIL_CONFIG_3     ›
        FAIL_IGN_3    ›
        InitState_3   ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   partition(STATES_3, {RUN_3},{FAIL_3},{FAIL_DETECT_3},
{FAIL_ACTIV_3},{FAIL_CONFIG_3},{FAIL_IGN_3}) not theorem ›
        axm2:   InitState_3 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_3 not theorem ›
        axm3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_3 ∈ InitState_3 not theorem ›
        axm4:   ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_3 ∧ st2 ∈ STATES_3 ∧
s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_3 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_3 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C04      ›
    EXTENDS
         C03
    SETS
        STATES_4      ›
    CONSTANTS
        RUN_4     ›
        FAIL_4    ›
        FAIL_DETECT_4     ›
        FAIL_ACTIV_4      ›
        FAIL_CONFIG_4     ›
        FAIL_IGN_4    ›
        DPL_4     ›
        InitState_4   ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   partition(STATES_4, {RUN_4},{FAIL_4},{FAIL_DETECT_4},
{FAIL_ACTIV_4},{FAIL_CONFIG_4},{FAIL_IGN_4},{DPL_4}) not theorem ›
        axm2:   InitState_4 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_4 not theorem ›
        axm3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ InitState_4 not theorem ›
        axm4:   ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st2 ∈ STATES_4 ∧
s ↦ st1 ∈ InitState_4 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ InitState_4 ⇒ st1 = st2 not theorem ›
    END
```

```
CONTEXT
    C05      ›
EXTENDS
     C04
CONSTANTS
    min_inst      ›
    init_inst     ›
AXIOMS
    axm1:   min_inst ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℕ1 not theorem ›
    axm2:   init_inst ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℕ1 not theorem ›
    axm3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ min_inst(s) ≥ 2 not theorem ›
    axm4:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ init_inst(s) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
    axm5:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ init_inst(s) ≥ 2 theorem ›
END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C06      ›
    EXTENDS
         C05
    SETS
        PEERS     ›Set of PEERS
    CONSTANTS
        InitSrvcPeers     ›Initial set of peers / instances per service
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   InitSrvcPeers ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℙ1(PEERS) not theorem ›each service
is provided by a non empty set of peers/instances
        axm2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ finite(InitSrvcPeers(s)) not theorem ›each
service is provided by a finite set of peers/instances
        axm3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ card(InitSrvcPeers(s)) = init_inst(s) not
theorem ›each service s is provided by peers/instances, whose number is
init_inst(s)
        axm4:   ∀ s1, s2 · s1 ⊆ PEERS ∧ s2 ⊆ PEERS ∧ s1 ≠ ∅ ∧ s2 ≠ ∅ ∧ finite(s1)
∧ finite(s2) ∧ s1 ⊂ s2 ⇒ card(s1) ≤ card(s2)−1  not theorem ›
        axm5:   ∀ s1 · s1 ⊆ PEERS ∧ s1 ≠ ∅ ∧ finite(s1) ⇒ card(s1) > 0 theorem ›
        axm6:   ∀ s1, s2 · s1 ⊆ PEERS ∧ s2 ⊆ PEERS ∧ finite(s1) ∧ finite(s2) ∧ s1
⊆ s2 ⇒ card(s2) − card(s1) = card(s2\s1)  not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C07      ›
    EXTENDS
         C06
    CONSTANTS
        deplo_inst    ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   ∀ set, s1, s2 · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈
SERVICES ∧ s1 = s2 ⇒ ({s1} ⩤ set)[{s2}] = ∅ theorem ›
        axm2:   ∀ set, s1, s2 · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈
SERVICES ∧ s1 ≠ s2 ⇒ ({s1} ⩤ set)[{s2}] = set[{s2}] theorem ›
        axm3:   ∀ set, s1, s2, p · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈
SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ s1 = s2 ⇒ (set ∪ {s1 ↦ p})[{s2}] = set[{s2}]∪{p} theorem
›
        axm4:   ∀ set, s1, s2, p · set ⊆ SERVICES×PEERS ∧ s1 ∈ SERVICES ∧ s2 ∈
SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ s1 ≠ s2 ⇒ (set ∪ {s1 ↦ p})[{s2}] = set[{s2}] theorem ›
        axm5:   deplo_inst ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℕ1 not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C08      ›
    EXTENDS
         C07
    CONSTANTS
        init_tok      ›
        InitStatus    ›
        InitSuspPeers     ›
        InitFail      ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   init_tok ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›
        axm2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ init_tok(s) ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) not theorem
›
        axm3:   ∀ a1, a2 · a1 ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) ∧ a2 ∈ PEERS ↔
(SERVICES×PEERS) ∧ finite(a1) ∧ a2 ⊆ a1 ⇒ finite(a2) not theorem ›
        axm4:   InitStatus ∈ (PEERS × SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
        axm5:   ∀ s, p · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ p = init_tok(s) ⇒ (p ↦ s) ↦
RUN_4 ∈ InitStatus   not theorem ›
        axm6:   ∀ s, p, stt · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ PEERS ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ (p ↦
s) ↦ stt ∈ InitStatus ⇒ p = init_tok(s) ∧ stt = RUN_4 not theorem ›
        axm7:   InitSuspPeers ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        axm8:   ∀ p, s, sp · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ sp ⊆ PEERS ∧ (p ↦ s) ↦
sp ∈ InitSuspPeers ⇒ p = init_tok(s) ∧ sp = ∅ not theorem ›
        axm9:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = init_tok(s) ⇒ (p ↦ s) ↦
∅ ∈ InitSuspPeers not theorem ›
        axm10:  InitFail ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        axm11:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ InitFail(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
    END
```

```
    CONTEXT
        C09     ›
    EXTENDS
         C08
    CONSTANTS
        InitStateSrv     ›
        InitSuspPrs  ›
        InitRunPeers     ›
    AXIOMS
        axm1:   InitStateSrv ∈ PEERS × SERVICES ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
        axm2:   ∀ s, p · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) ⇒ (p ↦
s) ↦ RUN_4 ∈ InitStateSrv not theorem ›
        axm3:   ∀ s, p, stt · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈
InitStateSrv ⇒ p ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) ∧ stt = RUN_4 not theorem ›
        axm4:   InitSuspPrs ∈ PEERS × SERVICES ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        axm5:   ∀ s, p · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) ⇒ (p ↦
s) ↦ ∅ ∈ InitSuspPrs not theorem ›
        axm6:   ∀ s, p, stt · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈
InitSuspPrs ⇒ p ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) ∧ stt = ∅  not theorem ›
        axm7:   InitRunPeers ∈ PEERS × SERVICES ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        axm8:   ∀ s, p · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) ⇒ (p ↦
s) ↦ InitSrvcPeers(s) ∈ InitRunPeers not theorem ›
        axm9:   ∀ s, p, stt · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈
InitRunPeers ⇒ p ∈ InitSrvcPeers(s) ∧ stt = InitSrvcPeers(s)  not theorem ›
    END
```

```
MACHINE
    M00     ›
SEES
     C00
VARIABLES
    serviceState     ›
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   serviceState ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES not theorem ›
    inv2:   ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES ∧ st2 ∈ STATES ∧ s ↦
st1 ∈ serviceState ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ serviceState ⟹ st1 = st2 not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState ≔  InitState ›
        END

    FAIL:    not extended ordinary ›
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState ≔ ({s} ⩤ serviceState) ∪ {s ↦ FAIL}  ›
        END

    HEAL:    not extended ordinary ›
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL ∈ serviceState not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState ≔ (serviceState \ {s ↦ FAIL}) ∪ {s ↦ RUN} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M01     ›
    REFINES
         M00
    SEES
         C01
    VARIABLES
        serviceState_1    ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   serviceState_1 ∈ SERVICES ↔ STATES_1 not theorem ›
        gluing_run1:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN ∈ serviceState ⇒ s ↦ RUN_1
∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›
        gluing_run2:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ serviceState_1 ⇒ s ↦
RUN ∈ serviceState not theorem ›
        gluing_fail1:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL ∈ serviceState ⇒ (s ↦
FAIL_1 ∈ serviceState_1 ∨ s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_1 ∈ serviceState_1) not theorem ›
        gluing_fail2:   ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_1 ∧ st ∈
{FAIL_1,FAIL_DETECT_1} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_1 ⇒ s ↦ FAIL ∈ serviceState not
theorem ›
        gluing_state3:  ∀ s, st1, st2 · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st1 ∈ STATES_1 ∧ st2 ∈
STATES_1 ∧ s ↦ st1 ∈ serviceState_1 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ serviceState_1 ⇒ st1 = st2 not
theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_1 ≔    InitState_1 ›
            END

        FAIL:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ RUN_1 ∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_1 ≔ (serviceState_1\{s ↦ RUN_1}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_1}   ›
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
```

