Conference Papers Year : 2011

Reflections on Vote Manipulation

Abstract

The notion of non-manipulability (or: strategy-proofness) used in the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is too strong to make useful distinctions between voting rules.We explore alternative definitions and suggest how these can be used to classify voting rules.

Dates and versions

hal-00644260 , version 1 (23-11-2011)

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Jan van Eijck, Floor Sietsma, Sunil Simon. Reflections on Vote Manipulation. Proceedings of LORI 2011, Oct 2011, Guangzhou, China. pp.386-387, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_30⟩. ⟨hal-00644260⟩

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