# Online Sparse bandit 

## What is a zero-sum Matrix Game (MG)?

$\mathrm{M}=\mathrm{KxK}$ matrix, coefficients in $[0,1]$
Player 1 chooses i in $\{1,2,3, \ldots, \mathrm{~K}\}$
Player 2 chooses j in $\{1,2,3, \ldots, \mathrm{~K}\}$
Player 1 gets reward Mij
Player 2 gets reward 1-Mij

## Is solving a MG hard ?

= polynomial time (by linear programming) best known coef 3.5

## How to find approximate solutions?

Grigoriadis \& Khachiyan or Exp3 or Inf:
time $\mathrm{O}(\mathrm{Klog} \mathrm{K} / \varepsilon 2)$ with proba $1 / 2$
(Auer et al, Audibert et al, Grigoriadis et al)

## Sparse versions?

Very often, ( $\mathrm{x}^{*}, \mathrm{y}^{*}$ ) is very sparse; plenty of 0 's. How to benefit from this ?
Algo. in Flory et al.:

1. Approximate solving by t iterations of EXP3
2. Remove small components
(keep only components

$$
\left.\geq(\max (\mathrm{tx}))^{(4 / 5)} / \mathrm{t}\right)
$$

3. Re-normalize
==> no proof
We propose the following online version ==> (EXP3 recalled below...)

Algorithm 1 EXP3 algorithm for iteration $t$ with $K$ arms.
Initialise $\forall i, p(i)=\frac{1}{K}, n(i)=0, S(i)=0 ; t=0$
while t < T do
Arm $i$ is chosen with probability $p(i)$
$\mathrm{n}(\mathrm{i}) \leftarrow \mathrm{n}(\mathrm{i})+1$
Receive reward $r$
$\mathrm{t} \leftarrow \mathrm{t}+1$
$S_{i}$ modified by the update formula $S_{i} \leftarrow S_{i}+r / p(i)$ (and $S_{j}$ for $j \neq i$ is not
modified).
$\forall i, p(i)=1 /(K \sqrt{t})+(1-1 / \sqrt{t}) \times \exp \left(S_{i} / \sqrt{t}\right) / \sum_{j} \exp \left(S_{j} / \sqrt{t}\right)$
end while
return n

## What means "solving" a MG ?

Strategy x: probability distribution on $\{1,2,3, \ldots ., \mathrm{K}\}$
Strategy y: probability distribution
on $\{1,2,3, \ldots, \mathrm{~K}\}$
Expected Reward:
$\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y})=$
E Mij $\mid(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}) \sim \mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y}$

Nash equilibrium:
$\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)=$ Nash
$<==>$ for all ( $\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y}$ )

$$
\mathrm{R}\left(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y}^{*}\right) \geq \mathrm{R}\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}, \mathrm{y}^{*}\right) \geq \mathrm{R}\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}, \mathrm{y}\right)
$$

## Approximate solving?

( $\mathrm{x}^{*}, \mathrm{y}^{*}$ ) $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium if for all (x,y), $\mathrm{R}\left(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y}^{*}\right)+\varepsilon \geq \mathrm{R}\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}, \mathrm{y}^{*}\right) \geq \mathrm{R}\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}, \mathrm{y}\right)-\varepsilon$

## So what?

There is a offline solution (i.e. sparsity used at the end). Can we use it online ?

## Conclusions ?

(i) it works (see numbers in paper)
(ii) theory missing
(iii) better (parameter-free ?) versions

<== application: Urban Rivals (free, you can test!)
Next application: Pokemon ==>