```
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_1 ∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_1 ≔ (serviceState_1\{s ↦ FAIL_1}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_1}  ›
        END

    HEAL:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             HEAL
        ANY
            s     ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_1 ∈ serviceState_1 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_1 ≔ (serviceState_1 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_1})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_1} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M02
REFINES
    M01
SEES
    C02
VARIABLES
    servi2
INVARIANTS
    i
    s ∈ SE  R ∈ CES ∧ s ↦ R ∈ S  TATES2 ⇒ s ∈
R ∈ servi  2 ⇒ s ∈
    2 : ∀s · s ∈ SE  R ∈ CES ∧ s ↦ R ∈ S  2 ∈ servi 2 ⇒ s ∈
R ∈ servi
    s ∈ SER  ∈ CES ∧ s ↦ FAI ∈ S  ∈ servi  ⇒ s ∈
FAI2 ∈ servi  2 ⇒ s ∈
    2 : ∀s · s ∈ SER  ∈ CES ∧ s ↦ FAI ∈ S  2 ∈ servi 2 ⇒ s ∈
FAI ∈ servi
    s ∈ SER  ∈ CES ∧ s ↦ FAI ∈ S  ETECT ∈ servi  ⇒
⇒ (s ↦ FAI ∈ A  2 ∈ servi  2 ∨ s ↦ FAI ∈ S  TECT2 ∈ servi  2
    2 : ∀s · s ∈ st · s ↦  SER ∈ CES ∧ st ∈ S  STATES2 ∧ st ∈
FAI ∈ A2 FAI  E TECT2 ∧ s ↦  st ∈ servi 2 ⇒ s ∈ FAI  ETECT ∈
servi
    s ∈ st1 ∧ st2  ∈ s ↦ SER ∈ CES ∧  st1 ∈ STATES2 ∧  st2 ∈
STATES2 ∧ s ↦ st  1 ∈ servi 2 ∧ s ↦ st2 ∈ ser  vi2 ⇒ st
  1 = st2
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:  ordinary
        THEN
            a
        END

    FAIL  ordinary
        REFINES
            FAI
        ANY
            
        WHERE
            
            2 :  s ↦ R ∈ s  ervi2
        THEN
            a
FAI2
        END

    FAIL_DETECT  ordinary
        REFINES
```

```
        FAI□□□ECT
    AN□
        □    ›
    □HERE
        □□□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□□    ›
        2□□ :    s □FAI2□□    servi2□□□□□□□  □t□□□□□□□    ›
    THEN
        a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□2 □(servi□□□□□□□ 2□□□FAI2□□        □□□
FAI□□□ECT2□     ›
    EN□

IS_OK□  □□xte□□□□    or□□□□□□□ ›
    REFINES
        HEA□
    AN□
        □    ›
    □HERE
        □□□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□□    ›
        2□□ :    s □FAI□□□    CT2 □servi□□□□□  2    □t□□□□□□□    ›
    THEN
        a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□2 □(servi□□□□□□□ 2 □□□FAI□□      TECT2□□
□□□R□2□       ›
    EN□

FAIL_ACTI□□     □□xte□□□□    or□□□□□□□ ›
    AN□
        □    ›
    □HERE
        □□□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□□    ›
        2□□ :    s □FAI□□□    CT2 □servi□□□□□  2    □t□□□□□□□    ›
    THEN
        a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□2 □(servi□□□□□□□ 2 □□□FAI□□      TECT2□□
□□□FAI□CTI□      2□  ›
    EN□

□EAL□   □□xte□□□□    or□□□□□□□ ›
    REFINES
        HEA□
    AN□
        □    ›
    □HERE
        □□□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□□    ›
        2□□ :    s □FAI□CTI   2□□servi□□□□□□   2   □t□□□□□□□    ›
    THEN
        a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□2 □(servi□□□□□□□ 2 □□□FAI□CA      TI2□□
□□R□2□      ›
    EN□
```

EN□

M03

MACHINE
  M03
REFINES
  M0
SEES
  C03
ARIABLES
  servi3
INARIANTS
  i   3 SER CES S TATES3 t
  s s SE R CES s ↦ RUN servi s ↦ RUN3 servi 3 t
  s s SE R CES s ↦ RUN 3 servi 3 s ↦ RUN servi t
  s s SER CES s ↦ FAI servi s ↦ FAI3 servi 3 t
  s s SER CES s ↦ FAI 3 servi 3 s ↦ FAI servi t
  s s SER CES s ↦ FAI ETECT servi s ↦ FAIETEC T3 servi 3 t
  s s SER CES s ↦ FAI ETECT3 servi 3 s ↦ FAIETEC T servi t
  s s SE R CES s ↦ FAI CAI servi (s ↦ FAI CAI 3 servi 3 v s ↦ FAIC NF3 servi 3 v s ↦ FAI 3 N serv i3 t
  st s SER CES st STATES3 st FAICTA3 FAI C NF3 FAI I 3 N ↦ st servi3 s ↦ FAI CAI se rvi t
  s st1 st s SER CES st1 STATES3 st STATES3 s ↦ st 1 servi 3 s ↦ st ser vi3 st 1 = st t
EENTS
  INITIALISATION: e
    THEN
      a 3 I 3
    END

  FAIL: e
    REFINES
      FAI
    AN

    HERE
      SER CES t
      ↦ RUN3 s ervi3 t
    THEN
      a 3 (servi 3 ↦ RUN3 ↦ FAI3

```
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    □e□□□□□□□□    □□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                 FAI□□□□CT
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□    ›
                □□□□□   ⇸ FAI3□□     servi3□□□□□□□  □t□□□□□□    ›
            THEN
                a□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□3 □(servi□□□□□□ 3□□⇸FAI3□□       □□⇸
FAI□□□□CT3□     ›
            END

        IS_OK:  □e□□□□□□□□    □□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                 IS□□□
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□    ›
                □□□□□   ⇸ FAI□□□     CT3 □servi□□□□□  3    □t□□□□□□    ›
            THEN
                a□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□3 □(servi□□□□□□ 3 □□⇸ FA□□□     TECT3□□
□□⇸ RUN3□     ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTI□:     □e□□□□□□□□    □□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                 FAI□□TAI□
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□   □SER□CES     □t□□□□□□□    ›
                □□□□□   ⇸ FAI□□□     CT3 □servi□□□□□  3    □t□□□□□□    ›
            THEN
                a□□□□   □□□□□□□□□□□□□□3 □(servi□□□□□□ 3 □□⇸ FA□□□     TECT3□□
□□⇸ FAI□□TAI□     3□  ›
            END

        FAIL_CONF_I□N: not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                s    ›
                st   ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd3:   st ∈ {FAIL_CONFIG_3,FAIL_IGN_3} not theorem ›
```

```
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_3 ∈ serviceState_3 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_3 ≔ (serviceState_3 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_3}) ∪
{s ↦ st} ›
        END

    HEAL:   not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            HEAL
        ANY
            s    ›
            st   ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd3:   st ∈ {FAIL_CONFIG_3,FAIL_IGN_3} not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_3 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_3 ≔ (serviceState_3 \ {s ↦ st}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_3} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M04
REFINES
    M03
SEES
    C04
VARIABLES
    serviceState_4
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   serviceState_4 SERVICES ↔ STATES_4
    SE VICESR∧ s ↦ RUN_3  S 3
R N 4  S 4
    SE VICESR∧ s ↦ RUN_4  S 4
R N 3  S 3
    SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_3  S 3
FAI 4  S 4
    SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_4  S 4
FAI 3  S 3
    SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_ ECT 3  S 3
FAIL E E T 4  S 4
    SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_ ECT 4  S 4
FAIL E E T 3  S 3
    SE VICESR∧ s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_3  S 3
FAIL ACTIVA _4  S 4
    SE VICESR∧ s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4  S 4
FAIL ACTIVA _3  S 3
    SE VICESR∧ s ↦ FAIL_IGN_3  S 3
FAI I N 4  S 4
    SE VICESR∧ s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4  S 4
FAI I N 3  S 3
    SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_3  S 3
CONFAIL I 4  S 4 4 4  S
    VICES SER st ∈ STATES_4
FAIL CONFI 4 4 S CONFIG 4 3 FAI
S 3
    VICES ∧ SER st ∈ STATES_4
STATES 4  S S 4 4
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:   not e
        THEN
            a  S 4  I S 4
        END

    FAIL
        REFINES
            FAIL
```

```
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   □ □ SEE    not theorem ›
                gr□□□    □ □ R□N□4 □ □       □□□□□□□□S□□□□□□4□□□□□□□ ›
            THEN
                a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□□            4 □ □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□      □      □4□□□ □ R□
FAI□□4□  ›
            EN□

        FAIL_DETECT□   □□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                FAI□□□□E□E
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   □ □ SEE    not theorem ›
                gr□□□    □ □ FAI□□4 □       □□□□□□□□S□□□□□4□□□□□□□ ›
            THEN
                a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□□            4 □ □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□     □ □     □4□□□ □ FA
FAI□□□□E□4□      ›
            EN□

        IS_OK□  □□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                IS□□□
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   □ □ SEE    not theorem ›
                gr□□□    □ □ FAI□□□E□ECT□4 □ □□□□□□□□S□□     □□□□ □□□□□□4□ ›
            THEN
                a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□□            4 □ □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□     CT□4□□   □4 □ □□ □
□ □□ □ R□N□4□ ›
            EN□

        FAIL_ACTIV□     □□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                FAI□□□TIV
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   □ □ SEE    not theorem ›
                gr□□□    □ □ FAI□□□E□ECT□4 □ □□□□□□□□S□□     □□□□ □□□□□□4□ ›
            THEN
                a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□□            4 □ □□□□□□□□□S□□□□□     CT□4□□   □4 □ □□ □
□ □□ □ CTIV□A    _4□ ›
            EN□
```

```
        FAIL_CONFIGURE□    □□□□ e□□e□□e□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL□C□NF□I□N
            AN□
                s    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   s □ SE□RCES   not theorem ›
                gr□□□   s □ FAIL□AC□IV_4 □ se□□□□eS□□□    □□□□ e□4□□e□ ›
            □I□H
                s□□ s□ □ FAIL□C□NFI3   ›□□
            □HEN
                □□□□□□   se□□□□eS□□□e□         4 □ □se□□□□eS□□□e         □44□□□□S □ FAIL□AC
□s □ FAIL□C□NFI□□   ›  4□
            EN□

        FAIL_IGNORE□    □□□□ e□□e□□e□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL□C□NF□I□N
            AN□
                s    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   s □ SE□RCES   not theorem ›
                gr□□□   s □ FAIL□AC□IV_4 □ se□□□□eS□□□    □□□□ e□4□□e□ ›
            □I□H
                s□□ s□□FAIB□I□N□  ›
            □HEN
                □□□□□□   se□□□□eS□□□e□         4 □ □se□□□□eS□□□e         □44□□□□S □ FAIL□AC
□s □ FAIL□I□N□4□ ›
            EN□

        IGNORE: □□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            AN□
                □    ›
            □HERE
                □□□□□□   □ □ SE□RES    not theorem ›
                gr□□□   □ □ FAI□□I□N□       4 □ □□□□□□□□S□□□□□□□□□□□□□ ›     4
            □I□H
                □□□ □□ □ FAI□□I□N□3 ›
            THEN
                a□□□□□   □□□□□□□□S□□□□□□            4 □ □□□□□□□□S□□□□□      □□ □   □4 □ □□ □
□□ □ R□N□4□ ›
            EN□

        REDEPLO□□   □□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ ›
            AN□
```

```
        s     ›
      □HERE
        □□□□□    □ □ SEES    not theorem ›
        gr□□□    □ □ CANF□□    I□□4 □ □□□□□□□S□□    □□□ □□□□□□□□□4 ›
      THEN
        a□□□□    □□□□□□□S□□□□□        4 □ □□□□□□□□□S□□□□    NFI□□4□□□4 □ □□ □
□ □□ □ □□□□4□ ›
      EN□

    □EAL□   □□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□ ›
      REFINES
        HEAL
      AN□
        □     ›
      □HERE
        □□□□□    □ □ SEES    not theorem ›
        gr□□□    □ □ □□□□4 □ □        □□□□□□S□□□□□□4□□□ ›
      □I□H
        □□□ □□CFNEL□□□        ›3
      THEN
        a□□□□    □□□□□□□S□□□□□        4 □ □□□□□□□□S□□□□    □□ □   □4 □ □□ □
R□N□4□ ›
      EN□

  EN□
```

```
    MACHINE
        M05     ›
    REFINES
         M04
    SEES
         C05
    VARIABLES
        serviceState_4    ›
        num_run   ›
        num_susp      ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   num_run ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℕ1 not theorem ›
        inv2:   num_susp ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℕ not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st ∉ {FAIL_4,
FAIL_DETECT_4} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ⟹ num_susp(s) = 0 not theorem ›
        inv4:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 ⟹ num_susp(s) =
0 theorem ›
        inv5:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 ⟹
num_run(s) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        inv6:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⟹ num_susp(s) < num_run(s) not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔    InitState_4 ›
                act2:   num_run ≔ init_inst ›
                act3:   num_susp ≔ SERVICES×{0} ›
            END

        FAIL:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s     ›
                nb_fail   ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   nb_fail ∈ ℕ1 not theorem ›
                grd4:   nb_fail < num_run(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_4}   ›
                act2:   num_susp(s) ≔ nb_fail ›
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
```

```
            ANY
                s    ›
                num_safe     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   num_safe ∈ ℕ not theorem ›
                grd4:   num_safe ≤ num_susp(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
                act2:   num_susp(s) ≔ num_susp(s) − num_safe ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   num_susp(s) = 0 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   num_susp(s) > 0 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
                act2:   num_run(s) ≔ num_run(s) − num_susp(s) ›
                act3:   num_susp(s) ≔ 0 ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
```

```
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   num_run(s) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
        END

    FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   num_run(s) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
        END

    IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
        END

    REDEPLO□:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY
        ANY
            s    ›
            new_run  ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   new_run ∈ ℕ1 not theorem ›
            grd4:   new_run ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4})
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
                act2:   num_run(s) ≔ new_run ›
            END

        □EAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_4} ›
            END

    END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M06     ›
    REFINES
         M05
    SEES
         C06
    VARIABLES
        serviceState_4    ›
        run_peers    ›
        susp_peers    ›
        fail_peers    ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:    run_peers ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℙ1(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv2:    susp_peers ∈ SERVICES ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv3:    fail_peers ∈ SERVICES ↔ PEERS not theorem ›
        gluing_run1:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ finite(run_peers(s)) not theorem
›the number of instances providing a service s is finite
        gluing_run2:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ num_run(s) = card(run_peers(s))
not theorem ›the number of instances providing a service s is num_run_peers(s)
        gluing_susp1:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ finite
(susp_peers(s)) not theorem ›the number of suspect instances of a service s is
finite
        gluing_susp2:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES  ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ num_susp(s)
= card(susp_peers(s)) not theorem ›the number of suspect instances of a service
s is num_susp_peers(s)
        inv4:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ run_peers(s) ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not
theorem ›an instance of a service s is either failed or providing the service s
        inv5:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ susp_peers(s) ⊆
run_peers(s) not theorem ›suspicious instances of s are a subset of the
instances providing s
        inv6:    ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st ∈ {FAIL_4,
FAIL_DETECT_4} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) not theorem ›
        inv7:    ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ st ∈ {FAIL_4,
FAIL_DETECT_4} ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4 ⇒ susp_peers(s) ⊂ run_peers(s) not
theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:    serviceState_4 ≔    InitState_4 ›
                act2:    run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:    susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:    fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        FAIL:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
```

```
            s    ›
            fp   ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd5:   fp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   fp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            grd4:   fp ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›
        WITH
            nb_fail:    nb_fail=card(fp) ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_4}  ›
            act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ fp ›
        END

    FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_DETECT
        ANY
            s    ›
            sf   ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            grd6:   sf ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd7:   sf ⊆ susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
        WITH
            num_safe:   num_safe=card(sf) ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
            act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) \ sf ›
        END

    IS_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             IS_OK
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd5:   susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
```

```
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ susp_peers(s) ›
                act3:   susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
```

```
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        REDEPLO□:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                new_inst     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   new_inst ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd5:   new_inst ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   finite(new_inst) not theorem ›
                grd7:   run_peers(s) ∩ new_inst = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   fail_peers[{s}] ∩ new_inst = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(new_inst) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            WITH
                new_run:    new_run=card(run_peers(s))+card(new_inst) ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4})
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ new_inst ›
            END

        □EAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_4} ›
            END
```

```
    UNFAIL_PEER:    not extended ordinary ›
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M07     ›
    REFINES
         M06
    SEES
         C07
    VARIABLES
        serviceState_4    ›
        run_peers    ›
        susp_peers    ›
        fail_peers    ›
        dep_inst     ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   dep_inst ∈ SERVICES ↔ PEERS not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not
theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ s, st · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ st ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ st ∈ serviceState_4
∧ st ≠ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
        inv4:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ finite(dep_inst[{s}]) not theorem ›
        inv5:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not
theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔    InitState_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:   susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                fp    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   fp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   fp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   fp ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ fp ›
            END
```

```
        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                sf   ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   sf ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   sf ⊆ susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) \ sf ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ susp_peers(s) ›
                act3:   susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
```

```
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        REDEPLO␣INST : not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                s    ›
                dep  ›
            WHERE
```

```
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   dep ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   finite(dep) not theorem ›
            grd4:   dep ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            grd5:   dep ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
            grd6:   card(dep) = deplo_inst(s) not theorem ›
            grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd8:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×dep) ›
        END

    REDEPLO□:   not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            REDEPLOY
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
        WITH
            new_inst:   new_inst=dep_inst[{s}] ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4})
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
            act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
        END

    □EAL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            HEAL
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_4} ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
```

```
        UNFAIL_PEER
    ANY
        s    ›
        p    ›
    WHERE
        grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
        grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
        grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
    THEN
        act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
    END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M08     ›
    REFINES
         M07
    SEES
         C08
    VARIABLES
        serviceState_4   ›
        run_peers    ›
        susp_peers   ›
        fail_peers   ›
        dep_inst     ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        susp_inst    ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   token_owner ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›
        inv2:   unav_peers ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∈ run_peers(s)\unav_peers
not theorem ›
        inv4:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉
susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
        inv5:   susp_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv6:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_inst[{ld}])
⇒ ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
        inv7:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_inst[{ld}]) ∧
ld = token_owner(s) ⇒ ld ∉ susp_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
        inv8:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_inst[{ld}]) ∧
ld = token_owner(s) ⇒ susp_inst[{ld}][{s}] ⊂ run_peers(s) not theorem ›
        inv9:   ∀ ld, s, stt · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦
stt ∈ serviceState_4 ∧ ld = token_owner(s) ∧ stt ≠ RUN_4 ⇒ susp_inst[{ld}][{s}]
= ∅ not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔    InitState_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:   susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act8:   susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                prs  ›
```

```
                E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd4:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable and the service is not suspicious,


then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ susp_peers(srv) ∪
fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not
suspect instances anymore
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is OK
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp))
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            WITH
                fp: fp=susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                sf   ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   sf ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   sf ⊆ susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) \ sf ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
```

```
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd5:   susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
        END

    FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_ACTIV
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ susp_peers(s) ›
            act3:   susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
            act4:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
        END

    FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_CONFIGURE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
        END

    FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
```

```
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
        END

    IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INST: extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            REDEPLOY_INST
        ANY
            s    ›
            dep  ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   dep ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   finite(dep) not theorem ›
            grd4:   dep ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            grd5:   dep ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
            grd6:   card(dep) = deplo_inst(s) not theorem ›
            grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd8:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×dep) ›
        END

    REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            REDEPLOY
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4})
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
                act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_4} ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
            END

    END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M09     ›
    REFINES
         M08
    SEES
         C08
    VARIABLES
        serviceState_4   ›
        run_peers    ›
        susp_peers   ›
        fail_peers   ›
        dep_inst     ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        susp_inst    ›
        rec_inst     ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rct_inst     ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   rec_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv2:   rct_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] ≠ ∅ ⟹
rec_inst[{ld}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        inv4:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] ≠ ∅ ⟹
rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] ⊆ rec_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
        inv5:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rec_inst[{ld}]) ⟹
ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
        inv6:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rec_inst[{ld}]) ∧
ld = token_owner(s) ⟹ ld ∉ rec_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
        inv7:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rct_inst[{ld}]) ⟹
ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
        inv8:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(rct_inst[{ld}]) ∧
ld = token_owner(s) ⟹ ld ∉ rct_inst[{ld}][{s}] not theorem ›
        inv9:   dom(rct_inst) ⊆ dom(rec_inst) not theorem ›
        inv10:  ∀ ld · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ ld ∈ dom(rct_inst) ⟹ rct_inst[{ld}]  ⊆
rec_inst[{ld}] theorem ›
        inv11:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⟹ token_owner(s) ∉
susp_peers(s) not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔    InitState_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:   susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act8:   susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
```

```
            act10:  rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act11:  rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›
            E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
        WHERE
            grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
            grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
            grd4:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⟹ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
            grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉
dom(susp_peers) ⟹ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable and the service is not suspicious,


then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
            grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈
dom(susp_peers) ⟹ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ susp_peers(srv) ∪
fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
            act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
            act3:   susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not
suspect instances anymore
            act4:   rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›
            act5:   rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›
        END

    SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
```

```
                SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is OK
            THEN
                act1:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp))
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:    not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious
peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ susp_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›i is a
suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
```

```
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious
instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious
peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ susp_peers(s)∩unav_peers not theorem ›i is a
suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious
instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›
            WITH
                sf: sf=rct_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
            THEN
```

```
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) \ rct_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⊳ ({s} ⩤ ran(rec_inst)) ›
                act4:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⊳ ({s} ⩤ ran(rct_inst)) ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ susp_peers(s) ›
                act3:   susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INST: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INST
            ANY
                s    ›
                dep  ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   dep ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   finite(dep) not theorem ›
                grd4:   dep ∩ run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep ∩ fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(dep) = deplo_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd8:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×dep) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4})
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
                act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_4} ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
            END
```

```
    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M10     ›
REFINES
     M09
SEES
     C08
VARIABLES
    serviceState_4   ›
    run_peers    ›
    susp_peers   ›
    fail_peers   ›
    dep_inst     ›
    token_owner  ›
    unav_peers   ›
    susp_inst    ›
    rec_inst     ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
    rct_inst     ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    actv_inst    ›instances activated by token ownes
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   actv_inst ∈ PEERS ↔ (SERVICES×PEERS) not theorem ›
    inv2:   ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ finite(actv_inst[{i}][{s}])
not theorem ›
    inv3:   ∀ ld, s · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(actv_inst[{ld}])
⇒ ld = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
    inv4:   ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ actv_inst[{i}][{s}] ∩
run_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
    inv5:   ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ actv_inst[{i}][{s}] ∩
dep_inst[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
    inv6:   ∀ s, i · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ i ∈ PEERS ⇒ actv_inst[{i}][{s}] ∩
fail_peers[{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
    inv7:   ∀ ld, s, stt · ld ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦
stt ∈ serviceState_4 ∧ ld = token_owner(s) ∧ stt ≠ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ⇒ actv_inst
[{ld}][{s}] = ∅ not theorem ›
    inv8:   finite(actv_inst) not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔    InitState_4 ›
            act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
            act3:   susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
            act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act8:   susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act10:  rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act11:  rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act12:  actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
```

```
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
            ANY
                prs  ›
                E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd4:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⟹ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉
dom(susp_peers) ⟹ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable and the service is not suspicious,


then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈
dom(susp_peers) ⟹ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ susp_peers(srv) ∪
fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not
suspect instances anymore
                act4:   rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›
                act5:   rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›
                act6:   actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
```

```
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is OK
            THEN
                act1:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp))
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ RUN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ RUN_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(susp_inst)) ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious
peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ susp_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›i is a
suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
```

```
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious
instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›the state of s
is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious
peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ susp_peers(s)∩unav_peers not theorem ›i is a
suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious
instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4\{s ↦ FAIL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
FAIL_DETECT_4}  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) \ rct_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
                act4:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_DETECT_4})
∪ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ susp_peers(s) ›
                act3:   susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
```

```
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4} ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ∪
{s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4} ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_IGN_4}) ∪
{s ↦ RUN_4} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
            ANY
                s     ›a service s
                i     ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
                grd5:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
```

```
not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INST
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd8:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
            WITH
                dep:    dep=actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
                act2:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
                grd7:   actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ FAIL_CONFIG_4})
∪ {s ↦ DPL_4} ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
                act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
```

```
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   s ↦ DPL_4 ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   serviceState_4 ≔ (serviceState_4 \ {s ↦ DPL_4}) ∪ {s ↦
RUN_4} ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             UNFAIL_PEER
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M11     ›
    REFINES
         M10
    SEES
         C08
    VARIABLES
        run_peers    ›
        susp_peers   ›
        fail_peers   ›
        dep_inst     ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        susp_inst    ›
        rec_inst     ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rct_inst     ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
        actv_inst    ›instances activated by token ownes
        i_state  ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   i_state ∈ (PEERS × SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4  not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(i_state) not
theorem ›
        gluing_state1:  ∀ s, stt · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ s ↦ stt ∈
serviceState_4 ⇒ (token_owner(s) ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈ i_state not theorem ›
        gluing_state2:  ∀ s, stt · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ stt ∈ STATES_4 ∧ (token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ↦ stt ∈ i_state ⇒ s ↦ stt ∈ serviceState_4 not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(i_state) ⇒ p
= token_owner(s) not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:   susp_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act8:   susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act10:  rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act11:  rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act12:  actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act13:  i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
            ANY
```

```
                prs  ›
                E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
                i_s  ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd4:   i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∉
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers
[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable and the service is not suspicious,


then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
                grd7:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧ srv ∈
dom(susp_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}]
∪ susp_peers(srv)) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
                grd8:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(i_s) ⇒
p = E(s) not theorem ›
                grd9:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not
suspect instances anymore
                act4:   rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›the peers in prs can not try
to recontact instances anymore
                act5:   rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›the peers in prs can not
recontact instances anymore
                act6:   actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
                act7:   i_state ≔ i_s ›
            END
```

```
        SUSPECT_INST:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
            THEN
                act1:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp))
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⊳ ({s} ⩤ ran(susp_inst)) ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious
peers for s is not empty
```

```
                grd5:   i ∈ susp_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›i is a
suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious
instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set of suspicious
peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ susp_peers(s)∩unav_peers not theorem ›i is a
suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all the suspecious
instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
```

```
                grd8:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = susp_peers(s) not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
                act2:   susp_peers(s) ≔ susp_peers(s) \ rct_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⊳ ({s} ⩤ ran(rec_inst)) ›
                act4:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⊳ ({s} ⩤ ran(rct_inst)) ›
            END

        IS_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   susp_peers(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ susp_peers(s) ›
                act3:   susp_peers(s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×susp_peers(s)) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
```

```
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
        END

    FAIL_IGNORE:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
        END

    IGNORE: not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY_INSTC
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            i    ›an instance i
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
            grd4:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
            grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
```

```
            grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY_INSTS
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd8:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
        THEN
            act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
            act2:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
        END

    REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            grd7:   actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
            grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
            act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
        END

    HEAL:   not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             HEAL
        ANY
```

```
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             UNFAIL_PEER
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M12     ›
REFINES
     M11
SEES
     C08
VARIABLES
    run_peers    ›
    suspc_peers  ›
    fail_peers   ›
    dep_inst     ›
    token_owner  ›
    unav_peers   ›
    susp_inst    ›
    rec_inst     ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
    rct_inst     ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    actv_inst    ›instances activated by token ownes
    i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   suspc_peers ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
    inv2:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(suspc_peers)
⟹ p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
    inv3:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⟹ (p ↦
s) ∈ dom(suspc_peers) not theorem ›
    gluing_tok_own1:    ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ s ∈ dom(susp_peers) ⟹
susp_peers(s) = suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
            act3:   suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
            act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act8:   susp_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act10:  rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act11:  rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act12:  actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act13:  i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›
            E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
```

```
                i_s  ›
                p_s  ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd4:   i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∉ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service
becomes unavailable and the service is not suspicious,


then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
                grd7:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}] ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) not theorem
›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
                grd8:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(i_s) ⇒
p = E(s) not theorem ›
                grd9:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s not theorem ›
                grd10:  p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd11:  ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(p_s) ⇒
p = E(s) not theorem ›
                grd12:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_peers
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ p_s not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   susp_inst ≔ prs ⩤ susp_inst ›the peers in prs can not
suspect instances anymore
                act4:   rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›the peers in prs can not try
to recontact instances anymore
                act5:   rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›the peers in prs can not
recontact instances anymore
```

```
            act6:   actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
            act7:   i_state ≔ i_s ›
            act8:   suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
        END

    SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            SUSPECT_INST
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            susp     ›suspicious instances
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
            grd4:   s ∉ dom(susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}]) not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
            grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
        THEN
            act1:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ∪ ({token_owner(s)} × ({s}×susp))
›the members of susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
        END

    FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            FAIL
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   susp_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
            act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
            act3:   susp_inst ≔ susp_inst ⩥ ({s} ⩤ ran(susp_inst)) ›
        END

    RECONTACT_INST_OK:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            RECONTACT_INST_OK
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            i    ›an instance i
        WHERE
```

```
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
```

```
                FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ rct_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
                act4:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
            END

        IS_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ suspc_peers(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act3:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)) ›
                act4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
```

```
    END

FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
    REFINES
         FAIL_CONFIGURE
    ANY
        s    ›
    WHERE
        grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
        grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
        grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
    THEN
        act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
    END

FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
    REFINES
         FAIL_IGNORE
    ANY
        s    ›
    WHERE
        grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
        grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
        grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
    THEN
        act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
    END

IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
    REFINES
         IGNORE
    ANY
        s    ›
    WHERE
        grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
        grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
    THEN
        act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
    END

REDEPLOY_INSTC:    extended ordinary ›
    REFINES
         REDEPLOY_INSTC
    ANY
        s    ›a service s
        i    ›an instance i
    WHERE
        grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
```

```
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
                grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd8:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
                act2:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
                grd7:   actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            THEN
```

```
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
            act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
        END

    HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            HEAL
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            UNFAIL_PEER
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M13     ›
    REFINES
         M12
    SEES
         C08
    VARIABLES
        run_peers    ›
        suspc_peers  ›
        fail_peers   ›
        dep_inst     ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        suspc_inst   ›
        rec_inst     ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rct_inst     ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
        actv_inst    ›instances activated by token ownes
        i_state  ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   suspc_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(suspc_inst) ⟹
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⟹ (p ↦
s) ∈ dom(suspc_inst) not theorem ›
        gluing_tok_own1:    ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom
(suspc_inst) ⟹ susp_inst[{p}][{s}] = suspc_inst(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:   suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act4:   fail_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act5:   dep_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act8:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act10:  rec_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act11:  rct_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act12:  actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
                act13:  i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
            ANY
                prs  ›
                E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
```

```
                i_s  ›
                p_s  ›
                s_i  ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd4:   i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∉ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}]) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service
becomes unavailable and the service is not suspicious,


then a new token owner among available peers is chosen
                grd7:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ∧
token_owner(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(suspc_peers) ⇒ E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers
∪ prs ∪ fail_peers[{srv}] ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) not theorem
›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
                grd8:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(i_s) ⇒
p = E(s) not theorem ›
                grd9:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s not theorem ›
                grd10:  p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd11:  ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(p_s) ⇒
p = E(s) not theorem ›
                grd12:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_peers
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ p_s not theorem ›
                grd13:  s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd14:  ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p ↦ s ∈ dom(s_i) ⇒
p = E(s) not theorem ›
                grd15:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ (E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ s_i not theorem ›
                grd16:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ⇒ (E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ s_i not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
```

```
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   rec_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rec_inst ›the peers in prs can not try
to recontact instances anymore
                act4:   rct_inst ≔ prs ⩤ rct_inst ›the peers in prs can not
recontact instances anymore
                act5:   actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
                act6:   i_state ≔ i_s ›
                act7:   suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
                act8:   suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END
```

```
        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›i is
recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ rec_inst not theorem ›the
token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ⊂ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to
```

```
recontact all the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›the
token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   rec_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] = suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ rct_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}] ›
                act3:   rec_inst ≔ rec_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rec_inst)) ›
                act4:   rct_inst ≔ rct_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(rct_inst)) ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
```

```
            grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ suspc_peers(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
            act3:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers ∪ ({s}×suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)) ›
            act4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_CONFIGURE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
        END

    FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
        END

    IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END
```

```
        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ fail_peers[{s}] ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_inst[{s}] not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
                grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_inst[{s}]) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd8:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_inst ≔ dep_inst ∪ ({s}×actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}]
[{s}]) ›
                act2:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
```

```
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
                grd7:   actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   dep_inst[{s}] ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_inst[{s}]) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_inst[{s}] ›
                act3:   dep_inst ≔ {s} ⩤ dep_inst ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   s ↦ p ∈ fail_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   fail_peers ≔ fail_peers\{s ↦ p} ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
            ANY
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
```

```
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M14     ›
    REFINES
         M13
    SEES
         C08
    VARIABLES
        run_peers    ›
        suspc_peers  ›
        failr_peers  ›
        dep_instc    ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        suspc_inst   ›
        rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
        actv_inst    ›instances activated by token ownes
        i_state  ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   rect_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(rect_inst) ⇒
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦
s) ∈ dom(rect_inst) not theorem ›
        gluing_tok_own_rec1:    ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈
dom(rect_inst) ⇒ rec_inst[{p}][{s}] = rect_inst(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv4:   rctt_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv5:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(rctt_inst) ⇒
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
        inv6:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦
s) ∈ dom(rctt_inst) not theorem ›
        gluing_tok_own_rct1:    ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈
dom(rctt_inst) ⇒ rct_inst[{p}][{s}] = rctt_inst(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv7:   failr_peers ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        gluing_fail_1:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ fail_peers[{s}] = failr_peers(s)
not theorem ›
        inv8:   dep_instc ∈ SERVICES ⟶ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        gluing_act_1:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dep_inst[{s}] = dep_instc(s) not
theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act3:   suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act4:   failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
                act5:   dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
                act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act7:   unav_peers ≔ ø ›
```

```
            act8:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act10:  rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act11:  rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act12:  actv_inst ≔ ∅ ›
            act13:  i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›
            E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
            i_s  ›
            p_s  ›
            s_i  ›
            rc_s     ›
            rt_s     ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
            grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
            grd4:   i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
            grd5:   p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
            grd6:   s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
            grd7:   rt_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
            grd8:   rc_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
            grd9:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does
not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
            grd10:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ⇒ E
(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers(srv) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service
becomes unavailable, and the service


possess suspicious instances, then a new token owner among available and not


suspicious peers is chosen
            grd11:  dom(i_s) = E~ ∧ dom(p_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(s_i) = dom
(i_s) ∧ dom(rc_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(rt_s) = dom(i_s)  not theorem ›
            grd12:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ i_s ∧ (E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∈ p_s) not theorem ›
            grd13:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ ((E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ s_i) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ rctt_inst(E
```

```
(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ rt_s) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∈ rc_s) not
theorem ›
                grd14:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs ⇒ ((E
(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ s_i) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈ rt_s) ∧ ((E(srv) ↦ srv) ↦ ∅ ∈
rc_s)  not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ rc_s ›the peers in prs can not try to
recontact instances anymore
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ rt_s ›the peers in prs can not recontact
instances anymore
                act5:   actv_inst ≔ prs ⩤ actv_inst ›
                act6:   i_state ≔ i_s ›
                act7:   suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
                act8:   suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
```

```
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
            act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
            act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    RECONTACT_INST_OK:     not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             RECONTACT_INST_OK
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            i    ›an instance i
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
            grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
            grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
            grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
            grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
        THEN
            act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
        END

    RECONTACT_INST_KO:     not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             RECONTACT_INST_KO
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            i    ›an instance i
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
            grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
```

```
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
```

```
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ suspc_peers(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act3:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
                act4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
```

```
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY_INSTC
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            i    ›an instance i
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
            grd4:   token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i) ∉ actv_inst not theorem ›
            grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) < deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ∪ {token_owner(s) ↦ (s ↦ i)} ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY_INSTS
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd6:   card(actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]) = deplo_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd8:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
        THEN
            act1:   dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_inst[{token_owner
(s)}][{s}] ›
            act2:   actv_inst ≔ actv_inst ⩥ ({s} ◁ ran(actv_inst)) ›
```

```
        END

    REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             REDEPLOY
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            grd7:   actv_inst[{token_owner(s)}][{s}]=∅ not theorem ›
            grd6:   dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
            act3:   dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             HEAL
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             UNFAIL_PEER
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)\{p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
```

```
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M15     ›
REFINES
     M14
SEES
     C08
VARIABLES
    run_peers    ›
    suspc_peers  ›
    failr_peers  ›
    dep_instc    ›
    token_owner  ›
    unav_peers   ›
    suspc_inst   ›
    rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
    rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
    i_state  ›
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   actv_instc ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
    inv2:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈ dom(actv_instc) ⇒
p = token_owner(s) not theorem ›
    inv3:   ∀ p, s · p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ p = token_owner(s) ⇒ (p ↦
s) ∈ dom(actv_instc) not theorem ›
    gluing_tok_own_rec1:    ∀ p, s ·  p ∈ PEERS ∧ s ∈ SERVICES ∧ (p ↦ s) ∈
dom(actv_instc) ⇒ actv_inst[{p}][{s}] = actv_instc(p ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act2:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
            act3:   suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act4:   failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
            act5:   dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
            act6:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
            act7:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act8:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act10:  rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act11:  rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act12:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act13:  i_state ≔ InitStatus ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›
            E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
```

```
                i_s  ›
                p_s  ›
                s_i  ›
                rc_s     ›
                rt_s     ›
                ac_i     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd4:   i_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd6:   s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd7:   rt_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd8:   rc_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd9:   ac_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd10:  dom(i_s) = E~ ∧ dom(p_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(s_i) = dom
(i_s) ∧ dom(rc_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(rt_s) = dom(i_s) ∧ dom(ac_i) = dom(i_s) not
theorem ›
                grd11:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) = token_owner(srv) ∧
                        s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rctt_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = actv_instc(E(srv) ↦ srv) not
theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token
owner is not changed
                grd12:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers
(srv) ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
                        s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  ∧
                        rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧
                        rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧
                        ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  not theorem ›if the owner of the
token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service
                                                                possess suspicious
instances, then a new token owner among available and not
                                                                suspicious peers is
chosen
                grd13:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ i_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = i_state
(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∧ p_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
```

```
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ rc_s ›the peers in prs can not try to
recontact instances anymore
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ rt_s ›the peers in prs can not recontact
instances anymore
                act5:   actv_instc ≔ ac_i ›
                act6:   i_state ≔ i_s ›
                act7:   suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
                act8:   suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_4 ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END
```

```
        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
```

```
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd8:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_DETECT_4  ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
                grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not theorem
›
```

```
            grd5:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_ACTIV_4 ›
            act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ suspc_peers(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
            act3:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
            act4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_CONFIGURE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_CONFIG_4 ›
        END

    FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not theorem ›
            grd3:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ FAIL_IGN_4 ›
        END

    IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             IGNORE
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
        END
```

```
        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd8:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
```

```
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not theorem
›
                grd7:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ DPL_4 ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
                act3:   dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ RUN_4 ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)\{p} ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
            ANY
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
```

```
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M16     ›
    REFINES
         M15
    SEES
         C09
    VARIABLES
        run_peers    ›
        suspc_peers  ›
        failr_peers  ›
        dep_instc    ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        suspc_inst   ›
        rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
        actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
        inst_state   ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   inst_state ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ STATES_4 not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(inst_state) not
theorem ›
        gluing_state_1: ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ i_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) =
inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv3:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ run_peers
(s) not theorem ›
        inv4:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆
run_peers(s) not theorem ›
        inv5:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ run_peers
(s) not theorem ›
        inv6:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊆ run_peers
(s) not theorem ›
        inv7:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ suspc_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv8:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv9:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv10:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) not theorem ›
        inv11:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩
suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
        inv12:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∉
{FAIL_4,FAIL_DETECT_4} ⇒ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
        inv13:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ FAIL_4 ⇒
rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
        inv14:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ∧ inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ FAIL_4 ⇒
rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
```

```
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
                act2:   suspc_peers ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act3:   failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
                act4:   dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
                act5:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act6:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act8:   rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act9:   rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act10:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act11:  inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
            ANY
                prs  ›
                E    ›new values for token owner per service if needed
                p_s  ›
                s_i  ›
                rc_s     ›
                rt_s     ›
                ac_i     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd3:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
\prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›
                grd4:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›new value for token
owner per service if needed
                grd5:   p_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd6:   s_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd7:   rt_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd8:   rc_s ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd9:   ac_i ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
                grd10:  dom(p_s) = E~ ∧ dom(s_i) = E~ ∧ dom(rc_s) = E~ ∧ dom
(rt_s) = E~ ∧ dom(ac_i) = E~ not theorem ›
                grd11:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) = token_owner(srv) ∧
                        s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspc_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rctt_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = rect_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = actv_instc(E(srv) ↦ srv) not
```

```
theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token
owner is not changed
                grd12:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers
(srv) ∪ suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
                        E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∧
                        inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        s_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  ∧
                        rt_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧
                        rc_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅ ∧
                        ac_i(E(srv) ↦ srv) = ∅  not theorem ›if the owner of the
token for a service becomes unavailable, and the service
                                                                possess suspicious
instances, then a new token owner among available and not
                                                                suspicious peers is
chosen
                grd13:  ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ p_s(E(srv) ↦ srv) =
suspc_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) not theorem ›
            WITH
                i_s:    i_s = E~ ⩤ inst_state ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new value for token owner
per service is given if needed
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ rc_s ›the peers in prs can not try to
recontact instances anymore
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ rt_s ›the peers in prs can not recontact
instances anymore
                act5:   actv_instc ≔ ac_i ›
                act6:   suspc_peers ≔ p_s ›
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ s_i ›
                act8:   inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
```

```
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\(suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪
unav_peers) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
```

```
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the set
of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspc_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
```

```
                grd6:   prop = ((run_peers(s) \ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s))
∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})
›
                act2:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s) \ (unav_peers ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ suspc_peers(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act3:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspc_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
```

```
            act4:   suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    FAIL_CONFIGURE:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_CONFIGURE
        ANY
            s     ›
            prop      ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
            grd4:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
        END

    FAIL_IGNORE:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             FAIL_IGNORE
        ANY
            s     ›
            prop      ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
            grd4:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
        END

    IGNORE: not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             IGNORE
        ANY
            s     ›
            prop      ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem
›
```

```
            grd4:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            REDEPLOY_INSTC
        ANY
            s    ›a service s
            i    ›an instance i
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
            grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
            grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
            grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
        END

    REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            REDEPLOY_INSTS
        ANY
            s    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
            grd3:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            grd4:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
            act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END
```

```
        REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
                act3:   dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        HEAL:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
```

```
            act1:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)\{p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p     ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M17     ›
REFINES
     M16
SEES
     C09
VARIABLES
    run_peers    ›
    suspct_peers     ›
    failr_peers  ›
    dep_instc    ›
    token_owner  ›
    unav_peers   ›
    suspc_inst   ›
    rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
    rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
    inst_state   ›
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   suspct_peers ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
    inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(suspct_peers) not
theorem ›
    gluing_susp_1:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ suspc_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) =
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act1:   run_peers ≔ InitSrvcPeers ›
            act2:   suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
            act3:   failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
            act4:   dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
            act5:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
            act6:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act7:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act8:   rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act9:   rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act10:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act11:  inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
            E    ›Values for token owner per service
        WHERE
            grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
```

```
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not
yet unavalaible
                grd3:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ⩤ {srv})
\prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1
peer available
                grd4:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner
per service
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token
owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) ∈ run_peers(srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_peers
(srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
                        E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∧ E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom
(suspct_peers) ∧
                        inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable,


A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics


as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must


not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
            WITH
                p_s:    p_s =  E~ ⩤ suspct_peers ›
                rc_s:   rc_s = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)
~)×{∅}) ›
                s_i:    s_i = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)
~)×{∅}) ›
                rt_s:   rt_s = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)
~)×{∅}) ›
                ac_i:   ac_i = ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)
~)×{∅}) ›
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new values for token
owner per service
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
```

```
anymore (1)
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (2)
                act5:   actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
                act6:   suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
                act8:   inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_peers(s) ∩ unav_peers not theorem ›instances
in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ø not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ø not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ø not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\(suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪
unav_peers) not theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
```

```
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
                susp     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = ((run_peers(s) \ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦
s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))\unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd8:   susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})
›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
```

```
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s) \ (unav_peers ∪ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) \ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ›
                act3:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
                act4:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
            END
```

```
        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_peers(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem
›
                grd4:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_peers(s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪ unav_peers ∪
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not
unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
```

```
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd3:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_peers(s)) < min_inst(s)
not theorem ›
                grd4:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(run_peers(s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
                act2:   run_peers(s) ≔ run_peers(s) ∪ dep_instc(s) ›
                act3:   dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
```

```
        END

    HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             HEAL
        ANY
            s    ›
            prop     ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
            grd4:   prop = run_peers(s)\unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             UNFAIL_PEER
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)\{p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M18     ›
REFINES
     M17
SEES
     C09
VARIABLES
    run_inst     ›
    suspct_peers     ›
    failr_peers  ›
    dep_instc    ›
    token_owner  ›
    unav_peers   ›
    suspc_inst   ›
    rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
    rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
    inst_state   ›
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   run_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
    inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(run_inst) not
theorem ›
    gluing_run_1:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⇒ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) =
run_peers(s) not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act1:   run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
            act2:   suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
            act3:   failr_peers ≔ InitFail ›
            act4:   dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
            act5:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
            act6:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act7:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act8:   rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act9:   rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act10:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act11:  inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
            E    ›Values for token owner per service
        WHERE
            grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
```

```
                grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not
yet unavalaible
                grd3:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ▷ {srv})
\prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1
peer available
                grd4:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner
per service
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)\(unav_peers ∪
prs ∪ failr_peers(srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
                        E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩ dom
(run_inst) ∧
                        run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes
unavailable,


A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics


as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must


not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new values for token
owner per service
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (1)
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (2)
                act5:   actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
                act6:   suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst) ⩤
```

```
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
                act8:   inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
                act9:   run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes
unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ø not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ø not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ø not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ø ›
            END
```

```
        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
                susp      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))\unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd8:   susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})
›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
```

```
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ (unav_peers ∪
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)\suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s) ∪ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ›
                act4:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
```

```
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
            END

        IGNORE: not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem
›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_peers(s) ∪
unav_peers ∪ dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is
not unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
```

```
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd3:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd4:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥
min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd7:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instc(s)}) ›
```

```
            act3:   dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
        END

    HEAL:    not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            HEAL
        ANY
            s    ›
            prop     ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
            grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
        END

    UNFAIL_PEER:    extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            UNFAIL_PEER
        ANY
            s    ›
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd3:   p ∈ failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   failr_peers(s) ≔ failr_peers(s)\{p} ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
            MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M19     ›
    REFINES
         M18
    SEES
         C09
    VARIABLES
        run_inst     ›
        suspct_peers     ›
        failr_inst   ›
        dep_instc    ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        suspc_inst   ›
        rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
        actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
        inst_state   ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   failr_inst ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⟹ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(failr_inst) not
theorem ›
        gluing_fail_1:  ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⟹ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) =
failr_peers(s) not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
                act3:   failr_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act4:   dep_instc ≔ InitFail ›
                act5:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act6:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act8:   rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act9:   rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act10:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act11:  inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
            ANY
                prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
                E    ›Values for token owner per service
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
```

grd2: prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not yet unavalaible
grd3: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ⩤ {srv}) \prs ≠ ∅ not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1 peer available
grd4: E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner per service
grd5: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E (srv) = token_owner(srv) not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
grd6: ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
⇒
E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)\(unav_peers ∪ prs ∪ failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)) ∧
E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩ dom (run_inst) ∩ dom(failr_inst) ∧
run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner (srv) ↦ srv) ∧
failr_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable,

A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics

as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must

not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
THEN
act1: unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become unavailable
act2: token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new values for token owner per service
act3: rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances anymore (1)
act4: rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances anymore (2)
act5: actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc) ⩤ (((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
act6: suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers

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in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
                act8:   inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
                act9:   run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
                act10:  failr_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ failr_inst ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes
unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
```

```
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
```

```
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
                susp     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))\unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd8:   susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})
›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
```

```
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ (unav_peers ∪
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)\suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   failr_inst ≔ failr_inst ⩤  ((prop×{s})× {failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act4:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s     ›
                prop      ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
```

```
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem
›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instc(s) not theorem ›i does not run s,
is not failed for s, is not unavailable and is not already activated for s
                grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
```

```
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd3:   card(dep_instc(s)) + card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))
< min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd4:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_instc(s) ≔ dep_instc(s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ›
                act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep_instc(s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instc(s)) ≥
min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd7:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
```

```
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instc(s)}) ›
                act3:   dep_instc(s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd4:   p ∈ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   failr_inst ≔ failr_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ {p}}) ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
            ANY
                p    ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
```

```
        grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
    THEN
        act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
    END

END
```

```
    MACHINE
        M20     ›
    REFINES
         M19
    SEES
         C09
    VARIABLES
        run_inst     ›
        suspct_peers     ›
        failr_inst   ›
        dep_instcs   ›
        token_owner  ›
        unav_peers   ›
        suspc_inst   ›
        rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
        rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
        actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
        inst_state   ›
    INVARIANTS
        inv1:   dep_instcs ∈ (PEERS×SERVICES) ⇸ ℙ(PEERS) not theorem ›
        inv2:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⟹ token_owner(s) ↦ s ∈ dom(dep_instcs) not
theorem ›
        gluing_act_1:   ∀ s · s ∈ SERVICES ⟹ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) =
dep_instc(s) not theorem ›
    EVENTS
        INITIALISATION:    not extended ordinary ›
            THEN
                act1:   run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
                act3:   failr_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act4:   dep_instcs ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act5:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
                act6:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act8:   rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act9:   rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act10:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
                act11:  inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
            ANY
                prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
                E    ›Values for token owner per service
            WHERE
                grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
```

```
                grd2:   prs ⊈ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not
yet unavalaible
                grd3:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⇒ dom(dom(inst_state) ⩤ {srv})
\prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1
peer available
                grd4:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner
per service
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⇒ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
                        ⇒
                        E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)\(unav_peers ∪
prs ∪ failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv))
∧
                        E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(inst_state) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩ dom
(run_inst) ∩ dom(failr_inst) ∩ dom(dep_instcs) ∧
                        run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        failr_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        dep_instcs(E(srv) ↦ srv) = dep_instcs(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable,


A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics


as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must


not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new values for token
owner per service
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (1)
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{∅}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (2)
                act5:   actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc) ⩤
```

```
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
                act6:   suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
                act8:   inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
                act9:   run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
                act10:  failr_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ failr_inst ›
                act11:  dep_instcs ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ dep_instcs ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes
unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ø not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ø not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ø not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
            THEN
```

```
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
```

```
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
                susp     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))\unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd8:   susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})
›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
```

```
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ (unav_peers ∪
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)\suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   failr_inst ≔ failr_inst ⩤  ((prop×{s})× {failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act4:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
```

```
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem
›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
```

```
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem
›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not unavailable and is not already
activated for s
                grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs ⩤ ((prop×{s})× {dep_instcs
(token_owner(s)↦s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)↦s)}) ›
                act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   not extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
```

```
theorem ›
                grd4:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instcs
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd7:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd4:   p ∈ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   failr_inst ≔ failr_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ {p}}) ›
            END
```

```
    MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
        ANY
            p    ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```

```
MACHINE
    M21     ›
REFINES
     M20
SEES
     C09
VARIABLES
    run_inst     ›
    suspct_peers     ›
    failr_inst   ›
    dep_instcs   ›
    token_owner  ›
    unav_peers   ›
    suspc_inst   ›
    rect_inst    ›instances that are tried to be recontacted
    rctt_inst    ›instances effectively recontacted after a try
    actv_instc   ›instances activated by token ownes
    inst_state   ›
INVARIANTS
    inv1:   dom(run_inst) ⊆ dom(inst_state) not theorem ›
EVENTS
    INITIALISATION:    extended ordinary ›
        THEN
            act1:   run_inst ≔ InitRunPeers ›
            act2:   suspct_peers ≔ InitSuspPrs ›
            act3:   failr_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act4:   dep_instcs ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act5:   token_owner ≔ init_tok ›
            act6:   unav_peers ≔ ∅ ›
            act7:   suspc_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act8:   rect_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act9:   rctt_inst ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act10:  actv_instc ≔ InitSuspPeers ›
            act11:  inst_state ≔ InitStateSrv ›
        END

    MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL:     not extended ordinary ›
        REFINES
             MAKE_PEER_UNAVAIL
        ANY
            prs  ›Peers that will become unavailable
            E    ›Values for token owner per service
        WHERE
            grd1:   prs ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   prs ∉ unav_peers not theorem ›the peers in prs are not
yet unavalaible
            grd3:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ⟹ dom(dom(inst_state) ⩤ {srv})
\prs ≠ ∅  not theorem ›for each service srv, there must always be at least 1
```

```
peer available
                grd4:   E ∈ SERVICES ⟶ PEERS not theorem ›Value for token owner
per service
                grd5:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∉ prs ⟹ E
(srv) = token_owner(srv)    not theorem ›If the token owner of a service srv
does not belong to prs, the token owner is not changed
                grd6:   ∀ srv · srv ∈ SERVICES ∧ token_owner(srv) ∈ prs
                        ⟹
                        E(srv) ∈ run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv)\(unav_peers ∪
prs ∪ failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(srv) ↦ srv))
∧
                        E(srv) ↦ srv ∈ dom(run_inst) ∩ dom(suspct_peers) ∩  dom
(failr_inst) ∩ dom(dep_instcs) ∧
                        run_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = run_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        inst_state(E(srv) ↦ srv) = inst_state(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        suspct_peers(E(srv) ↦ srv) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(srv) ↦ srv) ∧
                        failr_inst(E(srv) ↦ srv) = failr_inst(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv) ∧
                        dep_instcs(E(srv) ↦ srv) = dep_instcs(token_owner(srv) ↦
srv)  not theorem ›if the owner of the token for a service becomes unavailable,


A new token owner is chosen: the new token owner must have same characteristics


as the previous one (state, list of suspicious neighbours, etc.), and it must


not be an unavailable, suspicious, failed peer or a member of prs
            THEN
                act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers ∪ prs ›the peers in prs become
unavailable
                act2:   token_owner ≔ token_owner ⩤ E ›new values for token
owner per service
                act3:   rect_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rect_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (1)
                act4:   rctt_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ rctt_inst) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not try to recontact instances
anymore (2)
                act5:   actv_instc ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ actv_instc) ⩤
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not activate instances anymore
                act6:   suspct_peers ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspct_peers ›the peers
in prs can not suspect instances anymore (1)
                act7:   suspc_inst ≔ ((prs×SERVICES) ⩤ suspc_inst) ⩤
```

```
(((E\token_owner)~)×{ø}) ›the peers in prs can not suspect instances anymore (2)
                act8:   inst_state ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ inst_state ›the peers in
prs can not monitor the state of the services provided anymore
                act9:   run_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ run_inst ›
                act10:  failr_inst ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ failr_inst ›
                act11:  dep_instcs ≔ (prs×SERVICES) ⩤ dep_instcs ›
            END

        SUSPECT_INST:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 SUSPECT_INST
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                susp     ›suspicious instances
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   susp = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∩ unav_peers not
theorem ›instances in susp are suspicious if the peers running them becomes
unavailable
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ø not theorem ›the
member of susp have not yet been suspected for s by the token owner of s
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is OK
                grd6:   susp ≠ ø not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ susp ›the members of
susp become suspected instances for s by the token owner of s
            END

        FAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = RUN_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ø not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\(suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_4}) ›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{suspc_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   suspc_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ø ›
```

```
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_OK:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_OK
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is available (can be contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
                act2:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›i is recontacted by the token owner of s successfully
            END

        RECONTACT_INST_KO:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 RECONTACT_INST_KO
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›the
state of s is SUSPICIOUS
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›the
set of suspicious peers for s is not empty
                grd5:   i ∈ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)∩unav_peers not
theorem ›i is a suspicious instance of s and is unavailable (can not be
contacted)
                grd6:   i ∉ rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token
owner of s has not yet tried to recontact i
                grd7:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ⊂ suspct_peers(token_owner
```

```
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›the token owner of s has not yet tried to recontact all
the suspecious instances of s
            THEN
                act1:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ rect_inst(token_owner(s)
↦ s) ∪ {i} ›the token owner of s has tried to recontact i
            END

        FAIL_DETECT:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_DETECT
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
                susp     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd7:   susp ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = suspct_peers(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = ((run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ suspct_peers
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ∪ rctt_inst(token_owner(s)↦ s))\unav_peers not theorem ›
                grd8:   susp = suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\rctt_inst
(token_owner(s)↦ s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_DETECT_4})
›
                act2:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{susp}) ›
                act3:   rect_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
                act4:   rctt_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        IS_OK:  extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 IS_OK
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
```

```
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_ACTIV:     extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_ACTIV
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_DETECT_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ (unav_peers ∪
suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_ACTIV_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s)\suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   failr_inst ≔ failr_inst ⩤  ((prop×{s})× {failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ suspct_peers(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act4:   suspct_peers ≔ suspct_peers ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        FAIL_CONFIGURE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 FAIL_CONFIGURE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_CONFIG_4}) ›
            END

        FAIL_IGNORE:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
```

```
                FAIL_IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_ACTIV_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{FAIL_IGN_4}) ›
            END

        IGNORE: extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                IGNORE
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_IGN_4 not theorem
›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state ≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTC:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                REDEPLOY_INSTC
            ANY
                s    ›a service s
                i    ›an instance i
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   i ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   i ∉ run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ∪ unav_peers ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem
›i does not run s, is not failed for s, is not unavailable and is not already
activated for s
                grd4:   i ∉ actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
```

```
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd6:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd7:   card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ actv_instc(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ {i} ›
            END

        REDEPLOY_INSTS:    extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY_INSTS
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   card(actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) = deplo_inst(s) not
theorem ›
                grd4:   card(dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) + card(run_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) < min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd6:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs ⩤ ((prop×{s})× {dep_instcs
(token_owner(s)↦s) ∪ actv_instc(token_owner(s)↦s)}) ›
                act2:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≔ ∅ ›
            END

        REDEPLOY:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 REDEPLOY
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = FAIL_CONFIG_4 not
theorem ›
                grd4:   actv_instc(token_owner(s) ↦ s)=∅ not theorem ›
                grd5:   dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s) ≠ ∅ not theorem ›
                grd6:   card(run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s))+card(dep_instcs
```

```
(token_owner(s) ↦ s)) ≥ min_inst(s) not theorem ›
                grd7:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{DPL_4}) ›
                act2:   run_inst ≔ run_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})× {run_inst(token_owner
(s) ↦ s) ∪ dep_instcs(token_owner(s) ↦ s)}) ›
                act3:   dep_instcs ≔ dep_instcs ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{∅}) ›
            END

        HEAL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 HEAL
            ANY
                s    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   inst_state(token_owner(s) ↦ s) = DPL_4 not theorem ›
                grd4:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   inst_state≔ inst_state ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{RUN_4}) ›
            END

        UNFAIL_PEER:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 UNFAIL_PEER
            ANY
                s    ›
                p    ›
                prop     ›
            WHERE
                grd1:   s ∈ SERVICES not theorem ›
                grd2:   prop ⊆ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd3:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
                grd4:   p ∈ failr_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s) not theorem ›
                grd5:   prop = run_inst(token_owner(s) ↦ s)\unav_peers not
theorem ›
            THEN
                act1:   failr_inst ≔ failr_inst ⩤ ((prop×{s})×{failr_inst
(token_owner(s) ↦ s) \ {p}}) ›
            END

        MAKE_PEER_AVAIL:   extended ordinary ›
            REFINES
                 MAKE_PEER_AVAIL
```

```
        ANY
            p     ›
        WHERE
            grd1:   p ∈ PEERS not theorem ›
            grd2:   p ∈ unav_peers not theorem ›
        THEN
            act1:   unav_peers ≔ unav_peers \ {p} ›
        END

END
```